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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation focusses on invisibilities of ethno-religious minorities which face cycles of 
persecutions and severe discrimination in their larger societies. The literature portrays 
marginalized groups’ visibility either as a requirement for their empowerment or a source of their 
surveillance. However, I argue that for such groups what matters is not their visibility or 
invisibility per se but rather their control over it, i.e. to what extent the community members are 
able to reveal or conceal information about themselves. For them, invisibility may be a tactical 
tool as well as a structural burden. My dissertation examines complicated (in)visibilities of a 
double minority, Alevi Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria and Turkey. 
Specifically, I focus on a paradoxical configuration of Alevis’ invisibilities: while the 
minority is marginalized and rendered invisible due to historical and structural conditions, they 
have not strived for increased visibility, but rather tried to decrease it. This configuration of self-
imposed invisibility is captured by the term takiye (protective dissimulation), a Turkish variant of 
the Arabic taqiyya. In Islamic theology, the term refers to hiding one’s religious identity or its 
components. My analysis of takiye enables me to develop the English concept of dissimulation to 
indicate the possibility for collective agency for marginalized minorities even when their 
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marginalizations persist, as I show by examining Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ historical and present 
day dissimulations. The major theoretical contribution of the dissertation is development of this 
concept of dissimulation. 
For a dissimulating minority, the group’s identity remains robust even when its members 
publically claim membership in other groups, and group boundaries remain salient even when 
the members of the minority pretend to cross them. Therefore, dissimulation actually reinforces 
the distinction between the minority and other groups in the eyes of the minority’s own 
members. I discuss cases in which Alevi Bulgarian Turks utilized dissimulation by means of 
simulating the varying, historically changing majorities in post-Ottoman Bulgaria, while still 
following Alevi ways in the privacy of their own group members. The data for my thesis was 
gathered during nine months of ethnographic fieldwork Bulgaria and nine months of fieldwork in 
Turkey. 
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1.0  A PARADOXICAL INVISIBILITY: FORTIFYING INVISIBILITY FOR 
EMPOWERMENT IN THE FACE OF DISEMPOWERING STRUCTURAL 
INVISIBILITIES 
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
In the social science literature, visibility is usually attributed with positive qualities. It is seen as 
desirable for the empowerment or recognition of marginalized communities. Several studies are 
built upon this assumption and frame invisibility as a problem for ethnic, religious or gendered 
groups (e.g. Blacks in the USA [McDonald and Wingfield 2009], lesbians in Thailand 
[Thongthiraj 1994], Arab-Americans in the USA [Naber 2010]). An alternative approach to 
visibility recognizes it as a conduit for control (Goffman 1971) and even as a means for 
surveillance of marginalized groups, much as the panopticon model for prisons shows how 
visibility of inmates before invisible guards helps control the inmates (Foucault1977). In addition 
to immediate control, hypervisibility may be a source of social stigmatization (McDonald and 
Wingfield 2009), such as the extreme visibility of Senegalese migrants in Italy which has 
produced negative stereotypes that circulate constantly (Carter 2010). Usually, anthropological 
studies are inclined to see visibility as these groups’ empowerment (e.g. in so-called “advocacy 
anthropology”) even if some anthropologists recognize that visibility may also serve purposes of 
social control (e.g. M. Strathern 2000, Carter 2010).  
 2 
Accounts from both perspectives by non-members of marginalized groups (such as 
academics, policy makers and NGO workers) presume that making the invisible visible is an 
absolute act; one of benevolence if visibility is seen as recognition, and of malevolence if 
visibility is seen as a matter of social control. Such accounts, however, portray marginalized 
communities as weak, powerless, and deficient of will and agency. Yet as Brigenthi (2007) says, 
visibility is a double-edged sword: it may be a source of empowerment or disempowerment 
depending on the socio-political context. Following this point, I argue that for marginalized 
communities what matters is not visibility or invisibility per se, but rather controlling one’s own 
visibility and invisibility: whether or not and to what extent, when and how, a community is 
willing to reveal or conceal information about itself. 
My thesis focuses on the complicated invisibilities of Alevi Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria 
and Turkey. The ethnic Turks of Bulgaria were transformed into “Bulgarian Turks” (Bulgaristan 
Türkleri) as a minority community in Bulgaria and an external kin-nation to Turks in Anatolia, 
following Bulgaria’s de facto independence from Ottoman rule in 1878. Since then Bulgarian 
Turks have faced mass forced migrations in 1913, in the 1930s, in 1950-1, between 1968-78, in 
1989 and in the 2000s. Some also returned, and some families are therefore currently living 
across the Bulgaria–Turkey border. The community has been homogenized and externalized in 
political, public and scholarly discourses as a disfavored minority in Bulgaria and a disliked 
migrant community in Turkey, while in fact, it is divided into followers of the Alevi and Sunni 
sects of Islam. Alevis have formed a demographic minority within the Bulgarian Turkish 
minority. Furthermore, Alevis have remained legally underrepresented, socially externalized and 
structurally invisible to most observers and to the Bulgarian and Turkish states, both of which 
favor Sunni Islam. Under these circumstances Alevi Bulgarian Turks have managed their 
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invisibilities, often by utilizing the collective strategy named takiye (prudential or prudential 
dissimulation)
1. My thesis focuses on Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ dissimulations in relation to 
different national and local majorities, under varying minority-majority configurations and 
historically changing political and social circumstances in Bulgaria and Turkey.  
1.2 WHY ALEVIS, ALEVI BULGARIAN TURKS AND THEIR INVISIBILITIES? 
Alevis as a Muslim community stand outside the mainstream Sunni and Shia sects of Islam. 
Alevi and related communities currently live in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Iran, Albania, 
Macedonia, Romania, Greece, Bosnia, Serbia and Bulgaria under different names, e.g. Alawite, 
Druze, Nusayri, Ismaili, Bektaşi, Kızılbaş; these differently-named communities differentiate 
among themselves but are all regarded with suspicion by Sunni and Shia religious 
establishments. In these societies, Alevis constitute a religiously marked minority group in 
relation to a group belonging to “mainstream” Islam (either Sunni or Shia) or to another majority 
religion. They have been seen at best as “heterodox” groups as opposed to the presumably 
“orthodox” Muslims, and even as “heretics” (see Karolewski 2008 for criticism of the view of 
Alevism as heterodoxy). Often they have faced discrimination, state-initiated persecutions or 
even societal violence; though a notable exception is present day Syria where Alevis are a 
demographic minority yet have formed the core of the administrative, political and military elite 
that has utilized severe violence against Sunni civilians and villages under the reign of the Assad 
                                                 
1 The term takiye  (in Turkish, literally means dissimulation) refers to concealment of one’s religious identity and 
belief under threat and persecution. The term is used in the Islamic jurisprudence while Sunni and Shia scholars of 
Islamic Law have contradictory opinions on the concept (Kohlberg: 1974). In the rest of my thesis, I will use the 
Turkish transcription of the word given that my informants’ native languages are Turkish. 
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family, most recently since the start of protests for governmental change in the summer of 2011. 
Given this near uniformity of hostility, it is unsurprising to note that Alevis have often lived as 
closed communities in isolated locations, relied on oral traditions and secret rituals, and often 
hiding their religious identity from non-Alevis (Melikoff 1994). In other words, visibility has not 
always been a desirable condition for Alevis, despite what a naïve would-be ethnographer might 
anticipate.  
Notably, the term Alevi itself is relatively new, in many places dating only to the 
Twentieth Century. The term originated in Turkey, and arrived to Bulgaria only after the end of 
socialism in Bulgaria in 1989, due to the increased interaction between Alevis in Bulgaria and 
Turkey. Many Sunni and Alevi Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria and Turkey have reminded me that 
“Alevis” in Bulgaria used to be called “Kızılbaş.” Given this, I could have used the term Kızılbaş 
for all Alevis in Bulgaria; yet it would be technically wrong to do so since Kızılbaş refers to a 
specific group of Alevis who are different in history, rituals and beliefs from other Alevis in 
Bulgaria, such as Babais, Dervişhes and Musahiplis. Therefore, I utilize the term Alevi to 
include all sub-groups of Alevis, as all groups now see themselves as Alevis. 
The term Alevi is useful in grouping communities sharing the following traits: they 
perceive Ali, the cousin and the son-in-law of Muhammed, as the bearer of divine knowledge; 
they attribute exceptional qualities to the members of Muhammed’s family (Ehl-i beyt); they 
have mystic elements in the belief system such as that God is reflected in every human being and 
that the Quran has deeper meanings than are portrayed in the mainstream Islamic interpretations; 
they believe holy souls or saints have been seen in the form of local, historical characters 
believed to have caused miracles; and they conduct rituals distinct from those mentioned in the 
Five Pillars of Islam. 
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 Even though Alevism has often been treated as a derivative of Shia belief due to Alevis’ 
exceptional love for Ali and Ehli-Beyt, Alevism is a syncretic belief incorporating elements of 
Central Asian shamanism, mystical versions of Shia and Sunni Islam, Christianity and 
Zarathustra (Melikoff 1994). Despite their differences, Shia and Sunni communities see what is 
called the Five Pillars of Islam (in the Sunni version) or the Aspects of Islam (in the Shia 
version) as the main and nonnegotiable markers of being a Muslim, irrespective of varying 
degrees of actually following each of the pillars, namely the creed stating that God is one and 
only and Muhammed is his messenger, and the followers should practice daily prayers, fast 
during Ramadan, practice almsgiving and go on a pilgrimage to Mecca.  Alevis say that they 
follow these principles but with different practices. These will be explained in detail in what 
follows, but in brief, Alevis hold more of a mystical perception of God. They replace daily 
prayers with cem (literally “gathering”) ceremonies, which have a completely different form and 
reasoning. They replace the Ramadan fast with the Muharram fast to commemorate the murder 
of Ali’s son Huseyin by the Sunni rulers after Muhammed. Alevis have a differently structured 
system of almsgiving in the form of animal sacrifice during cems and at türbe (saint’s tomb) 
visits and they follow the principle that there is no need to seek God in Mecca as it is enough to 
look at every human as the reflection of God.  
My research trajectory moved through stages of my own ignorance, then naivety and then 
to a degree of informed awareness about Alevis invisibilities. In 2006 as a PhD student eager to 
study ethnic minorities and borders, I decided to focus on Bulgarian Turks, at least in part for 
family reasons: three of my Turkish grandparents had been born in Bulgaria. It took me two 
years to visit Bulgaria for the first time for a short term (NSF-REG) research project on “Muslim 
religious sites” in 2008. Having reviewed the core of the literature and contacted Bulgarian 
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Turks in Turkey, I designed the research to seek out mosques, as if Muslims in Bulgaria are only 
from Sunni sects. Yet my first experience in Bulgaria was dazing and confusing from the very 
start: my first Muslim site was an Alevi Muslim religious site (a tekke) and my first Bulgarian 
Turkish informant was an Alevi community leader! My embarrassment was infinite, since I had 
missed a crucial fact about Islam in Bulgaria: some Turks in Bulgaria are Alevis! During my 
visits to Alevi and Sunni Muslim sites in 14 cities, the question had bothered me: how could one 
who had established contacts with Bulgarian Turks and who had read the core literature on this 
group remain so completely ignorant of the fact that some Bulgarian Turks are Alevis?  
Reviewing the literature and interviews again revealed surprising results: while Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks are mentioned in a few books, these can be found only if one uses the keyword 
“Bulgarian Alevis” instead of “Alevi Bulgarian Turks” or “Bulgarian Turks.” Soon I realized 
that this situation hints at the externalization of Alevis from the Bulgarian Turkish community in 
the literature, as well as in institutional, organizational and social life in Bulgaria and Turkey. In 
fact, Alevis have been excluded by means of projecting the Bulgarian Turks’ communal identity 
as predominantly Sunni, not merely by Sunni Bulgarian Turks but also by the Turkish and 
Bulgarian majorities, and by the governments of both states. I use the term “the Sunni 
assumption about Bulgarian Turkish identity,” (or “the Sunni assumption,” from now on) to 
discuss the structural conditions that make Alevi Bulgarian Turks invisible. This situation 
compromises inter-group relations in various local settings.  
The Sunni assumption dominates literatures from both Bulgaria and Turkey, despite their 
conflicting nationalist presumptions on history as well as historiography. Both emphasize Islam 
as the communal marker of the Bulgarian Turks and consider Sunni Islam as the only form of 
Islam. The literature from Bulgaria has been hesitant to accept “Bulgarian Turks” as an ethnic 
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group and uses the term “Bulgarian Muslims” for Bulgarian Turks, and it has promoted the term 
“Bulgarian Alevis” over “Bulgarian Alevi Turks.” Likewise, the literature from Turkey 
emphasizes the Sunni Muslim identity of Bulgarian Turks. According to this literature, Turks in 
Bulgaria have been oppressed as the Bulgarian state has interfered with Sunni Muslims’ 
practices and sites (e.g. daily prayers, monthly fast, animal sacrifices, mosques), but no reference 
is made to Alevi practices and sites. Thereby the literature from Turkey silences the fact that 
some Bulgarian Turks are Alevis.  
Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ invisibilities in minority organizations in Bulgaria and migrant 
organizations in Turkey are striking. These organizations still operate on the principle of the 
Sunni assumption: any questions mentioning Alevis in the community may cause these 
organizations’ members to feel threatened; Alevi is a taboo word. For instance, in Bursa in the 
largest migrant organization in Turkey, my questions about Alevi migrants caused shock, raised 
eyebrows and even accusations of an “attempt to separate the community” by some top level 
personnel. Yet, the same people had no problem inviting me to the organization’s public feasts 
during Ramadan, the month of fasting for Sunni Muslims. 
Historical macro-political and social configurations in Bulgaria and Turkey have fostered 
the invisibilities of Alevi Bulgarian Turks. In Bulgaria, Alevis have formed a disprivileged 
minority within the already disfavored Turkish minority, i.e. they are a doubly disfavored 
minority. The independence of Bulgaria led to transformation of the formerly dominant Turks 
into a disfavored minority. Since then, Islam has been recognized as an official religion by the 
Bulgarian state and Muslims are allowed to organize, but only under Sunni müftülüks and 
mosques. Thus, Alevis were underrepresented under socialism and even before. For example, my 
numerous elder Alevi informants recall that they had to attend primary education in their villages 
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before 1945 when Sunni imams were the teachers forcing them to do Sunni Friday prayers. 
Alevis have never been institutionally represented in Bulgaria; the first Alevi organizations were 
opened as regional organizations in early 2000s. Despite these developments, Alevis continue to 
be underrepresented in the academic literature after socialism. For instance, Kristen Ghodsee 
(2010) portrays Alevis as a Shia group as opposed to Sunnis; she divides Muslims in Bulgaria 
into Turkish, Roma and Bulgarian ethnic groups (14); and she clearly states her focus as the 
Pomaks who do not claim the Turkish identity but the Bulgarian ethnic identity or a separate 
identity of their own (14), ignoring Alevis entirely in a book entitled Muslim Lives in Eastern 
Europe and focused almost exclusively on Bulgaria.    
On the other hand, Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ situation was not improved following the 
waves of migrations to Turkey. Historically, the secularism of Turkey was intended to control 
religion by rejecting “the ideology of Islamic polity” (Berkes 1964: 499). As early as 1924, the 
new regime replaced the caliphate system with the Department of Religious Affairs, but later 
introduced mandatory religious education in schools, which promoted only Sunni Islamic 
principles. Alevis in Turkey had supported the new regime with the hope of equal citizenship, 
following state-initiated persecutions and conversion attempts during the Ottoman Empire 
(Deringil 2000, Erdemir 2005, Özyürek 2009). In the Republic, they did not face state-initiated 
systematized violence, but there were instances of societal violence directed at local Alevis, in 
the 1940s in Turkish Trace; in 1978 in Kahramanmaraş; in 1980 in Çorum; in 1993 in Sivas, and 
in 1994 in Gazi Mahallesi (Jongerden 2003). By the late 1990s, political, administrative, 
economic and social life was subject to (Sunni) Islamization due to the success of the Islamist 
political parties in the local and national elections after 1994. The Welfare Party won the local 
elections and then the general elections in 1995, followed by the electoral victory of the Virtue 
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Party in 1998 which became the ruling Justice and Development Party in 2002 (White 2005, 
Özyürek 2009). At the same time, and perhaps in response, a counter-tendency was emerging: 
Alevis in Turkey and Europe gained visibility, Alevism became a “public religion” (Erman and 
Göker 2000) and Alevis formed organizations, a TV station, and even a political party, all part of 
what has been called an “Alevi Revival” (Bruinessen 1996   amuroğlu 1998), “Alevi Re-
politicization” (Erman and Göker: 2000) or “Alevi Renaissance” (Neyzi 2003).    
The turning point of my dissertation research was the realization that Alevi Bulgarian 
Turkish migrants are extremely invisible, unlike local Alevis in Turkey and Bulgaria who have 
started to gain public some forms of visibility in the last two decades. At first glance, Alevi 
migrants’ invisibilities in Turkey are due to their status as migrants. That is, having status as 
migrants might become another burden on Alevis who were already a double minority in 
Bulgaria as Turks and Alevis, and then in Turkey as Alevis and “Bulgarians,” as Bulgarian Turks 
are stigmatized by some local, Anatolian Turks. To a degree this is correct. However, as I 
noticed during my fieldwork in Bulgaria, dissimulation is not merely a migrant phenomenon. My 
non-migrant Alevi informants (in Bulgaria) also narrated how they had protected the community 
historically under the most trying circumstances. I noticed that all of these narratives related to 
Alevis’ historically self-imposed invisibilities through dissimulation. Furthermore, I observed 
several cases of dissimulations by Alevis in the present day either against some segment of 
society or against me.  
The complications in the Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ invisibilities become visible to be at the 
very beginning of my fieldwork as the following excerpt from my fieldnotes displays in a 
nutshell:  
The beginning of my fieldwork in Turkey was very discouraging concerning 
several problems about access: The visibly Sunni orientation of Bursa was 
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sometimes overbearing for me as a secular researcher with Sunni heritage, a 
heritage which did not help at all in my attempts to reach both Sunni and Alevi 
Turkish migrants from Bulgaria. Strikingly, devoted Sunni Bulgarian Turks were 
not taking me seriously because of my visibly secular stance, marked by not 
wearing a hair scarf, a common marker in Bursa. Most of the Bulgarian Turks 
with Sunni heritage were questioning the point of studying religious sects among 
Bulgarian Turks since they see “Turkishness” as the prime marker. Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks were completely invisible.  
 
Generations of migrants have been attracted to the city of Bursa from all over 
Bulgaria, but Alevi migrants were only a few individual families and not a 
community of believers organized around a religious leader. Besides, Alevi 
migrants were successfully hiding their Alevi heritage from not only local Sunnis 
but also local Alevis. Only Sunni migrants were aware that some migrants are 
Alevis; but, they were hesitant to introduce me to their Alevi migrant friends. As 
they put it, they were “cautious not to bring up Alevi-Sunni issues” considering 
that “[their] Alevi friends may be offended,” as if Alevism is something 
inherently offending. In those days, Alevi Bulgarian Turks in Bursa were “hidden 
people,” at least, at that time, to me.   
 
After several attempts through various channels I was still unsuccessful in 
reaching Alevi migrants in Bursa so I decided to check another setting in order to 
clarify the problem in Bursa: Was it about my skills as a researcher? Was it 
because I was not an Alevi?  Was it a peculiarity, something unique to Bursa, or 
was this something characteristic of Alevi migrants in Turkey more generally? I 
located and went to a village that was five hours away. The village was formed by 
migrants in the 1930s and attracted later migrants as well. The villagers were from 
one of the few Alevi-only villages in Bulgaria, and they were practicing Alevis in 
their re-settlement location too. On my way, having changed two busses, the local 
minibus driver asked me with a curious and questioning face whether I “really” 
wanted to go to “that village,” implying that I would have little to do at there. I 
confirmed the exact destination one more time and ignored the implied question. I 
first noticed a Sunni mosque in the middle of the Alevi village where I met with 
my Alevi informants. They were very kind, welcoming and supportive, and 
willing to talk as they are proud migrants who transformed this swamp-like 
territory into a modern agricultural center.  
 
During an hours-long focus group interview no one ever mentioned or implied 
their Alevi roots. A few times they mentioned how residents of the neighboring 
villages resisted the migrants’ settlement in the region  yet, anytime I asked them 
the reasons, they masterfully changed the subject. After maybe 3 hours, I showed 
them a new book about the villages of Bulgaria populated by Turks, knowing 
Bulgarian Turkish migrants’ buzzing interest in any tiny bit of data on the history 
of migrations from Bulgaria. As I located their village of origin in the book, they 
requested I read it out loud. In the 100-line paragraph about the village history, 
economy, and culture there was one short sentence: “the residents of the village 
 11 
are Alevis.” When I finished reading, a long and deadly silence prevailed until the 
eldest among the group (who I later learned was a religious leader) broke the 
silence with the following sentence: “yes, we are Alevis.”  
 
This excerpt shows the complexity of the Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ other- and self-imposed 
invisibilities. On the one hand it shows the structurally-imposed invisibilities that affect Alevi 
migrants as the Turkish state influences their settlement location but does not interfere when 
local Turkish Sunni villagers reject Alevi newcomers. Nor does the state seek the Alevi 
villagers’ consent when it sponsors construction of a Sunni mosque. Yet it also shows their social 
exclusion due to hyper-visibility, as the Alevi village still seems to be stigmatized by the 
surrounding villagers, even the minibus drivers. On the other hand, it shows how invisibility is 
self-imposed, or at least attempted, by Alevis, who prefer to hide their Alevi identity from an 
“outsider” – in this case, from me, as a researcher who is neither an Alevi nor a migrant nor even 
from the region, so that I could be presumed not to know about Alevis in the village.   
The later stages of my fieldwork revealed another striking aspect of Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks’ self-imposed invisibilities: The local Alevis in Turkey might continue to enjoy the 
possibilities that exist for their visibility while Alevi Bulgarian Turkish migrants seem unwilling 
to utilize these possibilities. Instead, Alevi migrants pursue further invisibility by hiding under 
the generic blanket term “migrant identity,” even though it is marked as Sunni, as seen in the 
following example:   
One settlement in Bursa is physically and demographically divided between 
Kurdish internal migrants and Bulgarian Turkish migrants. Both groups have 
Alevi and Sunnis, but while Kurds are mostly Alevis the Bulgarian Turks are 
mostly Sunnis. An Alevi organization together with a separate Cemevi is located 
on the Kurdish side. Struggling to make contact with Alevi Bulgarian Turks, I 
contacted the Cemevi in the Kurdish side. I still remember the surprised facial 
expression of the leader of the Cemevi because the first he heard about some of 
the Bulgarian Turks in the upper neighborhoods being Alevis was from me, since 
they have never visited the Cemevi. Later my Alevi Bulgarian Turkish informants 
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explained the reasons: Some said that they do not attend local cems “since those 
Alevis are Kurds with questionable perceptions of the state,” while Bulgarian 
Turks are those “who had been oppressed in Bulgaria just because they are 
Turks.”  Others underline the importance of the ritual and perceptional difference 
between local Alevis and Bulgarian Turkish Alevis. Thus, Alevi Bulgarian Turks 
have neither formed their own cem communities nor attended the local Alevis’ 
cemevis. Instead they pretend to be Sunnis among other Bulgarian Turks, local 
Turks and Kurdish Alevi migrants.    
 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks control their own visibilities and invisibilities in relation to 
differing majority-minority configurations and depending on the social setting and actors 
surrounding them at any given time. This situation also caused differentiated accessibility to the 
community by me as a researcher. In the isolated settings where Alevi heritage was well-known 
to both insiders and outsiders, such as villages in Turkish Thrace, Razgrad and Kardjali, Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks were relatively easy to access. However, in extremely Sunni dominant settings, 
such as in Bursa, Alevi Bulgarian Turks were “hidden communities,” that is, “social groups that 
are difficult to access for the purpose of social research, where issues regarding access, emotions, 
power, and the politics of representation were particularly sharply posed” (Ashe, Frazer and 
Piacentini 2009:3).  
1.3 INVISIBILITIES AND THE NOTION OF DISSIMULATION  
My thesis examines complicated invisibilities of a marginalized community, specifically, Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria and Turkey. I argue that their invisibility may be both self-voicing 
and being silenced; it may be a tactical tool and a structural burden; it may be self-chosen and 
also imposed by others; and finally their invisibility may be subversive as well as something that 
can be suppressing, depending on historical, political and social configurations on either side of 
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the two nation-states’ border, depending on varying manifestations in the particular regional and 
local configurations, and the particular nature of the inter-group relations.   
I particularly stress a paradoxical configuration: the community that has become 
invisible, disempowered and marginalized due to historical, structural, and social factors strives 
not for achieving visibility but for furthering existing invisibilities, as a form of collective 
empowerment: their self-imposed invisibility lets them hide their religious identity from 
“outsiders” or pretend to be members of the majority. In either case, they develop a notion of 
“outsiders,” who are carefully defined and ranked, from the most outside to the relatively less so. 
This collective practice is referred to in Alevi terminology as “takiye” (and known as 
dissimulation in general) which forms the main focus of my thesis.  This term, of course, has a 
much wider usage in Islam, which is also part of the story.  
The term takiye refers to hiding one’s religious identity and concealing information about 
one’s religious group from outsiders, in the face of life-threatening contexts and severe 
discrimination, as is discussed in Sunni and Shia doctrines (see Kohlberg 1975, Sachedina 2010). 
These doctrines also recognize that dissimulation may require appearing to claim membership to 
the religious majority group. In the Islamic doctrine, takiye does not have negative connotations. 
On the contrary the notion of takiye is grounded in several Quranic verses (for examples, see R. 
Ibrahim 2010). Also the scholarly literature on Islamic doctrine (e.g. Kohlberg 1975, Sachedina 
2010) and Islamic societies such as Iran (Gordon 1979), Afghanistan (Dupree 1979), India 
(Virani 2011) recognizes that taqiya is not merely acceptable but is a legitimate part of the 
religion.  
Expanding my investigation from this specifically Islamic concept into an 
anthropological focus on dissimulation has several important advantages. First, some policy-
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oriented works reduce “dissimulation” to its negative connotations in the colloquial usage, as 
faking and deception, and portray dissimulation as inherent to some religious groups, which are 
thereby “othered” negatively. For instance some works on Iran (e.g. Campbell 2005) and 
Afghanistan (e.g. Tribal Analysis Center 2010) portray dissimulation negatively and as a 
characteristically Islamic phenomenon. In contrast, an anthropological study shows that 
dissimulation is not about inherent qualities of particular religious systems. Historical cases show 
us that members of any religious group may dissimulate. They do so when they become a 
minority facing a severely oppressive religious majority, such as done historically by the crypto-
Christians in Anatolia (Clark 2006), Crypto-Jews and crypto-Sunni Muslims in Inquisition Spain 
(Root 1988, Ward 2004, Ibrahim 2008, Rosa-Rodrigez 2010) and in post-1978 Iran (Nissimi 
2004).  
An anthropological analysis of dissimulation tells about more than the theme of religion 
or specific religions, and it captures a unique manifestation of hostile majority and minority 
relations. Any religious group may dissimulate and a dissimulating group may lessen its 
dissimulations in degrees, or even completely terminate them, in accordance with the changing 
circumstances. Dissimulation is context-dependent. For instance Geaves argues that Alevi 
migrants terminated their dissimulation against Sunnis following their migrations to Britain, 
where both Alevis and Sunnis become migrants (2000). My thesis also shows that Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks ended their protective dissimulations against socialists, who no longer pose a 
threat against the community.   
Second, an anthropological perspective on dissimulation broadens our present knowledge 
about dissimulating religious minorities, which had been reduced by theologically-oriented 
approaches to the issue of legitimacy. Such approaches are concerned with dissimulation only in 
 15 
terms of to what extent, how and when the dissimulation of some groups is legitimate according 
to a particular religious doctrine (see Kohlberg 1975, Sachedina 2010). Yet here I argue that the 
legitimacy of dissimulation comes after the fact for minorities; some minorities dissimulate 
irrespective of whether it is legitimate doctrinally in their religious system. They do so as a 
strategy to survive.  
Thirdly, I argue that dissimulation is a manifestation of the collective agency of 
minorities. This agency rests on group members’ capacity to determine the form, degree, limits 
and the timing of their own visibilities and invisibilities. Further, all these factors are conditioned 
by the relations among varying social actors, specific majority-minority configurations in the 
larger society and changing macro-political and social configurations. I argue that dissimulation 
is the last resort for extremely marginalized communities that cannot utilize other collectives 
tactics such as “dissimilation” (as a minority’s emphasis on their separate identity) indicating 
absolute visibility, or “assimilation” (as a minority’s blending within the society at large) 
indicating absolute invisibility. Finally an anthropological study of dissimulation may broaden 
our understanding of religiously-marked minorities’ situations in extremely divided societies. 
Historical cases show that dissimulation was utilized by minorities who faced extreme forms of 
violence such as persecutions, severe discrimination (e.g. Jews and Muslims in Inquisition 
Spain) or social, political and legal exclusion (e.g. Jews, Sunnis, Christians in contemporary 
Iran).  My case study on Alevi Bulgarian Turks analyzes the dissimulation experiences of a 
religiously marked minority which had historically faced cycles of persecutions and severe 
discrimination dating back to Ottoman rule (see Hazerfen 2002, 2004), and still face legal 
exclusion and societal discrimination due to their religious identity in present-day Bulgaria and 
Turkey.  
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In the contemporary world, Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ situation may not sound like an 
“extreme case,” or at least not as much as it used to be  yet, they still face severe discrimination. 
For instance, the only Islam recognized in Bulgaria and Turkey is Sunni Islam, which leads to 
Alevis’ underrepresentation in legal terms. Alevis do not get state support for conducting their 
religious affairs, for their religious ritual spaces and for their religious leaders while Sunni Islam 
is institutionalized under muftuluks, Sunni mosques are supported by the state, and Sunni 
religious leaders are trained, financially supported and appointed by these states. This also means 
that Alevi sites (such as Alevi saints’ tombs) and their religious foundation (waqf) territories are 
under the control of Sunni authorities.  While Alevi Bulgarian Turks have not been under the 
threat of persecution since 1878, it took as late as 1990s for Alevis to be able to conduct their 
rituals freely. Moreover, they remain as the targets for social discrimination: almost all of my 
Alevi informants told me how, at some points in their lives, they faced questions about whether 
Alevis practice incest and orgies during mixed-gender rituals, from people who were not always 
aware of my informants’ Alevi identities. I was myself asked about “the truth behind” these 
slanders regarding Alevis during my fieldwork, given that I was a researcher! I was told about 
doubts about whether someone newly appointed to state service was picked for the job not by his 
or her merits, but because Alevi identity “which is supported by some party leaders to get their 
[Alevis] votes,” as a Sunni informant put it. Several of my Alevi informants in Bursa mentioned 
that they need to present themselves as Sunni, such as by carefully placing Sunni markers (such 
as pictures of the Qabe) into their shops in the migrant settings, since “otherwise nobody would 
come to shop from [their] store.” Furthermore, in July 2012 the Supreme Court of Turkey said 
that cemevis are not religious structures because the religious structures of Muslims are mosques!  
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While such events may not sound sufficiently extreme for a groups’ members to hide 
their identities or the components of this identity, we must recall that extremely divided societies 
may be prone to extreme cases, at least in the eyes of religious minorities. Especially this seems 
to be the case when these minorities’ members still carry collective memories of cycles of 
historical persecution which were followed by discrimination and again by persecution. The 
members of such minorities may not be sure whether and when “mere discrimination” may 
transform into persecution. Therefore, they may continue to utilize precautionary dissimulation 
even in the absence at present of mass persecutions. Furthermore it is often unclear whether a 
threat is only perceived, or is real. For instance, in 1990s when Alevi Bulgarian Turks attempted 
to form an Alevi NGOs in a local setting in Bulgaria, some Turkish politicians in Bulgaria 
threatened to “burn that NGO” down, which recalls the infamous Sivas event in Turkey in 1993 
when 37 Alevi intellectuals were burned alive in a hotel by a Sunni mob during a cultural event 
associated with Alevism.  
My thesis contributes to the literature on dissimulation by analyzing its impact on 
intergroup distinctions and boundaries. In my case study, I argue that a dissimulating minority 
publicly claims the majority identity, and therefore it may create the impression that their 
differences from the rest of the society are overcome. Their public appearance is often 
interpreted by outsiders as fulfillment of the minority’s assimilation into the surrounding society. 
Yet this public appearance aims to protect not only the minority members, but also the minority 
group itself and thus the minority’s separate identity. Dissimulation helps minorities to reinforce 
to their own members the inter-group differences; it reflects and fortifies the salience of inter-
group distinctions and boundaries in the eyes of minorities even while giving the appearance to 
outsiders of abandoning them. 
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While I state that dissimulation shows the robustness of group identities on the part of 
minority members, I do not attribute essentialist traits or impose a false homogenization on 
internally heterogeneous minorities. On the contrary, in this specific case, I emphasize that the 
specific differences between Alevi and Sunni Muslims are not inherent but have been formed 
and deeply engrained due to the historical power relations within different Muslim communities. 
The point is that while differences between Alevis and Sunnis may have been initiated in  
particular moments in history, they have been solidified through time by inter-group interactions, 
and even become stronger through classifications that see the Alevis as Heterodox Muslims (if 
indeed Muslims at all, in some formalist interpretations), and Sunnis as bearers of Orthodox 
Islam.   
Moreover, my thesis recognizes the inherent heterogeneity of Alevis and Sunnis by 
discussing Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ subgroups,  (Bektaşi, Babai, Derviş and Musahipli), along 
with these groups’ differing religious beliefs, practices, and organizational forms, as due to 
Alevism’s syncretic nature, uncodified character, and extremely localized and unorganized 
settlement patterns. Yet, I argue that these inherent heterogeneities do not invalidate the ultimate 
significance of the categorical “Alevi” and “Sunni” identities among Bulgarian Turks. On the 
contrary, I claim that in divided societies the historical processes that lead to constant 
inequalities may intensify group identities, often irreversibly, even though actual relations of the 
members of these communities have had alternating cycles of peaceful and conflictual relations.  
My argument is thus that even though each group is internally heterogeneous, 
immediately after the categorical group identities are formed, named and hierarchically ranked, 
these group identities stop being only about religious identities and become social identities. In 
such cases, individuals are attributed to one group or the other irrespective of their religiosity, or 
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whether their practices actually deviate from the assigned group’s ideal norms. As my fieldwork 
shows, a Sunni is a Sunni is a Sunni for an Alevi Bulgarian Turk, even though Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks refer to Sunnis as “the others” in Turkey, “Turks” in Razgrad, and “Muslims” in Kardjali. 
Furthermore, an Alevi is an Alevi is an Alevi for a Sunni Bulgarian Turk, even though Alevis are 
divided into Babai, Bektaşi, Musahipli, and Derviş subgroups. They are also considered Alevis 
even though some Alevis are not practicing Alevism or even attend the village mosque for 
Friday Sunni prayers, a practice that should be antithetical to being Alevi.  
 
At this point, the following is a valid question: what is the use of a minority’s 
dissimulation as a majority, if the majority and minority identities remain robust in the eyes of 
both groups? Under these circumstances, would it even be possible to expect dissimulation to be 
successful? I argue that dissimulation works because it is actually a collaborative performance, 
between members of groups that ocntinue to recognize their differences even as they seem to 
share practices.  The following excerpt from my fieldnotes illustrates this phenomenon: 
In Bursa, in a migrant setting, nearly all of my informants have some idea 
about who is Alevi in the neighborhood. Even though they do not know every 
resident, they know the villages they come from and they can identify the 
Alevi, Sunni and mixed villages. Knowing who is an Alevi in the 
neighborhood or befriending them does not mean acknowledging Alevis. Some 
of my Sunni informants told me that they have migrant friends “from these 
villages with Alevis” and that “they may be Alevis” but then add the following  
“we have never asked them directly whether they are Alevis or not, in order not 
to offend them,” indicating that my Sunni informants think Alevism is 
shameful or a potentially shameful trait of their possibly Alevi migrant friends! 
When who is Alevi or Sunni is clear to members of both communities, an 
Alevi pretending to be a Sunni is not easily accepted as Sunni, neither by 
Sunnis nor by Alevis.   
 
Dissimulation is a mutual performance- that is, dissimulation is a matter of not only why, 
when and how some minorities may dissimulate but also how such actions are received. Just as 
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the very secrecy of secret societies indicates a concession to larger society (Simmel 1950), 
Alevis’ dissimulation is a concession, although their concession means not giving up, but rather 
maneuvering pragmatically within the existing social order. This possibility makes dissimulation 
a viable tactic for Alevis. Furthermore, just as majority groups in society “tolerate” secret 
societies, Alevis’ dissimulations are “tolerated” in the larger society - “tolerate” in the negative 
sense of not interfering, rather than the positive sense of embracing the Other (see Hayden 2002).  
The secrecy of such groups serves the interests of the dominant groups by indicating that secret 
groups are kept under control and “in place” (George 1993). In the case under study, Alevis’ 
secrecy by dissimulation serves the Sunni Bulgarian Turks’ interests by signaling that Alevis are 
under control. Furthermore, by keeping the Alevis under control, Sunni Bulgarian Turks find a 
way to re-define “Bulgarian Turkish” identity exclusively in Sunni terms. In this regard, the 
silence of Alevis helps Sunnis to define Sunni identity as the primary identity for Bulgarian 
Turks. 
1.4 FIELD SITES 
To examine the complicated invisibilities of Alevi Bulgarian Turks, I decided to study Bulgarian 
Turks in both sides of the Bulgaria-Turkey border as they form a distinct minority community in 
Bulgaria and a distinct migrant community in Turkey. In both sides of the border, I examined at 
least two major areas of concentration of Bulgarian Turks with varying configurations of Alevi 
and Sunni Bulgarian Turks in relation to majority groups, such as ethnic Bulgarians in Bulgaria 
and local Turks in Turkey. In Bulgaria, I focused on two sites (Figure 1-1): Razgrad in the 
Northeast where ethnic Bulgarians slightly outnumber Bulgarian Turks (Figure 1-2), and 
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Kardjali in the South, where ethnic Bulgarians are significantly outnumbered by ethnic Turks 
(Figure 1-3). In both locations, Sunni Turks outnumber Alevis.  In Turkey (Figure 1-5), I focused 
primarily on Bursa, a well-known migrant city that is known for the visible dominance of Sunni 
Islam (Figure 1-6), but I also studied a number of villages and towns in Turkish-Thrace and a 
migrant neighborhood in İstanbul and Yalova (Figure 1-7) where I could reach practicing Alevi 
migrant communities. This turned out to be an advantage in revealing various ways of interplays 
of migrant Alevis with the local Alevi groups, as well as their interactions with the majority 
populations surrounding them. 
 
Figure 1-1 Kardjali and Razgrad Municipalities on the Bulgaria map (Modified template from wikipedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bulgaria_Aministrative_Provinces.png) 
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Figure 1-2 Map of the Razgrad province and its Municipalities (Modified template from wikipedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Blank_Map_Razgrad_Province.png) 
       
 
Figure 1-3 Kardjali Province and Its Municipalities  
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Blank_Map_Razgrad_Province.png) 
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Figure 1-4 Field sites in Turkey 
(http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dosya:Latrans-Turkey_location_Bursa.svg) 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-5 Map of Bursa (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6a/Bursa_districts.png ) 
 
Figure 1-6 Map of Edirne, Tekirdağ, İstanbul and Bursa 
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1.5 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS  
 Research on a marginalized community which may utilize collective tactics such as 
dissimulation raises numerous potential methodological issues, concerns and problems. 
Therefore, I devote Chapter Two to methodology discussions on epistemology and research 
ethics, in addition to providing more detailed information about the research locations, specific 
sites, and informant profiles. I answer two sets of questions: First, how is it possible to gather 
reliable data about a community when its members are dissimulating? In other words, how did I 
know my informants were not dissimilating to me, too? Second, if dissimulation is a collective 
tactic of a marginalized community to cope with structural disadvantages, how might publishing 
about these tactics influence the community?  
In the third chapter, I provide the theoretical framework to explain Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks’ invisibilities, utilizing various literatures. I focus on the literature about ethno-national 
groups and their boundaries and argue that dissimulation as a collective tactic indicates the 
robustness of inter-group differences and rigidity of inter-group boundaries. I examine the 
literature on minority-majority configurations and utilize the notion of “a minority within a 
minority” to highlight the structurally disadvantaged conditions of Alevis within the Bulgarian 
Turks, in terms of their access to available resources and power. Yet, I also point out available 
forms of collective agency and their utilization by Alevis even though their disadvantageous 
status prevails. Specifically, I examine dissimulation as a collective tactic that causes Alevis to 
retain the minority identity while pretending to be a part of the majority.    
The fourth chapter provides an account of the historical development of Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks’ status in Bulgaria and Turkey to point out their structural invisibilities. I argue that 
despite their changing macro-political and economic circumstances, Alevi Bulgarian Turks have 
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remained a double minority since the formation of the Bulgaria-Turkey border in 1878. By 
examining the archival data and academic literature in both settings, I emphasize the different 
historical turning points when being an Alevi Bulgarian Turk meant specific opportunities and 
burdens. In the second part of this chapter, I review the core literature on Bulgarian Turks that 
has originated from Bulgaria and Turkey and that has operated on conflicting presumptions and 
competing projections on Bulgarian Turks, while concurrently silencing the Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks.  
In Chapter Five, I examine the norms of being an Alevi, as defined by Alevi Bulgarian 
Turk religious leaders in Bulgaria and Turkey. These rules include the ideal-typical conditions of 
being an insider, being an insider banished from the community, and being an outsider.  I utilize 
my interviews with the Alevi Babas who answered the following questions: Who is an Alevi? 
How does one become Alevi? May a person with Alevi heritage but who does not pledge be 
considered Alevi? To what extent and when might an Alevi become [or be considered?] 
Sunnified or assimilated? In this chapter, I show that there are variations in the ideal-type among 
Alevis, across the confessional groups (Babai-Bektaşi etc) and among regional practices (north 
and south). These variations might occur due to the lack of codification in Alevism and its 
reliance on oral traditions. For instance, a northern Babai’s norms and practices may resemble 
those of a Northern Bektaşi more than those of a Southern Babai. I argue that these religious 
norms are ideal-types; they are neither implemented exactly nor are they uniform. However, 
since the term “Alevi” signals not merely a religious identity but also communal identity with 
secular elements, they continue to claim the Alevi identity, and they recognize themselves and 
each other as Alevis despite the variations in religious beliefs and practices.  
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Chapter Six portrays dissimulation as Alevis’ hiding their identity from outsiders, and 
Alevis’ acting as if they are members of other groups by consciously exhibiting the other group’s 
practices. The chapter argues that this has helped the Alevi retain identity and community in a 
hostile society. Considering that Alevi and Sunni group identities are not merely religiously but 
also socially marked, I focus on Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ historical and present dissimulations on 
both religious and socio-political issues. The Alevi have experienced dissimulations as Sunnis in 
relation to Sunni Turks, as “converted Muslims” in relation to Bulgarian nationalists, as well as 
atheists to Turkish and Bulgarian socialists, and as secular (and sect-less), nationalist Turks to 
Sunni Turks in Bulgaria and Turkey.    
Chapter Seven portrays dissimilation as a collective tactic for the minorities who are able 
to openly emphasize their own distinct identity in their larger society. I consider this emphasis on 
distinctiveness not as a matter of strictly following the Alevi religious ideal types as defined by 
babas, but more broadly also forming a publicly visible, collective and distinct Alevi identity that 
is based on political, social as well as religious distinctions within society. I claim that both 
dissimilation and dissimulation function to fortify inter-communal boundaries, with the former 
seeking visibility of the difference and the latter seeking its invisibility. I examine cases of 
dissimilation in social and political relations that are often spatially marked, in addition to 
religious dissimilation by Alevi Bulgarian Turks who publicly discuss distinct features of Alevi 
belief and practices. In the same chapter I also discuss assimilation as a situation when some 
members of a minority may blend with the larger society while the generic minority identity 
remains categorically different. In other words, some Alevis may assimilate into Sunnism while 
the categories of Alevi and Sunni remain intact. An absolute assimilation seems to be a 
hypothetical condition even in purely religious terms. For instance, some Alevi religious leaders 
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think of assimilation as Sunnification (i.e. a person with Alevi heritage goes to mosques) while 
other Alevi Babas think of assimilation as leaving the Alevi ways (i.e. not coming to cem, not 
pledging). The former is treated as individual cases of specific people’s misconduct (such as 
adultery or intermarriage), while the latter is seen as more common, neglect rather than 
misconduct. Yet, people in both types of cases are still seen as Alevis, due to their heritage. 
Assimilation in a secular sense is a non-phenomenon too, as long as both Alevi and Sunni 
Bulgarian Turks share the idea that Aleviness is a condition defined at birth: an Alevi is an Alevi 
is an Alevi. 
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2.0  METHODOLOGY: OPEN METHODS FOR RESEARCHING HIDDEN 
POPULATIONS 
Numerous methodological concerns intersect in research on dissimulation. Several psychologists 
(e.g. Rogers 1997) and security studies experts (e.g. Pope, Jøsang, McAnally 2006) have raised 
epistemological issues regarding dissimulation when that condition is clearly seen to be 
threatening, concentrating on how to identify dissimulation of individuals or groups in order to 
prevent it from happening. Also, sociologists have raised ethical issues regarding groups largely 
hidden from public view, when members of these groups are unwilling to be studied or pursue 
unpopular goals (e.g. Blee 2009, Cowley 2009). Studying people who are not willing to be 
studied violates ethics inquiring consent, which I followed as basic ethnical principle during my 
research, and not only because I was bound by the University of Pittsburgh’s IRB to do so. Some 
earlier scholars seem to have followed a different ethics.  For instance, sociologist Roger Homan 
confesses to utilizing “covert research methods” for his research among “old time Pentacostals” 
as groups unwilling to be studied, which he justifies on the grounds that “covert methods are in 
some cases favorable to and in the interests of subjects” (1980: 46). This research as conducted 
before IRB reviews were required, yet even Homan recognizes the detrimental effects of such 
methods on the researcher’s personality during and after the fieldwork. Ethical issues concerning 
researcher and group relations are magnified when a researcher’s political dispositions are 
opposed to those of the group (e.g. Socialists in Poland in Stoczowski 2008) or the group’s moral 
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dispositions are disturbing to the researcher (e.g. female racists in the USA, in Blee 2009). Also 
several ethical concerns may arise after research, such as whether to publish the findings if it is 
possible that negative effects on vulnerable groups or society could arise. In this chapter, besides 
detailed information about the design of my fieldwork, I will discuss the intricate 
epistemological and ethical concerns which have marked my dissertation research on Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria and Turkey.   
2.1 AN EMPIRICAL QUESTION: “HOW DO YOU KNOW YOUR INFORMANTS 
HAVE NOT DISSIMULATED TO YOU?”  
“How did you know your informants had not dissimulated to you?” was the first question 
addressed to me by a friend, after hours of talking about my fieldwork. The question is germane; 
it nails the central paradox of the research regarding its empirical accuracy. I examine a 
structurally invisible community whose segments could and have been able to dissimulate, and 
they could have dissimulated to me during my fieldwork. 
Concern about the accuracy of the data seems to be inherent in ethnographic methods 
relying particularly on interviews. “There is nothing self-evident about why anyone would bother 
talking to the would-be ethnographer —assuming they do— except perhaps for polite 
platitudes,” as Metcalf states (2002). As a would-be ethnographer, I faced empirical problems 
like those of any other PhD student conducting fieldwork in a new surrounding: I encountered 
problems in meeting Alevis in some settings where I had anticipated easier access (e.g. in Bursa, 
assuming I would have easier access since I am a citizen of Turkey), while I did not face any 
problems in places where I had anticipated difficulties before the research (i.e. Razgrad, due to 
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strong Alevi identity that might prevent access of a Sunni researcher). I was excluded from 
certain public rituals by not being told about them despite my manifest interest, such as several 
public ceremonies at the türbes in Kardjali. Yet, I had been invited to strictly in-group rituals 
even though my outsider status was well-known, such as village cems where non-Alevis or 
uninitiated Alevis are not allowed to participate. The moments I felt like an ultimate outsider 
were followed by the moments when the insider-outsider boundary became irrelevant. Often I 
found myself questioned and even challenged by informants as I was trying to find answers for 
my questions.  
As a would-be ethnographer alone among many members of the group I was researching, 
I also had problems studying what may be called their tactical use of invisibility. I was forced 
into a constant state of alertness about my informants’ re-calibration of their visibilities, and I 
needed to adjust my own visibility so that they would feel comfortable participating in 
interviews. I still cannot claim with certainty that my informants have never dissimulated to me; 
yet, I can claim that through my relatively long-term stay in multiple settings and interviews with 
Alevis and Sunnis from different backgrounds, I managed to identify certain patterns, shared 
perceptions, and practices, as well as divergences in the narratives and practices among my Alevi 
informants coming from different backgrounds and located at different settings. Also, I had a 
chance to better recognize the inconsistencies and discrepancies as well as the silenced parts in 
the narratives and practices. 
By stating that my informants might have dissimulated to me I recognize the possibility that my 
Alevi Bulgarian Turkish informants might hide certain components of Alevi belief and practices 
(such as the “Alevi secret”) especially given my outsider status as a researcher with Sunni 
heritage. I do not mean that some Bulgarian Turkish informants hid their Alevi identity from me. 
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As a matter of fact, if some Bulgarian Turks hide their Alevi identity from me, I could not know 
then and I still do not know. All of my informants were self-identified Alevi or Sunni 
BulgarianTurks. To access my Alevi informants I utilized the snowball technique. I started by 
contacting people whose Alevi identity is publicly known, such as Alevi NGO members and 
residents of well-known Alevi villages and neighborhoods in Bulgaria. Then I asked them to put 
me in contact with Alevis in the Bulgarian city centers and with Alevis who migrated to Turkey. 
For instance, at the beginning of my fieldwork, when I was in Bursa, I could reach only a few 
Alevis who explicitly mentioned their Alevi identity to me. Following my fieldwork in Bulgaria 
I contacted much more easily Alevi migrants in Turkish Thrace and İstanbul, where they do not 
hide their Alevi identity. In the rest of this section, I elaborate on issues such as access, rapport, 
and my subject position as well as addressing sensitive issues during interviews. 
2.1.1 Access hinting Alevis’ visibilities and invisibilities  
My fieldwork evolved as I faced problems accessing some Alevi groups and trying to identify, 
diagnose and find solutions for these problems. I often questioned to what extent, how and when 
my access to certain groups of Alevis became an issue. I constantly reflected on what these 
problems implied for the findings of the research: i.e. what does it mean if a particular Alevi 
community is inaccessible to a researcher and specifically to me?   
During my fieldwork I realized that my patterns of access to different Alevi communities 
have often correlated with Alevis’ general patterns of visibilities and invisibilities. Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks were more difficult to access compared to Sunni ones, due to the historical 
structural conditions forming Alevis as a minority within a minority, as I elaborate in Chapter 
Three. More importantly, some Alevi Bulgarian Turks were easier to access compared to others, 
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despite the common structural burdens they have been exposed to inside the borders of both 
Bulgaria and Turkey. Despite the fact that all of these groups are double minorities, different 
Alevi Bulgarian Turkish groups were utilizing varying tactics to handle this situation, and they 
have relied on differentiated degrees and forms of visibilities and invisibilities in particular 
settings.   
Specifically in Turkey, I had difficulties in accessing Alevi migrants in Bursa. They were 
few in number, mainly individual migrants, and they did not have religious leaders as they had 
not approached local Alevis. More significantly, as I found out after my interviews with a few 
Alevi migrants in Bursa, my original access problem hints at a steady assimilation (if not 
dissimulation) among Alevis in Bursa in the strictly Sunni environment of Bursa. On the other 
hand, in Turkish Thrace and İstanbul, access to Alevi migrants was not a concern at all; they 
were migrant groups forming communities with religious leaders, and they had connections with 
the local Alevi organizations. As I figured out, my relatively easier access suggested that Alevi 
migrants manifest sporadic cases of dissimulation in the historically multi-ethnic context of 
Thrace and İstanbul.   
Similarly, in Razgrad, Bulgaria, Alevis were easy to access; they had been actively 
pursuing an identity distinct from the rest of society. Also, they had formed an influential third 
group, as ethnic Bulgarians and Sunni Turks were in competition for power on the local level. 
Therefore, Alevis were able to dissimilate. Finally, in Kardjali, my access to Alevis had 
complications: even though Alevi villages were well-known, these Alevis hide their identity in 
public, emphasizing their Turkishness and trying to attach Alevi identity to a generic Bulgarian 
Turkish identity. This seems to hint at Alevi’s dissimulation in secularized terms in Kardjali, as a 
known and powerful center of ethnic Turkish nationalism.  
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2.1.2 A complicated situation of rapport: “Interview as a form of İbadet (worshipping)”  
“Rapport” is generally understood as a desirable emotional connection, similar to friendship, 
between the researcher and participants (see Harrington 2003). The concept has been criticized 
for legitimizing anthropologists’ attempts to form an “instrumental relationship” with 
participants with “the predesigned purposes of the…inquiry in mind” and the recommendation 
made that it should be abandoned (Marcus 2001). My fieldwork experience shows that such 
straightforward notions of rapport do not work for studying hidden communities. Even so, for 
studying such communities, the notion of rapport provides almost the only empirical and ethnical 
ground on which to conduct research.   
During my fieldwork, I met with Alevi religious leaders who were particularly frustrated 
by “scientific” works on the community, which they see as studies with hidden agendas. These 
leaders felt people who study the Alevi have various political and religious orientations and 
intend to harm the community. Specifically, they often reminded me that in the 1930s Bulgarian 
nationalists were involved in research in order to “prove” that Alevis were forced converts from 
Christianity to Islam under Ottoman rule. This story reemerged among Bulgarians, Sunni Turks 
and even Alevi Turks in the 1980s. Some also mentioned post-1989 visits paid by Sunni scholars 
from Turkey who were conducting research to list points in common between Alevi and Sunni 
Islam, in order “to create sympathy for Sunni Islam and inject Sunnism among Alevis in 
Bulgaria” as several of my informants stated.  
In this regard, being a researcher was neither a source of legitimacy nor rapport, but 
rather caused doubts among my informants. It is the orientation and intentions of a researcher 
that matter  therefore, I often faced questions that tested my perspective on “Alevi issues.” 
Aware of this, I often emphasized that the general framework of my research was how Alevi 
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Bulgarian Turks were a minority within a minority in Bulgaria and Turkey. My research was 
being done in order to understand how Alevis have dealt with this situation on the everyday 
level. I often emphasized that my research interest derives not from my identification with Alevis 
—despite my deep respect— but from my primarily intellectual concern with social, political and 
economic inequalities (cf. Springwood and King 2001).  
Most of my informants valued the transparency of my intentions; they could have been 
more skeptical and seem my efforts as useless intellectualism or pure utilitarianism in order to 
receive a PhD. This reaction was not surprising given that Alevi Bulgarian Turks still have a 
tradition of thinking, interpreting and talking about religious texts, comments, and practices 
during cems, as I also noticed as a participant observer.  As a graduate student I had read widely 
and reflected extensively on the literature about the problems of ethnographic representation and 
truth claims by ethnographers. However, one finding struck me during my interviews: my Alevi 
informants treasure the notion of the truth and perceive any good intentioned attempt to seek the 
truth as a sacred act. For instance, several informants ended our interviews by reminding me of 
Ali’s statement that seeking the Truth is ibadet [worshipping.] They added that they saw the 
interviews as a form of ibadet.”  
2.1.3 Not really a Native Ethnographer: “I am a Zahiri, not a Yezid”  
Some scholars promote the role of “native ethnographer” and thereby complicate the researcher-
informant hierarchy (Ohnuki-Tierney 1984). Others criticize the inherently positive qualities 
attributed to the “native ethnographer” in the supposed ability to figure out the local 
configurations better than outsiders (Narayan 1993), and still others analyze situations of 
complicated insider-outsider boundaries for the “native ethnographers” (Sherif 2001). During my 
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fieldwork, I have never seen myself as a “native ethnographer,” given that I was neither a 
migrant nor an Alevi. Besides, my focus on the Alevi Bulgarian Turks was only coming from my 
intellectual interests with marginalized minorities, even though I had some distant heritage 
connection to Bulgarian Turks owing to my paternal grandmother who was originated from 
Suhindol, Bulgaria and who had illegally crossed from Bulgaria into Turkey when she was 5, in 
1939. Before my research, I had never been to Bulgaria or for that matter to Bursa in Turkey, and 
while I grew up in Turkish Thrace cities, I had never heard of Alevi migrants in the villages.  
The only aspect that could be considered as native was my native language, Turkish.  
It was unsettling for me, as a person who happily embraced a secular worldview, that 
people constantly asked the religious sect I belong to immediately after I introduced myself and 
my research: “Ok, but, you first tell me, are you an Alevi or Sunni?” I had never experienced that 
before. The concern with heritage is important for Bulgarian Turks, who claimed to trace their 
roots back seven generations. These genealogical claims were not necessarily true, given the 
perplexing historical population movements that have occurred, but the concern indicates an 
anxiety among the Bulgarian Turks with ethnic mixing with the other groups and a manifest 
intention of unmixing with those who are not Turkish. Furthermore, heritage is a gatekeeper 
among Alevi Bulgarian Turks; ideally an Alevi is one whose parents are Alevis (and then he or 
she is expected to take the Oath), as different from a Sunni whose parents are Sunnis. Therefore, 
it was no surprise that my heritage became a concern for many informants.  
When someone asked me whether I was Sunni or Alevi, I immediately responded that I 
was from Sunni heritage. At times when my informants asked the question differently, for 
example asking which sect I belong to, I stated that “Zahiriyim ama Yezid degilim” which 
literally means “I am an Outsider but I am not Yezid.” This statement indicates two perceptions 
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of Sunnis by Alevis: “Zahiri” is a relatively value-free reference to those who are not Alevi, 
while Yezid is the name of the Umayyad Caliph who murdered Ali’s son, Huseyin, in Karbala by 
surrounding him and his community in a desert and leaving them without water. His name has 
become a symbol referring to Sunnis known for cruelty against Alevis; many Alevi mystical 
poems use the word “Yezid” to refer to not merely the historical person but also to Sunnis 
discriminating against Alevis.  
Unsurprisingly, my Sunni heritage brought limitations to the research. I noticed at the 
very beginning of my fieldwork that I was denied access to several important Alevi ceremonies. 
Only in the later stages of my research was I accepted at cem ceremonies, with the requirement 
not to record them and assurance I would leave at the parts of the ceremony that are only open to 
Alevis of Alevi heritage who had taken the Alevi Oath, i.e. the part when the religious leader 
states: “May all Zahiris leave.” However, the effect of my heritage on the interviews was 
relatively minor: none of my Alevi informants denied me an interview. Several times, I was 
initially granted 15 minutes for an interview when I revealed my heritage, though the interviews 
lasted about 3 hours in the end. A few times, my Alevi religious leader informants showed their 
disappointment when they heard I was of Sunni heritage yet they kindly accepted the interview. 
After a relatively long interview, I was often sent off with good wishes and prayers.    
2.1.4 Red Flags: The Secret, Slanders and Other Taboo Issues  
Many Alevi informants anticipated taboo subjects to come up during the interviews because they 
have constantly received questions about them by their curious Sunni friends. I deliberately 
ignored these subjects if they were irrelevant to my research. For instance, my informants were 
used to receiving questions about alleged Alevis practices, such as structured adultery between 
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fictive kin, orgy rituals, and forcing newcomers to burn pages of the Quran, or spitting into Sunni 
guests’ food etc. I rejected asking any questions about such matters so that my informants would 
not be in any doubt that I do not take these accounts seriously, which are in fact untruthful and 
deliberately malevolent accusations that stigmatize Alevis. Sometimes, however, my informants 
brought up these issues themselves.  
More importantly, another question informants expected me to ask was about a particular 
Alevi belief: what is “the secret” that Alevis always mention but do not explain? I did not ask 
any questions about the secret, knowing the value of this notion for Alevis who are under an oath 
that they commit to in their formal entrance ceremony to the Alevi path, stating that “unveiling 
of the secret may lead to death.” On the contrary, I stated that what “the secret” is to them, 
should remain a secret to me too; since I am an outsider and it is what makes them Alevi.  
For a thesis on dissimulation, leaving the notion of the secret unquestioned may sound 
like a research fallacy. Yet, this did not prevent me from getting some sense about the notion of 
“the secret,” in line with Kenneth George’s statement on the notion of secrecy among Sulawesi:  
the problem… is not simply one of whether an ethnographer finds out about, 
introduces upon, or is let it on things secret or hidden. Rather the real problem, the 
real secret, begins with knowing what kinds of knowledge and what kinds of 
relationships are culturally (and historically) constructed, recognized, and read as 
“secret” (George1993: 231)  
 
During my fieldwork, I found myself exploring the borders of “what is seen as secret” as 
I started noticing the point where an informant would stop discussing some belief or practice, 
and explain his or her silence in terms of “the secret.” Interestingly, soon I noticed that the 
borders of what counts as secret seems to vary across different cem communities, as I discuss in 
detail in Chapter Six.   
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  Finally, the term dissimulation (takiye) is not a taboo word among Alevis even though it 
has been used historically by some Sunni leaders to portray Alevis as hypocritical. During my 
interviews, I refrained from using the term and waited until my informants used it, given that I 
was known to be a Sunni and I did not want to be seen as being judgmental about Alevis’ 
dissimulation. In many cases, the term was not used by either my informants or me; but my 
informants’ answers still provided sets of cases and examples about dissimulation as well as 
dissimilation and assimilation, especially in regards to my questions about Alevis’ historical and 
current survival strategies in Bulgaria and Turkey. Predictably, the historical cases have been 
relatively easier to discuss for many informants, such as dissimulations during socialism in 
Bulgaria. I had a chance, however, to witness and ask questions about current cases, such as the 
reaction of Alevi Turks in Bulgaria to the Müftülük Crisis in Bulgaria in 2010, when elected 
müftüs had been removed from their office due to a High Court ruling, and were replaced by 
appointed müftüs from the socialist period.    
Overall, I deliberately avoided taboo subjects, and engaged with analytical questions on 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ differences and similarities in belief and practices, their historical and 
current situation vis-à-vis other groups in Bulgaria and Turkey, and their ways to deal with these 
situations. Many informants were noticeably relieved and felt confident in talking without fear of 
disclosing what should be kept hidden.  
2.1.5 Gender and Research 
The Alevi Bulgarian Turkish community is marked by the relative equality of the status of males 
and females, compared to other religious groups found among Turkic speakers. Their religious 
rituals require the participation of both males and females. Females have been actively involved 
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in the social and political life in their communities. Alevi women have utilized opportunities for 
education.  For instance, Alevi sides of the mixed villages had several Alevi females who had 
attended boarding schools and become teachers in Turkish Teacher schools in 1950s when 
socialists opened for schools for training Turkish teachers. In contrast, I have not met even one 
female teacher from this period on the Sunni side of the mixed villages. I was not faced with any 
problems as a female researcher during my fieldwork among Alevis, owing to the well-
established egalitarian worldview among Alevi males and females. 
 On the other hand, all Alevi religious leaders are males as a rule. Alevi females are not 
allowed to become religious leaders (baba), though they may hold other religious positions in 
ritual settings. This situation influenced my research design, since all of my Alevi female and 
male informants politely directed me to their religious leaders by stating that the religious leaders 
are the only ones who should reveal information about Alevism. For this reason, my data on the 
religious issues is based on my interviews with Alevi leaders.  Yet, I also conducted interviews 
with Alevi males who did not hold religious leader positions, and with Alevi females on issues 
such as everyday interactions between Alevis and non-Alevis.    
2.2 AN ETHICAL QUESTION: “IF DISSIMULATION IS A SURVIVAL TACTIC 
FOR ALEVIS, HOW MIGHT PUBLISHING ABOUT THESE TACTICS INFLUENCE 
THE COMMUNITY?”  
At a first glance, publishing research on a marginalized group tactically seeking invisibility may 
look ethically risky, because, such publication might lead to undesired visibility for the group. In 
particular, revealing their tactics for navigating structural burdens may put a researcher into a 
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dilemma, as the group has faced systematic discrimination and even persecution throughout 
history. Thus I took several recent developments into account before I started writing my thesis 
on Alevi Bulgarian Turks.  
First, in the last 20 years Alevis in both Bulgaria and Turkey have chosen to become 
more and more visible. During my fieldwork, while a number of religious leaders were hesitant 
to make comments about their religious beliefs and practices on the grounds that they need to 
protect “the secret,” many other religious leaders stressed that this notion of secrecy was 
originally intended to avoid persecution but has actually caused further stigmatization of the 
community. I was told that because Alevis did not talk about themselves, outsiders with dubious 
intentions have talked on their behalf. It was this latter group of religious leaders who had invited 
me to their religious ceremonies despite my being an outsider (zahiri), and I took these 
invitations as expressions of my informants’ intention to talk on their own behalf. I often 
checked my interpretations of particular practices with my informants in these cems. In this 
regard, my fieldwork data comes from my interviews and participant observations with Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks who were not merely content with my presence among them but also aware that 
the research findings will be published.   
Second, the Alevi revival had already started in Europe with the formation of Alevi 
organizations by migrants from Turkey, and later this revival was carried to Turkey (Özyürek 
2009). Alevi Bulgarian Turks have been affected inevitably by these processes beyond their 
control. As a response to these developments, since the early 2000s, Alevi Turks in Bulgaria 
have formed their own regional organizations. Since the 1990s another related development has 
been the increase in publications not merely focusing on Alevi social and political identity but 
also on Alevi beliefs and ritual. In addition to academics and researchers, well-respected Alevi 
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religious leaders have published detailed guidelines for the rules of conduct (erkan) for almost all 
Alevi rituals, such as a seven-volume set of Alevi guidelines by Bedri Noyan (1998). 
Furthermore, Alevi rituals literally gained visibility as they were broadcasted on Cem TV, a TV 
station established by one segment of Turkish Alevis in Turkey in 2005, and Alevis in Bulgaria 
have had widespread interest in watching Cem TV. During my fieldwork, I noticed that even the 
most conservative Alevi Bulgarian Turks are influenced by publications and TV programs from 
Turkey. During the interviews, they often emphasized the differences in the ritual order in 
Alevism in Bulgaria compared with those in Turkey, as shown on TV, while recognizing that the 
main ritual structure is the same. They recognized the utility of TV shows in showing outsiders 
that the slanderous misunderstandings about Alevis are wrong; yet they were skeptical about the 
extent to which outsiders really understand the deeper meaning in these rituals, as outsiders are 
presumed to be spiritually immature.   
Third, dissimulation seems to be less needed as a tactic for Alevi Turks in Bulgaria at 
present. They have gained not only organizational and social visibility but also political visibility 
by holding significant political positions at the local and national levels. Alevis in both Razgrad 
and Kardjali had demanded representation in parliament and gained this from the Turkish party 
in the 2000s. Every year since 1990, the Turkish Party (The Movement of Rights and Freedoms) 
has organized commemoration ceremonies for the martyrs during the 1985-1989 forced name 
change process at a significant Alevi site, the Demir Baba Tekke, in Razgrad. Also, in September 
2011 a very important tekke, the Elmali Baba Tekke in Kardjali, was opened following 
restoration, with the contribution of the Turkish party and both Sunni and Alevi authorities.  
Lastly, I made myself visible as a researcher while among segments of Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks. Often I started by introducing myself as a graduate student, explaining my research topic 
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and how I reached the particular informant. I asked my informants for informed consent before 
the every interview I made. Often I brought a notebook with me to take notes during the 
interview and I asked their permission. I explained that the data would not be kept in a form 
where their identity may be revealed even in my notebooks, and that I preferred note-taking over 
tape-recording as a double measure to protect their anonymity. After getting their permission, I 
made certain that my informants could not only see that I was taking notes but invited them to 
check the notes that I took during the particular interview. Also, when they asked me to see the 
notes from other interviews, I declined on the grounds of protecting my informants’ anonymity. 
Often my informants knew the identity of only one informant, the one who directed me to them; 
I did not reveal the identity of people I interviewed, unless they recommended I talk to someone 
whom I already interviewed.   
In addition, while conducting participant observation, I attended public events with a 
camera, a notebook and a tape recorder, and I made myself visible to the people participating in 
the events, as a researcher. In private events, I asked for consent from the religious leaders and I 
guaranteed them I would leave the settingduring the parts of the ritual where they thought I 
should leave. I assured them I would not take notes or record the ceremony. As the cem 
communities are small and made up of people who know each other well, I was often introduced 
to the community by the leader of the ceremony.  
During the ceremonies, I often found myself having to make a decision of whether just to 
go with the flow like any other participant, or of acting like a distant observer, given that I am 
not an Alevi and I am a researcher. Relying on people being aware of my identity as a non-Alevi 
researcher as announced by the community leader at the beginning of the ceremony, I often 
decided to go with the flow so as not to disturb or interrupt the ritual order. In addition, my 
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presence was justified in advance because I had already answered questions about myself and my 
research. Often I picked a spot that would indicate my position at the end of the religious 
hierarchy, as the ceremony is highly spatialized and structured. Most of the time I stood at the 
end of the place devoted to the people who are more recently accepted to the community: i.e. the 
place most distant from the religious leaders, and among females, if there was a gender-
segregated sitting plan. Often an elderly female approached me during the cem ceremony to 
show me the particular postures and practices. She would say “do like I do” and she corrected me 
and explained the particular gesture or action.  
2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
I conducted my dissertation fieldwork on a variety of segments of Bulgarian Turks, who were 
internally divided in terms of religious affiliations as Alevis and Sunnis, and regional affiliations, 
from Northeastern or Southern Bulgaria. Following the mass migrations, Bulgarian Turks were 
also divided along lines of citizenship (Bulgarian, Turkish or dual citizens) and residential status, 
as residents of Bulgaria or Turkey. As my fieldwork proceeded, I noticed Alevis’ complicated 
invisibility patterns, and adapted my research design to focus more on Alevis.   
The dissertation is based on my ethnographic fieldwork between June 2009 and 
December 2010 in Bulgaria and Turkey. I also conducted preliminary research during the 
summer of 2008 in Bulgaria. For my preliminary fieldwork, I visited Alevi and Sunni religious 
sites in 14 Bulgarian provinces, which helped me determine the dissertation fieldwork sites. For 
my dissertation research, I conducted 8 months of fieldwork in Bursa (Turkey), a 3.5-month 
period of fieldwork in Razgrad (Bulgaria), and a 4-month period of fieldwork in Kardjali 
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(Bulgaria). Later, I conducted one month of fieldwork in several Alevi migrant settlements in 
Turkish Thrace (Edirne and Çorlu), Yalova and İstanbul for better assessment of the situations of 
Alevi migrants in Turkey. Besides ethnographic fieldwork, I conducted one month of archival 
research in Sofia, Bulgaria in October 2008, and one month of archival research in Ankara, 
Turkey in November 2010.   
2.3.1 Research Sites  
My dissertation builds on a “multi-sited” fieldwork approach (Marcus 1989), an in-depth 
examination of several carefully selected sites, a selection made by focusing on the residents’ 
symbolic, social, political, economic and spiritual connections, currently and in terms of their 
history.  
I determined the major research sites based on the following grounds: In Bulgaria, 
Kardjali and Razgrad are the provinces with the largest concentration of Turks even after the 
waves of mass migrations to Turkey after 1878. Also, these provinces became the Turkish 
minority’s cultural, religious and political centers, especially after Bulgaria’s independence. 
Importantly, these provinces also have the largest concentration of Alevis from different 
subgroups, namely Bektaşi, Babai and Derviş in Razgrad, and Bektaşi, Babai and Musahipli in 
Kardjali.   
I conducted fieldwork in both provinces instead of in only one since each province 
represents different but comparable majority-minority configurations in historical, social, 
political and demographic terms. Razgrad province is a microcosm of broader Bulgaria; the 
national (ethnic Bulgarian) majority also forms the demographic local majority and holds 
administrative control locally, while Turks form a minority. However, Kardjali province shows 
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the opposite configuration: the national minority (Turks) is the demographic local majority and 
the group holding administrative control in the local provincial government. As I will discuss in 
Chapter Four, these differences have led to two different senses of minority among Turks. While 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks constitute a double minority in both provinces, in each they have utilized 
different tactics in relating to local majorities.   
Each of these provinces has seven municipalities. However, considering the changing 
demographic patterns in each municipality and the limited time period I had, I focused on 
Razgrad and Kardjali central municipalities as well as two other municipalities in each province.  
In Razgrad central municipality, I contacted religious institutions, such as the Razgrad 
Regional Müftülük as the institution representing Sunnis, and the Razgrad Cem Association as 
the organization representing Alevis. In addition, I contacted religiously unmarked institutions 
and organizations commonly associated with Bulgarian Turks, such as Nazim Hikmet State 
Theater and the Deliorman Author's Association. Furthermore, I focused on Isperih and Kubrat 
municipalities, as the former is a Sunni-Turk dominant setting while the latter is a mixed Alevi-
Sunni-Bulgarian setting. In Isperih, I made daily visits to 5 Turkish villages (with few if any 
Bulgarians) where I conducted in-depth individual and focus group interviews at their citalishte 
(state-run Community Centers in villages and towns) and mosques. In Kubrat, I focused on 
Alevi-Sunni mixed villages with varying configurations, such as one (Babai) Alevi-only village, 
one (Babai and Bektaşi) Alevi, Sunni and Roma mixed village, and one (Bektaşi) Alevi, Sunni, 
Christian-mixed village. In these villages, on the Sunni side, I interviewed the imams and 
parishioners of mosques. On the Alevi side, I interviewed religious leaders of the different sub-
sects as well as Alevis gathering in the Pensioners’ Clubs of these villages.      
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In Kardjali city center, I contacted religious institutions, namely the Kardjali Regional 
Müftülük and Krumovgrad Regional Müftülük as representatives of Sunnis. I also contacted the 
South Bulgaria Cem Association with Kardjali and Haskovo branches as the representative of 
regional Alevis. I approached organizations commonly associated with the minority, such as 
Kadriye Latifova State Theater, the Istikbal Association, the ALEV journal, and the Omer Lutfu 
Culture Association. Furthermore, I focused particularly on the villages and centers in three 
municipalities due to their particular Alevi-Sunni configurations. In Kardjali municipality, I 
conducted interviews at a Bektaşi Alevi-Sunni village, four Babai Alevi-Sunni villages, a Babai 
and Bektaşi Alevi-Sunni village, and a Bektaşi-only Alevi village. The Alevis in this area are 
mostly Babais and these territories are called “Otman Baba Soil,” indicating the spiritual 
connection to the Otman Baba Tekke in Haskovo. In Momchilgrad municipality, I conducted 
interviews at the center as well as a Bektaşi-only Alevi village, and a Bektaşi-Alevi-Sunni mixed 
village. Alevis here are Bektaşis and the area is known as “Elmali Baba Soil” due to the presence 
of the Elmali Baba Tekke. I conducted interviews in the Krumovgrad Municipality Center by 
contacting the Krumovgrad's Sunni institutional center. Also, I accessed the Musahipli-Alevi 
communities who are spiritually tied to Kızıldeli Sultan Tekke in Dimetoka. The area is called 
“Sultanyeri.”  
In Turkey, Bursa was my primary research site as the main city of arrival for generations 
of Bulgarian Turkish migrants from Kardjali and Razgrad. I contacted the following migrant 
organizations: BAL-GÖÇ Merkez, Osmangazi, Kestel, Karacabey, GÖÇ-TÜRK, Rodop-Tuna 
Association, Tuna Boylular Deliormanlılar Association, Kuzey Bulgaristan Kültür Associations, 
Kosukavaklılar Association, 93 War Migrants’ Association, Cebelliler Associations, and 
Mestanlılar Association.   
 47 
My primary research sites were migrant neighborhoods. Some were originally migrant-
only neighborhoods built during 1950-1 which later attracted locals and migrants from other 
places (i.e. Hurriyet, Adalet, and İstiklal Mahalles). Some were mixed neighborhoods with 
migrants from 1968-78 (i.e. Bahar, Kemerçeşme, Mehmet Akif, Yeşilyayla, Davutkadı, and 
Beşevler) while others were migrant-only areas where migrants from 1989 lived (i.e. Kestel, 
Gorükle). Also, I made daily visits to 5 villages made up of descendants from the migrants of 
1878.   
In terms of original location, 1878 and 1968-78 migrants were spatially segregated into 
Razgrad migrants’ neighborhoods (e.g. Bahar, Kemerçeşme) and Kardjali migrants’ 
neighborhoods (e.g. Mehmet Akif, Yeşilyayla, Davutkadı, Millet, Vatan). Yet, 1950-1 and 1989 
migrants’ neighborhoods do not display spatial segregation in terms of where they migrated 
from, i.e. Northeastern Bulgaria or Southern Bulgaria.  
In regard to religious affiliations, the majority of my informants were Sunni Bulgarian 
Turks. I noticed that Alevi migrants in Bursa were almost unreachable, since they did not 
migrate as groups but as families. They did not form a separate religious community and they did 
not approach local Turkish and Kurdish Alevis. This finding was confirmed by Alevis in 
Bulgaria in later parts of my fieldwork. In Bursa, the few Alevi migrants were hiding themselves 
from society, as revealed during my interviews with Alevi migrants in Bursa. Seeing Bursa as 
one pattern, I decided to search for other patterns of Alevi migrants in Turkey and extended the 
research to a few sites in Turkish Thrace and İstanbul.  
Other sites Turkish Thrace, Yalova and İstanbul: I made visits to the religious leaders 
who themselves were migrant Alevi Bulgarian Turks following the Babai, Bektaşi, and 
Musahipli paths from Razgrad and Kardjali. The settings they migrated to were one (Babai) 
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Alevi-only village, one (Babai-Bektaşi) Alevi-Sunni village, and two Alevi-Sunni mixed cities in 
Turkish Thrace. In addition to these rural settings, I wanted to see an urban setting, so I visited 
one neighborhood in İstanbul where there are Sunni Bulgarian Turks,  local Turkish and Kurdish 
Alevis and (Bektaşi, Babai, and Musahipli) Alevi Bulgarian Turks from both Razgrad and 
Kardjali.  
2.3.2 Interviews and Informant Profiles  
During my fieldwork I conducted semi-structured, unstructured and focus group interviews with 
both Alevi and Sunni Bulgarian Turks to get a holistic picture of inter-group relations. In 
Razgrad I made 62 individual, semi-structured and unstructured interviews as well as 8 focus 
group interviews. In Kardjali, I conducted 38 interviews. In Turkey, I interviewed 99 individuals 
in Bursa, and 10 individuals in Turkish Thrace and a neighborhood in İstanbul.  
 In Bulgaria, my informants were primarily past and current religious leaders of the 
Sunni and Alevi Bulgarian Turks in the city, towns and villages as well as the beneficiaries of the 
religious services in mosques or Cemevis. I also interviewed Alevis and Sunnis holding secular 
social, political and economic positions in society, such as Sunni and Alevi local administrators 
in the city, towns and villages; Turkish teachers who had attended Razgrad or Kardjali Turkish 
Pedagogy Schools (the pedagogy high schools that were open during 1952-1957); Turkish 
amateur authors and poets who wrote histories of their villages or of their family; Alevi and 
Sunni Turks who were involved in high level positions during the socialist regime as members of 
the Bulgarian Communist Party as administrators, journalists, artists, poets, as well as Alevi and 
Sunni Turks who refused to be Party members and were forced into blue-collar jobs despite their 
white-collar job training.   
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In Turkey, I interviewed migrants in Bursa in accordance with their regional affiliations, 
their migration experience, citizenship status and religious affiliations. My informants’ 
distribution according to their regional orientations is as follows: 54 from Kardjali, 26 from 
Razgrad, 3 from Ruse, 9 from Shumen, 1 from Tirnavo, 1 from Kircim, 1 from Burgas, 1 from 
Slistre, 1 from Haskovo, and 2 from Plovdiv. Also, I conducted several focus group interviews in 
the mountain villages where descendants of 1878 migrants from Razgrad and Ruse reside, and in 
a village in Yalova.  
  My informants are divided into the following groups according to their migration 
experience: 8 migrants from 1950-1, 10 migrants from 1968-72, 16 from the 1977-8 migration, 
52 from the 1989 migration, 5 migrants after the1990s, and the residents of 5 villages were 
descendants of 1878 war migrants. In terms of citizenship status, only 2 hold only Bulgarian 
citizenship and stay in Turkey with residential permits; 52 were dual citizens (all of them were 
1989 migrants) and the rest of the informants were only Turkish citizens. 2 1989 migrants had 
the right to apply for dual citizenship but declined to do so, while 1 1978 migrant had not had the 
right to apply for but somehow still became a dual citizen.  
 My informants are divided into the following groups regarding their religious 
affiliations: Among all informants in Bursa, only 5 informants were self-defined Alevis by 
heritage, while I conducted a focus group interview in a (Babai) Alevi-only village in a town 
between Bursa and İstanbul where all 6 informants were actively following the Alevi path. In 
these sites, I conducted interviews with 10 Alevi Bulgarian Turk migrants, and religious leaders 
from Babai, BektaşBektaşi and Musahipli sub-groups.  
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2.3.3 Participant Observation, Venues and Events  
I conducted participant observation in several venues to understand the relations between the 
Bulgarian majority and Turkish minority as well as relations between Alevi and Sunni Bulgarian 
Turks.   
On majority-minority relations, I did participant observation at the official public 
ceremonies organized by the majority, such as in Razgrad the Treti Mart ceremony on March 3, 
celebrating Bulgaria’s independence from Ottoman rule, and in Kardjali the Unification Day of 
Bulgaria on September 6, marking the unification of Northern and Southern Bulgaria. Both 
ceremonies had Turks taking part. In the first one there were a few attendants and in the second 
one the Turks were the local administrators. Also, I attended public ceremonies organized by the 
minority, such as in Razgrad attending the premier of a Turkish play at the Nazim Hikmet 
Theater in February. In Kardjali I attended preparations for a Turkish play at the Kadriye 
Latifova State Theater in September. I attended two events: a performance by the Razgrad 
Nazim Hikmet State Theater when I was in Kardjali and a trip I took with the Kardjali 
Municipality's folk songs band to Razgrad, both of which exemplify the connections between 
Razgrad and Kardjali Turks. 
My fieldwork focused on religious and secular ceremonies by Alevi and Sunni Bulgarian 
Turks in both Razgrad and Kardjali. I attended a number of Sunni-only ceremonies at Sunni 
sites, such as burials and marriage ceremonies, daily prayers and Friday prayers, mevluds (i.e. the 
religious poem about the life story of Muhammed and respective ceremony where the poem is 
cited) in Razgrad and Kardjali mosques. Also, in Kardjali, I attended several village mevluds, 
where villagers read the mevlud for the spirits of the all deceased from the village, such as the 
Balkan War Martyrs.     
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I also attended numerous Alevi-only ceremonies at Alevi sites. I did participant observation 
in gorgu cems led by Babais in Razgrad and Babais and Bektaşis, even though neither Babais 
nor Bektaşis normally allow Sunnis into their religious rituals. However, I was not allowed to 
attend cem ceremonies by Musahipli Alevis, who do not even let Babais and Bektaşis into their 
ceremonies.    
During my fieldwork, I conducted participant observation at region-specific ceremonies 
by Alevis, such as Hıdrellez in Razgrad and mayes in Kardjali. During Hıdrellez, on May 6, I 
attended two Alevi-populated villages. One is made up of Babais and the other is made up of 
Bektaşis. Also, in Kardjali, I attended several village mayes, around local türbes, including the 
biggest mayes at the Otman Baba Türbe and Elmalı Baba Türbe as well as the small, village 
mayes.  
In addition to segregated ceremonies, I managed to attend mixed ceremonies, such as Sunni 
ceremonies or sites where both Sunnis and Alevis attend. For instance, in Razgrad, I attended the 
commemoration of the Holy Birth Day of Muhammed, which is organized by the Sunni 
müftülük, yet some Alevis were present too. Also in Kardjali, I visited a türbe in what is now a 
Sunni village, along with with some Alevi informants.  Mirroring this, I conducted participant 
observation at Alevi ceremonies and sites with Sunnis present. Most strikingly, in Razgrad, I 
attended the traditional Annual Celebration at the Demir Baba Tekke as organized by the Turkish 
Rights and Freedoms' Political Party on May 29, 2010, when the ceremony started with the 
Sunni forms of prayer by imams from the region. Also, in Razgrad, I attended the Deniz Ali 
Baba Türbe celebrations in the North with a Sunni and Alevi mixed group from Kardjali, and in 
Kardjali, I attended the Elmalı Baba maye where Sunni and Alevi groups from the North and 
Turkey were present.   
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 One event marked my fieldwork and turned into a venue for participant observation for 
me. In mid-May 2010, the Bulgarian High Court ruled to de-authorize the existing Grand Müftü 
of Bulgaria as well as the regional müftüs, which practically meant the return of the Grand Müftü 
of the socialist period, who, it was claimed, had supported the socialist regime as a former police 
officer. This situation became unsettled during my fieldwork in Razgrad and Kardjali. During 
this period, I managed to conduct interviews with existing Sunni müftüs as well as Alevi leaders 
on the issue. The event caused peaceful protests all over Bulgaria following Friday prayers. I 
conducted participant observation in these protests in Kardjali.   
I also conducted participant observation in village cemeteries, where the interaction 
between communities became concrete and spatialized and where inter-group mixings or 
segregations became sealed. For instance, in Razgrad, a Bulgarian-Sunni-Alevi mixed village 
had three physically segregated neighborhoods with three separate cemeteries, while another 
Sunni-Alevi-Roma village had physically segregated neighborhoods, yet only one cemetery that 
was divided into an Alevi side and a Sunni side. On the other hand, in Kardjali, there was no 
such visible segregation. However, another pattern characterizes Kardjali cemeteries: presence of 
at least one türbe in almost all Sunni and Alevi villages. These türbes are attributed sacredness 
by both Alevis and Sunnis, even though their approaches and practices at them are quite 
different.     
In Bursa, I was the tenant of a migrant family from 1978 in a neighborhood formed by 
migrants from Kardjali during 1968-78. In this neighborhood, I did participant observation at 
events such as marriages, death ceremonies, and celebrations of religious events in individual 
families. In the other migrant neighborhoods, I did participant observation at markets, coffee 
houses and stores owned by migrants or where migrants were their customers. I also conducted 
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participant observation with migrant organizations by attending their activities addressing 
migrants, such as a conference on migration, a festival celebrating migration, and an annual feast 
during Ramadan. 
2.4 CONCLUSION  
To conclude, in this chapter I discussed various methodological concerns and problems I faced 
during my ethnographic fieldwork on Alevi Bulgarian Turks in two zones of territorial 
concentration of Bulgarian Turks in either side of the Bulgaria-Turkey border.  First, I examined 
several empirical problems regarding the research, starting from the accuracy of data for a study 
on a dissimulating community, in addition to problems of access, rapport and my subject position 
as a researcher in such a context. Second, I addressed the ethical problems of researching and 
writing on a community that may sometimes make tactical use of invisibility as a survival 
strategy in hostile environments, by discussing the recent inclination among Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks towards public visibility. Finally, I provided detailed discussion about my field sites and 
my research methods in these sites.  
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3.0  DISSIMULATION: RETAINING MINORITY IDENTITY WHILE 
PRETENDING TO BE PART OF THE MAJORITY 
The terms dissimilation and assimilation have been utilized in social science to explain 
relationships between two units, elements and groups. In historical linguistics, dissimilation 
occurs when two similar phonemes become less similar, while assimilation occurs when two 
dissimilar phonemes become alike (Kent 1936, Alderete 1997). In social psychology, 
dissimilation is the emphasis on distinctiveness from others when they threaten one’s identity, 
and assimilation is the adaptation to others’ ideas in the absence of such a threat (Lemaine 1975, 
1981). Simply, the term assimilation refers to the processes of two entities becoming alike, while 
the term dissimilation refers to the opposite processes of resisting likeness.  
Though assimilation is more often used in literature regarding minorities (see Alba and 
Nee 1977), several scholars have used dissimilation as the crux of their research. Yinger, for 
example, perceives assimilation as a “condition under which the cultural lines of divisions within 
a society are weakened,” implying that minorities blend into the society. He defines dissimilation 
as a “condition under which [these divisions] are reinforced (sic),” implying the minorities’ 
renewed attention to their own distinctiveness (Yinger 1994: 40). Bechir does not cite Yinger, 
yet utilizes the framework seeing assimilation and dissimulation as two possible conditions for 
minorities, and he compares Tatars in Romania as assimilating to Gagauz in Moldova as 
dissimilating populations (2008).  
 55 
Such approaches to assimilation and dissimilation portray rather straightforward, either/or 
relations between minorities and majorities. They portray dissimilation as a minority’s ability to 
keep its own distinct culture intact in the face of a dominant majority and they portray 
assimilation as the minority’s inability to preserve its own distinct identity. My thesis argues that 
these perspectives ignore more subtle and indirect ways in which minorities relate to majorities, 
as shown by the concept of dissimulation.  
The term dissimulation means one entity pretending to be like another, and I argue that it 
shows that a minority group may claim the majority's identity (appear to be assimilated), but 
does so in order to keep itself intact in the face of a threat, thus similar to dissimilation. In this 
sense, dissimulation has a paradoxical effect: even though minorities may act as if their 
differences from the society have been abandoned, they do so to reinforce these very differences. 
Therefore, the term dissimulation shows the robustness of inter-group differences, though the 
concept has often been rendered without considering its effects, or simply been reduced to 
negative connotations, such as faking, malingering and deception. .   
The term dissimulation does denote deception and deceit in everyday English. However, 
only the psychology literature utilizes the term dissimulation to refer to individuals’ deception 
and faking (e.g. Rogers 1997) during personality tests (e.g. Holden et.al 1992), after post-
traumatic disorders (e.g. Gerardi et al. 1988) or after traumatic brain-injury (Slick et al. 1994). 
Some less than scholarly policy-oriented studies portray dissimulation negatively as an inherent 
quality of Islam, for instance in Afghanistan (Tribal Analysis Center 2010), in Iran (Campbell 
2006) and other Islamic governments (Campbell 2005). Yet, the academic literature on 
minorities’ dissimulations does not carry such value judgements, and recognizes dissimulation as 
a coping strategy which is utilized by various communities, such as by Alevis and Shias in 
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Afghanistan (Dupree 1979), Iran (Gordon 1977) and India (Virani 2011), by  Jews and Sunni 
Muslims in Inquisition Spain (Root 1988, Ward 2004, Ibrahim 2008, Rosa-Rodrigez 2010), by 
Jews in the Ottoman Empire in the 19
th
 century (Neyzi 2002), by Jews, Christians and Sunnis in 
Iran (Nissimi 2004), and Christians in Turkey after 1923 (Clark 2006).  
Studying dissimulation helps address basic issues of cultural analysis, such as the borders 
and identy markers of cultural and ethnic groups. In this study, I utilize the term dissimulation 
for the narratives and practices used by a marginalized group’s members in order to obscure their 
identity and to pretend to be members of a majority group, for the immediate survival of 
individuals and the long term survival of the group as well as of the group’s identity. I argue that 
the concept of dissimulation both reflects and fortifies the salience of inter-group distinctions and 
boundaries, precisely because a minority’s members claim another group’s identity and act like 
its members without intending to become part of that group.  
My thesis is that dissimulation is a social mechanism involving similarity in opposition. 
Dissimulation has a simulation aspect: dissimulating religious minorities do not merely hide their 
own identity or certain components of their beliefs; they often simulate a majority’s ways. Some 
scholars, such as Rosa-Rodrigez, portray simulation and dissimulation as a complementary pair 
in the case of Moriscos in Inquisition Spain (2010). This situation may give the impression that 
dissimulation is merely about minorities’ imitating, copying or simulating the other groups’ 
culture and practices. In fact, the success of dissimulation rests on a minority’s mimicking 
aspects of the majority group identity without attracting the attention of that majority. For the 
same reason, acts of dissimulation may not be noticed and recognized by policy makers and 
academics, who may be ready to see a successfully dissimulating population as a ‘perfectly 
assimilated’ one. Yet simulation is only one aspect of the dissimulation process. I argue that 
 57 
dissimulation is, at the last instance, oppositional: dissimulating minorities simulate the majority 
groups’ beliefs and practices to in order to protect the group members, the group and the group 
identity against hostile majorities.  
The social science literature recognizes the use of simulation for strategical purposes. 
Specifically, the literature on dissimulation as takiye clearly mentions strategic simulation within  
the context of dissimulation (e.g. Kohlberg 1975, Gordon 1977, Dupree 1979, Layish 1985, 
Emadi 1998 and 2000; Sachedina 2010). This means that such minorities’ simulations are 
temporary since they serve for their dissimulation. As anthropologist Louis Dupree states 
explicitly, “…true taqiyya (however defined) can in no way be equated with apostasy, as is 
sometimes suggested” (Dupree 1979: 681). Furthermore, empirical evidence for the 
oppositionary nature of dissimulation is that successfully dissimulating minorities have actually 
preserved their group identity until the present. My case study exemplifies such a configuration: 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks have simulated various majority groups under changing political and 
social configurations when they faced persecutions and severe discrimination in Bulgaria and 
Turkey. In fact, I think that if there is still an Alevi population in Turkey and Bulgaria and if 
Alevi Bulgarian Turkish group identity has remained, their survival is due to their 
dissimulations. For instance, under the Ottoman rule, Alevis faced executions which were 
grounded on official orders (fatwa) by the state’s religious authorities about the legitimacy of 
killing Alevis (Hazerfan: 2002). At those times, they probably appeared in public as if their 
identities had completely changed” and they had shifted to Sunnism. However, when the 
Ottoman Sultan changed and state policies become more tolerant, the Alevi group identity 
become revived.  
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Simulated identity markers may not become additional facets of a dissimulating 
minoriy’s identity for several reasons. First, dissimulating minorities conduct their simulations 
only in the presence of “outsiders,” while continuing to follow their own practices in the 
presence of in-group members. Second, the collective identities of the dissimulating and 
simulated groups are already marked antithetically to each other in the eyes of both. For instance, 
the conflictual and incommensurable premises of Alevism and Sunnism in belief, organization 
and practices have been actively utilized by members of both groups to mark their inter- and 
intra-group relations. Thus irreconcilable premises, such as the belief in reincarnation among 
Alevis and belief in the afterlife in Sunnis, have led to Sunni accusations of Alevis as heretics, 
while the same same premises have grounded Alevi claims for a group identity distinct from 
Sunnis, for a long time.  
My research focusses on dissimulation within the context of sharply divided societies 
where ethnic groups’ boundaries remain salient and apparently irreversible once they are formed: 
individuals are assigned to either one or the other birth group, and their group identities condition 
the life chances and burdens for them. Furthermore, in such societies, the majority-minority 
tension precludes recognition of heterogeneities within either group, even though some segments 
of a minority may become more disadvantaged than the other members of that minority, and thus 
form the most disadvantageous group in the society, i.e. a minority within a minority, or a double 
minority. For such double minorities, dissimulation may become a major tool to cope with their 
disadvantages. Generally they cannot freely emphasize their differences from the rest of the 
society (i.e. dissimilate) as this may mean extra constraints being put upon them. Nor are they 
allowed to blend in (i.e. assimilate), as their original difference may always be recalled.  
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  At first glance, my approach seems contrary to that of most writers in contemporary 
social science, because it sees cultural distinctions as often not being fluid. Of course, the 
perception of cultures as isolated, coherent, integrally homogenous and externally distinct unities 
has long been heavily criticized in anthropology. Earlier works underline the relations between 
interconnected cultures (e.g. Wolf 1982, Mintz 1985). Later authors argue that new forms of 
flow, interconnectedness, and flexible relations have challenged territorially bounded perceptions 
of cultures and led to concepts of “deterritorialization” (Hannerz 1996) and “reterritorialization” 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1997). Such works have proposed either replacing the culture concept with 
new analytical concepts (e.g. “ethnoscapes” by Appadurai and “discourse” by Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997) or “writing against culture” (Abu-Lughod 2006). Nevertheless, some 
anthropologists have defended the notion of culture by showing that only a few traditional 
anthropologies consider cultures as isolated units of analysis (Bashkow 2004, Sahlins 1999) and 
by asking why new global or transnational complexities should lead to an abandonment of 
cultural boundaries, especially when the problem is the superabundance, and not the absence, of 
claims of boundaries (Brightman 1995: 519). 
Such criticisms of the notion of culture have carried into discussions of other units of 
analysis, such as ethno-national groups. Prominent works in the early 1980s opposed the idea 
that nations are extensions of groups’ pre-modern distinctions (Smith 1987), and emphasized that 
nations are modern entities. For instance, Ernest Gellner states that nations were “made” 
following the emergence of nationalist elites with high culture (1983); Eric Hobsbawn claims 
that nations were “historical innovations” which emerged along with “invented traditions” such 
as national symbols and discourses (1983); and Benedict Anderson states that nations were 
“imagined” by the masses following the development of printing press and capitalism (1983). 
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Subsequent to these works, most writers have taken the statement “nations are invented” as self-
evident.  
In addition, many ethnographic studies have been conducted with the presumptions that 
ethno-national groups are constantly invented, made and unmade (e.g. Wimmer 2008); that they 
are continuously imagined and re-imagined by their members (e.g. Kong 1999); that their 
boundaries are flexible; and that their members have fluid ethnic identifications while ethnic 
groups’ identities are contested (e.g. Lynch 2006). These perceptions have led to questioning 
analytical use of the concept “ethno-national group” to study ethnicity, such as Brubaker’s 
criticism of “groupism” and suggestion of studying “ethnicity without groups” (2004).  
These constructivist approaches reject the perception of ethno-national groups as 
bounded entities that are ultimately distinct from each other, and they do so in order to avoid 
essentialism—a “dirty word of anthropology” (Fischer 1999). For instance, Brubaker 
acknowledges the importance of ethno-national affiliations for ordinary people; yet he devalues 
this fact as commonsense reification that scholars should avoid re-producing (2006: 9). To avoid 
“essentialism,” he recommends examining “how ethnicity ‘happen[s]’ in everyday” affairs rather 
than “presuming [that] everyday experience is pervasively organized by strong ethnic identities.” 
This approach rather bizarrely prioritizes the perceptions and indeed normative 
preferences of scholars over those of the people that these scholars study, perhaps the ultimate 
denial of agency to the subjects. Brubaker invites us to pretend that ethnic identities do not 
organize peoples’ everyday experience. Yet, in reality, no matter how good scholars are at 
turning a self-blinded eye, ethnicity seems still to be used to organize the everyday lives of 
people. For instance, in Gil-White’s examination of a Kazakh community’s self-identified so-
called “primordialist” ethnic acquisition and transmission rules in Mongolia, even if a child of a 
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Kazakh parent is adopted by a Mongolian family, does not know how to speak Kazakh or does 
not know anyone Kazakh, he or she is still seen as a Kazakh (1999). In fact, while Brubaker 
intends to show how everyday interaction makes Hungarian and Romanian ethnicities “happen” 
in Cluj, his field data show the opposite process: how being a Hungarian or Romanian 
determines the forms of everyday interactions there. Specifically, Hungarians continue to be seen 
as Hungarian even if they deemphasize their Hungarian identity, claim a broader Romanian 
citizenship or are involved in mixed marriages with Romanians (1995).  
I argue that in divided societies where inter-group distinctions are already established and 
groups are “labeled” (Goodenough 1965, in Gil-White 1999), individuals are already placed into 
one or another group. Such group identities not only position individuals but also limit the range 
of available relations, affiliations, and life opportunities as well as burdens. In other words, once 
ethnic groups are “imagined,” they stop being “imaginary” (cf. Anderson 1983, Jenkins 2002) 
and they have real effects on peoples’ self- and other-perceptions, everyday decisions and 
interactions. Everyday practices of individuals are inevitably marked by already existing ethnic 
distinctions, not the other way around as Brubaker claims. As my fieldwork shows, Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks see themselves as Alevis even when they do not participate in a pledge 
ceremony and do not attend the periodic ceremonies that demonstrate allegiance to the 
community and are often seen as conditions for “becoming” an Alevi. Furthermore they are seen 
as Alevis by outsiders even though some may claim a Sunni identity, attend Sunni religious 
practices and are involved in mixed marriages with Sunnis. In other words, Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks’ ethnic identities remain robust regardless of their varying degrees and forms of everyday 
religious practices. 
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The presumption that ethnicities may “happen” is not unique to Brubaker, of course, but 
has been used by others who are inspired by Frederik Barth’s famous statement that it is the 
“ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff it encloses” (1969: 15). Barth 
argues that an ethnic shift happens when a group stops claiming a distinct identity and claims 
membership to that of another group, and imitates the new group’s organizational forms (Barth 
1969: 25). Most scholars portray Barth’s framework as a statement on the unstable, fluid and 
negotiable nature of ethnic groups. Accordingly, it is generally said that ethnic groups may be 
made, remade and even unmade while the ethnic boundaries emerge, shift and disappear. For 
instance, Andreas Wimmer introduces a model for shift in ethnic group boundaries via 
“expansion,” which refers to an increase in the group in terms of the number of people; by 
“contraction,” which refers to the exclusion of some individuals from the group; by 
“repositioning,” which means individuals’ change of their categorical group membership from 
one group to the other; by “inversion,” which indicates a shift in the hierarchy among categories; 
and by “blurring,” which means overcoming ethnicity as a criterion in social and political 
organization (Wimmer 2008).  Yet, these configurations do not terminate the very existence of 
categorical ethnic group identities. Barth’s argument was criticized by Gil-White on the grounds 
that even though an ethnic group may claim the identity of another group, the latter group will 
not be willing to accept the newcomers (1999). As Robert M. Hayden reminds us, Barth himself 
clearly states that movement of people across the ethnic boundaries does not lead to categorical 
changes (Barth 1969: 24), which Hayden sees as an indicator of the robustness of intergroup 
distinctions (2011). 
Some explain ethnic boundary and identity shift as a matter of the cumulative effect of 
individuals’ choices. For instance, Evergeti claims Pomaks may manipulate their ethnic identities 
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in relation to Turks and Greeks in Northern Greece (2005: 178).Similarly, Smith (2002) argues 
that Uyghur may strategically emphasize or de-emphasize certain religious markers to solidify 
their group boundaries as opposed to Han Chinese in Xinjiang. Other scholars suggest structural 
factors leading to ethnic identity shift, such as a state’s creation of new ethnic categories with 
entitlements motivating an ethnic shift. For example, Gorenburg (1999) argues that changing 
state policies in Russia have led to shifts in both public and private identities of Tatars, who have 
oscilliated between Tatar and Bashir identities before, during and after socialism.     
These studies on shifting ethnic boundaries and ethnic identities appear to rely on Barth, 
who discusses ethnic identity shift or “assimilation” among Pathans, in which Southern Pathans 
became Baluch while Northern Pathans remained as Pathan (1969: 25). While most subsequent 
authors who cite him miss this point, Barth explicitly states that while ethnic shift may lead to 
“categorical changes of the ethnic identity,” they also “leav[e] dichotomized ethnic groups 
unaffected (other than numbers) by the interchange of personnel” (1969: 24). As Robert M. 
Hayden reminds us, such a Barthian ethnic shift argument points out that “boundaries could be 
crossed without challenging the system of distinctions itself” and it indicates the robustness of 
the inter-group “distinctions” (2011: 11) In other words, the Pathan and Baluch as categorical 
identities and their differences remain salient, even though some Pathans may “become” Baluch.  
My thesis highlights a further complication regarding ethnic shift theory by focusing on 
situations similar to those of Pathans who are said to have “become” Baluch. First, I emphasize 
that even though an ethnic group’s members may claim another group’s identity, the latter 
group’s members may not be willing to accept these newcomers as “real” members of the group. 
For instance, Gil-White doubts that South Pathans are seen as “real Baluch” by Baluch (1999). 
Second, this ethnic shift or assimilation perspective implies closure: minorities may be content 
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with sacrificing their own differences in return for favors in the society. Yet, this assumption 
ignores the possibility that minorities may not really assimilate but only publicly pretend to do so 
(i.e. they dissimulate) while in private still following their distinct ways, as was done by many 
Jewish and Muslim converts in Spain (Ibrahim 2008, Rosa-Rodriguez 2010), Cyrpto-Christians 
in the Ottoman Empire (Skendi 1967) and crypto-Muslims in post-Ottoman Balkans (Idriz 
2009). Furthermore, pretending to assimilate may be a tactical move not merely for short-term 
utilitarian agenda but for the long-term survival of the minority community and even of its 
identity. In this sense, pretending to assimilate, i.e. to dissimulate, does not cause a closure but 
rather fortifies the gap between the minority and the majority.  
In the literature on ethnic groups, Barth’s statement that it is the “ethnic boundary that 
defines the group, not the cultural stuff it encloses” (1969: 15) led to a dichotomous perception 
of ethnic content and ethnic boundaries (Conversi 1999). The concept of dissimulation as I have 
developed it challenges such dichotomous perceptions of ethnic group content and ethnic 
boundaries, showing the continued relevance of groups, and the robust salience of group 
boundaries, for some ethno-religious double minorities in extremely divided societies.  
Some studies have tried to transcend the dichotomy but have instead relativized both the 
ethnic content and the boundaries. For instance, William Fisher criticizes Barth’s model on the 
grounds that it relegates the cultural content of groups to being a dependent variable while 
peoples’ identifications to a group is contextual (1987:11). He argues that the term ethnic group 
implies a cultural coherence and historical endurance (2001: 192) while in reality ethnic groups 
are not heterogeneous and their identities emerge in action within their particular social contexts” 
(1987: 12). Therefore he calls for the need to examining group processes rather than group 
maintenance (1987: 13, 2001). His ethnographic evidence for this framework comes from 
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Tamhang Thakalis in central Nepal, whom he portrays as heterogeneous, since they are divided 
into three endogamous descent groups with their own political autonomy. Moreover he argues 
that Thakali identity has been an emerging one during processes of Sanskritization, de- 
Sanskritization, Westernization and revitalization of their indigenous practices, as well as 
migrations over about a century (2001: 193).  Fisher argues for complexities in Thakalis identity 
while Thakali NGOs claim a unified heritage as the ground for the group identity. Ultimately he 
states that these emerging indigenous movements, while claiming to return to the tradition, need 
to first “create” or “re-create” it (1987: 300, 2001).  
Fisher thus uses an anti-essentialist framework, yet at the cost of suppressing Thalikis’ 
“self-imposed essentialism” (cf. Gil-White). In fact his anti-essentialism seems to lead him “[un-
]imagining other’s [already imagined] communities” (cf. Hayden 2007). My approach, in turn, 
reverses Fisher’s question: how has a double minority managed to keep imagining itself as a 
distinct group even when it has been internally divided into subgroups and subsegments and has 
been exposed to various state-initiated and socially-circulating exclusions? I see Alevis’ 
dissimulations as a collective strategy in maintaining their group identity, despite their internal 
heterogeneity and the external pressures on the community in the form of mass persecution, 
structural and social discrimination by the changing majorities in Bulgaria and Turkey.   
The dissimulation concept also challenges some instrumentalist perceptions of ethnic 
group identities, since dissimulating double minorities strive for protecting and maintaining their 
group identity even at the cost of extreme marginalization. In the literature, the instrumentalist 
approach is exemplified by the work of Abner Cohen, who portrays an ethnic group as “an 
informal interest group whose members are distinct from members of other groups within the 
same society in that… they share a measure of what Smith calls ‘compulsory institutions’ 
 66 
kinship and religion, and can communicate among themselves relatively easily” (1969:4). He 
argues that members of ethnic groups articulate these “compulsory institutions” for their political 
and economic interests. Cohen’s evidence comes from the Hausa in Nigeria, who are a Muslim 
community migrated from Northern to South Nigeria and who had developed intense trade 
networks in Nigeria. He argues that Hausa moved from being a Muslim community which did 
not have any remarkable difference from any other Nigerian tribe (49) to being a community 
increasingly emphasizing its Islamic identity and “customs.” According to Cohen, ethno-
religious group identity has strengthened for two reasons. First, Hausas intended to create a 
separate, distinct identity in order to maintain their monopoly over trade, which was challenged 
by Yoruba after the Indirect rule. Second, Hausas intended to preserve their political autonomy, 
which had been granted under the British Indirect Rule but eroded after Independence. 
Moreover, Hausa have not only emphasized their Muslim identity as an ethnic marker against the 
new political regime in Nigeria, but also further emphasized it after the Yorubas also claimed 
Islamic identity.    
Cohen’s approach to ethnic groups has been criticized on several grounds. First, Epstein 
argues that instrumentalism cannot explain all expressions of ethnic identity or ethnicity, 
especially the cases in which ethnicity is “active” yet does not have an aim (Epstein 1978: 96 in 
Banks: 36). I add to Epstein’s criticism by showing another configuration: dissimulating Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks’ ethnicity has been “active” in private (among the insiders) but has appeared 
“passive” in public, or in the presence of outsiders. Moreover they act in these ways not to 
maintain a powerful position in the society (which they do not have) but rather to avoid further 
marginalization due to persecution, as well as political and social discrimination.  
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A second criticism of Cohen comes from John Peel, who values Cohen’s valuation of 
historical factors in explaining social change among Hausa during and after colonialism but 
criticizes the absence of pre-colonial cultural differences in his analysis. Peel argues that 
“ethnicities may appear as inventions; yet they are not arbitrary” (Peel 1989 in Eriksen 1993: 
93). I consider that the distinction between Alevi and Sunni Bulgarian Turks goes back to the 
Ottoman era. For instance, many Alevis in present day Bulgarian are descendants of Alevi tribes, 
which were seen as rebellious and subversive by the Ottoman state. A third criticism to Cohen’s 
framework comes from Marcus Banks, who argues that Cohen excludes the narratives of Hausa 
themselves and that there may be “apparent distinctions between the analysts’ and actors’ 
behaviors and motivations” (Banks 1996). He adds that “a pious Hausa might be surprised or 
even offended to be told that his commitment to Tijanniya order (a Sufi Islamic order) was 
‘merely’ a building block in the construction of his ethnic consciousness” (Banks 1996: 35).  
During my research on dissimulation among Alevi Bulgarian Turks, I have been very 
aware of the possible distinctions between my perceptions and those of my informants as to what 
constitutes “dissimulation.”  The dissimulation concept came out organically as a theme during 
my interviews, when I was trying to find answers to my questions about survival strategies of a 
minority within a minority in a society. During the research, I noticed that informants were more 
comfortable in talking about dissimulation cases in the past, especially during their interactions 
with Communist Party Officials, given that communists no longer constitute a threat to Alevis or 
to any other community in Bulgaria. Understandably, my informants did not display the same 
level of comfort in talking about historical and present relations with the surrounding present-day 
majorities, such as Sunnis in Bulgaria or Turkey. Cautious of a possible variance between my 
analysis and my informants’ perceptions of dissimulation, I always asked my informants for off-
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the-record remarks on present day dissimulations, which helped me to get a broader picture of 
the events.  However, I have not utilized these explanations in this study in order to honor my 
pledge, and to protect my informants and the community. 
My analysis approaches the question of the relevance of culture and of ethnic boundaries 
by looking carefully at a disfavored minority group within a larger, also disfavored minority 
group – that is, this larger minority group is disfavored by the majority in the society while the 
smaller group is disfavored by the larger minority group, thus doubly disfavored. As I show in 
this work, in societies where power asymmetry prevails, group identities become much more 
salient, meaning that a minority within a minority may remain always as such even when both 
groups are encapsulated within several broader societies. Further, as a doubly underprivileged 
community, a double minority may still manifest a degree of agency even though the conditions 
that have caused its members’ oppression persist. Such people develop collective dissimilation, 
assimilation or dissimulation as ways to cope with their situations of disadvantage, while 
maintaining their condition of “minority within a minority.” They remain a minority within a 
minority regardless of their dissimilating (by asserting the distinct character of their own 
community), assimilating into a majority group (e.g. Turks in Turkey and Bulgarians in 
Bulgaria) or the larger part of the minority (e.g. Sunni Bulgarian Turks), or pretending to be 
members of a larger community (either the majority community or the larger part of the 
minority) by dissimulating.  
 In my analysis, I argue that dissimilation, assimilation, and dissimulation are not markers 
of absolute manifestation, final shift or constant volatility of the ethnic groups’ affiliations but 
rather are collective practices by members of a double minority, in response to social settings in 
which they have differentiated degrees of availabilities and capacities to maneuver. These 
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practices are important since they show that an oppressed community may develop and manifest 
a degree of agency even though the conditions that cause its members’ oppression persist and 
they remain a double minority. In this sense, dissimulation, dissimilation and assimilation are 
“tactics,” as per DeCerteau: they are practices used to maneuver within pre-given spaces, in the 
domain created, demarcated and defined by powerful groups (1984) and in this sense these 
practices are used for coping with the existing conditions rather than trying to alter them.  
In this chapter, I use literature on national minorities that stretch across the border 
between a residential state and an external homeland state in order to examine external and 
internal homogenizations of these minorities by nationalist projects (minority and majority), and 
also in the academic literature. I utilize the “minority within a minority” or “double minority” 
concept to point out patterned segmentations within larger minority communities, as opposed to 
their homogenization. I have observed specific criteria (religious and regional affiliations) being 
used to demarcate a structurally imposed hierarchy in terms of access to power, resources, 
prestige, and wealth. Finally, I use border-frontier literature to analyze how the Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks’ varying collective “tactics” depend on the local, regional and national political, social and 
economic configurations at the frontiers of the residential state (Northeastern and Southern 
Bulgaria) and, following migrations, of their ethnic homeland state (Turkey).  
3.1 DISSIMULATION IN-BETWEEN DISSIMILATION AND ASSIMILATION    
I consider assimilation, dissimilation and dissimulation as collective practices to cope with the 
structural conditions that have constantly marginalized a double minority. Yet by seeing all three 
categories as “tactics,” I do not conflate them. On the contrary, I underline that segments of the 
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same community may utilize varying practices as their marginalizations vary in degree and form, 
while they remain a double minority. I develop a model to understand such minority member’s 
practices: what is seen as “assimilation” and “dissimilation” are in fact practices that are closer to 
emulations of “ideal-types” (Weber 1904), meaning norms and characteristics, in this case 
dictated by religious leaders representing communities. Accordingly, the practices of 
dissimulation indicate a location in between these “ideal-types,” while a practice indicating 
closeness to one end means distancing from the other.  
As my fieldwork shows, some Alevi everyday religious practices may look like 
“dissimilation” from Sunni practices, as they strictly follow principles set by the local Alevi 
leader in Alevi-dominant settings. Alternatively, some Alevi practices may look like 
“assimilation” as they seem to follow Sunni norms set by religious leaders in extremely Sunni-
dominant settings. Often, since both Alevi and Sunni principles are ideal types, the majority of 
Alevis’ everyday practices do not fully conform to either extreme but are somewhere in between 
them. Mostly these collective practices take the form of dissimulation, and they are conditioned 
by the demographic composition of local settings as well as local and national social, political 
and economic configurations.  
The term dissimulation has not often been utilized with regards to minorities. One 
exception is in the work of James Scott, who sees dissimulation as a form of resistance by 
powerless groups (e.g. slaves, peasants, etc.) who pretend to be in conformity with the existing 
order, yet merely intend by so doing to avoid any explicit display of insubordination or open 
confrontation with authority (Scott 1990). In this reading, dissimulation is a concealment of 
discontent from outsiders and from the public discourses (“public scripts”), but is known by 
insiders. It may be detectable by examining the “hidden scripts”, such as subordinates’ speeches 
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behind the backs of the dominant (Scott 1990). This perspective is significant in illuminating the 
discrepancy between public and in-group discourses of the dissimulating populations, yet, it 
treats dissimulation as the ad hoc, arbitrary, and unstructured practices of individuals. Scott’s 
framework does not explain the calculated, planned and structured collective dissimulation 
practices of Alevi Bulgarian Turks.    
Dissimulations of religiously-marked minorities may show a degree of dynamism, which 
might make the “performance” concept seem an attractive theoretical tool for analysis. In my 
view, however, while the performance concept hints at the complexities of acts of dissimulation, 
it may also obscure the extremely patterned and structured nature of minorities’ dissimulation 
practices. I argue that dissimulation is a very specific type of performance in terms of its nature, 
aims and methods. Dissimulation is the last resort of extremely marginalized communities when 
they cannot emphasize their separate identity in a society (i.e. dissimilate) and when they are not 
willing to blend into the larger society (i.e. assimilate). It is based upon a collective intent for the 
immediate protection of the minority members and the minority community, and for long-term 
protection of the minority identity. Dissimulation leads to a minority’s public appearance being 
as if inter-communal differences are overcome, while this process actually produces the futher 
fortification of the inter-communal boundaries.      
Judith Butler has introduced a more refined analysis of performance concepts regarding 
gender identities. She identifies a “regulatory regime of gender differences in which genders are 
divided and hierarchized under constraint” (1993: 21) and argues that “the reiteration” of the 
gender norms inherent to this regime may “work, animate and constrain the gendered subjects” 
or may be “a source of resistance and subversion of [these very gender] norms” (1993:22). She 
defines the first type of reiterative acts as “performances” and the second type of reiterative acts 
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as “performativity” (1993: 24). Both performance and performativity rely on “the force of 
authority through the repetition and citation of a prior, authoritative set of practices” (1993: 19). 
Yet they differ in terms of end-results: “performance” reproduces the regulatory regimes and 
their assumptions while “performativity” is subversive, since it leads to the “the unanticipated 
resignifiability” of gender norms in the “regulatory regime” (1993: 28).  In this sense, Butler 
rejects seeing “performativity” as a matter of actors’ “will,” “choice” (24), “control” and 
“calculation” (29).    
In my view, however, Butler’s conceptualization of the terms “performance” and 
“performativity” is not useful for understanding dissimulation processes. Dissimulation can not 
be seen as a “performance” in the Butlerian sense, since dissimulating minorities do not affirm 
the existing regulatory regime that locates them at the lower rank in the inter-group hierarchy. 
On the contrary, dissimulation is a manifestation of their conditioned agency to protect their 
group identity for long term. Furthermore dissimulation also does not indicate “performativity” 
in the Butlerian sense, since dissimulating minorities conduct acts of dissimulation intentionally 
and collectively after calculating the circumstances and their possibilities given circumstances. It 
indicates a minority’s collective will to survive hostile circumstances. My field data indicates 
that Alevis’ have decided collectively, in the cem communities, about their dissimulations: that 
is, whether or not, how and when as well as in relation to which groups they should dissimulate 
or terminate dissimulation.  
A collectivist account of dissimulation is found in Shia Islam theology, which extensively 
discusses a specific concept of dissimulation (takiye) or concealment of one’s religious identity 
in the face of threat coming from hostile outsiders or even from some insiders who have not 
reached to the maturity to grasp the esoteric belief system. As explained more fully later in this 
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chapter, dissimulating communities do not merely hide their identities but also pretend to be the 
members of another, mostly of the majority, religious community in the society. Shias thereby 
treat being dissimulation as itself a norm, and largely ignore the varying ways this norm is 
utilized. Contrary to such normative perceptions, my work examines dissimulation (together with 
assimilation and dissimilation) as minorities’ ways of relocating themselves in power 
asymmetries in their larger societies. Further, I argue that religiously-marked minority 
communities involved in such realignment under changing political and social configurations, 
irrespective of whether religious doctrines (Sunni, Shia Islam, Christianity or Judaism) legitimize 
or prohibit varying dissimulations for their adherents.  
Dissimulation is often presented as a phenomenon specific to certain religious doctrines; 
however, historical examples show that members of any religious group holding minority status 
may dissimulate as members of the majority. Furthermore, dissimulation is practiced by 
minorities adhering to varying religious doctrines. For instance, in post-Reconquest Spain, 
Jewish (Ward 2004, Ibrahim 2008) and Muslim (Root 1988, Rosa-Rodriguez 2010) religious 
minorities were forced to convert to Catholicism, yet they still maintained practices from their 
earlier religions – indeed, their doing so was the reason for creating the Inquisition. Likewise, 
Christians, Jews, and Bahais were dissimulating by not converting to Shia Islam but by hiding 
their real religious identity in Iran even during the reign of Shah and before the Islamic 
Revolution in 1978 (Gordon 1977). With such cases in mind, I stress that dissimulation crosscuts 
religious groups, irrespective of whether specific religious doctrines permits or prohibits it. More 
importantly, dissimulating minorities may carry their religious identity as a cultural marker. That 
is to say, dissimulation may be done by committed, secular and even atheist members of a 
religious minority, in the present case Alevis, even though the minority is marked in the society 
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primarily in religious terms. Furthermore, my data show that members of religious minorities 
may dissimulate in regarding not only to religious issues but also to secular ones For instance, as 
my fieldwork found, Alevi Bulgarian Turks dissimulated not only by conducting some Sunni 
practices but also by pretending to occupy several secular subject-positions in relation to 
Bulgarian and Sunni Turk groups. Such subject positions included those of the socialist-atheist 
citizen, the converted Bulgarian, or the pure Turk (i.e. samo Turk in Bulgarian).    
Dissimulation may also be utilized by the minority sect of a religious group against its 
majority sect. For instance, Sunni scholars of Islamic theology have often negatively associated 
dissimulation with Shia and Alevi Muslims. While Sunni theologians have portrayed 
dissimulation as internal to the Shia belief system, announced it as unacceptable for Muslims and 
criticized it as hypocrisy (see Kohlberg 1975), Shia theologians have pronounced it to be a 
legitimate practice and institutionalized it (see Sachedina 2010). However, Sunni scholars’ 
refusal and Shia scholars’ institutionalization of dissimulation are not about the inherent 
difference between the two religious doctrines, but rather reflect the historical asymmetry that 
has emerged within Islamic theology. The general superiority of power held by Sunnis over 
Shias has caused increasing marginalization of non-Sunni doctrines in what is generally seen as 
orthodox Islamic theology, at least in Sunni-dominant Islamic settings. Still, it should be noted 
that in Shia-dominant settings such as Iran (Gordon 1977) or present-day Syria, Sunnis have in 
fact themselves dissimulated. More interestingly, dissimulation is sometimes promoted by Sunni 
religious authorities. Historically, the Sunni Muftu of Oran released a fatwa recommending that 
Muslims simulate being Catholics in Inquisition-period Spain (Rosa-Rodriguez 2010). 
In perceiving dissimulation as a manifestation and product of particular historical 
minority-majority conditions within a society, I assert that dissimulation is context dependent. 
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While persistent power inequalities may lead to institutionalization of dissimulation for some 
religious minorities, a change in these inequalities may lead to abolishment of dissimulation. For 
instance, Hafizullah Emadi (1998) argues that Ismaili Shia in the Badakhshan region of 
Afghanistan ended their dissimulations (taqiyya in Arabic) from oppressive Sunni groups by 
means of allying themselves with the government after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 
The more recent study of Ron Geaves argues that dissimulation may take “a modified form” and 
might terminate; for instance, Alevi and Sunni migrants from Turkey are equal in minority status 
in Britain, and Alevis have formed their own religious and secular organizations openly while 
abandoning their traditional ritual animal sacrifice ceremonies there, though they continue to 
attend such ceremonies during their visits to Turkey (Geaves 2003: 62). Strikingly, Alevi 
migrants from Turkey to Germany conduct the ritual animal sacrifice in Turkey in the cemevis of 
the local Kurdish and Turkish Alevis.  
Alevi Bulgarian Turkish migrants in Turkey exhibit a more complicated configuration. 
As with the Kurdish Alevi migrants migration caused little hostility between Alevi and Sunni 
Bulgarian Turks from Turkey sharing the same social spaces (e.g. neighborhoods and support 
organizations), as well as “migrant” status). Questions I asked during my fieldwork about Alevi 
migrants raised the eyebrows of some Sunni migrants, who saw my injquiries as an attempt to 
create a division within the migrant community. Yet Alevi migrants had to dissimulate as Sunnis 
in local Sunni-dominant settings such as in Bursa, otherwise local Sunni Turks would call them 
gavurlar (infidels), not Alevis or even “Bulgarians,” for not practicing Sunni Islam, as one 
informant stated. For instance, migrant Kurdish Alevis in Bursa had narrated to me the 
difficulties of living in “such a Sunni-hegemonic place.” During the times of Ramadan fasting, 
not following the Sunni fasting would cause verbal harassments by the locals who call them 
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“Kızılbaş2,” an insult implying “heresy.” However, I did not experience hearing them placed 
into the category of “infidels.” 
Changes in power balances may cause other changes, such as a majority group being 
replaced by another one while the minority group remains the same. Even though its status does 
not change, the members of the minority still have to dissimulate, though perhaps as members of 
different majorities. In Bulgaria, majority groups have historically replaced each other: Sunni 
Ottomans, Sunni Bulgarian Turks, Bulgarian Christians, ethnic Bulgarian and Turkish socialist 
authorities, among others. It might be presumed that socialism terminated the dissimulation, but 
my fieldwork revealed that Alevi Bulgarian Turks had to dissimulate before socialist authorities 
as atheist citizens, similar to cases in the other parts of the world, such as Muslim Azeris who 
had dissimulated under Soviet Socialism (Swietochowski 2002). As different majorities have 
hold power in different historical periods in Bulgaria, Alevi Bulgarian Turks have been 
constantly marginalized, while they dissimulated against whatever group ruled.  
In Islamic theology, dissimulation (takiye)
 
 has three specialized meanings. The first is 
prudential concealment, which stands for the concealment of one’s religious identity in order to 
protect oneself or one’s religious group in life-threatening contexts (Kohlberg 1975; Sachedina 
2010). Second, takiye may mean protective concealment, pretending to be a member of the 
                                                 
2
 Kızılbaş: The term literally refers to nomadic warriors who had placed a red cloth on their headgear representing 
the side of the Shia Safavid Empire of Persia against the side of the Sunni Ottoman Empire during the Chaldiran 
Battle in 1514. In 14
th
 the century, the term Kızılbaş referred to Persian Safavids while by the 16th century meant for 
Anatolians supporting the Safavids’ Twelver Shia belief.  By the 18th century, the term referred to rural and semi-
nomadic followers of the Twelver Shia belief, requiring Alevi parents for group membership. It was opposed to 
urban   Bektaşis,  who were followers of Haci Bektas Veli, not requiring Alevi parents for the group membership 
(Melikoff:1998). The difference matters  since Kızılbaş were seen as “heretics” and “rioters” in the Ottoman 
documents while Bektaşi  were seen as the backbone of the Janissary Army (Melikoff: 1998). In present-day 
Turkey, the ters Kızılbaş carries a pejorative meaning (Melikoff: 1998) and has been replaced by the term “Alevi.”  
On the other hand, in Bulgaria, Alevis historically identified themselves as “Kızılbaş” and the term Alevi did was 
not used until after 1989. Currently, the term Kızılbaş is still in use in Northern Bulgaria while in Southern Bulgaria 
it gained a pejorative meaning and has been replaced by the term Alevi.               
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hegemonic religious group to avoid discrimination and to have equal access to power and 
prestige (Kohlberg 1975, Sachedina 2010). Finally, takiye may mean secrecy, hiding the esoteric 
elements of the belief system from those unable to grasp the true meaning of them (Kohlberg 
1975). These distinctions indicate varying contexts and different addressees of dissimulation. 
The first two forms are against outsiders, while the last is against potentially harmful insiders. 
Also, prudential concealment is a matter of life or death, while protective concealment is for 
minorities that are recognized yet disadvantaged, leaving their members to seek upward mobility 
by pretending to be the members of the majority. 
The term itself, takiye, has been translated as “dissimulation” by sociologists (Neyzi 
2002), anthropologists (Dupree 1979), historians (Pipes 1989, Firro 2001), religious studies 
scholars (Kohlberg 1975, Zeidan 1999, Sachedina 2010, Virani 2011) and literature scholars 
(Gordon 1977). Many of these scholars display discomfort with doing so due to the negative 
connotations of the term dissimulation in colloquial usage, and use qualifiers such as “religious 
dissimulation” (Ibrahim 2010), “precautionary dissimulation” (Kohlberg 1975), “protective 
dissimulation” (Dupree 1979), “precautionary dissimulation” and “prudential concealment” 
(Sachedina 2010) at the beginning of their works, though they then mainly continue to refer to 
takiye simply as dissimulation.    
These studies on takiye recognize the function of dissimulation to be providing 
immediate protection for individual minority members and for the group (Kohlberg 1975, 
Gordon 1977, Dupree 1979, Layish 1985, Emadi 2000; Sachedina 2010). They emphasize the 
defensive aspect of dissimulation for religious minorities in the face of persecution (Kohlberg 
1975) or discrimination (Dupree 1979), or both (Sachedina 2010). In this respect dissimulation is 
not about tricking or fooling a majority; it is a last resort for minorities to survive the most trying 
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circumstances. In fact, a few works point out the stereotypes about dissimulating minorities in 
their surrounding societies. For instance, Zenner examines the stereotypes of Israeli Arabs in 
Galilee and identifies Arab resentment of the Druze use of dissimulation and their perception of 
Druze dissimulation as opportunism (Zenner 1972: 412-413). In other words, the perception of 
dissimulating religious minorities as opportunists or tricksters may be a phenomenon by outsider 
majority communities, while the academic community recognizes dissimulation as an issue of 
minorities sheltering themselves in hostile circumstances. 
Dissimulation as prudential concealment is a tactic for avoiding or surviving extreme 
violence, such as forced mass conversions, migrations and killings, without actually erasing but 
instead fortifying the sense of self-identity among minority group members. For instance, 
dissimulation allowed the survival of Jews and Muslims in Inquisition-period Spain, even though 
after conversions they faced surveillance as potential heretics (Root 1988). Despite their 
conversions, they were discriminated against for being “new Christians” as opposed to “old 
Christians” (Ibrahim 2008).  More importantly, as Ibrahim’s and Root’s works on the converts’ 
literary texts indicate, they continued to imagine their group through their heritage identity. In 
other words, conversion and dissimulation had not caused the erasure of the communal identity, 
but fortified it.  Similarly, the rivalry between the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shia Safavid 
Empire in the 15
th
 century caused Shiafication in current day Iranian territories (Moreen 1981) 
by forced conversions (Abisaab 1994), and the Sunnification of Anatolia. Shia, Kızılbaş and 
Alevi populations there faced mass conversion, or being killed. Yet, despite the extreme 
violence, contemporary Iran has Sunni minorities and Turkey has Shia and Alevi minorities, 
indicating that survival under strictly oppressive regimes was possible through their prudential 
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concealment.
3
 Likewise, segments of Jewish populations were forced into conversion in Ottoman 
Izmir, and followed the Sabetay Sevi, a rabbi who declared himself as the messiah, converted to 
Islam, and formed in the 17
th
 century the secret society called Sabbateanists. The existence of 
this group disturbed the rabbis in Izmir, yet gained popularity among Jewish migrants from 
Salonika to Izmir in the Ottoman Empire in 19
th
 century, as discussed by Leyla Neyzi (2002). 
Similar cases of Jewish dissimulation were seen in Masshad, Iran in the 19
th
 century (Nissimi 
2004), and among Christians on the North Sea shores of Turkey after the population exchange 
between Greece and Turkey of 1923 (Clark 2006). In all of these cases, those who survived 
oppression by dissimulation held on to their identities even tighter.   
Dissimulation as protective concealment is a tactic to survive discrimination in contexts 
where minorities are recognized, but seen as inferior. It also fortifies the sense of self of minority 
members. For instance, in India between 1900 and the 1930s, Guptis were a minority within the 
Ismaili Shia Muslim minority and dissimulated as majority Hindus instead of minority Sunni 
Muslims (Virani 2011). Between 1930 and 1946 a segment of Southern Guptis excommunicated 
from their caste, which resulted in increased group coherence among Guptis and their efforts to 
reconciliate of their religious identity with their caste. This process of reconciliation lead to 
abandonement of their dissimulation after 1930s and led to their dissimilation by publicly 
forming a separate housing society by Guptis (Virani 2011: 104) 
Similar to the Guptis, Alevi Turks in Bulgaria interact with a majority, the Bulgarian 
Orthodox Christians, and with the dominant sect of the minority, the Sunni Turks. Alevi 
dissimulation, however, is more complicated than merely dissimulating as the majority, since 
                                                 
3
 In the Turkish republic Turkey, the minority status is granted only to non-Muslim groups since the Lausanne 
Treaty in 1923. Therefore, Shia and Alevi groups have not been recognized as minorities but conflated under the 
Muslim category. In contemporary Iran, Armenians, Zoroastrians, Jews are recognized as the official minorities. 
Therefore, Sunnis are conflated under the category of Muslims (Sansarian 2000).   
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there has beeen more than one such majority group in Bulgaria, from Sunni Ottomans, to 
Orthodox Christian Bulgarians, to Socialist Bulgarians, and back to Orthodox Christian 
Bulgarians. Second, at any given time, varying majority-minority demographic configurations in 
Alevi residential areas have complicated Alevi dissimulations. For instance, as my fieldwork 
shows, in demographically mixed areas of socialist Bulgaria such as Razgrad, some Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks had to dissimulate before Bulgarian socialist officials as former-Christians-
converted-to-Islam. In other times, they dissimulated as atheist socialist citizens before Turkish 
socialist officials, in Turkish-majority Kardjali. In both cases, they dissimulated in order to 
continue practicing Alevism.  
Sometimes dissimulation involves pretending to be a member of a majority ethnic group 
without mentioning the sect, since the majority ethnic group is presumed in the society to be the 
majority sect of the same religion. In this way, the dissimulating community shelters its ethnic 
identity and does not need to claim directly the majority’s religious identity or deny its own 
religious identity. For instance, in Afghanistan in the late 1970s, Sunni Islam was 
constitutionally declared to be the official state religion, but Shia Pashtun individuals could hold 
bureaucratic positions by dissimulating as Sunni Pashtuns (Dupree 1979). This allowed Shias to 
claim Sunni identity without denying Shia identity. This case gives insight about practices of 
Alevi Turks in Kardjali, where Sunni Turks form the demographic and administrative majority. 
Alevis in Kardjali dissimulate not by denying Alevi identity or declaring themselves to be Sunni, 
but by overemphasizing their Turkishness, which is presumed in the society to mark Sunni 
identity. This dissimulation helps maintain the Alevi identity without facing explicit 
discrimination.  
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In recent literature, dissimulation is claimed to create hybrid identities and to blur the 
symbolic borders between groups. Accordingly, long lasting dissimulation practices by groups 
are seen as causing not only a pause in their practices of their original religion, but also as 
establishing a complicated belief system made up of elements from the original and dissimulated 
religions. Virani’s work (2011) states that Gupti dissimulation as Hindus is not 
“simply…syncretic” but signals hybridity, and Ibrahim’s and Rose-Rodriguez’s works on Jewish 
and Muslim converts in Inquisition Spain claims that hybrid identities resulted (Ibrahim 2008, 
Rose-Rodriguez 2010).  
My work challenges such analyses, however. While the term “hybridity” may serve as a 
pseudo-explanation for the situation of minorities without actually really explaining it (Pieterse 
1995), I argue that dissimulation is a collective and calculated practice primarily intended to 
keep the collectivity, as such, alive in hostile environments. Thus, even though long lasting 
dissimulation may lead to lessened information about the original belief. due to lessened 
transmission of knowledge across generations, or fewer religious rituals and practices due to 
surveillance, members of the dissimulating minorities continue to define themselves by the very 
heritage that their dissimulation is meant to hide. As observed during my fieldwork, an Alevi 
dissimulates in order to remain Alevi and, even after a long period of dissimulation, he or she 
does not forget that he or she is an Alevi, even if he or she does not practice Alevism. In this 
way, dissimulation does not blur but instead reinforces the boundaries separating communities; 
while the “cultural content” of being an Alevi changes, the boundaries of the Alevi community 
remain (Barth 1969, Hayden 2011).   
Dissimulating groups may also have nested identities, such as Alevi Bulgarian Turks who 
are self-identified Alevi Muslims in confessional terms and Turkish in ethnic terms. It is possible 
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that some individual members of these minorities may prioritize the non-religious aspect of their 
identity, such as Alevi Bulgarian Turks who may identify themselves primarily as Turks, which I 
do not see as an example of dissimulation at all. There is, however, another configuration among 
minorities with nested identities: some segments of religiously-marked minorities may announce 
their religious identity as primary, while they use their self-identified secondary identities for 
strategic purposes, even as both primary and secondary identities are sincere parts of their 
personalities. They may utilize the secondary identity to blanket their primary identity when the 
latter is used for their oppression. I see such a configuraton as dissimulation. For instance, in 
Chapter Six I focus on the strategic utilizations of self-identified Turkishnessby Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks when their Alevi identity is used as a pretext for discrimination, or for denial to them of 
rights stemming from their Turkishness.  
On the other hand, my work has revealed the possibility of another configuration of the 
religious minorities with nested identities: a religiously-marked minority’s members may not 
recognize non-religious markers as central to their identity at all. For instance the residents of 
present-day Razgrad (and Kardjali in the past) used the following taxonomy about the 
neighborhoods in mixed settings: “Bulgarian,” “Turkish” (meaning Sunni) and “Kızılbaş” 
(meaning Alevi) neighborhoods. I argue that in such a setting an Alevi groups’ public utilization 
of Turkish identity exemplifies the strategic use of the secondary component of their nested 
identity.  
Other literature on dissimulation prioritizes theological explanations by focusing on 
religious texts and Islamic scholars’ interpretations, instead of actual practices of the religious 
communities. For instance, Sachedina locates dissimulation as a practical political strategy of 
quietism (and as an alternative to other strategies, such as activism or migration), adopted to 
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survive an oppressive regime until a theologically-projected “just order” will be established 
(2010). These perceptions are too doctrine oriented to recognize the various ways in which 
religious ideas, beliefs, or doctrines, such as dissimulation, are utilized on an everyday level. 
Contrary to such frameworks, my work prioritizes an empirically–oriented framework to 
examine dissimulation as one tactic for survival for all religious minorities, including but not 
limited to Alevi Bulgarian Turks, and that that does not necessarily depend on the establishment 
of  a “just world order” that is projected by Islamic theology, but rather on mere survival in the 
society.  I discuss how, when, and why dissimulation is utilized (or not) as alternative to other 
tactics, such as dissimilation or assimilation, by some Alevis and not others.  
3.2 MINORITIES, AND MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES  
The literature on minorities has evolved along several lines, reflecting differing 
conceptualizations of European and American minorities. Work on European minorities (i.e. 
“national minorities”) examines ethnic groups that are marked by political agendas such as self-
determination, while the literature on American minorities (i.e. “minority groups”) focuses on 
cultural groups without political agendas subversive to the residential states (see Meyers 1984; 
Gleason 1991). The literature on European “national minorities” tends to portray them as either 
victims of the detrimental policies of discrimination in their host states (e.g. Horowitz 1985; 
Mann 2005), or as a “menace” (Miller 1934) for their host states due to their cross-border ties 
with an external homeland state. The literature on U.S. “minority groups” recognizes internal 
differences within them and even uses the term “a minority within a minority” for double-
marginalized groups, such as groups falling into two designated minority statuses (e.g. Black 
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Jews in the US, Gold 2003), or into several demographic segments (e.g. age and gender groups) 
of one designated minority group (e.g. non-heterosexual Muslims in Britain, Yip 2004). My 
work draws upon and contributes to both literatures. It focuses on a “national minority” 
(Bulgarian Turks) by examining the internal segmentation within the minority and the effects of 
this on the members of certain segments. In this respect, my work differs from the “minority 
group” literature, since I examine both the categorical distinctions (e.g. regional affiliations and 
demographics) and substantive distinctions (e.g. religious affiliations) that imply a structural, 
patterned, and institutionalized hierarchy within the minority.   
Many works have examined how nationalist projects pretend to homogenize the majority 
nations (e.g. Gellner 1983, Hobsbawn 1983, Anderson 1983), and a few academic works have 
focused on homogenizing representations of ethnic minorities by the majority nationalisms. 
Mary Neuburger states that Bulgarian majority nationalism has been formed through 
representations of Turkish Muslims as the ultimate outsiders, deemed the “Orient within” (2004). 
Minority nationalisms have also contributed to such homogenizations. For instance, Bulgarian 
Turks have often been portrayed as Sunnis, not Alevis, in Bulgarian Turk memoirs (e.g. Raci 
Efendi 2004, Akseki 2000, Topaloğlu 2006, Kurt 2006, Türker 2003, Gülmen 2006, Erdi 2009) 
and academic works (e.g. Memişoğlu 1992, Şimşir 2009). Some Bulgarian Turkish intellectuals 
mention Alevi Bulgarian Turks, but only to discuss the general minority-majority problems (e.g. 
Kılıç 1993). Alevi Bulgarian Turks have been mentioned in research on regional folklore 
(Taceman 1995) or Alevi ethnography (Georgieva 1998), but broader context is ignored. 
Grammatikova, an Alevi Bulgarian Turkish scholar, is an exception in recognizing the broader 
context by seeing the minority within a minority status of Alevi Turks in Bulgaria (2000). She 
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leaves this as an unexplained statement, however, neglecting to examine how Alevi communities 
have coped with this situation.  
Marginalization of minority sects by a religious majority has been studied, such as 
Protestants in Catholic Europe (Coakley 2009), Catholics in Protestant Europe (Evans 1999), 
Sunnis in Shia Iran (Sanasarian 2000), and Kurdish Alevis in Sunni-dominant Turkey 
(Shankland 1999, 2003). These studies focus on majority-minority relations, while my work 
focuses on relations within a minority, between its two sects. Alevis in Bulgaria remain the most 
disfavored segment of a disfavored community: the state-recognized “traditional” religion is 
Orthodox Christianity, though Sunni Islam is also recognized, as is Judaism. For those Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks who migrated to Turkey the situation is not better, since Sunni Islam has been 
the only form institutionalized in Turkey even under the officially secular Republic, and even 
more so with the accession to power of the AKP since 2000 (Harmanşah, Tanyeri-Erdemir and 
Hayden 2010). 
Some national minorities in the newly formed nation-states have remained in territories 
adjacent to the nation-state of their own group. Earlier literature has assumed an unproblematic 
relation between national minorities and their external homeland nations, since the former were 
seen as “fragments” of the latter (Broz 1927). Yet recent literature points out collective 
externalization of these groups following their migrations to homeland states. Greek migrants 
from Anatolia to Greece after 1922 were seen as “refugees,” not Greeks (Karakasidou 1997) as 
the Turkish migrants from Greece were externalized in Turkey (Clark 2006); Armenian migrants 
from the Middle East to Soviet Armenia in 1946-47 were seen as “outsiders” (Pattie 2004)  
Turks migrating from Bulgaria to Turkey were seen as “kin-nationals” (Poulton 1997) or 
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“Bulgarians” (Vasileva 1992, Parla 2003). Alevi Bulgarian Turks are structurally and socially 
double marginalized in the external homeland state, Turkey.     
Some scholars see such minorities with dual affiliations as instances of emergence of 
hyphenated identities in their residential states, such as Palestinian-Israelis (Hammack 2010); or 
in their external homeland states after migrations, such as Bulgarian Turks in Turkey (Parla 
2006). Scholars valorized such conditions of hyphenated identities, since they presumably 
challenge the rigid distinctions between two communities. This approach risks seeing hybrid 
identities as themselves homogenous (Ewing 1998) and homogenizes the minority by presuming 
a single and shared trajectory for all of its members. This reduces the potential of recognizing 
more complicated experiences of a minority’s varying segments, and refrains from explaining to 
what extent, how, and when such minorities’ dual affiliations are experienced by its members. 
Yet, claims to be hybrid may be a strategy utilized to ground some communities’ authenticity 
claims over others, as “autochthonous hybrids” (Ballinger 2003). With these issues in mind, my 
work emphasizes the differences between the Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ experiences and those of 
their Sunni counterparts.  
Other scholars have explained the complex situation of such minorities along structuralist 
models, such as the “trapped minorities” model of Rabinowitz (2001). These models recognize 
the predicaments of these minorities due to their potentially troubling dual affiliations in two 
nation-states. However, they do not take into account possible manifestations of agency by the 
members of such minorities even when their structural entrapment continues. Again in contrast, 
this work argues that even though the conditions of oppression persist, members of an oppressed 
community may show a degree of agency, as indicated by the experiences of Bulgarian Turkish 
minority and specifically Alevi Bulgarian Turks. 
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3.3 NATIONAL MINORITIES AND A NOTION OF COLLECTIVE AGENCY  
Studies of social movements have examined collective actions of groups by focusing on actors 
and interest groups, their motivations and behaviors, their social agendas, and the structural 
availabilities for them (see Edelman 2001). Such perspectives reduce collective agency to the 
context of groups’ formally organized movements. Other studies have considered the 
unorganized, everyday activities by the members of the oppressed groups as manifestations of 
agency, such as Scott’s “weapons of the weak” model. This model considers Malaysian 
peasants’ subtle acts of showing discontent as manifestations of agency and frames them as 
“everyday forms of resistance” (1985). Yet such approaches equate any manifestation of agency 
with resistance (Ahearn 2001) and reduce collective agency of groups into a sum of random, 
sporadic acts by individuals. Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ experiences contradict both approaches 
because Alevis have displayed unorganized yet patterned collective actions and agency in 
pursuing the agenda of the community’s survival. 
In this study, I utilize the term agency as the capacity to act and pursue desired ends, as 
an alternative to a liberal individualist notion of agency, which portrays agency as an attribute of 
individuals (Ortner 1996), and I examine the minority members’ collective capacity to act to 
pursue desired ends through organized or unorganized, but more or less patterned behaviors. I 
focus on agency as a “collective,” “interactional,” and “intersubjective” social action possibility 
(Bucholtz and Hall 2005).  
This notion of agency emphasizes that minority members’ collective capacity to act is not 
unconstrained but “socioculturally mediated” (Ahearn 2001). I examine to what extent, when and 
how double minorities may find spaces of maneuver to cope with their environment or even to 
achieve certain desired ends for collective betterment. On a broader level, I examine to what 
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extent, how and when a marginalized community may develop and manifest a degree of agency 
even though the conditions that caused its member’s marginalization persist.  
I employ the notion of “distributed agency” to acknowledge that agency may be 
distributed among several actors in the society (Bucholtz and Hall 2005). This helps me 
understand that Alevi and Sunni Bulgarian Turks’ and their different segments may have varying 
availabilities, and spaces to maneuver, in different locations in Bulgaria and Turkey. 
Furthermore, I discuss the patterns of the distributed agency within segments of Alevi Turks by 
answering to what extent, how, and when some segments of the minority may, or may not, have 
been granted space to maneuver as  changes in macro political, social, and economic conditions 
may create new and different possibilities or burdens for segments of minorities.  
Finally, I underline the scope of minorities’ agency, meaning what this capacity to act 
may lead to when this capacity is fully realized, also conditioned by the structural factors that 
place minorities into disadvantageous positions in the larger society. To discuss all of this, I 
utilize Michel DeCertau’s distinction of “tactics” from “strategies” in his examination of 
everyday level practices (1984). According to DeCerteau, “tactics” are the forms of “calculated 
[everyday level] actions” by the weaker segments of the society, who can only maneuver within 
already existing power relations that place them into marginal position, i.e. “within the enemy 
territory” (37), as opposed to “strategies” as “calculations (or manipulations) of power 
relationships that become possible [by] subjects with will and power,” (35-36) i.e. the powerful 
segments of the populations who can change the rules of the game. I show that Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks’ collective agency, as capacity to act, is “tactical” in two senses: first, their collective 
actions are limited to the existing forms of asymmetrical relations and second, these collective 
actions do not challenge existing power asymmetries in the society but only cope with the 
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burdens thus imposed on the community. My work considers agency as “socioculturally 
mediated acts” (Ahearn 2001) and considers Alevis’ dissimulation as a tacticedintends for not 
changing the social structure that marginalize them, but provides venues to cope with this 
marginalization.  
3.4 BORDERS AND FRONTIERS  
The terms “frontier” and “border” are often used inconsistently. In international relations and 
international law, the term “frontier” generally means an internationally recognized state 
boundary, which is referred to as a “border” in sociology, anthropology and geography. In this 
study the term “border” refers to the demarcated boundaries of states, while the term “frontier” 
refers to cultural and territorial zones distinguished from other territories of the state but 
implying contact between different “cultures” (Bailey 1957), or between particular “relations, 
behaviors, and traits” (Alvarez and Collier 1994). Some scholars portray frontiers as states’ 
peripheral zones, signifying physical margins as well as lack of incorporation to the state, as 
prone to lawless state-violence (Ron 2003) while others, such as Das and Poole, state that the 
margins of a state are sites where normal (not exceptional) modalities of state power are 
exercised, so that frontiers are sites of unpredictability of state behavior (Das and Poole 2004). 
This uses of the term “frontier” emphasizes the distinction of territorial zones from the larger 
wholes containing them and therefore assumes a degree of internal homogeneity within frontier 
zones and non-frontier zones in a state. For instance, Deliorman in Northeast Bulgaria and 
Eastern Rodops in South Bulgaria are frontier regions bordering Greece and they are distinct 
from the rest of Bulgaria in terms of high spatial concentration of the Turkish minority. 
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Furthermore, both frontier regions have a distinct history in relation to borders: Deliorman region 
become a part of Bulgaria in 1878 while Eastern Rodops was incorporated into the state in 1913.  
My fieldwork data come from two provinces in these two frontiers: Razgrad in the 
Northeast and Kardjali in the South; and three frontiers in Turkey: Bursa, Turkish Thrace, and a 
neighborhood in İstanbul where Bulgarian Turkish migrants are concentrated (See Figure 3-1). 
These frontiers are also internally divided into sub-frontiers, of concentrations of minority sub-
groups: Alevis and Sunnis. In Bulgaria’s two frontiers, territorially-marked senses of the selves 
have developed among Bulgarian Turks. Alevis and Sunnis from the Northeast are considered 
Deliormanli, and those from the South are the Rodoplu. These regional affiliations are also 
shared by both Alevis and Sunnis at the same frontiers as opposed to Alevis and Sunnis at the 
other frontier, and they have continued to be valid in Turkey even decades after the last 
migrations.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Distribution of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Turkoj_en_Bulgario.png) 
 
 
 
 
 91 
 
Figure 3-2 Distribution of Turks in Bulgaria according to the 2001 census 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:2001_Distribution_of_Turks_in_Bulgaria_by_District.jpg) 
 
The regional identities of Bulgarian Turks have remained salient for several reasons. 
First, historical processes have kept Northeastern and Southern Bulgarian Turks apart. Under 
Ottoman rule, present-day Razgrad was politically, economically and socially affiliated to Vidin 
and Ruse while Kardjali was affiliated to Dimetoka and then Edirne. Even after the 
independence and unification of Bulgaria, these connections had continued, as stated by my 
informants. Under socialism, the Bulgarian state utilized diversified political, social, and 
economic policies in the two frontiers where Turks were concentrated, similar to Hetcher’s 
(1975) “internal colonialism” framework, which discusses the British state’s different policies in 
different regions with minorities. Thus, an economic discrepancy appeared between the 
Northeast and South. Also, socialist period policies, such as controlling and restricting migration 
and mobility, fortified the regional identities. For instance, even today it is impossible to find a 
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public bus route directly connecting Razgrad and Kardjali. Also, in Turkey, many migrant 
organizations either prioritize regional identities explicitly (e.g. by using names referring to 
regions or provinces) or tacitly (e.g. by preferring certain regional NGOs).      
The salience of the Bulgarian Turks’ regional affiliations complicates, yet does not 
trivialize, the significance of the religious affiliations among the Bulgarian Turks. Alevis in 
Northeastern and Southern Bulgaria had remained disconnected from each other until very 
recently. Alevis in the North still see Demir Baba and Huseyin Baba as their major saints while 
Alevis in the South see Otman Baba and Elmali Baba as their major saints. Also, Babais and 
Bektaşis in each frontier are differentiated in terms of their beliefs, rituals and symbols. Yet their 
common Alevi identity still prevails over the regional identities in Bulgaria; a Northern Alevi 
feels more affiliated with a Southern Alevi than with a Northern Sunni. These relations are also 
carried into the settlement zones in Turkey following migrations. My fieldwork shows that Alevi 
migrants from north and south form their own distinct religious communities even if they live in 
the same neighborhoods or villages in Turkey. Despite these differentiations, “the Alevi migrant” 
identity prevails over the generic migrant identity. An Alevi Bulgarian Turkish migrant generally 
does not intermarry with a Sunni Bulgarian Turkish migrant or even a local Alevi Turk in 
Turkey.   
The specific demographic configurations in each frontier led to Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ 
varying tactics in relating to other groups in the larger society. In Razgrad, Bulgarian Turks form 
a local administrative and demographic minority in relation to the Bulgarian majority, while in 
Kardjali Bulgarian Turks form the local demographic majority and hold power in the local 
government. These different majority-minority configurations in the two frontiers in Bulgaria 
have resulted in two different senses of “being a minority” for Bulgarian Turks. In Razgrad, 
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Bulgarian Turks are an anxious minority feeling threatened by aggressive Bulgarian nationalism, 
while in Kardjali, Bulgarian Turks form a confident minority aggressively seeking increased 
political and social rights. Under these circumstances, Alevis in Razgrad have become 
recognized as a community with a separate identity, the “Kızılbaş,” which is distinct from 
“Turkish” (meaning Sunni) and “Bulgarian” communities. Alevis in Razgrad, despite their small 
numbers, are thus the third element (“mediator”) in a triad in which “it is important for [two 
antagonistic elements] to win over even the mediator” (Simmel 1950: 147). Yet Alevis in 
Kardjali cannot form a community with a strong and separate identity because there are not two 
antagonistic parties in the community like there are in Razgrad; Sunni Turks are both the 
demographic and local administrative majority. In this respect, Alevis in Razgrad have 
dissimilated their collective identity, while Alevis in Kardjali have often dissimulated as (Sunni) 
“Turks”.   
Even after the Bulgarian Turks’ waves of migrations to Turkey, the mismatch between 
the political borders and the ethnic frontiers has not reached a closure. Those who remain in 
Bulgaria continue to be a disfavored minority, and those who migrated to Turkey are still 
regarded as outsiders there. My fieldwork shows that many Northeastern and Southern Bulgarian 
Turks met with Bulgarian Turks from the other frontier for the first time following their 
resettlement in “the migrant neighborhoods” of towns and cities in Turkey. Particularly in Bursa, 
migrants incipiently formed a Bulgarian Turkish community distinct from local Turks in Turkey 
and other migrants. Therefore, the distinctions between migrants from Northeastern and 
Southern Bulgaria are often invisible at first glance. In reality, members of each group have 
formed their own separate neighborhoods, unless they felt forced into settlement in hybrid 
migrant complexes constructed by the state and local administrations.   
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Migration and resettlement has caused further marginalization of Alevi Bulgarian Turks 
in Turkey. They have formed small Alevi migrant enclaves, which often are kept closed to local 
Alevis and which are further internally divided in terms of sub-groups (i.e. Babai,  Bektaşi  or 
Musahipli) and in terms of original locations (i.e. the Northeast or South). On the one hand, 
Alevi migrants who were settled in the migrant neighborhoods of the heavily Sunni dominant 
cities (e.g. Bursa) could not take on an Alevi collective identity, and have refused to connect 
with local Alevis. Instead, they have taken on the “migrant” identity in relation to Sunni migrants 
and “Turkish” identity in relation to local Turks. Thus, they dissolved as a community. Some few 
individuals have assimilated into Sunnism, while the majority continues defining themselves as 
Alevis in private, even though they cannot practice Alevism. On the other hand, Alevis who 
managed to form their own villages (e.g. Subasi in Yalova, Cesmeli in Corlu) or managed to 
resettle in Alevi safe-haven neighborhoods in cosmopolitan cities (e.g. Firuzkoy in İstanbul) 
have managed to keep the community alive and continued practicing Alevism, but dissimulate as 
Sunnis in public. Furthermore, my fieldwork shows that migrant Alevis who formed their own 
separate and active religious community do not conduct their religious ceremonies with local 
Alevis yet they form social connections with the local Alevis’ organizations (e.g. in Turkish 
Thrace and İstanbul), while migrant Alevis who could not form their own religious community 
in Turkey (e.g. in Bursa).      
3.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I elaborated on the concept of dissimulation in relation to the concepts of 
dissimilation and assimilation, as a form of collective agency utilized by religiously-marked 
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communities when they face persecutions or severe discrimination. I argued that dissimulation 
has often been ignored in the social science literature on minority-majority relations, although 
the concept reveals a specific configuration of this relation in sharply divided societies: a 
minority’s members hide their identity and even pretend to be members of the majority group in 
order to ensure survival of their community. More importantly, dissimulation indicates the 
robustness of inter-communal differences and boundaries while it helps minorities to preserve 
their communal identity. Further, to introduce the specific minority-majority configuration in my 
research, I discussed the Bulgarian Turks’ marginalization as a minority community in Bulgaria 
and migrant community in Turkey.  I then utilized the concept of “a minority within a minority” 
to identify Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ situation within the Bulgarian Turkish minority and in relation 
to the two majority nations in Bulgaria and Turkey. Finally, I argued that dissimulation is a 
viable collective tactic for Alevi Bulgaria Turks, as their double-marginalization prevails in both 
Bulgaria and Turkey. Alevi Bulgarian Turks have dissimulated to protect their group identity 
when they could not directly emphasize their distinctiveness (i.e. dissimilate) under the threat of 
persecution, and neither could they blend in (i.e. assimilate), even if they wanted to, as their 
original distinct identity may always be recalled by outsiders.   
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4.0  HISTORY, HISTORICITY, HISTORIOGRAPHY 
This chapter shows the links between the current and historical invisibilities of the Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks’ in both countries. The “History” section discusses the developments that mark 
the lives of all Bulgarian Turks but have led to different trajectories for Alevis and Sunnis. 
Historical configurations led to the common tendency to identify the Bulgarian Turkish group 
identity with Sunni Islam, rendering Alevi Bulgarian Turks structurally invisible. The 
“Historiography” section examines the representations of Bulgarian Turks in the Bulgarian and 
Turkish academic literatures, which often hold conflicting opinions on Bulgarian Turks, but 
coincide in actively excluding Alevis from the Bulgarian Turkish community. “Historicity” 
examines the historical consciousness of Bulgarian Turks by analyzing family histories, memoirs 
and village histories to argue that these accounts contributed to Alevi invisibility in different 
ways. Sunni authors refuse to associate Alevism with Bulgarian Turkish identity, even if they 
recognize the presence of Alevis in the community. Alevi authors, for their part, do not explicitly 
mention Alevis and Alevism when they hint at their Alevi identity to insiders, which is consistent 
with dissimulation practices. 
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4.1 HISTORY  
Historical border formation processes between the Bulgarian state and the Ottoman Empire and 
Turkish Republic led to the transformation of ethnic Turks into a distinct community in both 
countries: the Bulgarian Turks. Bulgarian Turks remained a disfavored minority in Bulgaria as 
remnants from the Ottoman rule, and a distant “kin-nation” to Turkey (Poulton 1997). Following 
waves of mass migrations, the Bulgarian Turks were seen as “migrants” and even as 
“Bulgarians” in Turkey (Parla 2006). Despite these externally-defined homogenizations, 
Bulgarian Turks are divided into Alevis and Sunnis. This internal differentiation among 
Bulgarian Turks has been subsumed by larger majority-minority tensions, mainly those between 
Bulgarians and Turks in Bulgaria and between locals and migrants in Turkey. Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks thereby become doubly-marginalized and remain so today; they are a disadvantaged 
minority within a minority in Bulgaria, and an invisible segment of a migrant community in 
Turkey. In this section I examine five periods of major political change in Bulgaria and Turkey 
that have influenced policies and practices regarding Bulgarian Turks. I argue that these changes 
did not influence Bulgarian Turks uniformly, but created different experiences and differentiated 
status for Sunni and Alevi Bulgarian Turks. 
4.1.1 Principality in Bulgaria, Monarchy in the Ottoman Empire (1878-1908) 
In 1878, the Ottoman-Russia War led to the formation of an autonomous Bulgarian Principality 
and a semi-autonomous Eastern Rumelian State. The political and economic power in these 
territories shifted suddenly from Muslims to Orthodox Christian Bulgarians. Initial changes were 
symbolic, such as destruction or transformation of Ottoman administrative buildings and Muslim 
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religious sites, renaming the streets, villages, and towns, and annulling the legal significance of 
neighborhoods based on ethno-religious affiliation (Crampton 1990: 47-56). The Principality and 
the Empire’s “conceptual and administrative entanglement” persisted due to the presence of a 
large number of Turks in the territory of the Principality (Neuburger 2004: 35). Turks for their 
part were still displaying loyalty to the Empire, by identifying themselves as “Ottoman citizens” 
in the 1880 census (Crampton 1990) resisting learning Bulgarian, and using the Turkish language 
in official documents (Şimşir 1986: 46). Only after 1885, with the unification of the Principality 
and Eastern Rumelia, were Bulgarian regulations to sever the ties between the Empire and Turks 
in Bulgaria enforced. Bulgarian Turks’ rights were defined within the context of the tensions 
between the Bulgarian national state and the Ottoman Empire. The minority regime for Turks 
was dominated by Sunnis, as was the Empire, and led the affiliation of Bulgarian Turkish group 
identity with Sunni Islam. This led to the structural invisibility and exclusion of Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks. 
In the meantime, the successful uprisings in the Balkans led to a shift in Ottoman state 
policy to Islamism (Karpat 2002: 140), meaning that Islamic identity was projected as the 
binding force for Muslims from Ottoman territories and territories that were formerly ruled by 
the Ottoman Empire (Karpat 2002: 133). Thus, all treaties with the new states included an article 
permitting Muslims in these states to praise the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph during Friday Prayers 
(Karpat 2002: 133). In addition, the fatwa of 1880 encouraged Muslims to migrate from 
territories that were no longer ruled by the Ottomans, to Ottoman territories (Karpat 2002: 137-
8), triggering mass migrations from Bulgaria, among other places. From 1880-1884, the number 
of Turks in the Principality and Eastern Rumelia dropped from 802,597 to 601,999 (Turan 2000: 
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83). Sunni and Alevi migrants dealt diffently with the Ottoman policies of Islamism, as 
examined in the next section.  
Minority in Bulgaria:  The Turkish Muslims were legally recognized as a minority for 
the first time in 1878 at the Berlin Treaty, in return for the international recognition of the 
Principality (Dayıoğlu 2005: 88). The first constitution in 1879 declared Orthodox Christianity 
“the predominant faith” while guaranteeing “other believers’ rights” (Zhelyazkova 2002: 12), 
defining for the first time Orthodox Christianity as the majority religion and Islam as a minority 
one. The laws on organizations for Turkish Muslims introduced the institutionalization of Sunni 
Islam as the only legally recognized Muslim sect in Bulgaria. Thus, the Principality period was 
the turning point in which Alevi Bulgarian Turks became a minority within a minority.  
Alevi Bulgarian Turks also became invisible in the minority regime. For instance, the 
1880 law only recognized organizations that were affiliated with Sunni religious sites (i.e. 
mosques commissions), and gave recognition to Sunni administrative leaders (muftis) and the 
Sunni spiritual authority, the Seyhulislam in İstanbul. In contrast, traditional religious 
organizations for Alevis had been in cem communities under Alevi religious leaders (babas) in 
relation to Alevi spiritual centers in Bulgaria, Greece, and Anatolia. Alevi social organizations 
thus became legally unrecognized. In addition, Alevis became subjected to Sunni institutions: 
müftülüks were granted administrative powers over not only mosques, but also Alevi türbes, and 
waqfs, and over all Turkish schools.  
Later regulations reflected struggles between the Bulgarian and the Ottoman states for 
influence over Bulgarian Turks. For instance, the 1880 law defines müftüs as Bulgarian state 
personnel appointed by the Ottoman Seyhulislam, while the 1889 law specified they were only to 
be appointed by the Bulgarian prince (Günay 2006: 10). In 1884, when Bulgarian schools were 
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made state schools, Turkish schools became private schools with compulsory Bulgarian language 
education and müftülük-controlled classes on Islam (Şimşir 1986:33). In 1908, changes were 
made to increase Bulgarian state control over the minority schools. However, the minority legal 
structure that prioritizes Sunni Islam has remained intact.  
Migrants in the Ottoman Empire: In this period, the migrations of about one million 
Balkan Muslims (Şimşir 1986, Ekici 2004) caused a major demographic change towards 
religious homogenization in Ottoman society. The Muslim to non-Muslim ratio changed from 
62% to 75% (Bali 1999). This change, together with the Ottoman state policy of Islamization, 
compelled migrants to identify with a politicized notion of Islam, while Islam had originally 
been a cultural identity marker for them in Balkan societies (Karpat 2002: 136). All Turkish 
migrants were negatively influenced, since they moved closer to the Ottoman center, which 
promoted a politicized form of Sunni Islam.  
 In the Ottoman Empire of the late 19
th
 century, Sunni Islamist policies threatened local 
Alevis, who were no less invisible than in earlier periods when they had been classified under the 
“Muslim” millet. They remained so after the Tanzimat Edict, even though the edict recognized 
other groups in new millets (Poulton 1993). The Alevis faced systematized state policies 
prompting Sunnification, such as the construction of Sunni mosques and appointment of Sunni 
imams in Alevi villages, and were even subjected to attacks in the eastern provinces (Kehl-
Bodrogi: 56). Scholars highlight the mass scale conversions that occurred among Alevis in this 
period (e.g.  amuroğlu 1997, 1998), but have not considered the dissimulation of Alevis. For 
instance, the memoir of Fahrettin Erdoğan (1954) has a section explaining his escape from 
İstanbul to Bulgaria. He narrates an event from his childhood in İstanbul in the 1890s: a random 
stranger in the street threatened to report him to the local police for not fasting during Ramadan 
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(Erdoğan 1954: 9-11). The stranger turned out to be a “Ramadan detective acting according to 
the will of the Sultan-Caliph,” yet the author managed to escape with the help of neighbors.  The 
author never states his identity as being Alevi. After all he was then a parliamentarian from a 
Sunni city and does not refer to any sects throughout the book. Yet he also hints at his identity to 
insiders: his Alevi-only birth village and his family name recalling his Alevi lineage.  
The burden was heavier on Alevi migrants to Turkey than on local Alevis. Migrants had 
been forced to migrate from Bulgaria because of their ethno-religious identity, but they found 
themselves marginalized by the increasingly conservative Sunni Muslim polity. Kemal Karpat 
cites an attempt by the tariqa leaders of Sunni and Alevi migrants to replace the existing Sultan 
with someone more religiously conservative (Karpat 2002: 703). Karpat explains this event as an 
example of politicization of immigrants’ identities towards a “fundamentalist movement,” as 
they were “traumatized by the refugee experience” and as they put the blame on “the 
incompetency of the leaders” in “fulfillment of Islamic ideals” (703). Yet he seems to assume an 
unproblematic adjustment of Alevi tarikat into the Islamic political consciousness. Even though 
there is insufficient evidence to examine the intentions of these Alevi migrants, they may well 
have beeen dissimulating as a way to reconcile their “traumatization as refugees” while 
interacting with Sunni authorities in the already extremely politicized Sunni environment of the 
resettlement locations.  
4.1.2 Kingdom and Republic in Bulgaria, the Monarchy in the Ottoman Empire (1908-
1923) 
In 1908, Bulgaria declared full independence and established a monarchical regime, while the 
Ottoman Empire was proclaimed a constitutional monarchy. From 1908-1923 both states faced 
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major changes in demographics and political regimes because of major wars. The First Balkan 
War of 1912 led to military confrontations between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, leading to 
the mass murder and migration of Bulgarian Turks. In 1913, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire 
signed the İstanbul Treaty, defining the border between them and establishing a treaty regarding 
a “population exchange” of Bulgarians and Turks between the two states. Both countries were 
allied with the Central Powers in 1914; and then, as among the defeated in World War I, were 
forced to sign treaties that led to massive territorial losses. In 1919, Bulgaria signed the Neuilly 
Treaty, which was the beginning of a period of severe domestic instability that ended in the 
military coup of 1923. In 1920, the Ottoman Empire signed the Sevres Treaty, which led to the 
occupation of some of its territories by European powers and initiated the Turkish Independence 
Movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. This movement was a political and military 
success, forming parliament in 1920, defeating the Greek invasion in 1922, and proclaiming a 
republican regime in 1923.  
Minority in Bulgaria The independent Bulgarian state targeted all minorities except 
Bulgarian Turks, in the interest of ethnic and religious homogenization. In 1908-1914, Pomaks 
were denigrated for having converted to Christianity (Dayıoğlu 2005, 225), and after 1914, non-
Bulgarian Orthodox Christians in newly-occupied Thrace, Macedonia, and Dobrudzha were 
targeted for Bulgarianization (Neuburger: 42-43). Bulgarian Turks were exempt owing to the 
minority rights regime defined in the international treaties, such as the 1910 İstanbul Protocol.  
Even so, the status of the Turkish minority deteriorated from 1909-1919 because of wars and 
general societal violence against the Turks. From 1919-23 their situation improved under the rule 
of the Agrarian Party, a Bulgarian party that took the ideological position of “the estatist 
organization of the peasants” (Daskalov 2011, 94) and therefore supported both Bulgarian and 
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Turkish peasants (Şimşir 1986: 55). This party also introduced social policies for Turks, by 
supporting Turkish schools, opening new high schools for Turkish teachers and for müftüs 
(Nüvvab) (Memişoğlu 1989: 119). Turkish sports clubs, unions, and newspapers were also 
allowed. 
While there were minor differences between the minority regime of the independence 
period and that from the principality period, the independence period policies remained Sunni-
biased and the structural invisibilities of Alevis were reinforced. One novel characteristic of the 
period concerned organizations for Muslim-Turks: the Chief Müftü position was initiated as an 
elected position for coordinating the regional müftüs and to mediate between Bulgarian 
authorities and the Seyhulislam in İstanbul. By 1913, with the İstanbul Peace Treaty, the 
Bulgarian authorities’ control over the activities of the müftülüks increased (Dayıoğlu 2005: 
248). This development is important since the Chief Müftülük position still exists, and since the 
rules for electing the Chief Müftü have often been violated by the Bulgarian state, even today. 
For instance, the Chief Müftü was elected in 1910 and yet appointed by the state only in 1914-
1919; elected again in 1919-1928 (Dayıoğlu 2005: 250), yet appointed only after 1928. Some 
scholars see this as a major problem in representation, because the appointed muftis “could not 
be the leaders of the Muslim-Turkish minority in Bulgaria” (Dayıoğlu 2005: 250). Yet I would 
argue that the problem regarding representation for Turkish-Muslims in Bulgaria has been more 
acute: even if the Chief Müftüs have been elected, they cannot be seen as the leaders of the 
Muslim-Turks, since they were elected by the regional muftis who had been elected by the 
members of the Sunni Mosque commissions. Alevi Turks have been underrepresented in the 
existing legal organization system, not because Alevis were a minority in numerical sense among 
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Bulgarian Turks and a Sunni leader would thus always be elected, but because Alevis were from 
the beginning outside the election system, which was designed to include only Sunni institutions.  
Migrants in the Ottoman Empire By 1908, Ottoman state policy took another turn after 
the announcement of a constitutional monarchy and the Committee for Union and Progress 
government (CUP). The ideology promoting the millet system as the cementing force in the 
empire, Ottomanism, had already lost its power due to the success of the independence 
movements in the Balkans. Also, Islamism had lost its power because of revolts by Muslim 
communities like the Albanians and Arabs. From 1908-1923, the CUP implemented policies for 
“keeping the unity of the empire under the domination of a Turkish national core,” and for 
promoting “a mixture of Turkism and Ottomanism” (Űlker 2005). Turkish migrants were 
favored over other groups.  
The CUP started instituting policies for the Turkification of Anatolia (Űngör 2008) 
following the consequences of the Balkan Wars, which had led to migrations of Bulgarian Turks 
and Turks in Ottoman Thrace to the Ottoman center (Halaçoğlu 1994). 115,883 Turks migrated 
to the Ottoman center at that time (Halaçoğlu 1994: 63). In 1913, a population exchange treaty 
between Bulgaria and the Empire displaced 48,750 Turks from Bulgaria and 46,764 Bulgarians 
from the Ottoman Empire (Özgür: 88, Űlker 2005). This treaty was a turning point as it was the 
first social engineering project initiated by the CUP, and the project continued into the era of 
Republican Turkey (Baer 2004: 690, Dündar 2001, 2010). It excluded certain groups in the 
territories of the empire while it included some migrants (Űlker 2005, Dündar 2001, 2010). For 
instance, non-Muslims in Anatolia, including Bulgarians, were either relocated or deported, 
while Muslim migrants were resettled to parts of Anatolia that were dominated by non-Muslims 
(Űlker: 625). It was intended that non-Turkish Muslim migrants (e.g. Pomaks) and local groups 
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(e.g. Kurds and Arabs) would assimilate to Turkish identity (Űlker 2005: 628). During WWI, 
Greeks and Armenians were “relocated” or deported as well (Dündar 2001, 2010, Űngör 2008), 
in some cases being also the victims of mass killings. Bulgarian Turkish migrants were 
welcomed as “Turks and Muslims” and settled into areas with low population density, such as 
war-ravaged Edirne (Halaçoğlu 1994: 117) or areas with a low Muslim to non-Muslim 
population ratio, such as Balikesir, Adana, Mersin, Konya and Izmir (Halaçoğlu 1994: 118).  
Alevis in Anatolia were positively viewed by the CUP, which commissioned a report 
defining Alevis as “the true Turks.” Yet Alevis’ approach to the CUP government was not 
uniform. Some scholars see Alevis and the CUP as natural allies since Alevis had suffered under 
the Sunnification policies of Abdulhamid II, and the CUP advocated secular politics (Kehl-
Bodrogi: 56-7,  amuroğlu 1997). Others refrain from such generalizations, stating that the CUP 
appealed to Bektaşism but saw Alevism as a “sectarian dogma” (Bozarslan 2003: 5), which is 
strikingly similar to the Empire’s earlier policies that supported Bektaşism among Janissaries but 
showed hostility to Alevi-Kızılbaş. Other writers point to the different experiences of Turkish 
and Kurdish Alevis. Kurdish Alevis were witness to the CUP-ordered deportations of their 
Armenian neighbors, while Kurdish Sunni tribes were also involved in the mass deportations of 
Armenians when the Kurdish Alevis were not directly involved in these acts. Turkish Alevis 
were not aware of these events (Keiser 2003). These differences persisted during the Turkish 
Independence War against Greek forces as well. Some writers emphasize Alevi support for the 
war, e.g. Çelebis ( z 1989), on the grounds that the leader of the movement, Mustafa Kemal, 
was seen as a successor of the CUP ( amuroğlu 1991), while others underline the reaction from 
Kurdish Alevis (e.g. Koçkiri) who demanded autonomy (Kehl-Bodrogi: 59-60, Azak 2010: 146).  
Therefore, despite their positive perception by the CUP government, the migration and 
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resettlement experiences of Alevis depended on whether they resettled to Kurdish or Turkish 
Alevi-dominant zones, and whether they were Bektaşi or Babai Alevis.  
4.1.3 Totalitarianism in Bulgaria and the Single-Party Republic in Turkey (1923-1944) 
From 1923-1944, Bulgaria faced political instability domestically due to polarization between 
the agrarian-communist and anti-communist right-wing fronts, as well as the military coups in 
1923 and 1934. Bulgaria also pursued a revisionist foreign policy, intending to re-establish the 
borders of the “Great Bulgaria” as drawn at the San Stefano Treaty of 1878 but rejected by the 
European Great Powers and replaced by the Berlin Treaty in that same year. This foreign policy 
led to Bulgaria’s alliance with the Axis Powers in WWII. It granted passage through its 
territories to the German army, leading the Soviet Union to declare war and ultimately to occupy 
Bulgaria in September 1944.  These developments triggered more mass migration of Bulgarian 
Turks to Turkey.    
Meanwhile in Turkey, a republican regime was proclaimed and consolidated under the 
single-party rule of the Republican People’s Party (RPP), 1923-1945. The early republican 
period was marked by radical changes towards westernization and secularization through several 
policies: closure of religious schools, prohibition against displaying religious markers in public,  
closure of Sufi Orders and tekkes, abolishment of the caliphate, initiation of a new constitution in 
1924, introduction of female suffrage, a law separating religious and political affairs, the 
introduction of secular civil and criminal codes in place of Sharia in 1926, and the 
implementation of the first modern census in 1927. the removal from the constitution of the 
clause stating that the  “official religion in Turkey is Islam,” the adaptation to a new alphabet 
based on the Latin script in 1928, a requirement that mosque prayers be said in Turkish rather 
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than Arabic in 1933 and the abolishment of religious titles in 1934. The new regime alienated the 
former elite, religious communities and non-Turkish ethnic groups. In the 1920s the RPP 
imprisoned or exiled 150 members of the former elite (Yuzellilikler), the participants of the 
Kurdish nationalist and Islamist Sheik Said Revolt, and those involved in a plot against Ataturk 
and the Menemen Incident, a violent and reactionary uprising instigated by the forbidden 
Naksibendi orders ( zoğlu 2011).  
The RPP promoted a particular notion of secularism, which was not a mandate about the 
separation of state and religion, but rather enforced the state’s strict control over religion 
(Shankland 1999, 2003). The state’s control over religion was implemented by institutionalizing 
Sunni Islam as the only legally recognized Islamic confession and by abolishing the popular and 
“heterodox” Islamic organizations (Kehl-Bodgori: 64). Therefore, the RPP’s control over Sunni 
Islam was detrimental to Alevism (Azak 2010: 144). First, the Bektaşi order was banned, though 
its leaders secretly continued Bektaşi rituals (Azak: 144); and then, in the 1930s and 1940s, the 
Bektaşi belief was declared superstitious (Kehl-Bodgori: 64). These developments caused the 
migration of Bektaşi babas’ to Balkan countries, especially Albania and Bulgaria. During my 
fieldwork, I visited the türbe of Haydar Baba, a Bektaşi Baba who migrated from Turkey to 
Svestari (Razgrad). Haydar Baba reinvigorated what had been a faded belief in the local Derviş 
during the forced-conversions by Nakshibendi orders under Ottoman rule. Local Alevis still refer 
him as “Kemal’in Kaçkini”, literally “a runaway from [Mustafa] Kemal.”  
Despite these developments, Alevis supported the new Republican regime, at first 
because they believed that secular policies would grant them religious freedoms (Baer 2004: 702, 
Kehl-Bodrogi: 64), and later as they sought upward mobility and cultural acceptance (Neyzi: 
113). Also, Bektaşis attributed mystical qualities to Kemal Ataturk, some even seeing him as the 
 108 
reincarnation of Ali, and accepted his policies despite their negative influences, such as the 
closure of the tekkes’ ( z 1990). In 1935, the Dersim Revolt led to the massacre of Kurdish 
Alevis, which estranged other Alevis.  Western Alevis, however, accepted official portrayals of 
the Revolt as reactionary and an anti-republican mobilization. 
Minority in Bulgaria: 1923-1944, the Bulgarian Turkish minority was adversely 
affected by the Great Depression, political polarization, and the military coups in Bulgaria of 
1923 and 1934. Despite the existence of a legal minority rights framework, there was structural 
violation of the rights of the minority in the 1930s. Many minority schools were closed or 
transformed into Bulgarian schools; the graduates of Bulgarian and Turkish schools were 
assigned an unequal status  and Turkish teachers were accused of espionage (Memişoğlu 1989: 
16-20). Minority organizations were shut down and the participants of the National Congress 
were tracked down, while the Turan organization, the umbrella organization for the local sports 
organizations by the Turkish minority, was closed for irredentism, since the name “Turan” stands 
for homeland of Turks and implies the unification of the lands inhabited by Turks in the world 
according to Pan-Turkist ideology. The  Bulgarian Turks faced sporadic societal violence, with 
attacks by paramilitary organizations such as the Rodna Zastita (the Defence of the Fatherland), 
Macedonia, and Thrace Committees (Memişoğlu 1989: 14-15) as well as beatings, attacks, arson, 
and torture (Dayıoğlu 2005: 258-9). In 1933 Rodna Zashtita members attacked to the Razgrad 
Turkish cemetery and destroyed the tombstones, disinterring dead bodies. The event received 
wide coverage in the media in Turkey, resulting in mass protests by student organizations where 
they left flowers at the Bulgarian Cemetery in İstanbul (Uzun 2009). The reactions increased the 
pressure on minority intellectuals in Bulgaria (Deliorman 1955).   
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The formation of a Turkish Republic resonated among Bulgarian Turks, who became 
divided along nationalist “Kemalists” and Islamist “old Turks” lines (Neuburger: 44). The 
Kemalists favored following Turkey as a model. For instance, the Kemalist Turkish Teachers 
Union decided to adapt Latin letters at their Annual Congress, following Turkey’s move to do 
the same in 1928. The Nationalist Congress of Bulgarian Turks made a declaration for Turks’ 
rights and problems in 1929, and Turkish sports organizations unified under the name “Turan” to 
pursue the Turkish nationalist cause in 1931. The Old-Turks saw Turkey’s reforms as 
Bolshevism and promoted a global Muslim identity (ummet). The Bulgarian government 
supported the Old Turks and appointed a pro-state, pro-Muslim Chief Müftü, who was also 
overtly anti-Kemalist (Boyar and Fleet: 2008). Therefore, by the end of the 1920s, Bulgarian and 
Turkish official policies regarding Muslims were highly differentiated: Turkey had abolished 
Islamic Courts, confiscated the property of religious foundations, and replaced the Arabic script 
with the Latin script, while all of these practices were still effective in Bulgaria (Neuburger: 45, 
Boyar and Fleet 2008). In this period, heavy Sunni Islamic indoctrination in Bulgaria led to the 
oppression of Alevis there. This indoctrination was effective among some Sunni Bulgarian Turks 
who later had troubles in secular Turkey following migrations, as I discuss in the historicity 
section, below.  
Migrants in Turkey: In 1925 the new Republic of Turkey signed a Friendship Treaty 
and a Resettlement Treaty with Bulgaria, which guaranteed protection of the rights of Bulgarians 
in Turkey and Turks in Bulgaria. The treaties recognized the right of minorities to migrate to 
their external homelands by granting migrants property rights in the host states (Dayıoğlu 2005: 
118), but forbade dual citizenship for them by automatically ending their pre-migration 
citizenship (Şimşir 2003: 11-12). The treaty led to mass migrations by the Bulgarian Turks, who 
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had felt under pressure during the interwar years. Accordingly, 101,507 Bulgarian Turks 
migrated between1923-1933 and 90,000 Bulgarian Turks migrated from 1934-1940 (Turan 2005, 
85).  
In the 1930s, Bulgarian Turkish migrants were welcomed to Turkey where Turkish 
nationalism was on the rise, as reflected in the “Turkish History Thesis,” “Sun Language 
Theory,” and “Citizen Speak Turkish” Campaigns ( ağaptay 2004). This ideology informed 
naturalization policies: the 1928 Citizenship Law granted citizenship to “Bulgarian, Serbian and 
Romanian Muslims” ( ağaptay 2004). Immigrants were referred to as “Muslims” in the 1920s, 
as “Turks” in 1930-1934 ( ağaptay 2004) and as “persons of Turkish origin” after 1934.  They 
were settled first in Eastern Anatolia and Thrace, according to the 1934 Law on Settlement 
(Ülker 2008). In early 1935, the Inspectorate General of Thrace said as many as 100,000 
immigrants could settle in the East as well as in Turkish Thrace because many Jews migrated out 
of the area after anti-Semitic mobilization in the Thrace Events of 1934 (Ülker 2008).   
4.1.4 Socialist People’s Republic in Bulgaria, Multi-Party Republic in Turkey (1944-1989) 
From 1944-1989, Bulgaria initiated policies with decreased impartiality towards the Turkish 
minority. In the 1940s Bulgaria joined the Eastern Bloc and proclaimed a people’s republic 
(Crampton 1990: 327), moved toward a strict Stalinist path (328-343) by promoting the cultural 
rights of ethnic minorities in order to create loyal socialist citizens. After 1954, Todor Zhivkov 
initiated de-Stalinization of Bulgaria in terms of challenging the “cult of personality” ideal of the 
Stalinist periodand, and emphasized “a greater need for national integration,” starting from the 
April Plenum in 1954 (Eminov 1997). After this development the Bulgarian Communist Party’s 
(BCP) policies displayed “constant repudiation of nationalism as ideology, but not at the expense 
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of the Bulgarian nation” (Neuburger2004: 62). Finally in 1971, the BCP introduced the “unified 
socialist society” ideal (Crampton 1990: 356-7), which caused official denial of the existence of 
Turks in Bulgaria and led to an assimilation project between 1985 and 1989. In 1986, the BCP 
shifted the state policy from bureaucratic planning to decentralization in order to increase 
economic productivity, but it faced mass protests from different segments of the society, which 
led to the regime change in 1989, which I discuss in the next section, on events since 1989.  
For its part, from 1945-89, Turkey experienced a multi-party system, which had been 
characterized by periods of political polarization leading to military coups in 1960, 1971 and 
1980. The political rivalry between the secular RPP and the newly formed Democrat Party (DP) 
led to the latter’s victory in the 1950 election. Even though the DP did not explicitly promote 
political Islam (Poulton 1993: 172), a rise of Islamic groups led to a military coup in 1960 and to 
the 1961 Constitution, which prohibited the politicization of religion. The 1960s were 
characterized by the fragmentation of left and right wings into multiple parties which formed 
unstable coalition governments. The political polarization between the RPP and the moderate 
Justice Party government, as well as the rise of the overtly anti-secular National Order Party 
(NOP), led to the 1971 military coup. In the 1970s political instability escalated into societal 
violence between leftist and rightist groups and led to the 1980 military coup. From 1980-1983, 
the military regime implemented the “Turkish-Muslim synthesis” ideology, which was seen as a 
solution to both rightist and leftist radicalism as well as Islamism, and which led to state-
sponsored policies for promoting Sunni Islam, such as by re-introducing compulsory religion 
classes in schools and increasing the budget for the Department of Religious Affairs (DRA). The 
1983 election was won by the Motherland Party (MP), which combined the Turkish-Islam thesis 
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with economic liberalism by opening markets to Islamic capital, tolerating Sunni religious orders 
and encouraging the formation of an Anatolian bourgeois class. 
Alevis were directly influenced by the increased visibility of political Islam in Turkey. In 
the 1950s, their political alliances shifted from the RPP to the DP. Yet they were disappointed by 
the latter party’s policies, since the DP did not reform the Sunni-biased structure of the 
Department of Religious Affairs. It also allowed systemic policies to Sunnify Alevis, such as 
construction of mosques in Alevi villages and appointment of Sunni imams for Alevi services 
(Azak 2010: 152). In the 1960s, Alevis re-allied with Kemalist leftists (Azak: 154-5) as right-
wing parties increasingly used Islam to attract the masses (Şahin 2005: 471) and Kemalist-leftists 
saw Alevis as secular and loyal Kemalists against “Sunni fanaticism”. In the 1970s, Alevi 
identity became openly politicized for the first time with the formation of an Alevi political 
party; yet the party failed. Alevis could not generate a separate movement but were subsumed by 
stronger leftist movements (Şahin 2005: 471). In the 1980s, the state’s policies “recenter[ed] on a 
Turkish-Sunni axis” as Bozdogan (2007: 14) puts it. By this statement he refers to the process of 
shift from increased popularization of the political parties with Islamic discourses to promotion 
of Sunni Islam as a state policy. This shift aggravated the problems for Alevis on issues such as 
compulsory Sunni religious classes, construction of mosques in Alevi villages and the DRA’s 
strong position (Jongerden 2003: 80, Vorhoff 1998: 97-8).  
 Minority in Bulgaria Policies towards the Turkish minority during the Socialist period 
can be analyzed in three stages. First, from 1944-1956, socialists recognized the rights of the 
Turkish minority by introducing specific programs to transform the Turkish minority into loyal 
socialist citizens. The BCP’s minority policy was intended to replace “backwards religious and 
traditional values” with “progressive socialist values ” therefore BCP supported education for the 
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minority and allowed cultural organizations, but strictly controlled religious organizations and 
discouraged religious practice. The BCP nationalized the private minority schools, abolished the 
Quranic schools and ended religious training in schools (Eminov 1997: 51, Şimşir 1997). These 
changes also meant an end to the Sunni müftülüks’ control of Turkish schools. The BCP did not 
abolish the earlier Muslim organizational structure, but it replaced the former müftülüks with 
appointed ones (Dayıoğlu 2005: 326). Therefore, even under socialism, the legal Muslim 
organizations favored Sunnis. Also, both Alevi and Sunni religious practices were criticized in 
the party’s newspaper for Turks, Yeni Isik (Eminov 1997: 53), which presented Sunnis’ fasting 
during Ramadan as “reducing productivity,” Alevis animal slaughter rituals as “unhygienic” and 
circumcision as “unhealthy.”   
From 1956-1980, Bulgarian socialism gained a nationalist character, and the rights 
formerly granted to the Turkish minority were increasingly undone. Turkish schools were closed 
and Turkish language training was terminated. Still, Turks were not as directly targeted as the 
Macedonians, Muslim Roma, and Pomaks were (Dayıoğlu 2005: 289). The 1971 Constitution 
did not make any reference to minorities in Bulgaria; all citizens were portrayed as members of a 
“unified Bulgarian socialist nation,” indicating BCP’s vision of a socialist state with one nation 
and one language (Dayıoğlu 2005: 290). Zhivkov declared that there was no “national problem 
in Bulgaria, as this problem was solved by the people” (291), implying that ethnic Turks 
voluntarily become a part of “the unified socialist nation.” 
In the early 1980s, the BCP initiated a “hard assimilation” policy (Dayıoğlu: 2005), 
which officially declared that there were no Turks in Bulgaria and that those who self-identified 
as Turks were actually “real Bulgarians” who had been forcefully Islamized under Ottoman rule. 
The BCP commissioned reports by both Bulgarian and Turkish scholars to prove this thesis (e.g. 
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SPA 1989, Gerasimov 1989 and Zagarov 1987). In 1984, the “Rebirth Process” began with 
forced name changes for the Tatars and Albanians, which was expanded to the Turks in Southern 
and Northeastern Bulgaria and finalized between December 1984 and March 1985. Resistance to 
the assimilation policies resulted in unemployment, torture and imprisonment. In 1985 the 
Bulgarian Turks’ National Salvation Movement was founded as an underground organization 
that initiated passive resistance to the assimilation (Dayıoğlu 2005: 329-331).  Its leaders were 
captured and sent to the infamous Belene prison, where Sunni and Alevi Bulgarian Turks from 
Northeastern and Southern Bulgaria met. In 1989, mass protests and hunger strikes were often 
suppressed by the army at the villages where these protests and strikes happened. In addition to 
the Sunni Turkish villages, well-known Alevi villages in Yablonovo became sites for resistance 
and subsequently for state violence. This led to softening of the Sunnis’ negative perceptions of 
Alevis. Sunni Turks had accepted the thesis that Alevis were converted Christian-Bulgarians, yet 
Alevi Turks also claimed themselves as Turkish-Muslims during the assimilation process.    
From 1944-1989, the Sunni and Alevi Bulgarian Turks adopted different coping 
strategies for the socialist policies towards religion. Sunni Muslims were hypervisible, because 
Sunni Islam was the only institutionalized form of Islam, with visible religious sites and state-
appointed religious personnel. Alevi Muslims on the other hand were completely invisible, their 
social and religious organizations barely known to outsiders due to long term dissimulations. 
Therefore, the Sunni Bulgarian Turks faced extra pressure. Some muftis and imams partook in 
the Rebirth Process while others refused to do so. The mosques of the first group were called 
“official mosques” while the others were seen as “unofficial mosques” by the state (Dayıoğlu 
2005: 352). In addition, Sunni believers’ religious practices were under close scrutiny. Only 
Sunni elders were allowed to attend mosques, and only official mosques at that. The state 
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forbade other practices like going on pilgrimage, conducting circumcision, fasting, religious 
feasts, animal slaughter, and burial rituals (352-7).  
This Bulgarian case was not unique among socialist systems, of course.  A similar 
phenomenon has been analyzed by Sergei Poliakov, who distinguishes between “government 
Islam” and “everyday Islam” within the context of Central Asia (1993). The former refers to 
state-controlled Islam while the latter is “parallel Islam.” My case study develops his framework 
by showing that in socialist Bulgaria there were not only one parallel Islam but actually parallel 
Islams, plural, as Jennifer Murtazashvili has pointed out to me in correspondence. In socialist 
Bulgaria, “government Islam” was Sunni Islam, but both Sunnis and Alevis developed “parallel 
Islams” in practice. Alevis actively dissimulated by framing their religious rituals in secular 
terms. The cem rituals were held in the homes of religious leaders so that they seemed on the 
surface to be evening visits among colleagues. Religious visits to far off türbes were framed as 
excursions and religious visits to closer türbes were framed as picnics. During my fieldwork, I 
was told several times that under socialism Alevism in Bulgaria was in better shape because 
there was strict state control over aggressive Sunnism. Because of their contribution to the 
protection of the Alevi community, Alevi leaders who supported the BCP are still respected by 
the Alevis, while Sunni religious leaders who supported the BCP administration are seen as 
betrayers.    
Gendered effects of socialism on the Bulgarian Muslim populations were small. The 
socialist regime did not create a difference on Sunni and Alevi women’s markers of visibility. 
Before socialism the Sunni Turkish, Alevi Turkish and Bulgarian women were not very different 
in terms of the degree of modesty in their clothing, though they had differences in clothing forms 
and accessoires. In some rural regions Sunni and Alevi females wore traditional (non-religious) 
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hairscarves and trousers (salvar) during farming activities, unlike their Bulgarian counterparts. In 
the socialist period these practices become limited to elder Sunni and Alevi women.  
On the other hand Sunni and Alevi females utilized the opportunities granted by the 
socialist regime differently. For example, the socialist regime initiated boarding schools for 
training Turkish instructors in different parts of Bulgaria in 1950s. During my fieldwork in 
Sunni-Alevi mixed villages, I noticed that the women who graduated from these schools were all 
from the Alevi side of the villages. Alevi women seemed to be encouraged by their communities 
to actively participate in public life as instructors, while Sunni women seem to have been 
prevented from enrolling in these boarding schools. 
Migrants in Turkey From 1944-1989, the Bulgaria-Turkey border was a symbol of  
Cold War tensions between the two states, and formed a segment of the Iron Curtain between the 
two blocks. Mass migrations during this period were strictly planned and defined by bilateral 
treaties and controlled by both states. The 1950-51 forced migration was orchestrated by the 
BCP, who were alarmed by Turkey’s attempts to join NATO, and fears over the continuing 
loyalties of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey (Turan 2005: 86). 154,363 Turks migrated to Turkey at 
that time (Turan 2005: 83). Migrations from 1968-1978 were to unify families that were divided 
by the previous forced migrations, and 114,356 Bulgarian Turks migrated to Turkey (Eminov 
1997). In December 1989, Bulgaria expelled Bulgarian Turks while the Turkish government 
welcomed all Bulgarian Turks to the “motherland;” 321, 800 Bulgarian Turks were forced to 
migrate (Eminov 1997).   
Self-stereotypes are abundant among the generations of Bulgarian-Turkish migrants. 
These stereotypes are falsifiable, yet they reveal Bulgarian Turkish migrants’ perceptions of the 
community and its history. For example, the migrants of 1950-51 are seen as pious, conservative, 
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uneducated peasants with a strong sense of Turkishness. This is explained on the grounds that 
they faced totalitarian pressures, yet they remained immune to socialism. The migrants of 1968-
78 are seen as secularized, relatively educated specialists because they benefitted from early 
socialist policies regarding the Turkish minority and became accustomed to socialist education. 
The 1989 migrants are seen as secular and atheist. They are well-educated people who had 
assimilated almost voluntarily, so that they would not face “hard assimilation.”  
The changing political contexts in Turkey directly influenced migrants’ conditions. The 
1950-1951 migrants were supported by the DP government. The worldviews of Sunni migrants 
were not necessarily incompatible with the DP, and they were able to adapt to society. There 
were exceptional cases, such as that of Ahmet Davutoglu, which indicates the disappointment of 
an Islamist Old Turk migrant. Once imprisoned in Bulgaria for espionage, Ahmet Davutoglu 
migrated to Turkey in 1950 but was arrested there for anti-secular statements, as I discuss in 
more detail in the “historicity” section. Alevi migrants faced pressures to assimilate from the 
DRA and thus hid their identity, as also discussed below. The migrants of 1968-78 arrived 
during the period when there was political turmoil between leftist and right-wing groups. Some 
of my Sunni informants were harassed and threatened by local right-wing members in Bursa, 
because Bulgarian Turks were automatically assumed to be “socialists” since they were from 
Bulgaria. Alevi migrants were no better off, as became apparent during the mass violence against 
Alevis in the events in Sivas (1978), in Kahramanmaras (1978), and in Corum (1980).  
4.1.5 Multi-party Republics in both Bulgaria and Turkey (1989-)  
In 1989 the political regime changed in Bulgaria, as it did throughout what had until then been 
socialist Eastern Europe. The BCP initiated a multiparty system in 1990 but without effective 
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political infrastructure (Crampton 1990: 389). The first decade after communism was marked by 
political and economic crises, which proliferated due to the governmental changes between two 
political parties with contradictory programs. The BSP governments promoted a pro-Russian, 
anti-NATO foreign policy and a statist economy (Crampton 1990: 403) while the UDF 
governments promoted economic and political liberalism, liberal minority rights, and pro-West 
policies (Crampton 1990: 409). The MRF, the Turkish Party, become empowered as the party 
which maintained balance between the UDP and the BSP.  The period after 2001 was marked by 
relative stability after the National Movement Simeon II (NMSS) and the MRF government in 
2001; a coalition government by BSP, NMSS and MRF in 2005 (which led to EU membership in 
January 2007) and the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) government in 
2009.   
In Turkey, the same period was marked by unstable governments followed by the 
increased visibility of political Islam. In the 1996 elections, the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (WP) 
was victorious and initiated a political program openly promoting the politicization of Islam and 
overtly attacking the Kemalist organization of the state, society and economy. The WP also 
recruited Islamist civil servants to state offices, promoted relations with Iran, Libya and Egypt 
and developed a stance against the EU. In 1997, a local party meeting in Ankara was broadcast 
on TV, showing party members demanding Sharia Law, and this led to “28 February 
memorandum” in which the army declared its intention to defend secularism. The WP was 
disbanded but two parties were created in its place: the Islamist Virtue Party (VP) and the 
reformist Justice and Development Party (JDP). In 2001, the VP was banned by the 
Constitutional Court as a successor of the WP while the JDP gained great success in the 2002 
elections. The JDP pursued a modest Islamist policy, promoting EU membership and rapid 
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economic growth and privatization. However, after 2004, JDP policies moved towards 
prioritizing Sunni Islamist “religious and moral standards” on issues such as the hair scarf ban, 
the autonomy of the MRA and limiting rights for Alevis.    
In the 1990s, the rise of political Islam was paralleled by the “repoliticization of 
Alevism” (Erman and Göker 2000: 99). This time, Alevis emphasized religious and cultural 
elements rather than class identity and emerged as an independent movement with an elite and 
literature, associations, festivals, vakifs and networks in both Europe and Turkey (Şahin 2005: 
472). Alevis gained public visibility after the publication of a manifesto demanding equal 
representation (Erman and Göker 2000: 102). Alevism was also publicly discussed after the 
Sivas Massacre at an Alevi ceremony in 1993. Alevis remained ideologically fragmented under 
different associations: the (Kemalist) Cem Association; (Marxist) Pir Sultan Cultural 
Associations, (Mystical) Hacı Bektaş Veli Associations, and (Shia) Ehl-i Beyt Association 
(Erman and Göker: 2000).  The state’s response to Alevism was to recognize it as a cultural 
group but not as a political group (Şahin 2005: 481). For instance, politicians started to attend the 
annual Hacı Bektaş Veli Ceremonies in 1994 and to allocate resources from the state budget to 
Alevi organizations in 1998 (Şahin 2005: 477). Yet the DRA declared Alevism a folk culture and 
not an Islamic sect (Şahin 2005: 481), and began to transform key Alevi sites, such as that of 
Hacı Bektaş into Sunni ones (Harmanşah, Tanyeri-Erdemir and Hayden 2010). In 2007, the JDP 
government initiated an “Alevi Opening,” a set of workshops meant to bring about Sunni-Alevi 
rapprochement. Several sympathetic gestures on the part of politicians followed: Prime Minister 
Erdoğan attended some Alevi “breaking of the fast” (iftar) dinners during Ramadan in 2008-9. 
Alevis had three main demands: the recognition of Alevi Cemevis as places of worship; that 
changes would be made in the nature of compulsory religious education courses in public 
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schools; and that DRA would be restructured. Still, the Alevi Opening is now criticized by 
Alevis themselves on the grounds that it failed to accommodate Alevis’ demands and that it was 
a covert attempt at the Sunnification of Alevis. In 2009 research by Strategic Researches 
Institute, about 60 percent of Alevi participants saw the Alevi Opening as being intended to 
effect Sunnification of Alevis, while 22 percent of them see it as being intended “to solve the 
problems of the people” (in Köse 2010: 9).   
Minority in Bulgaria In Bulgaria, measures were taken to reverse the 1985-89 
assimilation process following the regime change from communism. Migrants from 1989 gained 
the right to return and to get their Turkish names back. Mosques were re-opened and new ones 
constructed. In addition, Turkish NGOs and Turkish newspapers were allowed (Dayıoğlu 2005: 
375).  
Minority rights were defined in the 1990 Constitution without using the term “minority,” 
but rather specifying “citizens of Bulgaria with different religious beliefs, mother languages” 
(Dayıoğlu 2005: 384-5). This period was dominated by a few major issues concerning the 
minority’s rights, notably the Turkish political party’s status and Grand Mufti elections. The 
MRF had great political success in the 1990 elections in constituencies with large Turkish 
populations. This led Bulgarian nationalists to make appeals to the Constitutional Court that the 
MRF be banned banned based on the Constitution, which forbids political parties that increase 
ethnic, religious, or national distinctions and create animosity. The Constitutional Court, 
however, ruled in favor of the MRF in 1992.  
Sunni Bulgarian Turks were directly influenced by the regime change. The appointed 
Chief Müftü from the socialist period, Nedim Gencev, resigned. Chief Müftü elections were 
conducted at the Muslim Conference in 1992, following which there was struggle over the Chief 
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Müftülük position between various MRF-supported candidates and BSP-supported Nedim 
Gencev. From 1995-1997, Muslims were represented by two Chief Müftülüks and two sets of 
regional müftülüks, one elected and the other appointed. In December 2002 a new law on 
religions replaced the Religious Confessions Law of 1949. It granted a privileged position to the 
Bulgarian Orthodox church and required the registration of all other religious groups at the Sofia 
City Court (Dayıoğlu 2005: 402-3). This time, registration issues were the problem. For instance, 
after the 2008 elections the court did not register the result on time; yet Gencev applied to the 
High Administrative Court and was recognized as the Chief Müftü. When the offices of the 
elected muftis were taken over by Gencev’s team, I observed mass scale protests by Muslims in 
Bulgaria. After the Muslim Congress in 2011 the elected Chief Müftü again was not registered by 
the Sofia Court, yet he applied to the High Appeals Court and returned to his position on 21 
April 2011. This tension about the election of the Chief Müftülük is also significant for 
understanding Alevi-Sunni relations, since segments of Alevis reacted to the Sunni müftülüks’ 
problems, as my fieldwork shows.  
In the early 2000s Alevis started to point out their historical underrepresentation in 
Muslim institutions in Bulgaria (Dayıoğlu 2005: 76). In 2001 in Razgrad, tension between Sunni 
and Alevi Turks was reflected in the local elections and tainted the victory of the MRF (Dayıoğlu 
2005: 76). As I was told during my interviews, the MRF lost the municipal administration to a 
Bulgarian candidate in the Kubrat (Razgrad) elections because of the Alevis’ support for the 
Bulgarian. Only after this did recognition of Alevis begin in the MRF cadres. This recognition 
began as a top down process initiated by its leader, Ahmet Doğan. He implemented an informal 
commission to visit Alevi-populated regions, first Kadjali and then Razgrad. As a result, the 
MRF leadership recognized the demands of Alevis for representation in the party and granted 
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them an informal quota, which allowed for the participation of one Alevi candidate from Kardjali 
in the parliamentary elections of 2001 and another Alevi candidate from Razgrad in the 2005 
elections. Moreover, Alevis in Razgrad applied to the Razgrad City Court demanding 
organizational freedom and recognition of the “Cem Association” in 2002. Alevi rituals gained 
increased visibility in Bulgaria, such as the annual Demir Baba commemorations for “the 
martyrs of the assimilation process” in Razgrad and the annual türbe day celebrations in 
Kardjali.   
Migrants in Turkey Local and national organizations for Bulgarian Turkish migrants 
flourished in the 1990s. Originally these organizations addressed problems that migrants faced in 
Turkey, such as getting identity cards and acquiring residential permits (Kirişçi 2009), as well as 
problems of the migrants that were related to Bulgaria, such as retirement payments, dual 
citizenship and visa related issues. They also addressed the problems of the non-migrant 
Bulgarian Turks, such as Turks’ political representation in Bulgaria and the müftülüks crisis in 
2011. Especially after the 2000s, the migrant organizations became interest groups and changed 
the course of local politics in places such as Bursa. Alevi Bulgarian Turks are still invisible in 
these migrant organizations, as I noted during my fieldwork. 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks have remained underrepresented because they have not formed 
their own organizations and they are hesitant to work with the existing local Alevi organizations. 
For instance, Alevi migrants in Bulgaria do not attend any Alevi organizations even for religious 
rituals, while Alevi migrants in İstanbul attend the meetings and religious rituals of Cem Vakfi. 
At the same time, Alevi migrants in İstanbul keep their own religious communities and Alevi 
migrants in Thrace also form relations with the Cem Vakfi and Hacı Bektaş Veli Association.  
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To conclude this section, I have outlined the major historical developments on the two 
sides of the Bulgaria-Turkey border, which was at various times a divide between: an 
autonomous (Bulgarian) principality and the (Ottoman) empire, 1878-1907; an independent 
kingdom and an empire, 1908-1923; a kingdom and a republic, 1923-1943  a people’s republic 
and a liberal republic, 1944-1989; and two liberal republics after 1990. By examining the 
influence of these changes on the minority and migrant regimes regarding Bulgarian Turks, I 
underlined that both states’ policies contributed to the affiliation of the Bulgarian Turkish group 
identity with Sunni Islam, which resulted in Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ structural exclusion. 
Specifically in Bulgaria, I argued that even under the most liberal regimes for the Bulgarian 
Turks (e.g. the Agrarian rule from 1919-1923, early stages of socialism from 1944-1955 and 
after 1989), the rights of Bulgarian Turks were developed within a Sunni-biased framework, 
making Alevis invisible. Also, I argued that Alevi Bulgarian Turks encountered institutionalized 
Sunnism in Turkey even under the most secular political governments (e.g. the CUP government 
and the early republican government) and they faced increased politicization of Islam after the 
1950s.  
4.2 HISTORIOGRAPHY   
The Balkans have been Orientalized historically vis-à-vis Europe by being portrayed as neither 
East nor West, but rather an interstitial and ambiguous area between them (Todorova 1997), or 
neither Orient nor Occident but a combination of both and thus a boundary zone of 
“civilizations” (Wolf 1994), or as the shifty historical frontier caused by Habsburg- and 
Ottoman-occupations (Ingario 1996). While the Balkans are Orientalized vis-à-vis Europe, the 
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Balkanist discourses construct their own historical other as Ottoman Turks (Todorova 1997).  
“Nesting Orientalisms” create further gradations among communities within the Balkans, for 
instance Orthodox Christians vis-à-vis Roman Catholics (Bakic-Hayden 1995). The process of 
Orientalizing has happened not only between majority nations, but also between the majorities 
and minorities. Thus Bulgaria has been Orientalized vis-à-vis Europe and certain other Balkan 
states, while the Bulgarian official literature has portrayed the Muslims as the “Orient within” 
(Neuburger 2004). Addressing this literature, in this chapter I show a further hierarchy imposed 
within minorities themselves, in this case the Turkish Muslims in Bulgaria. By focusing on the 
academic literature on Bulgarian Turks, I argue that Sunni Islam is portrayed as emblematic of 
the Bulgarian Turkish community, from which Alevis are excluded.  
4.2.1 Conflicting Historiographies on the Ottoman Rule in Bulgaria 
Balkanists and Ottomanists specializing in Bulgaria have conflicting assumptions on two issues. 
While Ottoman rule in Bulgaria is seen as a period of violent political and economic 
colonization, namely “the Turkish Yoke,” in the Bulgarian nationalist literature (e.g. Jirecek 
1875 in Karpat; Vazov 2005), it is seen as a period of political stability and religious tolerance, 
namely “the Ottoman Peace,” in the Ottomanist literature (e.g. Ortaylı 2004). Further, 
Islamization in Bulgaria under Ottoman rule (Todorova 2004) is seen as a mass, coercive process 
which has formed a central part of the “national myth of the abducted faith” in the Bulgarian 
literature (Aretov 2003: 103). Yet Islamization is not seen as a state policy (Inalcık 1954) but 
rather as a gradual, individual and voluntary process (Deringil 2000) in the Ottomanist literature.  
In Bulgaria, the discipline of history had functioned as “an instrument to cultivate and 
increase national consciousness” in pre-Independence times (Mosely 1937: 348), as a “justifier 
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and legitimizer” subservient to the state’s demands during socialism and as a “self-contained and 
parochial discipline” in post-socialism (Todorova 1992). Ottoman rule was considered 
destructive of the national culture because of forced conversions and mass violence (e.g. Hristov 
1980 in Eminov 1997: 34) by the “catastrophe theories” (Kiel 1985: 33-35) from different 
periods, except the earlier years of socialism. The newly formed socialist regime was 
preoccupied not with Ottoman rule but the pre-socialist regime. The BCP’s publications, such as 
Yeni Isik, avoided comments about the Ottoman period and targeted the “fascist” regime, 
specifically its policies towards Turks’ language and religion. They also highlighted the 
achievements of Turks during socialism, such as political representation, economic 
advancement, and religious and social freedoms to pursue Turkish culture (Durmazov 1947: 10-
16). Yet after the April Plenum, the literature resorted to the original “nationalist focus and bias” 
(Elenkov and Koleva 2003: 183). The Ottoman rule was portrayed not merely as the “national 
yoke” but also as a “feudal yoke” (Kossev 1976), and the Bulgarian nation was represented 
either as “martyred” under the “Islamicization and Turukicization [sic] (Dochev and Stoyanov 
1987), or as heroic for acting with “prolonged and stubborn resistance” to foreign rule (Khristov 
1985: 5). A balanced perspective developed only in post-socialism. Thus Maria Todorova 
(2004), Antonina Zhelyazkova (2002), and Anton Mikov (2004) problematize earlier works on 
the Ottoman period by showing their ideological character on issues such as conversions to 
Islam. 
Strikingly, the Turkish nationalist literature had also developed a problematic relation 
with the Ottoman Empire. In the early republican period, the political elite were concerned to 
distance the Republic from the Ottoman past by utilizing several arguments, such as declaring 
the ancient Turks in the Central Asia to have been their ancestors, claiming the Ottomans’ Turkic 
 126 
origins, and discussing the Byzantine or Seljuk roots of the Ottoman administrative model. This 
literature emphasized only the foundation and rise of the Ottoman Empire and ignored the period 
of decline (Ersanli 2002). Only in the 2000s did the academic literature start to discuss the 
continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic (Zürcher 2008, Göcek 2011). Still, the 
Ottoman presence in the Balkans remained unproblematized; it was seen as a period of tolerance 
(istimalet) for gaining the hearts and minds of the local non-Muslims (Inalcık 1954), when the 
Empire protected the Orthodox Church and gained support from both the local peasants and the 
Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian and Albanian feudal lords (Doğru 2000).  
4.2.2 Conflicting Historiographies on Bulgarian Turks  
The Bulgarian and Turkish historiographies on Bulgarian Turks have developed around two 
competing theses: Bulgarian Turks are presented either as the descendants of the colonizers and 
migrants from Anatolia or as local populations forcefully converted into Islam (Marushiakova 
and Popov 2006). Bulgarian literature has promoted the thesis of forceful conversion by stressing 
that conversions were done on a mass scale and that they were state-imposed, systematized and 
planned. The Bulgarian literature has also relativized the scale of migrations from Anatolia. The 
Ottomanist literature, however, has promoted the migrations thesis by discussing the Balkan 
migrants as Anatolian nomads (Doğru 2000), revolutionary tribes and members of the Sufi 
orders who moved according to the Ottoman settlement policies (iskan) (Barkan 1942). The 
Ottomanist literature has relativized forced mass conversions (e.g. Inalcık 1954, Deringil 2000).  
The discussion on Bulgarian Turks has been significant because it has informed both the 
Bulgarian and Turkish states’ policies towards Bulgarian Turks. In Bulgaria, the migration thesis 
was utilized to justify the ‘reverse’ process, the forced migration of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey in 
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1950-1 and 1989, while the conversions thesis was utilized to justify “recovering” their identity, 
through forced assimilation such as in the Rebirth Process in 1985-89. These theses have also 
informed the migration regimes in Turkey. For instance, in the 19
th
 century, migrants’ Islamic 
identity was sufficient to welcome them to Anatolia. From 1908 to 1918 the migrations of ethnic 
Turks (based on the language criteria) were encouraged and the migrations of non-Turkish-
speaking Muslims (e.g. Pomaks and Roma) were discouraged, according to the CUP’s Turkism 
ideology.  After 1923, the state pursued the notion of territorial citizenship and declared the 
Turks in formerly Ottoman areas, including Bulgarian Turks, as “kin-nationals” and other Turks, 
such as those of central Asia, as “Turkic” (Poulton 1997: 196-7). Even the kin-nationals did not 
automatically qualify for citizenship but required a visa from the embassy in Bulgaria, in 1950-1 
and 1968-78.  
The ethnogenesis of Bulgarian Turks’ has been a great concern in Bulgaria, given that 
“the Bulgarian political nation” has been defined by “drawing and re-drawing the borders and 
ethno-cultural boundaries between Bulgarian and Turk” (Neuburger 1997). Yet it remained as a 
taboo subject until 1989, because the socialist period research results remained unpublished, 
“internal documents.” After 1989, Bulgarian Turks received attention from academics (e.g. 
Maeva 2006) and NGOs such asthe works of the International Center for Minority Studies and 
Intercultural Relations (IMIR) on Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria (Zhelyazkova, Nielsen and Kepel 
1995) and Turkey (Zhelyazkova 1998).   
Turkish academic publications on Bulgarian Turks also flourished after mass migrations, 
as early as the 1950s. These works have focused on migrants’ adaptation to Turkey (Ari 1960, 
Parla 2003, 2006, 2007) and the social-cultural status of non-migrants in Bulgaria with studies 
concerning education, language (Memişoğlu 1992, Yenisoy 2007), religion (Hatiboğlu 2007, 
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Günay 2006), citizenship status and rights (Özgür-Baklacioğlu 2006) and international law and 
violations of their rights (eKarpat 1990, Şimşir 1986, 1989, Eminov 1997, Dayıoğlu 2005, Lütem 
2003). Strikingly, none of these works devotes significant space to Alevi Bulgarian Turks.  
4.2.3 Conflicting Historiographies on Alevis with their Harmonious Exclusion  
Following independence, some Bulgarian writings did focus on Alevi Turks in Bulgaria. 
Historical studies had the agenda of proving that Alevis are descendants of the non-Muslims 
converted to Islam under Ottoman rule. Modern studies still have a tendency to present Alevis as 
a distinct community, separate from the Bulgarian Turks (i.e. Bulgarski Aliyani i.e. Bulgarian 
Alevis) and they overemphasize their “heterodox Muslim” identity in order to de-emphasize their 
ethnic Turkish identity, as native speakers of Turkish whose rituals are in the Turkish language.   
Before 1989, historical works on Alevis in Bulgaria were ideologically parallel with the 
state’s demands. The majority of scholars promoted the conversion thesis by portraying Alevis as 
the descendants of ethnic Bulgarian Bogomils, Turkic pagan Pechenegs from Central Asia, pre-
Slavic and pagan Old Bulgarians, who had either converted to Islam after conversion to 
Christianity or directly converted from paganism into Alevi Islam (see Gramatikova 2001). 
Other scholars promoted the migration thesis, by portraying Alevis as migrants from Khorasan 
(Iran) to North Bulgaria from the north or south of the Black Sea, via Anatolia (see Gramatikova 
2001). None of these theses could be supported empirically, however.   
Ethnological studies were also under political pressure because ethnology functioned to 
identify the markers of Bulgarianness, often imposing these markers on other communities 
(Neuburger 2004). Bulgarian literature utilized the generic narratives of European travel writers, 
missionaries and foreign academics to prove the conversion thesis and “indigenize” the Pomaks, 
 129 
by localizing these generic theories into the Bulgarian context (Stoyanov 2010). One version 
localizes the conversion thesis: the European narratives argue that “heterodox” Christians faced 
mass conversions into Islam under Ottoman rule and that they either become Crypto-Christians 
(Skendi 1967: 234) or converted to “heterodox” Islam (Babinger 1978, Hasluck 2007). This 
localization strategy was utilized by several Balkan states, including Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia. 
The Bulgarian version of localization occurred when Bulgarian authors claimed that heterodox 
Muslims in Bulgaria were formerly heterodox Christians. For instance, Dimitar Marinov  argued 
that contemporary Alevis in Deliorman are the descendants of Bogomils, since these Alevis have 
similar social and religious beliefs, rituals and festivals with the Bogomils. For example, Alevis 
in Sevar cook breads similar to Easter breads (Mikov 2008: 15).  
The other version localizes the migration thesis: European authors examine the 
syncretism between local Christian and migrant Muslim beliefs and practices (Stoyanov 2010). 
Bulgarian literature utilizes this framework to emphasize the closeness of the migrant Muslims 
with local Christians, rather than with the local Muslims in Anatolia or Persia (Stoyanov 2010: 
268). Thus Todorov sees Deliorman Alevis as a small settler group from Persia (i.e. migrants) 
infused with the Old Bulgar communities in such a way that they pursue a supposedly Thracian 
folk cult in the areas close to Demir Baba türbe, rather than Persian beliefs (in Grammatikova 
2001: 582). It is not a surprise that such an oversimplified notion of syncretism served the 
ideological function of preparing Alevi assimilation projects like those from 1985-89.     
Academic interest in Alevis flourished after the mid-1950s (e.g. Todorov, Boev, Vasilev, 
Iliev, Lipchev in Grammatikova 2001) with the political agenda of promoting “national 
integration” after 1954. This interest peaked from 1984-89, becoming more politicized as well 
(Dayıoğlu 2005). For instance, the most detailed ethnographic study on Alevi Bulgarian Turks is 
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Ivanicka Georgieva’s edited volume (1998), which was commissioned by the BCP and carried 
out by graduate students in the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, who were themselves Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks. The intent of the study was to examine the traditions and rituals in three Alevi-
populated villages in Razgrad: Midrevo, Sevar and Bisertsi. However, the researcher on Sevar 
withdrew so as “not to reveal the secret,” upon the request of Alevi leaders in the village, as I 
was told during my fieldwork in Razgrad. It is thought that the book was commissioned by the 
state in order to prepare Alevis for the upcoming name-change process. After 1989, the research 
conducted on Alevis became free from political pressures or ideological concerns. Also, earlier 
research was published by foreigners, such as Lubomir Mikov’s studies on Alevi religious sites 
in Bulgaria (2008), Machiel Kiel’s study on Muslim religious structures in Bulgaria (1990) and 
Irene Melikoff’s studies on Deliorman Alevis (1994). However, some such studies contain 
superficial data on Alevis by defining them as a “modified versions of Shia” (e.g. Marushiakova 
and Popov 2006, 2) or merely Shia (e.g. Elchinova 2001, Eminov 2000, Evstatiev 2006, Ghodsee 
2010). This parallels Bulgarian state policies: the 1992 census provided only two options to 
Muslims, as either “Sunni Muslim” or “Shia Muslim,” when Alevis were either unfamiliar with 
the term “Shia” and reject the “Shia” identity.    
Many works on Alevi Bulgarian Turks rely on the syncretism notion of Irene Melikoff, 
who sees Bulgarian Alevism as a combination of Shia, Sufi Gnostic, Platonic, Manichaeist and 
Buddhist elements in addition to Jewish and Christian influences (Melikoff 1994: 110-111). 
Antonina Zhelyazkova follows a more specific notion of syncretism: “heterodox” Muslims in 
Bulgaria had “co-opted individual features from preceding religions” such as shamanism, 
Christianity, Zoroastrian, and Judaism and “borrowed elements from local heresies” such as 
Manichaeism and Bogomilism, while their mysticism remains Islamic (Zhelyazkova 2001: 328). 
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Stoyanov emphasizes that there is a need to substantiate the syncretism notion with a discussion 
of what particular ideas and practices Alevi groups have or have not borrowed from other groups 
(2010). Nevena Grammatikova makes the point there is a need to understand the historical 
processes of the present syncretic forms used by Alevis. Grammatikova calls for reconsideration 
of several “frames of reference.” Such frames of reference would include understanding the 
developments and schism of early Islam, examining the spread of Islam in Bulgaria via Turkmen 
tribes as well as analyzing what influences come from Shia Islam and Persian traditions (such as 
belief in imams), what influences come from the Sufi tradition (e.g. moral doctrine), and what 
influences come from Christianity’s various sects (e.g. rituals) (Grammatikova 2000: 612-3).  
The literature on Alevism, howver, has major flaws and gaps. First, existing works focus 
mainly on the Alevis in Northeastern Bulgaria and Gerlovo (Grammatikova), ignoring those in 
Southern Bulgaria, in the Haskovo-Kardjali area, as noted also by Beytullov (1999: 41). Second, 
even while examining the Northeastern Bulgarian Alevis, these works overlook the differences 
between Alevi communities, such as the differences in interactions, rituals and beliefs between 
Bektaşi, Babai and Derviş, as well as regional differentiations within these categories. Third, the 
existing scholarship reproduces the dichotomy of heterodox versus orthodox Islam. Fourth, the 
literature on Alevism overemphasizes the so-called “heterodox Muslim” identity of Alevis while 
it underemphasizes their self-identification as Turks. Considering these gaps, in Chapter Five I 
give a detailed account of how the practices, organizations and beliefs vary among different 
groups of Alevi Bulgarian Turks: namely the Bektaşi, Babai and Musahipli Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks in Razgrad and Kardjali region.   
In the Turkish academic literature, even the most prominent studies on Bulgarian Turks 
have contributed to the invisibility of Alevi Bulgarian Turks by de-emphasizing the religious 
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identity of all Bulgarian Turks, or by discussing their religious identity only in Sunni terms, or by 
deliberately excluding Alevis from the Bulgarian Turkish identity. There are also scholars who 
pursue not an emic but an etic perspective on Alevi Bulgarian Turks by utilizing Alevi and Sunni 
Islam in Turkey as a frame of reference to explain the beliefs and practices of Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks.    
Many Turkish scholars adopt a  strictly secular approach to Bulgarian Turks by 
emphasizing the community’s secular ethnic markers, like language, while de-emphasizing 
religious ones. Some writers focus on the minority status of Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria from a 
human rights perspective (Şimşir 1986, Turan 2005, Memişoğlu 1989, 1992, Eroğlu 1992). 
Others promote a secular approach by focusing only on the Bulgarian Turkish migrants and their 
“adaptation, acculturation, assimilation” into Turkish society (Ari 1960), or their experiences and 
affiliations (Toğrol 1991, Koçancı 2003, Kolukırık 2006, Kaderli-Yapıcı 2008, Çakar Mengu 
2008, Şirin 2011). These studies have left the Bulgarian Turks’ problems in utilizing their 
religious rights largely unadressed.  If these works mention Bulgarian Turks’ religious practices, 
they do so only to show  that Bulgaria’s policies violate Turks’ human rights, and again, only in 
reference to Sunni Muslim practices. Such works constantly reiterate themes like the state’s 
prevention of the müftülük elections,  the closure of Sunni religious schools, and the lack of 
freedom in attending mosques under socialism. In failing to mention religion, or by superficially 
discussing Sunni Muslims’ rights, these works contribute to the creation of the impression that 
all Bulgarian Turks are Sunnis, and thus to the exclusion of the Alevi Bulgarian Turks from the 
Bulgarian Turkish communal identity.   
Some researchers do focus on the religious identity of the Bulgarian Turks, yet still 
define Bulgarian Turkish identity only in Sunni terms. For instance, Ibrahim Hatiboğlu examines  
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religious reform among the Bulgarian Turks from 1878-1944 by focusing on the competing 
religious reform ideas coming from Cairo and İstanbul. These ideas affected Bulgarian Turkish 
Muslim intellectuals and how they envisioned Islam in Bulgaria (Hatiboğlu 2007). Similarly, 
Mehmet Günay (2006) examines the example of the Islamic Sheria courts in Bulgaria, which had 
been the sole judicial authority for issues on marriage, divorce and inheritance among Muslims 
in Bulgaria from 1880-1944. In these works, religion is defined as the central identity of 
Bulgarian Turks; yet again the only reference is to Sunni Islam.  
There are scholars who recognize the existence of Alevis among Bulgarian Turks but 
consider Alevis as unrepresentative of Turkish group identity. One version of this approach 
defines Alevis as essentially insiders, but not quite. Thus Zehra Kaderli provides elaborate 
ethnographic material about “the Turkish culture” in Deliorman by focusing on oral culture 
about rites of passage such as birth, naming and circumcision, pilgrimage, marriage and burial 
ceremonies, as well as rites related to sending men off to, and welcoming them back from, 
military service (2004). Kaderli recognizes that the category of Bulgarian Turks comprise both 
Alevi and Sunnis in the Deliorman region (82), and she discusses the historal settlement of 
Alevis in the region before the Ottoman conquest (25-38). Most importantly, Kaderli criticizes 
earlier ethnological works focusing on Bulgarian Turks in Deliorman, since these works 
represent only Alevis’ beliefs and rituals, or “one religious segment,” according to her (82-83). 
Yet Kaderli herself falls into the same fallacy by reversal: she conducts an ethnology ofBulgarian 
Turks by explaining only Sunni Turks beliefs and practices, thereby underrepresenting Alevis.  
The other version of this camp identifies Alevis as essentially outsiders assimilated to 
Turkish identity. Ali Eminov (1997) examines existing academic sources on Alevis in Bulgaria, 
but concludes that Alevis were originally a Shia community which became a “synthetic 
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population containing Iranian, Kurdish, Turkish and Bulgarian elements.” According to Eminov, 
irrespective of their origin, today Alevis are “assimilated into the Turkish community…[as they] 
speak Turkish and identify themselves as Turks” (Eminov 1997: 72). Another scholar, Ali 
Dayıoğlu, also adopts this approach by promoting a taxonomy of Muslims in Bulgaria: Turks, 
Roma, Pomaks, and Others. Alevis are placed under the last category even though he notes that 
the Alevis speak Turkish, conduct their religious rituals in Turkish, and self-identify as Turks 
(Dayıoğlu 2005: 75).   
Some academic studies focus particularly on Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ religious beliefs and 
rituals in Bulgaria by utilizing frames of reference coming from either Sunnism or Alevism in 
Turkey. For example, two Sunni researchers from Islamic theology departments in Turkey use an 
etic perspective. Adil Seyman (2006) focusses on Alevism and Bektaşhism in the Balkans, 
showing the historical developments of the different branches of Balkan Alevism in comparison 
with Anatolian Alevism, and İlyas Űzüm (2006) has conducted a detailed examination of Alevi 
religious beliefs, practices and organizational structure in Bulgaria. Yet the analyses of both 
authors utilize a Sunni Islamic framework in analysizing Alevi beliefs, practices and 
organizations. For instance, both works have a clear concern to find out to what extent Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks’ perceptions of God, Muhammed, Ali, and the Kuran are compatible with the 
Sunni Muslim doctrine in Turkey. They want to know whether or not they conduct Sunni rituals, 
including prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, and almsgiving (2006: 105-134).   
Strikingly, some Alevi researchers from Turkey use a frame of reference from Alevis in 
Turkey to analyze Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ beliefs, practices and organization. This perspective 
sees Balkan Alevism as a derivative and a distorted version of Turkish Alevism. For instance, 
Refik Engin researched Alevi Balkan migrants in Turkish Thrace but he also draws conclusions 
 135 
about non-migrant Alevis in Bulgaria. His argument seems primarily about terminology; he 
argues against calling Balkan Alevis “Alevis” or “Bektaşis,” saying they should instead be called 
“sürek Bektaşisi” (2000, 2008, 2009). The word “sürek” means “duration” or “continuation” and 
refers to a distinction between Bektaşis in Bulgaria and Bektaşis in Turkey over group 
membership, regarding whether one’s parents must be Alevi. This is not merely a matter of 
terminology but highlights how different are the Balkan Alevis.  Engin utilizes the taxonomy 
from Alevism in Turkey, which is quite different from that of Alevism in Bulgaria. For instance, 
in Turkey the term “Alevi” refers to groups following the heritage principle in religious 
leadership and community membership, in that Alevi leaders are expected to trace their heritage 
to Ali and Alevi members are supposed to have Alevi parents in Turkey. The term “Bektaşhi” 
refers to groups who do not require its members or leaders to have Alevi heritage, so that neither 
leaders nor members of the Bektaşi community need to have Alevi parents. Yet in Bulgaria, 
Alevis complicate the taxonomy used in Turkish Alevism, since they do not follow the heritage 
rules for the selection of religious leaders, while they do use heritage rules for  membership in 
the community. This means that ordinary Alevis in Bulgaria are supposed to have Alevi parents 
while Alevi leaders do not need to trace their heritage to Ali, as I discuss in Chapter Five. By 
placing such focus on the heritage requirements for leadership and membership (a major issue in 
Alevism in Turkey and a minor issue in Alevism in Bulgaria) Engin ignores the most unique 
element of Alevism in Turkey: the spiritual connection to sacred sites, such as Kızıldeli Sultan in 
Dimetoka for Musahiplis, Hacı Bektaş Veli Sultan in Turkey for  Bektaşis and Şücaaddin Veli 
Sultan for Babais. These authors do not  promote an emic perspective on Alevism in Bulgaria, 
which is not merely ethnocentric but also prevents them from being able to explain why Alevi 
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Bulgarian Turkish migrants to Turkey refuse to attend religious and social organizations of local 
Alevis in Turkey.   
Coşkun Kökel’s analysis (2007) has both an emic and etic character, but projects Alevism 
in Bulgaria as deteriorated versions of Turkish Alevism. Kökel identifies the self-identifications 
that different sub-segments of Alevis use in Bulgaria in terms of the centers they pledge to, ritual 
differences in structure and timing, and organizational differences between Bektaşi, Babai and 
Musahipli (Kökel 2007: 7). Kökel does not refrain from identifying the differences by utilizing 
critieria from Turkish Alevism, noting the absence of the heritage system in Bulgarian Alevism 
(3), the absence of certain ritual principles (12) and lack of musahiplik system among some sub-
segments compared to Turkish Alevism (16). By explaining the differences between Bulgarian 
and Turkish Alevism in terms of the negative effects of historical migrations, as well as in terms 
of the impact of the  socialist regime on Alevi belief and practices (3), Kökel’s work implies that 
Alevism in Turkey has more authenticity, and Alevism in Bulgaria is portrayed as a deteriorated 
or derivative. This approach not only orientalizes Alevism in Bulgaria vis-à-vis Alevism in 
Turkey, but is probably also empirically incorrect, given that Alevism in Turkey has remained 
close to the oppressive Sunni centers historically and thus has potentially remained more 
supressed than Alevism in Bulgaria, which managed to make use of the tension between the 
Bulgarian Christian majority and Turkish Sunni minority.  
In sum, in this section I have argued that Bulgarian and Turkish academic literature 
reveal different perspectives on Ottoman rule in Bulgaria and Bulgarian Turks in regard to 
migration and conversion. However, both literatures have been in perfect harmony in terms of 
excluding Alevis from the Bulgarian Turkish community, and Alevism from the Bulgarian 
Turkish group identity. Bulgarian academics have done so in two ways: they reformulated the 
 137 
conversion thesis and claimed that present-day Alevis are descendants of converted groups under 
Ottoman rule, or they revitalized the migration thesis and claimed that present-day Alevis are 
descendants of migrants who are closer to local Bulgarian populations than the local Turkish or 
Persian populations, due to their specificly syncretic beliefs and practices. On the other hand, the 
Turkish academics contributed to the invisibility of Alevi Bulgarian Turks by defining the 
Bulgarian Turkish group identity in Sunni terms, by openly denying Alevis’ representativeness 
of the group, by misrepresenting them as heretics or Shia and by utilizing Sunni or Alevi frame 
of references from Turkey to understand Alevi Bulgarian Turks.  
4.3 HISTORICITY    
The historicial consciousness of Bulgarian Turks is revealed in amateur publications about the 
community’s history, their family and village histories and individual memoirs, which form a 
strikingly large volume of literature following the migrations to Turkey. In general, these works 
by both Sunni and Alevi Bulgarian Turks also do not mention Alevis, or underrepresent them. In 
this section, I discuss how Sunni authors have often excluded Alevism as a legitimate belief 
among Bulgarian Turks even if they recognize that some Bulgarian Turks are Alevis. 
Surprisingly, even Alevi authors have not mentioned Alevism or their Alevi heritage in order to  
dissimulate, or hide their Alevi identity  when they resettled in Turkey.   
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4.3.1 Alevi and Sunni Bulgarian Turks Narratives on the Closure of the Gap Between  the 
Nation and the State 
The most common trope in these works is how the migrations have closed the former gap 
between the ethnic identity and citizenship status/ residence status of Bulgarian Turks, which 
indicates the reaffirmation of the unity of the nation, state, and territory. The closure trope is 
particularly common among those who experienced the forced migrations in 1950-1 or in 1989, 
rather than the “voluntary” migrations with visas in 1968-78 (e.g. before 1989 Kılıç 1989, 
Gülmen 2006,  zrodoplu: 1976  and after 1989 Kocaoğlu 1998, Toğrol 1991, Topaloğlu 2006, 
Türker 2003, Tacemen 2003, Yeşilbahçe 2009). My interviews with some of these authors 
revealed that the prevalence of the closure trope does not mean it is shared by all Bulgarian 
Turkish migrants. The return-migrants to Bulgaria are those for whom there has been no closure, 
not because of their conflicting loyalties but because local Turks perceive of them as outsiders: 
“migrants” or “Bulgarians”.  
The religious affiliations of some migrants prevented such closure as well, as exemplified 
in Ahmed Davudoğlu’s autobiographic book (1979). Davudoğlu is a devout Sunni who 
graduated from the famous Nuvvab school for training müftüs in Bulgaria. He attended the El-
Ehzer University for further studies and returned to Bulgaria as an administrator of Nuvvab under 
socialism. He was accused of espionage for Turkey and imprisoned in Bulgaria, then migrated to 
Turkey in 1949. In Turkey, however, he was imprisoned for 4 months due to his speech in Friday 
Prayers about “the virtue of Islamic marriage,” since the speech was seen as anti-secular and 
anti-republican during the single-party period in Turkey.  
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4.3.2 Sunni Bulgarian Turks’ Narratives related to Alevi Bulgarian Turks:   
In publications by Sunni Bulgarian Turks, the existence of Alevis among Bulgarian Turks is 
approached in three ways. One is to deny Alevi presence in the community by not mentioning 
them, even if the authors come from villages that neighbor Alevi villages. A second group 
misrepresents Alevis in the region by defining them as Shia or even heretics, while the third 
group recognizes them only superficially by utilizing an unsubstantiated tolerance narrative.  
 Denialist narratives: Some Bulgarian Turkish authors leave Alevis unmentioned. For 
instance, Recep Mehmet Arifoğlu wrote a book on his village Kadınka (Kardjali) which argues 
against a famous Bulgarian ethnographer from the socialist period, who had claimed the village 
has Bulgarian origins. In his book, Arifoğlu mentions rituals currently attributed to Alevis in his 
village, which is located next to Alevi villages, but he never mentions the existence of Alevis in 
the area (Arifoğlu 2009). A similar situation is found in a book on Podavya by Salih Sulusoglu, 
who does not mention anything about the Alevis in the area.   
 Narratives of Misrepresentation: Several authors misrepresent Alevis. For instance, Ömer 
Osman Erendoruk’s book is about folk beliefs, customs, and religious practices in Krumovgrad, 
which is an Alevi-Sunni mixed town and the center of the Musahipli Alevis in Bulgaria. Yet, 
Erdoruk describes the region as “made up of Turks whose religion is Islam and who are 
followers of the Hanefi School of Law, while there are few followers of bidat [fabrication]” 
referring to Alevi ways in the region (Erendoruk 2007: 97). Also, Ahmet Tacemen’s (1995) 
detailed ethnographic study in Kardjali and Haskovo examines folk and religious beliefs, 
practices, customs and superstitions. He misrepresents the rituals in the region that are primarily 
attributed to Alevis (e.g. the significance of Üçler, Yediler, Kırklar) and even presents a distorted 
representation of the practices that are unique to Alevis. For example, “tekke mayesi” is the 
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annual celebration and ritual carried out in every Alevi tekke in Southeastern Bulgaria, but 
Tacemen portrays them as ceremonies about goats (“teke” in Turkish) as if these ceremonies do 
not take place in the territories of Alevi tekkes (1995: 421)!  
 Unsubstantiated Tolerance Narratives: Some Bulgarian Turkish authors have a 
sympathetic approach to Alevi Bulgarian Turks and explicitly recognize Alevis in the 
community as Turkish Muslims. However, some of these authors do not recognize Alevi beliefs 
as legitimate and they subsume Alevis under the generic Bulgarian Turkish category. Thus 
Osman Kılıç (1989) mentions that some of the Deliorman Turks are Alevis. He does not 
stigmatize Alevis but sees them as “actually active, diligent people who are open to novelties in 
every aspect of life” (Kılıç 1989: 54-55). Yet his recognition of Alevi individuals does not mean 
recognition of their beliefs and practices, and he attributes Sunni character to explicitly Alevi 
sites and rituals. Specifically, he presents the Demir Baba Tekke from a Sunni point of view, by 
discussing the presence of the remains of a mosque as a manifestation of Demir Baba’s 
involvement with Sunni daily prayers, even though the mosque was known to be a product of the 
Ottoman policies that brought about the Sunnification of Alevis in the 19
th
 century. He de-
emphasized the Alevi nature of the Demir Baba Tekke by defining “meydanevi” as a place of 
“gathering,” since “meydan” means “public square,” rather than a space for the cem rituals of 
Alevis. He discusses the ritual slaughter ,yet not its Alevi elements; and emphasizes the Sunni 
practices in tekke, citing the Quran, but not mentioning the Alevi visitors’ practices, such as 
candle burning and Alevi ritual prayers.  
Some authors recognize the existence of Alevis in the community, but subsume them 
under the generic category of Muslims. Osman Keskioğlu sees both “Alevis” and “Sunnis” as 
Muslim communities in Bulgaria (1985: 52) and notes several important Alevi tekkes, türbes and 
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Dervişh lodges in Bulgaria (1985: 51-54). However, he defines these places not as Alevi but 
rather as Muslim sites under the administration of “Cemaat-i Islamiye.” He underlines how he 
appreciates the türbes in the region due to their function of “keeping the faith alive,” while he 
sees common Alevi ways of engaging with tekkes as superstitious, such as making requests of 
the saint rather than to God (1985: 55).  
Other authors manifest a secular version of the unsubstantied tolerance towards Alevis. 
For instance, Islam Beytullah Erdi examines the history of Bisertsi, a Bulgarian, Sunni and Alevi 
Turk mixed village in Razgrad. He discusses the history of their three neighborhoods, the major 
developments and famous people in the village history. Even though everyone in the village 
knows who has Alevi or Sunni heritage, Erdi refrains from making any reference that would 
indicate the presence of Alevis in the village. During my interview with him in Ankara, he 
answered my questions with pride: he “did not want to offend anyone.”  I had interpreted his 
response as an instance of his perception of Alevism as if it is inherently offensive. However, as 
Nicole Constable suggested to me,  his response may instead be a reflection his respect for Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks’ dissimulations and his hesitation to reveal the very Alevi identity his friends 
had been trying to conceal from outsiders. Alevi Bulgarian Turks’  
4.3.3 Narratives indicating “Assimilation” and Dissimulation:   
As I stated earlier, in Chapter Three, among Bulgarian Turks, Alevi and Sunni identities 
are heritage-based categorical group identities. Individuals are assigned to either one or the other 
category by birth, irrespective of their religious identifications or religiousity. They are also  
involved in social relations and networks that are informed by these categorical identities. To 
strenthen this point, in this section I examine the long-term family histories of two Bulgarian 
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Turks who have Alevi heritage, based on their autobiographies. These men followed quite 
different individual trajectories. One, Halil Uzunoğlu, expressed a strictly Sunni Islamist point of 
view while the other, Salih Ersoy, seems to have dissimulated as Sunni and hints at his Alevi 
identity throughout the autobiography. Uzunoğlu’s case exemplifies the option of “assimilation” 
for individuals with Alevi heritage,  in which the  categoric group identity of Alevi persists 
despite the assimilation of Alevi individuals, and Ersoy’s case exemplifies the option of 
dissimulation of indviduals with Alevi heritage.  
A narrative of individual assimilation: Halil Uzunoğlu   
Halil Uzunoğlu is a famous person among Bulgarian Turks in Bursa, Turkey. He is the 
founder of the Tuna-Rodop Turks Solidarity Association, the first active and known migrant 
organization that carried out successful campaigns against the assimilation of Pomaks in 
Bulgaria in the 1970s, which even got the issue on the agenda of the International Islamic 
Conference. In fact, because of his activities, Uzunoğlu was invited to Bulgaria by his relatives 
there in early 1980. He narrates that he had not anticipated getting a visa from the Bulgarian 
state; yet he ultimately did so. However, in the second day of his visit he was arrested, was and 
then imprisoned for 40 months in Bulgaria. Uzunoğlu is a self-identified Muslim who migrated 
to Bursa in 1950, which became a major rupture for him:  
“We did not know at that time. Despite all the pressures in 1947-49 Bulgaria, 
the mosques were open, the calls to prayers were done from minarets and the 
Ottoman language was taught to school kids, while at that time in Turkey, 
Muslim people were suffering under the pressure of the atrocious 
government; people who conducted call to prayer from minarets were being 
shot to death” (Uzunoğlu: 45-48). 
 
He is also a political Islamist. In the 1970s he was involved in local politics in Bursa as a 
prominent member of the Islamist National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi), which was   
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shut down during the 1980 coup due to the Konya meeting in which the crowd chanted slogans 
such as “the Sharia is Islam and the Constitution is the Quran.”  
The most striking fact about Uzunoğlu, however, is his Alevi-Bektaşi heritage. In his 
autobiography, he explains that his ancestors come from the nomadic tribes who were forced into 
settlement in Elmali, Antalya (a well-known Alevi village in Anatolia even now), then re-settled 
to Rodops, and formed the village “Ahatlar” under Ottoman rule (11). His book reveals a number 
of patterns indicating his Bektaşi heritage: most importantly, Uzunoğlu’s great grandfather, 
Hasan, was a janissary in the Ottoman army “in the period when the Muslims were also allowed 
to become a member of the Janissary Order.” He does not discuss it explicitly, but the Janissary 
Order was organized along Bektaşi principles until its closure in the 19th century. Also, another 
story concerns Omer, the son of Hasan the Janissary and the grandfather of Uzunoğlu, who 
became an Ottoman Army officer and served during the Ottoman-Russian War, and was forced  
by his relatives to stay in an Alevi tekke to recover from a nervous breakdown. The rupture in the 
family’s religious affiliations seemed to start after the independence of Bulgaria. Omer settled in 
Asenovgrad, as a former Ottoman army officer in independent Bulgaria. Uzunoğlu’s father and 
his sisters also remained in the Asenovgrad and Kardjali area. Uzunoğlu attended a religious 
school in Kardjali, served as an imam in a Smolyan village until socialism, and conducted 
military service in the socialist army as a worker-soldier, like other minority members. He 
migrated to Turkey in 1950.  
During my personal interview with him, Uzunoğlu confirmed the Bektaşi origins of his 
great grandfather who had served in the Janissary Order. Despite his politicized Sunni Islamist 
worldview and affiliations, he does not despise his heritage but does not emphasize it, either. His 
situation seems to be best viewed as a case of individual assimilation, which began when the 
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family settled in the Pomak-dominated Asenovgrad area and accelerated during the highly 
polarized political environment in Turkey in 1970, and the particularly Sunni-hegemonic context 
of Bursa.  
A narrative of dissimulation: Salih Ersoy  
Salih Ersoy is a Bulgarian Turk who migrated from the Alevi neighborhood of Bisertsi (Razgrad) 
to Turkey in 1950. In 2002 he published his autobiography, which never mentions his Alevi 
origin or the presence of Alevis in the village despite the fact that he is an Alevi. However, it is 
possible to ascertain that he is Alevi because he utilizes several codes that are characteristic of 
Alevi self-narratives. One is that he locates his ancestors as migrants from Khorasan (3), not 
Turkey. Another is his reference to a “sectarian difference” (29) in Bisertsi, where he states his 
group was seen negatively, though he does not mention either which sects he is talking about or 
which sect he belongs to. Third, he refers to the people of the other neighborhoods as “the 
others” and “the bigots” (yobazlar), a common code term that Alevis use to refer to Sunnis. He 
explains what he calls “the other’s bigotry” (2002:8) by giving an example about different 
perceptions of the residents of the Sunni and Alevi neighborhoods in the interwar period. Ersoy’s 
neighborhood initiated the opening of a modern Turkish school, while the Sunni neighborhood 
resisted it on the grounds that “education will be conca (gavurca) [in infidel language]” meaning 
it would be Turkish with the Latin alphabet rather than Ottoman Turkish (2002:8). Finally, the 
Alevis solved the issue by asking for help from the Bulgarian governor of the town, which was 
characteristic of a strategy that Northern Bulgarian Alevis used, dating back to the interwar 
period, by playing off the balance between the Bulgarian majority and Turkish minority. In the 
interwar period, Ersoy held prominent positions in the village’s local administration and in 1950 
he migrated to Turkey. He settled in Bandirma, where Alevi migrants were present and then 
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moved to İstanbul. His book ends with a statement of his gratefulness “for being able to conduct 
prayers five times daily owing to the peace of not having a spiritual destruction and collapse or 
physical misery” (62)  praying five times a day is a well-known Sunni marker which Alevis 
explicitly reject. Despite this final comment, Salih Ersoy’s autobiography indicates not 
assimilation but dissimulation, as throughout the book he utilizes codes that indicate Alevi 
heritage to insiders while hiding it from outsiders.   
In sum, in this section, I examined the place of Alevism and Alevis in the Bulgarian 
Turks’ historical consciousness by examining Bulgarian Turks’ family histories, village histories 
and memoirs. I argued that Sunni Bulgarian Turks contribute to Alevi invisibilities by overtly 
denying their existence, by misrepresenting them as heretics or Shia and in some cases, even if 
they recognize the Alevis in the community (along with the narratives of tolerance), by 
excluding Alevism from the group identity. Most strikingly, I argued that Alevi Bulgarian Turks 
also contribute to the invisibility of Alevis among Bulgarian Turks by showing two examples: a 
present-day Islamicist Bulgarian Turkish migrant with Bektaşi heritage and an Alevi Bulgarian 
Turkish migrant dissimulating as Sunni.   
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5.0  IDEAL-TYPES AMONG ALEVI BULGARIAN TURKS IN TURKEY AND 
BULGARIA  
This chapter describes Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ typical narratives and practices about Alevism 
(Alevilik). I utilize Max Weber’s concept “ideal type” for typical patterns reflecting the inner 
logic of particular meaning systems (1968: 19-22), in this case Alevism, and examine Alevism 
ideal-types among Alevi Bulgarian Turks. This focus is important for my thesis, since in my 
ethnographic analysis I operationalize the concepts dissimulation, dissimilation and assimilation 
by examining Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ narratives and practices in relation to such an Alevism 
ideal-type. Specifically I portray Alevis’ dissimulations as their narratives and practices which 
publicly indicate their distancing themselves from an Alevism ideal-type while they privately 
continue adhering to it. On the other hand, I see dissimilation as Alevis’ narratives and practices 
which publicly and privately indicate adherence to Alevism and assimilation as those which 
publicly and privately indicate adherence to ideal-types of the groups other than Alevis. 
I should note that I use the terms “public” and “private” to refer to domains of 
collectivities. In this usage, the term “public” refers to mixed settings where Alevis and non-
Alevis are present, and the term “private” refers to  Alevi-only settings. “Public” and “private” 
are also self-identified distinctions made by Alevi Bulgarian Turks, manifested in Alevi 
terminology such as insider (Can) versus outsider (Zahiri), notions of secrecy (Sır) and enacted 
in rituals such as cem. In this sense, my usage of ,the terms “public” and “private” is not directly 
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linked to conceptualization of the “public sphere” and “private sphere” as oppositionary (e.g. 
Arendt 1958, Habermas 1989), or to the critiques of this conceptualization in feminist theory 
(e.g. Frazer 1991) and neo-Marxism (e.g. Negri 2003). 
My analysis of the Alevism ideal-type prioritizes an emic perspective. I focus on the 
accounts of Alevi Bulgarian Turkish religious leaders (babas) who are currently residing in 
Bulgaria and Turkey. It should be recalled that among Alevi Bulgarian Turks, babas are elected 
male members of the cem community, based on the level of their spiritually maturity. During my 
fieldwork ,all of my Alevi female and male informants directed me towards their babas to talk 
about “religious issues,” as they see themselves unauthorized to talk about such things. 
Therefore, my discussions on religious issues regarding Alevism comes from Alevi babas while 
those on other issues comes from them but also from regular Alevi male and female members of 
the community.  
Alevi Bulgarian Turkish babas describe the Alevi Path (Alevi Yolu) or the Path (Yol) as 
their understandings of what typical beliefs and practices are anticipated from Alevis. They 
describe this Alevi Path not only on its own terms but also by making comparisons with Sunni 
Islam, Shia Islam and Alevism in Turkey. They specifically emphasize the internal 
differentiation of the Alevi Bulgarian Turkish community into subgroups of Bektaşi, Babai, 
Musahipli, and Derviş based on differences in perceived origins, affiliated saints, ritual orders 
and membership requirements.  
I also utilize an etic perspective, since the broad geographic range of my multi-sited 
fieldwork made it possible for me to recognize some distinctions that were unnoticed by Alevis 
themselves, due to the long-term isolation of Alevi groups from each other. I noticed another 
level of internal differentiation crosscutting the subgroups (Babai, Bektaşi etc.): Alevis are also 
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divided into regionally-marked subsegments, as Northeasterns and Southerners, depending on 
their location of origin or the “frontiers.” I use the term “frontiers” as cultural and territorial 
zones distinguished from other territories, as discussed in Chapter Three. I argue that Alevis’ 
regional differences have caused patterned differences in their religious practices. For instance, 
Alevis from Northeastern Bulgaria (Razgrad) value time-sensitive rituals such as cems, while 
Alevis from Southern Bulgaria (Kardjali) conduct space-sensitive rituals such as türbe visits in 
Bulgaria and Turkey.  
These multi-layered differences among Alevi Bulgarian Turks cause interesting 
configurations. The members of the same Alevi subgroups (Bektaşi or Babai) from the frontiers 
in Northeastern and Southern Bulgaria differ in terms of the most common ritual forms, ritual 
frequencies and ritual space. In other words, different subgroups from the same frontier resemble 
each other more than the same subgroup from the other frontier. In terms of predominant ritual 
forms, Babais from Razgrad are closer to Bektaşis from Razgrad, and Babais from Razgrad have 
less in common with Babais from Kardjali. Following the same pattern of influence from where 
they originated, Bektaşis from Kardjali are closer to Babais from Kardjali and have less in 
common with Bektaşis from Razgrad. This means complications during the encounters of these 
four Alevi communities: Alevis debate on which subgroup’s and subsegment’s ritual order 
regarding cems and türbe visits should be followed. They deal with these complications in 
several ways. In the case of short term encounters they comply, with the visitors following the 
locals’ ways, and in the case of permanent encounters they segregate, so that, for example, 
Razgrad and Kardjali Babais, or Razgrad and Kardjali Bektaşis in Turkey form separate cem 
communities.  
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A focus on these internal-differentiations among Alevi Bulgarian Turks is significant in 
two respects. First, the self-identified taxonomies of Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ been ignored in the 
highly politicized, nationalist literatures of Bulgaria and Turkey, as I have argued in the previous 
chapter. Second, these differentiations have real effects on Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ lives. Inter-
subgroup marriages are discouraged, and members of the same Alevi subgroups from different 
frontiers keep their separate cem communities. Alevis migrants refuse to join local Turkish and 
Kurdish Alevis’ cems, even when they face dissolution of their cem community. 
Strikingly, these differences may prevent the participation of Alevi subgroups and 
subsegments in the same cem rituals; yet they do not impinge on Alevi self-perceptions. Babais 
from Razgrad feel closer to Babais from Kardjali even though their ritual forms and ritual 
frequency resemble more that of Bektaşis from Razgrad. Furthermore, the members of various 
subgroups and subsegments from Razgrad or Kardjali still unite under the “Balkan Alevi” 
identity, sometimes in opposition to the “Anatolian Alevi” identity, and ultimately to Sunni 
identity. This situation reveals a significant point: “Alevi” group identity among Bulgarian Turks 
captures much more than religious identity defined by practices; it is a categorical identity which 
remains intact even in the face of varying religious practices and religious identifications.  
It would be a fallacy to understand the differences in Alevis subgroups and subsegments 
as a lack of an ideal type for Alevism. These differences are not essential differences but 
variations of the same ideal-type, indicating Alevi adaptations to both local and broader political, 
social and economic developments. Alevis have modified the aspects of beliefs and practices that 
could be modified while protecting central elements. For instance, when the Cold War border 
regime prevented Alevi babas from visiting spiritual centers in Turkey and Greece, they re-
oriented their visits to the major spiritual centers in Bulgaria.  Yet, their prayers continued to 
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include major saints beyond the border, such as Şücaaddin Veli Sultan for Babais and Hacı 
Bektaş Veli Sultan for Bektaşis.  
As I discussed in chapter three, Alevism and Sunnism are categorical group identities 
which incorporate people with different degrees and levels of religiosity, practicing, pious and 
even atheist individuals. This is because individuals are assigned by both Alevis and Sunnis to  
these groups by birth, irrespective of their religious beliefs or practices. While there are 
differentiations in religious practices, they do not cause a change in the categorical “Alevi” 
identity, nor in the self-identification of individual Alevis with this identity. As a matter of fact, 
Alevi babas often reiterated Alevi sayings that were common during my interviews: “the [Alevi] 
path is one, while [Alevi] practices are a thousand and one” (Yol bir surek binbir) or “Yol farki 
yok; surek farki var” (there is no difference in the Path, just in practices).  
The first section of this chapter examines the ideal-type of Alevism, first on its own terms 
and then in comparison with Sunni and Shia Islam, as well as local forms of Alevism in Turkey. 
The second section examines Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ differences with regards to the subgroups 
and subsegments, but points out the constancy of a shared sense of Alevism among nearly all 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks. This shared sense of Alevism came out in my interviews, and is 
manifested in the presence of common beliefs and practices, even though subsegments and 
subgroups may have minor variations (e.g. some believe in seven while others believe in twelve 
Holy Imams, some suggest slaughtering one and others suggest slaughtering two animals for 
initiation). 
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5.1 THE ALEVI PATH AS THE RELIGIOUS IDEAL TYPE ABOUT ALEVISM 
Alevis form a community dispersed across the borders of multiple states in which they are also 
divided into subgroups. In Turkey, Alevis are divided into Kızılbaş, Türkmen, Tahtacilar, Zaza 
and Bektaşis, while in Bulgaria they are divided into Bektaşi, Babai, Musahipli, Derviş, Gülşeni, 
and Ali Koçlus. These differences do not preclude the self-perceptions of Alevis as a group, as 
reflected in several Alevi sayings: “Yol farki yok; surek farki var” (there is no difference in the 
Path, just in practices) and “Yol bir surek binbir” (the Path is one; the form is a thousand and 
one). This section describes the Path (Yol) or the Alevi Path (Alevi Yolu) as a religious ideal-type, 
first on its own terms and then in relation to Sunnis and Shias. 
5.1.1 The Alevi Path as a religious ideal-type  
According to self-proclaimed Alevis, including those practicing and not practicing Alevism, and 
Sunnis, also including those practicing and unpracticing Sunnism, “Alevi” is a categorical group 
identity which includes all Bulgarian Turks having Alevi parents. Yet the Alevi ideal-type, as 
manifested in the term “the Alevi Path,” is a religious trajectory. Entering into the Path (Yol’a 
girmek) typically requires a person with Alevi heritage to become a member of a cem 
community. In other words, Alevi heritage is suffice for membership to the “Alevi” social group, 
while religious initiation is a requirement for membership to the Alevi religious group.  
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5.1.1.1 Belief  
The Perfect Human Being and the 4 Doors, 40 Levels  
A religious initiation ceremony transforms a Bulgarian Turk with Alevi heritage into a follower 
of the Alevi Path (talip). New members of a cem community are seen as spiritually “raw” (ham 
or cig), and are expected to “mature” (olgun) towards the ideal, to become “the perfect human 
being” (insan-ı kamil) and thus get closer to God (Hak). To be a perfect human being requires 
following a set of ethical, moral, and religious principles. Following pronuncements about 
personal ethics, such as “control your hands, loins and tongue” (eline, beline, diline sahip ol) is 
central to becoming “the perfect human being.”  
Transformation into such a perfect human being is an idealized form that is structured 
precisely in accordance to the stages manifested in the principle “Four Doors and Forty Ranks 
(Dort Kapi Kırk Makam). The four doors are named as Şeriat (Sharia as religious law), Tarikat   
(Tariqa as religious brotherhood), Marifet (Marifa as spiritual knowledge) and Hakikat (Haqiqa 
as the Truth). The Şeriat door represents the ostensive (zahiri), formalist and legalistic elements 
of Islam. The Tarikat door represents the esoteric (batini) elements of Islam, which can be 
experienced only with the guidance of a spiritual leader (mursit) in a cem community. The 
Marifet door represents the passage from possessing spiritual knowledge, while the Hakikat door 
represents passage to the state of “being one with God” (Hak ile yeksan olmak). Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks recognize the typical trajectory for an Alevi individual as to pass the Şeriat and Tarikat 
doors, while the Marifet door may be passed only by some babas, and passing the Hakikat door 
is equivalent to becoming a saint. Each door has ten levels, which are a combination of religious 
and ethical principles, and that should be passed by followers. 
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Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ perception of the relation between Tarikat and Şeriat seems 
ambiguous at first glance. In Alevi theology, the Şeriat and Tarikat doors are stages that every 
Alevi should pass through, and passing the Şeriat door is a prerequisite for reaching the Tarikat 
door. Over time, however, these concepts have gained other meanings. The term Şeriat is used 
for those following the formalist side of the religion, while Tarikat is used for those seeking the 
esoteric meaning of religion, which implies that the two doors are exclusive categories. 
Furthermore, this usage has informed and clearly marked intergroup distinctions. The followers 
of Şeriat are taken as “Sunni” and the follower of Tarikat are taken as “Alevi,” for Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks.   
This ambiguity is important for the general argument of my thesis, because it helped 
Alevis to manipulate their relations with Sunni communities in two ways. As I discuss in the 
ethnographic analyses, sometimes Alevi Bulgarian Turks utilize these concepts to overemphasize 
the intergroup differences and broaden the gap between Sunni and Alevi Islam, and therefore 
Alevis dissimulate as a group. Sometimes Alevis utilize these concepts to publicly deny inter-
group differences while privately continuing to believe in inter-group differences, thus to 
dissimulate as Sunnis while still following the Alevi Path.  
Alevi Bulgarian Turks overemphasizing or denying intergroup differences is not a matter 
of their unconditioned individual choices, but of contextually-conditioned and well-calculated 
performances. My fieldwork shows that segments of Alevi Bulgarian Turks have denied the 
inter-group differences in the presence of outsiders (i.e. they dissimulate) due to the perceived or 
actual threat when they cannot freely emphasize their own communal identity in public (i.e. 
dissimilate), yet they resist dissolving within the surrounding society (i.e. assimilate). For this 
reason, I see Alevis’ dissimulations as not an issue of collective and calculated dishonesty, 
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falseness or hypocracy, but a specific type of performance aimed at surviving the most trying 
conditions threatening the group members, the group and the group identity.   
In defining dissimulation as performance I do not use Judith Butler’s use of the latter 
term, since Butler identifies “performance” as acts of reiteration of the norms in “regulatory 
regimes” of group differences which cause the reproduction of the “regulatory regime” of group 
differences and hierarchy. Alevis’ dissimulations may be their public reiterations of the Sunni 
norms, yet these reiterations do not reproduce the regulatory regime of Alevi-Sunni difference 
and hierarchy.  On the other hand, Butler defines “performativity” as subversive acts of 
reiteration of the norms, not “intentionally” and “calculatably,” but until these reiterations lead to 
an “unanticipated resignifiability” of the group identities (1993: 28).  I do not see Alevis’ 
dissimulation as “performativity” in the Butlerian sense. Alevi dissimulations as reiterations of 
the norms about Sunni identity are acts which are decided, planned, calculated and executed 
collectively. Alevis reiterate norms about Sunni identity only in public,  switching to the Alevi 
ways immediately when they are in the privacy of their own group. Furthermore, Alevis’ 
reiterations of norms about Sunni identity do not seem intend to, or to lead to, an “unanticipated 
resignifiability” of what Sunni and Alevi identity signifies for Alevis and Sunnis within “the 
“regulatory regime” of Alevi-Sunni differences.    
Strikingly, dissimulation is marked by the mutuality of the performance between 
dissimulating minorities and simulated majorities. Dissimulation as a performance is a matter not 
only of what is intended or done by dissimulating actors, but also of how such actions are 
received. During my fieldwork I have noticed that in migrant neighborhoods of Bursa, where 
who is Alevi and who is Sunni is known to not outsiders, Sunni Bulgarian Turks do not reveal 
the Alevi identity of their friends to outsiders like me. In settings where who is Alevi and who is 
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Sunni is well-known to outsiders, Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ dissimulations help Sunni Bulgarian 
Turks to define the Bulgarian Turkish group identity in Sunni terms. In other words, minorities’ 
performances do not seem to actually mislead the majorities that the dissimulating minorities 
simulate. Dissimulation is a mutual and collaborative act, as Andrew Strathern has reminded me 
in our correspondence. 
The Threes (Üçler): Hak-Muhammed-Ali  
In Alevi cosmology, God is referred to as Hak or Hakikat (the Truth). The forms of 
Alevism which are less influenced by Sufism recognize the Islamic principle that asserts the 
unity of God (tevhid). Yet forms of Alevism which are closer to Sufism portray God as inherent 
in and manifested in every creation, including humankind, as captured in the statement “En el 
Hak” (I am the Truth/ God). This second perception also informs Alevi rituals. Cems start with 
participants’ supplication (niyaz) not only to people in positions of authority like the baba and 
the people holding religious functions, but also to all regular cem participants. Unsurprisingly the 
second perception is disliked by formalist Muslim groups and considered heretical.   
Alevis’ perception of divinity is summarized by the phrase “Hak-Muhammed-Ali,” which 
is cited in all Alevi prayers and rituals. The phrase suggests a trinity (üçleme) and it often led to 
the association of Alevism with Christianity in Bulgaria. However, the Alevi trinity is marked by 
ambiguity. Alevi Bulgarian Turks explain the trinity in multiple terms. Some Alevis consider it a 
hierarchical ranking with a clear division of authority, according to which Hak represents the 
ulviyet (sublimity), Muhammed represents the nübüvvet (prophecy) and Ali represents the 
velayet (eparchy). However, many Alevi babas place Hak at the highest rank, while Muhammed 
and Ali are claimed to be created by the same holy light (nur) and are equal in rank. In a third 
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variant, informed by Sufism’s portrayal of divinity in all creations, some Alevis consider Hak, 
Muhammed and Ali to be completely equal and even the same.    
 The ambiguity in the meanings of the phrase “Hak-Muhammed-Ali” is significant in 
understanding not only Alevi cosmology, but also the relations between Alevi and non-Alevi 
groups.  The last two explanations of the trinity have been considered heresy by so-called 
Orthodox Islam, and as grounds for the persecution of Alevis. The first explanation seems 
compliant with the putatively Orthodox interpretations; yet, it should be noted that even though 
Sunni Islam recognizes the importance of Ali in the development of Islam, he is not attributed a 
sacred place such as vilayet (eparchy). In fact, until the most recent Alevi revival in Turkey, 
Sunni Islam did not value Ali more than any of the other four Caliphs. Therefore, all three 
interpretations of the phrase mark Alevi religious identity as distinct from other Islamic religious 
group identities.  
The ambiguity in the interpretation of the trinity has been attributed to a lack of coherence 
in the belief system, since Alevism developed as an oral tradition. This may be the true reason 
for the ambiguity. My thesis, however, is more concerned with its result: the ambiguity has 
provided space for Alevis to maneuver when dealing with potentially hostile majority 
communities in their surroundings. For instance, Alevi Bulgarian Turks have been known to use 
a number of the interpretations stated above, the first interpretation in dealing with Sunni 
Muslims and the last interpretation in dealing with Orthodox Christians, as I discuss in chapters 
six and seven.  
Ehl-i Beyt (Beşler) and Teberra and Tavella 
Alevis especially value the household of Muhammed (ehl-i beyt), composed of Muhammed, 
Fatma (Muhammed’s daughter), Ali (Fatma’s husband and Muhammed’s son-in law), Hasan and 
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Huseyin (Muhammed’s grandchildren). Alevis believe that Quran and Hadith clearly state the 
devolution to ehl-i beyt. This notion of ehl-i beyt is not just used frequently in prayers and rituals, 
it also determines inter-group relations through the concepts of tavella and teberra. Tevella 
means devotion to and love of the household of Muhammed, and teberra means avoiding those 
who do not like ehl-i beyt.  
There are several reasons why the concept tavella is important. One is that a large portion 
of Alevi prayers, rituals, celebrations and commemorations have references to devotion to the 
ehl-i beyt. A second is that tavella is used to justify the heritage principle among Alevis. For 
instance, in Anatolian Alevism, all Alevi members of the community should have Alevi parents, 
and all Alevi leaders should prove their lineage connection to Muhammed and ehlibeyt, as 
members of an ocak (hearth). Ordinary Alevi Bulgarian Turks follow the membership rule about 
having Alevi parents, but religious leaders do not have their heritage linked to the ehlibeyt.  A 
third reason is that the tavella concept is used to legitimize the Alevi position regarding the 
Original Drift, i.e. the drift between Sunni and non-Sunni Muslims (Shia and Alevi). The 
Original Drift was caused by the Sunnis’ support for the election of Caliphs after Muhammed, 
when non-Sunnis supported Ali as the legitimate Caliph due to his heritage connection with 
Muhammed.  
Also important is the way the concept teberra regulates inter-group relations. It shows the 
dislike that Alevis hold for a number of historical Sunni leaders, who attacked and murdered 
members of the ehl-i beyt and also Alevis. For example, Alevis dislike Yezid as the Ummayid 
leader who murdered Ali’s son Huseyin in Kerbala. Yet the concept has gained a secondary 
meaning: it refers to all Sunnis who exclude Alevis or who favor leaders who have historically 
oppressed Alevis in the present day. Many Alevi prayers and nefes include phrases that curse 
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“Yezid,” which refers to not only the Umayid leader but also all Yezid-like Sunnis. My Alevi 
informants are often curious about my opinion of this cursing of Yezid. Many seemed satisfied 
with my response that “I have Sunni heritage, I am not Yezid,” indicating that I am aware they 
make a distinction between Sunnis and Yezid-like Sunnis. In this sense, the concept teberra 
fortifies Alevi ideas of caution and avoiding Sunnis, and therefore justifies practices of 
dissimulation as as hiding their identity from outsiders.   
Holy Imams (Yediler or Onikiler) 
Belief in the Holy Imams makes Alevism distinct from Sunnism and similar to Shiism. Sunni 
Islam does not attribute any exalted position to a human being other than prophets. In Sunni 
Islam the term “imam” refers to the clergy in the mosques. Shia Islam also values prophets, yet 
portrays the Holy Imams as exalted and infallible human beings. The first Imam was 
Muhammed, the second Imam was Ali. There are different beliefs about the number of imams 
across Shia subgroups: the Twelver Shia acknowledges 12 Holy Imams and the Sevener Shia 
acknowledge 7 Holy Imams. Both believe that the last Imam remains hidden and will return one 
day to bring peace and justice to the world.  
Alevi belief resembles Shia belief in terms of the value placed on Imams. Imams are 
sacred, infallible and it is believed the last imam will one day return. Among Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks, Bektaşis, Musahiplis, and Derviş believe in 12 Holy imams and Babais believe in 7 Holy 
Imams. The difference between Alevi and Shia rests on how the Holy Imam idea is translated 
into rituals. Alevis enact the Holy Imam idea in cems; the Holy Imams are directly represented in 
cems by people holding special religious functions and sitting on a specific sheepskin (post). 
Among Bulgarian Turks, Bektaşi and Musahipli have 12 posts and Babais have 7 posts in their 
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cems. Unlike Alevis, Shias do not personify Holy Imams in rituals, and they only have rituals 
devoted to Holy Imams, such as Karbela Commemorations.  
Saints  
Alevis are also distinct from both Sunnis and Shias in the way they perceive Saints. In Sunni and 
Shia Islam, Saints are historical persona who served God. In Alevism Saints are holy souls which 
are reincarnated in the bodies of historical persons and who have performed miraculous deeds. 
These differences among Sunni, Shia and Alevis become visible in the rituals at tombs. Sunnis 
pray to God for the soul of the saint during the türbe visit, while Alevis pray to and demand 
blessings from the saints during visits to the türbe.  
Alevi Bulgarian Turks respect all saints yet affiliate themselves with certain major Alevi 
saints (Pir), such as Hacı Bektaş Veli for Bektaşis and Musahiplis, and Şücaaddin Veli Sultan for 
Babais. Alevi Bulgarian Turks also pray to these saints and their major followers (Kutub), such 
as Demir Baba, Otman Baba and local saints who are considered to have brought about miracles.  
5.1.1.2 Practices   
Cem 
Cem (literally congregation or assembly meeting) is the central ritual of worship in Alevism. 
Cems are considered the re-enactment of the Alevi religious myth Kırklar cemi, which relates the 
narrative of Muhammed’s visit to the congregation of Ali and the Forty Holy People (Kırklar). 
Cems reflect the circular understanding of both time and space in Alevism. Alevis perform a 
ritual dance of turning and swirling (semah) to indicate the unity of god and follower, and Cems 
periodically involve purification ceremonies which symbolize a renewal of the membership oath 
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(tarik or bas okutma) and represent ritual rebirth of Alevis in accordance with Alevi 
reincarnation beliefs (don degistirme).   
Cems vary according to the day and time they are held, as well as in terms of their order, 
participants, religious positions, specific ritual elements and purpose. Some cem ceremonies are 
valued as a rite of passage and commemorate birth, initiation (ikrar), marriage, spiritual 
brotherhood (Musahiplik), burials and periodic purification ceremonies (tarik). Other cem 
ceremonies are periodically conducted. Thus in Razgrad, cems are conducted twice a week, by 
Babais on “Mondays” and “Fridays” and by Bektaşis on “Wednesdays” and “Fridays;” while in 
Kardjali weekly cems are not common. Alevi Bulgarian Turks conduct cems on special days, 
such as on Nevruz Day (March 21), at the end of the Muharrem Fast. Cems are also conducted 
on Hıdrellez (May 6) in Razgrad and at the end of harvest in Kardjali (birlik).  
Conventional cems (ayn-ül cem) are only open to Alevis who have been through the 
initiation ceremony for the Alevi path (ikrar), while conversation cems (muhabbet) are open to 
Alevis who have not taken the oath, as well as non-Alevis. The conventional cems follow the 
principles of tasavvuf and there is a hierarchy among the participants. Alevis who have taken the 
oath (ikrarlı) are not allowed to participate in the whole ceremony, while Alevis with both oath 
and spiritual brothers and sisters (Musahipli) are allowed to participate in the whole ceremony 
including the specific ritual called çırak uyarma. This is a ritual element central to the 
conventional cem (ayn-ül cem, i.e. cems which are open to initiated Alevis) and absent in the 
conversation cems (muhabbet cemi, i.e. cems which may include uninitiated heritage Alevis and 
even non-Alevis). The ceremony involves lighting 2 or 3 holy candles accompanied by special 
prayers, which indicates invoking the Holy light representing Hak-Muhammed-Ali. During my 
fieldwork I was allowed to join both conventional and conversation cems despite being an 
 161 
ultimate outsider, as a researcher with acknowledged Sunni heritage. Alevi Bulgarian Turks did 
not hesitate to invite me to the conversation cem, while at the conventional cems it was requested 
that I leave at the çırak uyarma, like the younger Alevis without ikrar. I was re-invited after the 
çırak ceremony, indicating that this ritual is seen as a part of the Alevi Secret (Alevi Sırrı). 
Despite this secrecy, Alevi babas did not hesitate to talk to me about the ritual. This may be 
because this part of the ceremony has been the subject of slander and groundless accusations that 
“Alevis put the lights off” (“Aleviler mum söndü yapıyor”), which implies Alevis partake in 
sexual orgies in cems, and that the çıraks are used by outsiders to stigmatize Alevis. In fact, 
Alevis treat çıraks as sacred; the oath given in front of the çırak cannot be broken. Deliberately 
putting out the çırak light is a sin. Accidentally putting out the candle indicates there will be 
misfortune in the future. Therefore, after cems the çırak light is not put out but left to burn (çırak 
dinlendirmek) with special prayers.    
The ritual order of the cem ceremonies may change depending on the purpose and the 
subgroups that are performing them, but certain ritual components are the same. First, cems 
reaffirm the spiritual hierarchies among followers with ikrar (talips). They reaffirm hierarchies 
between earlier members and later members; between those with musahips and those without 
them; between followers and those with religious functions; and between those with religious 
functions (post) and the cem leader (baba). Men and women followers are seen as equal. 
Females are not allowed to hold the baba position, but they are allowed to hold other positions. 
The baba’s wife (ana) has a powerful position in many cems.  
Second, all participants in cem become involved in ritual supplication (niyaz). The baba 
supplicates to his holy sheepskin, which symbolizes Ali’s position.  The holders of the other 
posts supplicate first to baba, to their posts (representing holy imams), and to each other. The 
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participants supplicate to the baba, the holders of the post and then to the other participants. 
Sometimes this supplication stage is held collectively, all at once (toplu niyaz or secde) and it is a 
symbolic affirmation of the tasavvuf belief: God is not far away but is manifested in every 
human being. Niyaz is also made by touching one’s lips and hearth when the names of sacred 
people are cited in cems, and onto ritual objects (such as cirak candles, tarik stick, dem drink). 
The niyaz transforms a candle into cirak and an alcoholic beverage to dem (Piroğlu: 2003).  
Cems start with a people’s court, when the baba’s invites followers to say if they are 
having trouble with any member of the community. The baba encourages reconciliation of 
differences, or he announces which party is at fault as düşkün (fallen), which means suspension 
of their participation in cems and even social life with fellow Alevis. This happens for reasons 
such as murder, adultery, and theft. The conditions for reinstation of the düşküns vary, depending 
on the case; but it requires a ceremony of removal of düşkünlük by ritual sacrifice of the follower 
after years multiple years of isolation from the religious community and social relations.   
The baba begins prayers (gülbenk) and introduces religious topics related to the specific 
reason for the ceremony, initiating a discussion between followers. Thus, unlike the worship 
practices of other Islamic groups, Alevi worship is based on active interaction between cem 
participants. In addition to these discussions, prayers are conducted in the community’s native 
language, meaning Turkish in this case. Prayers in all of these Bulgarian Turkish cems are to 
Üçler (the Threes, i.e. Hak-Muhammed-Ali), Beşler (the Fives, i.e. Muhammed, Ali, Fatma, 
Hasan and Huseyin) and depending on the subgroup Yediler (the Sevens, i.e. the Seven Imam 
among Babais) or Onikiler (the Twelves, the Twelve Imam among Bektaşis) and Kırklar (the 
Forties, i.e. Forty Holy Person). The community consumes small amounts of alcohol (dem) as 
part of rituals to re-enact the Kırklar Cemi where Muhammed joined the assembly of Ali and 40 
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Holy People and shared the drink made from one grape. The consumption of alcohol during 
worship is criticized by Sunnis but also by Alevis from Turkey. Alevi Bulgarian Turks, however, 
consume dem in a structured way, in an order that reflects the religious hierarchy, by utilizing 
several prayer sentences and with the consciousness of its historical and ritual significance.  
The religious personnel who holds the zakir position then sings religious ballads (deyiş 
and nefes). Nefeses concern themes such as love of God and of humankind. They also follow 
themes of Holy Imams, both major and local saints, as well as following the path of Ali. There 
are also specific nefeses that narrate and commemorate events such as the murder of Ali’s son in 
Kerbela (mersiye). The nefes among Bulgarian Alevis are structured in terms of their content, 
tune families, mode and meters, the instruments used and in terms of the responses of the cem 
participants (Markoff 2007). The followers perform the religious ritual dance semah, which is 
made up of localized ritual dances. The main pattern involves turning and swirling, which 
represents getting rid of one’s self and uniting with God. Also, the community shares a meal 
(lokma) of sacrificial meat (kurban).  
Tomb Visits 
Muharram Fast is an Alevi ritual that commemorates the Kerbela Battle, in which a group of Ali 
supporters, including his son Huseyin, were besieged in the desert and either murdered or left to 
die by dehydration and starvation. Only Zeynel Abidin, the son of Huseyin, escaped from the 
siege, becoming the only person with connections to Muhammed and Ali by blood line to 
survive. This historical event is the basis of the Muharram Fast, during which Alevis do not 
drink water (but do drink other liquids) and refrain from display of joy and comfort. Among 
Anatolian Alevis, the Muharram Fast lasts 12 days, following the Kurban Bayram. The fast ends 
with the preparation of a meal called aşure that combines various nuts and grains. The meal 
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celebrates the salvation of Zeynel Abidin, from whom present day Alevis derive some of their 
heritage. Among Alevi Bulgarian Turks, the duration of the mourning period (in the form of 
fasting) and the exact timing of the end of mourning (aşure) are not uniform, which often causes 
difference among Alevi babas as well as among visiting Alevis from Turkey. Some babas are 
open to influence from Turkey and follow the 12 day rule, while others follow the traditional 
way, i.e. “babamizdan gordugumuz gibi” (“as we saw from our fathers”), which was to fast for 9 
days.   
The Muharrem Fast and aşure are important for my analysis as they show internal 
differentiations among Alevi Bulgarian Turks, as well as their differentiation from Anatolian 
Alevism. More importantly the Muharrem Fast and aşure reveal much about Alevi-Sunni 
relations.  Sunnis also celebrate aşure, but they see it as a celebration of the survival of 
humankind following the apocalypse after Noah’s Ark. Recently some Sunni communities have 
attempted to attract Alevis to celebrate aşure together in the mosques, as a way to appropriate the 
Alevi content of aşure; while sometimes Alevis in both Turkey and Bulgaria manipulate local 
Sunni imams to celebrate aşure in Alevi villages. The various Alevi Bulgarian Turkish groups 
showed diverse reactions to this, ranging from rejecting the commemorations in Sunni spaces (to 
dissimilate their Alevi identity), to participating in the commemorations in Sunni spaces (to 
dissimulate their Alevi identity) as I discuss in my ethnographic analysis.  
Hıdrellez is the celebration of the meeting of Hızır, the savior of those on the land, and 
Ilyas, the savior of those on the sea, on the evening of May 6
th
. Hıdrellez is seen as an Alevi 
holiday in Razgrad and it is celebrated primarily by them. In Kardjali it is as a Roma holiday and 
is not celebrated by Alevis. In Razgrad, Hıdrellez is celebrated during the daytime, with various 
activities carried out by Alevi females in Alevi-only or mixed villages, while at night Alevis 
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perform cem. During my fieldwork, I had a chance to participate in one Babai and one Bektaşi 
celebration of Hıdrellez, which incorporated the following common folkloric elements: a 
trickster, soldiers and a lady who represents the Fatma Ana. I noticed that the celebrations 
incorporate local context of mixed and Alevi-only settings, in addition to Babai and Bektaşi 
beliefs, and therefore indicate inter- and intra-group relations in specific settings, as discussed in 
the ethnography.  
Nevruz is the greatest Alevis celebration, on March 21st. It is believed to represent a 
number of significant events, such as the day of the birth of Ali, the marriage of Ali and Fatma, 
and the creation of earth, as well as the Forty’s Cem, when Muhammed attended the cem 
community of Ali and Forty Holy Persons (Kırklar), as well as when Muhammed and Ali 
become musahips. It is also the Persian New Year. Among Alevi Bulgarian Turks, Nevruz is 
celebrated with a cem which is called “The Forties’ Cem” (Kırklar Cemi), recalling the meeting 
of Muhammed with Ali and the Forty Saints. Nevruz cems are the only cem ceremonies in which 
babas perform semah, at the beginning of the cem in Bektaşis and at the end of the cem in 
Babais. 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks also have unique celebration days when special cems are 
conducted. In Razgrad, Bektaşis and Babais celebrate the beginning, the middle and the end of 
the harvest season by Kasim in November, Harman Tavuğu, Kış Doksanı (after 90 days) and Yaz 
Doksanı as the second Harman Tavuğu, in August (Aydın: 2001, 6-10; Georgieva: 1998). I 
noticed during my fieldwork that these days are celebrated also in Kardjali.   
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5.1.1.3 Religious Organization   
Membership 
To become a member of the religious community, an Alevi should go through an initiation 
ceremony, called ikrar (oath), pledging to follow the Path. This ceremony transforms an ordinary 
person with Alevi heritage into an Alevi follower (talip). Bektaşis accept ikrar before marriage, 
while Babais often unify the ikrar and marriage ceremonies for membership (Űzüm 2006: 148). 
Every follower (talip) should marry another Alevi. If the husband and wife are from different 
cem communities, the wife joins the husband’s cem community. After the marriage, the Alevi 
couple is expected to form a spiritual brotherhood (Musahiplik) with another couple, through a 
special ceremony held in the cem community. The spiritual brothers and their wives are 
considered sisters and brothers in the Path (Yol Kardeşi). This is a form of fictive kinship, a bond 
seen as equal to and even prioritized over blood ties. Therefore, their children are seen as 
brothers and sisters and are not allowed to marry. A person is accountable for the mistakes his 
musahip has committed. In order to remain an Alevi, every male and female member of the cem 
community goes through periodic ritual purification ceremonies. In Razgrad, this ceremony is 
held weekly for regular followers and monthly for babas and it is called “passing [under] tarik” 
(tarikten gecmek). In Razgrad this ceremony is performed irregularly and it is called bas okutma 
(having one’s hat prayed) as it involves baba’s prayer upon every male and female followers’ 
ritual hat, which was given to them at the day of their ikrar. 
Leadership  
The Alevism ideal-type requires following a religious hierarchy based on levels of maturity. An 
Alevi religious leader (dede or baba) is always a male, who is typically expected to have varied 
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experience of occupying different positions representing the 12 or 7 Imams. Females can hold a 
number of these positions; yet, they cannot become babas. Among the Alevi females the wife of 
baba is particularly important in some subgroups of Alevi Bulgarian Turks regarding their active 
involvement in the ritual purification ceremonies.  
Among the Anatolian Alevis, the legitimacy of religious leaders, called dedes, is 
grounded in their heritage, their connection to Muhammed and the Holy Imams. Among Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks, the legitimacy of babas is based on their eligibility, since they are elected based 
on their spiritual maturity. Babas provide services to the community such as directing the cem 
rituals for birth, marriage, and death, as well as the cem rituals for the periodic purification of 
followers.  
Among Bulgarian Turks, a male follower may become the religious leader of the cem 
community (baba or dede) only after having performed functions in the cem.Among Bulgarian 
Turks, an elected religious leader (baba) is expected to be acknowledged by the regional 
religious baba or koca baba. Kocababas (Great Baba) or Halifebaba (Caliph Baba) have at least 
one cem community and also function as the leader among the regional babas of Babai, Bektaşi 
and Musahipli subgroups. The regional babas main function is to supervise other babas and lead 
their purification rituals. Kocababas are granted this function following their election by the 
regional Alevis, as well as acknowledgement from a spiritual center affiliated with the subgroup. 
For instance, Babais Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ Halifebabas have served in the Şücaaddin Veli 
Sultan Türbe in Turkey and received authorization documents (icazetname). However Bektaşi 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks could not serve in the Hacı Bektaş Veli Türbe because it has been turned 
into a museum. Therefore, they served at the Demir Baba Türbe in Razgrad, Elmali Baba Türbe 
in Kardjali and Kızıldeli Sultan Türbe in Dimetoka. Musahiplis also served at the Kızıldeli 
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Sultan Türbe in Dimetoka or the Seyit Sultan Türbe in Kardjali.  The term Halifebaba was 
dropped among Alevi Bulgarian Turks after their migrations in Turkey because the title 
“Caliphate” was constitutionally forbidden in 1924 in Turkey.  Thus, Alevi migrants use the term 
Kocababa.  
5.2 AN OUTLINE OF ALEVI IDEAL TYPE VERSUS SUNNI AND SHIA ISLAM  
The Alevi perception of the Quran differs from the perceptions of Sunni and Shia Islam. Alevis 
acknowledge the Quran as the words that God revealed to Muhammed. However, they claim that 
the authentic version of the Quran was changed by Sunni leaders, by removing parts indicating 
the special place granted to Ali and ehli beyt. Alevis justify this claim by stating that there are 
6236 verses in the present day Quran while it should be 6666. Alevi Bulgarian Turks share this 
belief. They utilize verses from the present day Quran; yet what they call the Quran are the 
sacred poems (nefes) sung during the cems, because these nefes are seen as reflecting the spirit of 
the verses that have been removed.  
The Alevi perception of the afterlife is different from Sunni and Shia Islamic perceptions 
as well. Sunni and Shia Islam follow the belief in ahiret, when all souls will rise again on 
doomsday to face divine interrogation and go to heaven for good deeds and hell for bad deeds. In 
contrast, Alevis follow a belief in tenasuh (reincarnation), which states that the soul of the dead 
reincarnates in the body of another human being (don degistirme). If a person was involved in 
bad deeds during his or her lifetime, he or she will come back to life in the body of an animal, 
such as a donkey or a dog. In this respect, Alevis do not believe in death of the soul but the 
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change of the body, and refer to death as kalibini degistirmek (shifting one’s mould). They 
further claim that heaven and hell are in this life.  
Alevis reject the Sunni “Five Pillars of Islam” or Shia “Aspects of Islam.” Both Sunni 
and Shia Islam accept the principle of sehadet, which requires reciting the creed “There is no 
God but God, and Muhammad is the messenger of God.” The Shia Muslims’ creed has an 
additional element: “…Ali is the vicegerent of God.” Alevi rituals utilize the Shia Muslim creed 
but also indicate the eparchy of Ali, as well as including statements about the “Hak-Muhammed-
Ali” trinity.      
Sunni and Shia Islam both follow the principle of salat, which requires performing daily 
prayers (namaz) at home or in mosques. Sunni Islam requires five daily prayers while Shia Islam 
requires 3 time daily prayers by combining two kept separate by the Sunnis. For their part, 
Alevis see daily prayers as formalities rather than a requirement, while cems, as esoteric and 
highly symbolic interpretations of Islam, are the markers of Alevi religious identity. In Alevism 
niyaz (supplication) replaces the formalistic namaz (daily prayers).  
Another difference is in the principle of zekat, which requires giving alms to the poor and 
is kept by both Sunnis ans Shias. The obligatory almsgiving is strictly structured in terms of 
when, how, by whom, and to whom alms should be given. In addition to the obligatory 
almsgiving, both groups accept voluntary giving, sadaka. While Alevis value almsgiving, it is 
requirement to be done at any specified time. In fact, almsgiving is seen as a form of sacrifice 
when they visit türbes.  
The principle of oruc, which requires fasting during the month Ramadan when the Quran 
was revealed to Muhammed, is accepted by Sunnis and Shias.. In both, believers are expected to 
fast for the whole month, with few exceptions such as when a person is sick or travelling. Fasting 
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is seen as a requirement to discipline one’s self (nefis). Alevis do not follow Ramadan fasting, 
seeing it as another formalistic element of Islam. However, as stated earlier, they fast during the 
month of Muharram for 10 to 12 days to commemorate the martyrdom of Huseyin, the son of 
Ali, during the Kerbela battle. Sunni Ramadan fasting is different from the Alevi Muharram Fast; 
the former requires abstaining from any food or drink from sunrise to sunset throughout the 
month, while the latter requires abstaining from water and any activity of comfort and enjoyment 
for 10-12 days. The Sunni and Shia Ramadan fasting ends with Ramadan Bayram, when 
congregations of male believers attend mosques for Ramadan Bayram prayer, while the Alevi 
Muharram Fasting ends with Aşure, a pudding made up of various grains, nuts and fruits, to 
celebrate the escape of the son of Huseyin, Zeynel Abidin. 
 Finally, the principle of hac stands for the pilgrimage to Mecca, Pilgrimage is required 
for believers who can afford it in both Sunni and Shia Islam. It is believed to bring Muslims from 
different parts of the world to create a sense of unity and it is strictly structured in terms of a 
ritual order. Shia Islam also values visits to Holy Imams’ tombs such as Necef in Iraq. Sufism in 
Alevi belief rejects the view that God resides in a distance place. Instead, God is seen in each and 
every creation. Therefore, Alevis see pilgrimage to Mecca as opposed to their belief, as captured 
in the Hacı Bektaş Veli’s following saying: “Whatever you look for, look for it in yourself/ 
neither in Jerusalem, nor Mecca or Haj” (Her ne ararsan kendinde ara/Kudus’te, Mekke’de, 
Hac’da degil.”)     
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5.3 ALEVISM AMONG BULGARIAN TURKS VERSUS ALEVISM IN TURKEY  
Encounters via migrations and visits make the differences between Alevi Bulgarian Turks and 
Alevis from Turkey more visible. The two Alevi groups across the border differ in their 
taxonomy for self-identification, their leadership rules and several elements in cems. These 
differences may result in misunderstandings as well as incompatibility in the religious rituals, but 
the Alevi ideal type, the Alevi Path and the “Alevi” categorical identity remains shared.   
Strikingly, Alevis themselves have different interpretations of the differences between the 
communities. During my fieldwork in Bulgaria I met with several Alevi visitors from Turkey 
who promoted a highly ethnocentric approach. They presumed that Alevi ways in Turkey are the 
correct ones while portraying the practices of Alevi Bulgarian Turks as deteriorated, supposedly 
“due to long-term socialist rule”. The Bulgarian babas’ response to this interpretation was quite 
polite in order to remain hospitable to their guests; yet, when I asked the babas for their 
thoughts, many underlined how Alevi ways actually flourished in socialist Bulgaria because the 
external pressure united the community, and compelled them to frame religious practices as 
secular celebrations. In addition, many babas emphasized that the Alevi practices they know 
were transmitted through the generations as practices.  
It is clear that the formation of the Bulgaria-Turkey border resulted in differentiation 
between the two Alevi communities. Strict border regimes prevented connections between the 
two groups, and obstructed Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ connections with the major spiritual centers 
in Turkey such as Hacı Bektaş Veli Tekke or Sucaadin Veli Sultan Tekke. Ivanka Georgieva 
claims that the Alevis in Bulgaria remained protected since they populated rural areas while 
Sunnis populated the cities (1998: 12). I argue, though, that it is not the urban-rural distinction, 
but rather border formation that granted Alevi Bulgarian Turks a degree of shelter from 
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aggressive Sunnism, as opposed to the situation for Alevis in Turkey. The latter have faced 
periods of intensive, state-initiated Sunnification policies, even when they were residing in rural 
areas.   
The two communities certainly utilize different taxonomic systems of self-identification, 
and lack of awareness of these differences has caused great misunderstandings at moments of 
encounter between the two groups. Alevi Bulgarian Turks have used the term “Kızılbaş” for self-
identification  the term “Alevi” is relatively new and a post-socialism phenomenon after the 
opening of the Bulgaria-Turkey border. Currently the term Kızılbaş is a neutral term that Alevis, 
Sunnis and Christians use to refer to Alevis in Razgrad, while in Kardjali as in Turkey, it is seen 
as derogatory. Moreover, Alevism in Turkey utilizes two main self-identification categories, 
Alevi or Bektaşi. The first term refers to members with Alevi parents, while Bektaşi refers to 
followers of the Alevi Path who have no heritage membership. In Bulgaria, Alevis are divided 
into subgroups of Babai, Bektaşi, Musahipli, Derviş, and Ali Koçlu. Only the Derviş are non-
heritage groups.  
This situation means that the category Bektaşiis not the same in Bulgaria and Turkey, 
while Derviş is the same. Also, there are no corresponding groups for Musahipli and Ali Koçlu in 
Turkey. These taxonomic differences have caused several misunderstandings and 
disappointments when Alevis from the two countries encounter one another. For instance, a 
group of Bektaşi from Turkey heard about the presence of Bektaşi in Bulgaria, visited Bulgaria 
and met with them; yet they were not allowed to enter the Bektaşi cems in Bulgaria. This is 
because Bektaşis in Bulgaria require heritage membership, the oath and musahips for 
participation in cems, while Bektaşis in Turkey are not heritage members and do not need to 
marry to join to cems. A similar historical example can be found in Haydar Baba, a Turkish 
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Bektaşi who migrated to Razgrad during the period of single party rule in Turkey, yet was not 
accepted into Bektaşi cems in Razgrad and was even denied burial and a Bektaşi ceremony in 
Bulgaria.     
  Leadership organization and requirements also differ between Alevis in the two 
countries. In Turkey, Alevi leaders are dedes and Bektaşi leaders are baba, but in Bulgaria all 
leaders are called baba. Dedes in Turkey and babas in Bulgaria are heritage members of the 
community while Bektaşi babas in Turkey are not. In addition, dedes in Turkey trace their 
lineage to Ali, while babas in Bulgaria are elected.    
 Several ritual elements practiced in Bulgarian cems are absent in the local Alevi cems in 
Turkey. For instance, Alevi Bulgarian Turks have kept the tradition of dem, while Alevis in 
Turkey either opt out of this or replace it with grapes. In fact, visitors to Bulgaria from Alevi 
organizations in Turkey criticize the use of dem in the Alevi cems in Bulgaria. Yet, as already 
mentioned, Alevi Bulgarian Turks do not drink alcoholic beverages if they are not blessed, 
(niyazlamak) and following the niyaz the beverage becomes dem. 
5.4 ALEVISM AMONG BULGARIAN TURKS ACCORDING TO THE SUBGROUPS 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks are divided into the Babai and Bektaşi subgroups, as well as the nearly-
extinct Dervişes in Razgrad and Musahiplis in Kardjali. These subgroup differences are 
mentioned by some authors who have been in Bulgaria, but works in this literature tend to be 
focused on only one region (e.g. Markoff 2007 on Kardjali Babais and Bektaşis, Georgieva: 
1998 on Razgrad Babais and Bektaşis, Gramatikova 2001 on Deliorman Alevis) or are based on 
short term visits (Aydın 2001, Kökel 2007). Other works examine Alevi ways using either a 
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Sunni Islamic perspective (Űzüm 2006) or Alevi taxonomies from Turkey (Engin 2000, 2008, 
2009). Based on my fieldwork, I examine the subgroup divisions based on their various t claims 
of superiority, which are in turn based on historical precedence, claims of authenticity, or 
connections to spiritual centers, saints and ritual elements.  
In both Kardjali and Razgrad, the main competition is between the majority Babais and 
Bektaşis, each group claiming superiority over the other. Babais claim they are superior because 
of the historical precedence of Babaism over Bektaşism. In brief, Bektaşism was formed in the 
16
th
 century after the death of the spiritual leader Hacı Bektaş Veli by his follower Balım Sultan, 
while Babaism developed in the 13
th
 century under the guidance of Baba Ilyas and Baba Ishak, 
who were connected with the Şücaeddin Veli Sultan Tekke and initiated major revolts in 
Anatolia. After these revolts, the majority of the Babais were exiled to the Balkans and unified 
around the Otman Baba Tekke (Bahadır2008), while Babais remaining in Anatolia had dissolved 
into the Bektaşi groups (Melikoff: 1994) or stayed close to Şücaeddin Veli Sultan Tekke in 
Turkey (Bahadır 2008).  
On the other hand, Bektaşi Bulgarian Turks claim superiority based on the preservation of 
their authentic belief system due, to its relatively recent systematization. In addition, Bektaşis 
were supported by the Ottoman state until the 18
th
 century, because Bektaşis belief was the 
backbone of the Janissary system.  Babais, however, have often been identified with subversive 
activity against political authority. In addition, Bektaşis strictly follow religious rituals and are 
closed to outside groups. While Babais may permit Bektaşis to see their cems, the latter do not 
let Babais see their cems even as visitors, as many of my Babai and Bektaşi informants stated. 
Furthermore, it was relatively more difficult for me to convince my Bektaşi informants to talk 
about Alevism compared to my Babai informants.  
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While both Babais and Bektaşis respect all Alevi saints, they differ in the major saints 
they acknowledge as their spiritual leaders. Babai Bulgarian Turks see Sucaaettin Veli Sultan in 
Turkey as the highest spiritual authority and Otman Baba in Haskovo as his follower. Therefore, 
even in the present day, Babai Koca Babas should receive their authorization (icazetname) from 
Sucaettin Veli Sultan Türbe in Turkey. Howver, in the periods where there was a strict border 
regime, Babai Koca Babas could not visit Turkey, and adopted the Otman Baba Tekke for the 
annual Koca Baba rituals of purification. It is also known that the Succaaeddin Veli Tekke’s 
postnisin (the spiritual leader and the administrator of the Tekke) had visited Bulgaria, and tied 
the local Babais to SücaeddinVeli Tekke in 1910 (Aydın 2006).  
For their part, Bektaşi Bulgarian Turks accept Hacı Bektaş Veli as their spiritual leader.  
Kocababas in particular used to visit and serve at his tomb in Turkey for authorization and 
purification; yet, the transformation of the türbe into a museum, as well as strict border regimes 
during socialism, resulted in adaptations in Bektaşi practices. In Razgrad, Bektaşis first started 
conducting services at the Demir Baba Türbe, which was also converted into a museum by the 
Bulgarian state. Then the Bektaşis oriented towards the Huseyin Baba Türbe. In Kardjali, 
Bektaşis recognize Kızıl Deli Sultan in Dimetoka as an earlier follower of Hacı Bektaş Veli. 
They used to visit his tomb when the Hacı Bektaş Veli türbe was transformed into a museum. 
However,, with the changing border regime, Bektaşi Kocababas in Kardjali have started to 
conduct services and get authorization from the Elmali Baba Türbe in Kardjali.      
The religious symbolism and ritual elements that Babai and Bektaşi utilize are different 
as well. Babais recognize the number 7 as sacred  their saints’ tombs have 7 cornered roofs and 
their cems have 7 positions representing the 7 Imams, while Bektaşis recognize the number 12 as 
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sacred. In cems Babai prayers are named Birler, Üçler, Beşler, Yediler and Kırklar, while 
Bektaşi prayers in cems are for Birler, Üçler, Beşler, Onikiler and Kırklar.  
Both Babais and Bektaşis follow the Hak-Muhammed-Ali trinity and light çıraks to 
represent this belief. However, the number of çıraks differs among Babais and Bektaşis, 
indicating different perceptions of the trinity. Babais use 3 çıraks as they attribute different 
authority positions to the Hak-Muhammed-Ali trinity:  sublimity, prophecy and eparch. Bektaşis 
use 2 çıraks, as they see Muhammed and Ali as created from the same holy light (nur).  
Finally, among both Babais and Bektaşis, to be a full member of the cem, musahiplik 
(fictive brotherhood) is required. Bektaşis accept those with ikrar to their cems, though they ask 
them to leave during certain parts, while Babais require ikrar and marriage together to allow 
followers to the cem. Furthermore, the Babai musahip ceremony requires the sacrifice of two 
animals, one each for the husband and wife, while for Bektaşi, the sacrifice of one animal for a 
couple is sufficient. This causes Babais to devalue the Bektaşi musahiplik ceremony as a 
violation of the rules of the cem (erkan).  
5.4.1 Alevism among Bulgarian Turks across the regional segments 
Among the Alevi Bulgarian Turkish communities, for those originating from Northern Bulgaria, 
time-oriented rituals prevail, while for those originating from Southern Bulgaria, space-oriented 
rituals prevail. Alevis from Razgrad manifest their identity by conducting frequent cems. While 
Kardjali Alevis also conduct cem, their primary rituals focus on türbes.  
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5.4.1.1  Cem Ceremonies as Time Bound Rituals  
Time is the characteristic that marks cems in Bulgaria. Cem ceremonies are often done at certain 
times: for individual rite of passages, such as birth, initiation (ikrar), fictive kinship 
(Musahiplik), death and after death. In addition, they periodically have cems for collective 
worship (i.e. weekly or monthly cems, purification cems) and during specific yearly events (i.e. 
Nevruz, Muharrem, Birlik). Also, the ritual components of the cems are expected to follow a 
certain coherent sequence.  
In terms of frequency, Babais and Bektaşis in Razgrad conduct weekly cems during the 
cem period, which is all year for Bektaşis and five months for Babais. Babais conduct weekly 
cems on Monday and Friday evenings and call themselves “Pazartesililer” (Monday-ers), while 
Bektaşi cems are on Wednesday and Friday evenings and they call themselves “Carsambalilar” 
(Wednesday-ers). Neither Babais nor Bektaşis in Kardaji conduct cems on a weekly basis, only 
during rites of passage and on special days. 
 This difference between the same subgroups across two frontier zones is due to their 
adaptations to local conditions. Three factors are involved. First, differening majority-minority 
configurations in Razgrad and Kardjali have created differing possibilities for Alevis, but also 
burdens in pursuing their religious ceremonies. Razgrad Alevis have remained powerful because 
they were the determining third group in the competition between Sunni Turks and Orthodox 
Christian Bulgarians. On the other hand, Kardjali Alevis were subsumed under the generic 
Turkish identity due to the vast Sunni Turkish majority of the region. Second, both Babai and 
Bektaşis in Kardjali and Razgrad rely on agriculture; yet the agriculture in Razgrad is resource-
intensive due to large parcels and fertile land, while the agriculture in Kardjali is labor-intensive, 
due to infertile and small-scale land holdings. Therefore, Kardjali Alevis have to spend more 
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time at agricultural production than Razgrad Alevis. Third, local organization of Alevism varies 
in both areas. In Razgrad, there are at least 5 babas living in the Alevi populated villages while 
in Kardjali, many Alevi-populated villages do not have their own baba. Their religious services 
are conducted by inviting a baba from a distant village.     
The impact of these differences is striking. The increased frequency of the cems certainly 
helps a community becomw more closely knit (e.g. in Razgrad); however, the absence of weekly 
cems does not necessary mean looser ties among Alevis. Kardjali Alevis also conduct cems for 
important events, such as rite of passages or Alevi holidays. In Kardjali, the absence of the 
weekly cems demonstrates the flexibility of Alevis to external circumstances, as many babas 
from Kardjali cited the famous saying by Ali: “working is worshipping.” 
5.4.1.2  Türbe Ceremonies as Space-Bound Rituals  
Visits to the saints’ tombs (türbes) are not a defining element of Alevism, unlike cems. Yet 
visiting saints’ tombs is a common practice among Alevi Bulgarian Turks, while Sunni Turks 
and Orthodox Christian Bulgarians also visit Alevi türbes.  
Visits to türbes are space-dependent rituals, given the spatiality of the türbe as well as 
their highly structured character in terms of the expected sequence of rituals involved, that I 
discussed in the previous section on ideal-types. The variations between Alevi Turks from 
Northeastern Bulgaria (Razgrad) and Southern Bulgaria (Kardjali) are related to the distribution 
of türbes in these regions and the significance attributed to türbe ceremonies.  
In Razgrad, türbes are large, architecturally ostentatious, and far from the settlement 
areas. Some of them are under state control as museums, such as Demir Baba Türbe. In Kardjali, 
every Alevi-populated village has at least one türbe, in addition to türbes that remain in the 
territories of what at present are Sunni-only villages. Their physical proximity and accessibility 
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make türbes a central area of activity in Alevi villages in Kardjali. People visit the türbes to 
make wishes and demands, and in every village with türbe, there is at least one family 
responsible from keeping the türbe (türbedar). Every week, türbedars light the çırak \s in the 
türbes. A recent development is the construction of special cem rooms next to türbes, although 
traditionally cems are held in houses.  
 Certain ritual elements during türbe visits distinguish Razgrad and Kardjali Alevis, as I 
noticed during my participant observations in the türbe in both places. I alsonoticed how these 
differences caused conflicts when I travelled with Razgrad Alevis visiting the türbes of Elmali 
Baba in Kardjali and Otman Baba in Haskovo, as well as with Kardjali Alevis visiting the türbes 
of Demir Baba and Haydar Baba in Razgrad. For instance, Razgrad Alevis perform niyaz  by 
walking around the türbe to make a full circle, similar to the full circle in their cems; while 
Kardjali Alevis perform niyaz by making a walk resembling a horseshoe; they refuse to pass 
behind the headstone of the türbe, seeing it as disrespectful to the saint. During my visit to Demir 
Baba, I noticed that Kardjali Alevis were terrified by the local Alevis’ full circle niyaz and tried 
to “teach” them the “proper” niyaz!   
 Most importantly, the annual rituals in türbes, maye or türbe mayesi, are unique to 
Kardjali Alevis and distinguish them from Alevis from Razgrad. Every türbe in Kardjali has a 
maye day during summer on the same day of the year, as the türbes are under the control of 
either Sunnis or Alevis in Kardjali, while türbes in Razgrad are mostly under the control of the 
state, like the Demir Baba Türbe.    
Maye rituals combine secular and religious elements as highly spatialized ceremonies. 
The mayes start with the baba’s prayer on the animals to be sacrificed (kurban). Mayes include 
slaughter of the animals, and combination and preparation of the meat together with other food 
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(such as rice) to be shared by the participants. Another typical ritual element of Kardjali mayes is 
about gifts for the türbe collected for a year. During the annual mayes these gifts are auctioned 
(tirk) for participants. The auction generates income in order to support the türbe for the next 
year. This income is always recorded and monitored by the maye committee, under the rule of 
maye babasi. Often Sunnis attend the mayes at the larger türbes. Sunnis participation in the ritual 
food consumption and tirk are seen as positive by Alevis. This is because when “eating Alevis 
food” has long been stigmatized by Sunnis, Sunnis cannot consume Alevi ritual food. Also 
Sunnis participation in the tirk auctions shows their financial contribution to the türbe. All these 
rituals are in the daytime and open to non-Alevis, while the evening cem is strictly restricted to 
Alevi followers.  
Some türbes’ mayes remain extremely localized and attract only Alevis in the villages, 
while others are attened by Alevi and non-Alevi outsiders, from nearby villages, the city, from 
other parts of the country, and even from outside of Bulgaria. For instance, I observed many 
migrants from Turkey visit the Otman Baba Türbe’s maye in Haskovo and Elmali Baba’s maye 
in Kardjali.  
Mayes are organized by the specific subgroups to which the saints are affiliated. For 
instance, Elmali Baba is seen as a Bektaşi saint, and therefore his türbe’s maye and the cem are 
organized following Bektaşi rules and by Bektaşi babas, while the Otman Baba Türbe’s maye is 
conducted by Babais and the Seyit Baba Türbe’s Maye is conducted by Musahiplis. During my 
fieldwork I noticed only once exception. A major maye at the Otman Baba Türbe was conducted 
not by the Halifebaba of Babais but by the Halifebabas of Bektaşis and Musahiplis. The 
participant Halifebabas explained this to me as a matter of convenience. The Bektaşi and 
Musahipli halifebabas were close to the türbe while the Babai halifebabas resided in another 
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village. Yet, later on I had a chance to contact the Babai Halifebaba and asked about 
thesituation. His absence was in protest against the halifebabas’ perception that the mayes were a 
source of income generation. 
  
5.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have described the ideal-type of Alevism among Bulgarian Turks by focusing on 
the accounts of Alevi religious leaders (babas), who are always males,since Alevi females may 
not become babas, though they can hold other important ritual positions in religious ceremonies.  
I noted that these babas define the ideal-type in terms of “the Alevi Path,” which is a religious 
trajectory that begins with the oath (ikrar) and transforms a heritage member into a follower 
(talip) in the cem community. I explained the Alevi Path by outlining its central elements 
regarding the belief system, namely the commitments to become “the perfect human being,” to 
follow the “four door, forty levels” ideal, to hold a characteristic perception of the Hak-
Muhammed-Ali trinity, and to adhere to the Holy Imams and Saints. I also explained the typical 
religious practices that were related to the Alevi Path, the cem rituals and türbe visits as well as 
the celebration and commemoration of special days. I also noted that Alevi Bulgarian Turkish 
babas’ accounts of the Alevi ideal-type are highly structured in comparison to Sunnism, Shiism 
and Alevism in Turkey. I explained the differences as being grounded on the Alevis’ batini 
(esoteric) versus zahiri (formalist) dichotomy in thinking about Islam. I also focused on Alevi 
babas’ self-perceptions, along with internal differences among Alevis in terms of subgroups 
(Babai, Bektaşi and Musahipli) and I discussed my observations about the differences of these 
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subgroups across the subsegments of Razgrad and Kardjali. I emphasized that these differences 
mark important variations in Alevis religious practices and they may even lead to incompatibility 
between the Alevi subgroups and subsegments. I argued, however, that these are not essential 
differences among Alevi communities, but rather are derived from the historical conditions in 
which these varieties of Alevism developed. More importantly, I argue that despite these 
variations and their significant effects, Alevi Bulgarian Turks continue to see themselves as a 
group, as the revealed by their universal accepgtance o the slogan that “the Path is one, while 
practices are a thousand and one.” 
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6.0  DISSIMULATION 
“When there is a trap, set up for you 
In every corner of this town 
And so you learn the only way to go is underground 
When there's a trap set up for you 
In every corner of your room 
And so you learn the only way to go is through the roof  
 
…Just like their meanings they lay between the lines 
Between the borders their real countries hide 
The strategigo's [sic] saw their advertise 
Their strategy of being is one of in-your-face disguise 
Ooohoohoooh, through the roof, underground!” 
Through The Roof 'N' Underground   
Gogol Bordello 
 
A common configuration of dissimulating minorities is that a minority’s members dissimulate 
against one single majority group, as was the case for Jews and Muslims in Inquisition Spain 
(Root 1988, Ibrahim 2008, Rose-Rodriguez 2010), and Christians in Anatolia (Clark 2006). I use 
the phrase “dissimulation against” in order to stress the oppositional nature of the process: 
dissimulating minorities simulate a majority’s beliefs and practices in order to protect their 
members, their group and their group identity from the same majority. Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ 
dissimulations are more complicated than these other cases because Alevis have dissimulated 
against varying national majorities and political regimes as these have changed over time, 
throughout which the Alevis have constantly remained a double minority in both Bulgaria and 
Turkey. In this chapter I examine Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ dissimulations by focusing on their 
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narratives and practices, which publicly indicate their distancing themselves from the Alevi 
ideal-type while they privately continue adhering to it. Sometimes Alevis disassociate from 
Alevi ways in the presence of Alevis who have not been initiated into the Alevi Path. More 
often, though, Alevis’ dissimulations are intended to address the threat coming from non-Alevis. 
It is for this reason that their public disassociations from Alevi ways go together with their public 
simulations of the practices of the dominant majority.  
My fieldwork data let me analyze the current patterns of dissimulations adopted by 
Alevis, depending on the political demography of their immediate surroundings. Kardjali Alevis 
often dissimulate not against the Bulgarian national majority but rather against local Sunni 
Turks, who now form the demographic and political majority at the local level. In contrast, 
Razgrad Alevis dissimulate against both Bulgarians and Sunni Turks, who compete with each 
other for demographic and political majority status, at the local level in Razgrad. Alevi migrants’ 
dissimulations are also patterned by the dynamics of political demography affecting migrants in 
Turkey. The Alevi migrants in isolated villages of Turkish Thrace or cosmopolitan 
neighborhoods of İstanbul do not need to utilize dissimulation since they are already assured a 
degree of every-day level invisibility in the broader society. Temporary dissimulation becomes a 
viable option for Alevis migrants when they need to interact with outsiders, such as Turkish civil 
servants and even Kurdish Alevis. On the other hand, in Bursa, there are few Alevi migrants and 
only a handful of them may dissimulate, by trying to hide their Alevi heritage in the rigorously 
Sunni-dominant Bursa. The majority of migrant Alevis in Bursa seem to have voluntarily 
assimilated into Sunnism after migration.  
I should note that my model is not grounded in geographical determinism but is meant to 
identify dissimulation patterns among Alevi Bulgarian Turks in relation to the political 
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demography of their surroundings. Of course, there are exceptions to these regional 
generalizations. For example, according to my model, Kardjali Alevis’ dissimulations are 
directed towards Sunni Turks on the provincial level. Yet in the few isolated Alevi-only villages 
of Kardjali, as in the isolated villages of Turkish Thrace, there is no need to dissimulate unless 
there is interaction with non-Alevi outsiders. At first glance this exception seems to contradict 
the model but in fact it conforms to its logic, since I argue that invisibility is about the 
performance of identity as much as visibility is. We may compare dissiumlation to the veil, 
which is not merely a form of clothing but also an instrument of embodied performance of a 
gendered identity. Veiling literally masks visibility of the individual’s features while 
simultaneously heightening her visibility as a member of a community that practices veiling. In 
the same vein, but in inverted fashion, dissimulating minorities’ performances for invisibility are 
hypervisible within their own communities, which is how it is possible to study dissimulation as 
a performance of invisibility. 
I begin this chapter by examining Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ particular notions of secrecy 
and of the Secret, which I see as symptomatic of their dissimulations. I then analyze particular 
cases of dissimulation, examining first Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ linguistic dissimulations by 
means of using specific words from the vocabulary pool of various majorities in order to hint at 
Alevi beliefs and practices to other minority members. I then analyze their dissimulations when 
Alevis publicly perform religious practices generally associated with Sunnis. Third, I investigate 
how Alevis’ dissimulation is manifested in their use of spatial arrangements commonly 
associated with Sunnis, and their manipulation of pre-existing Sunni religious spaces. Finally, I 
examine the common sayings and slogans used by Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ to explain their 
relations with religious and secular Turkish and Bulgarian majorities. 
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6.1 DISSIMULATION, SECRECY AND THE ALEVI SECRET:  
6.1.1 “In-your-face disguise:” Talking about the Secret without talking about what it is   
The word ‘secret [Sır]’ is charged, as I discovered very early at my fieldwork. It is 
charged in the sense that it either initiates an amazingly honest conversation or 
sabotages the entire conversation irreversibly! Using the word `secret` yielded the 
most awkward moments during the already awkward pre-interview periods of my 
fieldwork. I was requesting interviews from hopefully soon-to-be informants by 
introducing myself and explaining the purpose of my visit, including mentioning 
my Sunni heritage. Their immediate response was one or the other version of the 
following: an often painfully straightforward and, at first, somehow discouraging 
statement: “Fine, I will talk with you. However, do not have hard feelings because 
I will not tell you my secret. I cannot tell it. I gave the oath not to reveal the 
Secret!”… Then, something amazing happened. A majority of them devoted one 
to four hours for interviews with me. In addition, they talked about almost 
anything regarding the Alevi Secret, such as the reason for it -- its function, 
meaning, history -- all except what it really is.  
 
The above excerpt from my field notes dates back to a period in my fieldwork when I 
was puzzled by one question: Why would my potential informants need to state their reservations 
even before hearing my questions? After hearing a dozen variations of the statement “I will not 
tell you my secret,” I realized that it concerned their own assumptions: the main interest of a 
non-Alevi researcher must be the Alevi Secret. Interestingly, I had not developed such an interest 
at all! Originally I designed my fieldwork to study the different impacts of borders on Alevi and 
Sunni Bulgarian Turks, and the Alevi Secret was not central to my research. Ironically my 
informants taught me not only to refrain from mentioning the word “secret” unless and until they 
did, but also to be much more alert to any statement about the Secret. 
Few potential informants declined my interview requests, and many devoted long hours 
to talking with me. During the interviews, informants observed the prohibition against disclosing 
what the Secret is, yet they did not refrain from speaking about themes related to the Secret. For 
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example, they discussed topics like why there is the Secret and what the function of the Secret is, 
as well as who has access to it.  At the end of the interviews, I was always astonished by the 
experience of talking a lot about something, in this case the Secret, without ever talking about 
what it is.  
After completing the fieldwork, I found that my informants’ attitudes are not unique, but 
fit into the framework of “the paradox of secrecy” (Bellman 1981: 1). The paradox is that 
practicing secrecy requires a strict “do-not-talk-about-it proscription” (21) on the one hand, as in 
the case in my informants’ overt reservations about revealing the content of the Alevi secret 
before accepting an interview with me. On the other hand, secrecy requires “a number of 
instructions” for “restricting information about information” (9). These instructions are about 
how to communicate secrets, and this makes secrecy a form of “metacommunication” (9). The 
very metacommunicative element of secrecy among my informants, surprisingly, made them 
willing to talk to me about other aspects of the Secret, such as its history, its function and 
meaning, without revealing its content.  
Bellman’s paradox of secrecy framework, which examines the linguistic aspects of 
secrecy on an inter-personal level, is useful to explain the unique interview context with my 
individual informants. Yet it ultimately falls into “the occasionalist trap” (Bourdieu and Waquant 
1992, 144) because it portrays my interaction with informants as if they were occurring in a 
social vacuum and “on the spot” (Duranti 1997: 8), and “interpersonal’ relations as only directly 
person-to-person relations” (Bourdieu 1990: 291). This ignores the broader context conditioning 
my Alevi Bulgarian Turkish informants’ contact with me as a researcher from Turkey who is of 
Sunni heritage.   
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My informants’ pre-emptive refusals to reveal the Secret, as well as their observation of 
this prohibition while still discussing other aspects of it, is indicative of an exclusive 
characteristic of the notion of secrecy for Alevi Bulgarian Turks: it is an “in-your-face disguise,” 
as per the Gogol Bordello song quoted at the beginning of this chapter. They do not hide the 
existence of an Alevi secret from outsiders. On the contrary, it was the Alevis themselves who 
introduced the theme of secrecy into the interviews. In addition, the majority of non-Alevis in 
my field sites are aware of the existence of an Alevi secret, even though they do not know 
exactly what it is. This reflects one important point: Alevis do not try to completely restrict 
information, but rather to control the revealed and disguised information about the Secret. This 
element of control in Alevis’ secrecy is symptomatic of their dissimulations.  
6.1.2 “In Your Face Disguise”: Hiding a One’s Well-known Alevi Heritage 
“You understood this issue of secrecy. Of course previously they were hiding it 
only due to fear offrom death. In the present day everyone from everywhere 
knows that we are Alevis but they look at us negatively [Kotu bakiyorlar iste].” 
Musahipli, migrant from Kardjali to a mixed city of Turkish Thrace  
  
“You will not believe me. We came here, [the town X], initiated various projects 
for the betterment of this place. Building a cemevi has not crossed our minds even 
once! Why? I do not know…There were Sunnis around and we did not want 
negative reactions, we did not want them to see us differently. Otherwise, they all 
know we are Alevis.” Babai, migrant from Razgrad to an Alevi-only town in 
Turkey. 
 
The quotes above are excerpts from my interviews with two prominent members of the Alevi 
migrant communities in Turkey. Both communities have been actively practicing Alevi ways 
since the arrival of the first generation of migrants to their settlement areas. Both groups observe 
the traditions they held pre-migration, such as conducting cems in the houses of babas, 
prohibiting members of the other subgroup from attending to their own cems, and observing the 
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strict condition of Musahiplik for full-membership. My first informant resides in a rather 
cosmopolitan town where there are both migrant and local Alevis and Sunnis. The second resides 
in an Alevi-only town formed by first generation migrants to the area.  
Both informants are aware that they are known to be Alevis in their surrounding 
communities, and both of them characterize non-Alevis’ perception of Alevis as negative. There 
is thus a certain degree of clarity in the inter-communal role assumptions in their towns, since 
both Sunnis and Alevis know who is an Alevi and who is a Sunni locally. Yet this clarity does 
not liberate Alevis from the need to practice dissimulation. In fact, Alevi migrants prefer not to 
emphasize further the Alevi markers,  seeking instead to diminish their existing visibility. They 
cannot hide their Alevi identity, since it is already known. However, they prefer to not emphasize 
Alevi beliefs and practices. For instance, the second informant’s fellow Alevi migrant friends 
never think about building a cemevi in an Alevi-only town, while there is a state-built Sunni 
mosque in this town’s center. In this respect, their secrecy is also an “in-your-face-disguise,” 
which is not about hiding Alevi identity but rather making its contents invisible, by obscuring  
whether and to what extent they practice Alevism. Meanwhile, they continue practicing Alevi 
ways in the privacy of their religious communities.   
The notion of secrecy for the Alevi migrants is a rather different form of dissimulation, 
which hides not the Alevi identity but its content. This is safe in the present day because being an 
Alevi is usually not now a matter of life or death. There is a shift in the kind of threats faced by 
Alevis, from persecution to discrimination, as both of my informants recognize. However, this 
shift in the nature of the threat has not occurred for some other Alevis, who continue to 
dissimulate by hiding their Alevi heritage, as the following excerpt from an Alevi migrant from 
Bursa shows:  
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“We heard in Bulgaria before the migrations: they were referring to us as ‘they 
are Kızılbaş.’ There is no one call us ‘Kızılbaş’ here, unless they want to insult 
someone. Who would like to have such a label? We already got this stigmatizing 
label when we were there, in Bulgaria. Therefore, Alevis do not want to disclose 
that they are Alevi here [Turkey].” (Alevi migrant from Kardjali to Bursa) 
 
These examples show two patterns of Alevi dissimulations, as I discussed in Chapter 
Three. First, the conventional version of dissimulation requires Alevis to hide their identity in the 
face of a severe threat, such as persecution. This strategy can work only if the Alevis’ identity is 
unnoticed by outsiders, as in the case of my informant after migration. This version of 
dissimulation seeks total invisibility to outsiders, due to the level of perceived threat. On the 
other hand, the second version of dissimulation, and the one now most often used, seeks not 
absolute concealment but rather control of the information disseminated about the community. 
This is why Alevis employing the second version of dissimulation still hide specific Alevi ways 
when their heritage is already well-known by outsiders, as in the case of my first two informants 
after migration and the third informant before migration.  
6.1.2.1 The Alevi Secret as a Border Marker  
[Note: Elmali Baba is the major saint for Bektaşis]  In the 1990s a stranger visited 
the Elmali Baba türbe complex, saying he was an Alevi from far away. The 
Alevis at the site were preparing for a cem, and while they felt suspicious at first 
they trusted his word and allowed the man to attend the cem. At the beginning of 
the ceremony, the religious leader made the announcement: “those who are not 
insiders should leave now.” The stranger did not leave the ceremony. After the 
cem the stranger thanked the crowd and walked away. Two days later my Alevi 
informants were thrilled by the news: the man was a Sunni Imam from one village 
and had died the next day after his participation in the cem!   
My informants learned the story of the stranger after the stranger’s 
daughter’s visit:  The stranger had been stopped on his way from the türbe back to 
his own house by a wise old man in white clothes. “He must have been a saint,” 
my informants paused and stated. The saint questioned the stranger: “Why did 
you claim you were an Alevi? Don’t you know Alevis’ ceremonies are secret? I 
will take your soul tomorrow morning. Now, go to your home and say farewell to 
your family.” The stranger narrated the event to his family with regret and tears: 
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“I should not have tried to learn the Alevi secret. I asked for this end!” All night 
he recited the Kuran and his family found him dead in the morning.   
 
The story of the Sunni Imam in Elmali Baba Türbe is iconic of the Alevi türbe narratives. 
It shows the border-making function of the Alevi Secret and the outcome of transgressing that 
border, in addition to Alevis’ perceptions about the infallibility of the Secret. This means that 
despite the efforts of Alevis, there may be successful violations; yet those who transgress do not 
enjoy impunity. The story indicates the different feelings the secrecy has for outsiders and 
insiders: Alevis’ secrecy makes outsiders anxious despite their dominance in society more 
widely, while it creates curiosity and interest among insiders towards knowing more about the 
Secret.  
The border-making function of secrecy is well-established in the literature on secret 
societies. Simmel sees secrecy as first an “external relationship,” which is between the person 
“who has the secret and who does not have it.” Yet it “becomes internal… [and] determines the 
reciprocal relations of those who possess the secret in common” (Simmel1906: 470). Alevi 
secrecy fits into this framework, since knowledge of the Secret marks the border between 
insiders and outsiders. Moreover, such knowledge ranks the insiders in terms of their level of 
access to the Secret and highly formalized rituals, as I discuss at the end of this section. To Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks, the absolute outsiders are apparently non-Alevis, who neither have Alevi 
heritage nor have passed through initiation. The status of uninitiated heritage-Alevis is also 
interesting; they are equally treated as outsiders, since the Alevi Secret is primarily a religious 
concept, as one Alevi female informant explained: 
 “I was surprised by my grandson’s interest [in the Path], because my daughter is 
a college graduate and she had not had ikrar. Likewise my son is a college 
graduate and he had not had ikrar. They have never attended any cem since they 
have neither ikrar nor musahip. I could not let my own son and daughter in. I 
could not disclose any information. We hid the path even from our own sons and 
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daughters. Maybe because of this we lost our children. They lost interest and 
curiosity about the path.” Babai, Kardjali  
 
The function of secrecy among secret societies is well known. Georg Simmel, whose 
essays on secret societies and secrecy are canonical, claims that the external aspect of secrecy 
functions to protect the community against outsiders, while the internal aspect grants confidence-
based unity to insiders. The example of Alevi Bulgarian Turks supports this argument. For 
instance, as I discussed in an earlier chapter, Alevis refer to outsiders by either the rather neutral 
term “Zahir” or the negative “Yezid,” which implies usurper behavior. Zahir are outsiders who 
are forbidden access to the Secret, but Yezids are also damned in religious rituals. In other words, 
different categories of outsiders pose different levels of threat to the Alevi community. The 
following excerpts reveal the Alevis’ assessments of perceived threat from outsiders in relation 
to secrecy and dissimulation: 
“Once upon a time, during the time of Ali, the Alevi Path became so 
powerful…So powerful that the others [non-Alevis] wanted Ali to leave the 
Path… They kidnapped the brother of Ali and locked him in a castle. Then they 
found Ali and offered him his brother’s release, if only he left the Path…What 
could Ali do? What would you do? To save his brother’s life, Ali told them: ‘All 
right, I left the Path.’ Since then, our Path is kept a secret. This is why it is a 
secret…nothing else…”  
“The secret is from Ottoman times…At that time it was forbidden to talk 
about Alevism. At the end, there is the risk of death. If you noticed, Alevi groups 
in Bulgaria are located in hidden places, at sheltered nooks, at dry areas and 
always under restrictions.”   
“[Question: Why are Alevi migrants in Bursa not visible?] They would 
disclose to you that they are Bektaşis. I am sure they did not tell you about 
Bektaşism. Aren’t you from Turkey? Yes. Also, you were enrolled in a college in 
Turkey? Yes. Then this means you are a Kemalist. During Kemalism lots of 
Alevis moved from Bulgaria to Turkey. They left for Turkey knowing the 
Kemalist regime was against tekkes. Despite this fact, they knowingly decided to 
move to Turkey, and just since the Bulgarians had started to bother Turks here 
(Bulgaria).”   
 
These interview excerpts show, first, my informants’ intentions in explaining the 
rationale of Alevis’ secrecy to me. They explain Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ secrecy in relation to 
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various levels of perceived threat, which include different degrees of physical persecution and 
harm, isolation, and legal and social discrimination on the part of outsider groups and the 
religious regimes and secular political regimes under the control of these groups.  
On a secondary level, these excerpts show Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ sense of historicity 
regarding secrecy among Alevis; they perceive a historical continuity in the external threat. The 
threat began with Alevi-Sunni relations in the early days of Islam, and continued during Sunni-
dominant Ottoman rule and the secular nature of early-Republican Turkey. Simmel states that 
“[the] secret encircles [secret societies] like a boundary…which…formally shuts up the society 
within itself as a complete unity” (Simmel 1906: 484). Simmel sees the secret as a priori to the 
unity and closure of secret societies to the outside. In contrast to Simmel, I see the Alevis 
engaged in the reverse process:  the unity of the community and its closure to those outside is the 
result not of a secret essential and inherent to Alevism, but rather essential to a sense of 
historicity, which alerts Alevis to the constant threat from various historical outsiders. In other 
words, the conflictual historical relations between Alevis and non-Alevis, as well as the sense of 
constant threat result in the “shutting up of [Alevism] within itself as a complete unity;” leading 
to the essentialization of secrecy among Alevis and ultimately to the calcification of the secret. 
The following examples are illustrations of this:  
“The Bektaşi path is difficult; it cannot exist without hiding it. As the nefes says: 
Don’t think of the Bektaşi way as an easy lover: it is the Order of the Delicate 
(Tarikât-ı Nâzenin), the Secret of the Truth (Sır-ı Hakikât).”  Derviş from Razgrad   
 
“Earlier both mayes and the prayers were conducted in secrecy. Later everything 
has changed. Outsiders were allowed into these ceremonies.  Yet, in principle 
they should not be allowed.”  Bektaşi from Kardjali   
 
The first excerpt evokes well-known code names for Bektaşism, implying that secrecy is 
not an historical product but something internal to the Bektaşi belief system, which is why the 
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Bektaşi order is seen as the Order of the Delicate and the Secret of the Truth. The second excerpt 
also portrays secrecy as a principle inherent to Alevism, and not a product of historical insider-
outsider tensions.    
6.1.2.2 Secrecy as an Individualizing and Collectivizing Disciplinary Mechanism   
The notion of secrecy among Alevi Bulgarian Turks functions to “shut up the society within 
itself as a complete unity” against designated outsiders, while it imposes a clear hierarchy and 
form of self-discipline for the individual members of the group. The category “insiders” is pretty 
straightforward for Alevi Bulgarian Turks: it constitutes only those who have already gone 
through the formal initiation process, the Oath (ikrar). The Alevi Secret is primarily a religious 
category.  
The Alevi Secret is not distributed equally within the community. Ideally, Alevi cem 
groups’ members’ access to the Secret is conditioned by their position in the group. This 
position, in turn, is based on their spiritual maturity as well as their individual location on the 
Path towards the Perfect Human Being (Insan-ı Kâmil), as discussed in Chapter Five. Practically, 
one’s rank in the cem community can be evaluated based on the time passed since initiation; 
whether one has fictive kin (Musahiplik) if the group requires it; and whether one holds a special 
position (post) in cem, such as the baba postu. Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ secrecy is directly linked 
to their dissimulations, since dissimulation (takiye) is about the concealment of one’s religious 
beliefs not only from hostile outsiders but also from some insiders who have not reached 
spiritual maturity, as discussed in Chapter Three.    
Secrecy among Alevi Bulgarian Turks also has a disciplinary function, both 
individualizing each person and totalizing all of them. Each and every Alevi individual is 
responsible for the protection of the Secret and accountable for any disclosure of information. 
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The following excerpt exemplifies that even an Alevi religious leader (baba), the top rank in 
every cem community, may hesitate to reveal information about the group without the consent of 
those who stand at relatively lower ranks in the religious hierarchy: 
“Babas may not talk with you [about Alevism]. This is because they would not 
like to talk to you without the permission of the Twelves [Onikiler, those who 
hold a special sacred function, i.e. post, in the Bektaşi cems]” Bektaşi from 
Kardjali    
 
The gate keepers of the Alevi Secret remain the Alevi babas and elders, who displayed 
three different approaches regarding the Secret and secrecy during my fieldwork, as exemplified 
in the following excerpts from my interviews:  
“I thought about building a cemevi in the village. Under the influence of TV [the 
presence of TV programs on cems in Turkey] I suggested to shift to “open cem.” 
The elders said, “Don’t do it! Cem should be hidden. It has come to this day this 
way  do not open it.” Bektaşi from Razgrad  
 
“Let me tell you something: All these slanders are just because of keeping it [the 
Path] secret and following it secretly. They [Alevis in Turkey] already show Alevi 
ways on Turkish channels…even though they are slightly different from our 
ways.” Babai, from Kardjali   
 
“I told you about the secrecy before. The Others [Sunnis] use it against us a lot. 
They say, ‘All right. As you do your ways secretly, this means there is really 
something to hide, there is something you fear to be known.’” Babai from 
Kardjali  
 
On the one hand, there are traditionalist Alevi babas and elders who insist on protecting 
the “tradition” by strictly following the most formalist elements. They reject building a separate 
and visible cemevi instead of traditional cem rooms in the babas’ houses, having electricity in the 
cem rooms instead of traditional candles and çırak, having chairs instead of sitting on the floor 
and also reject the distortions of traditional niyaz. My first informant explained his interaction 
with babas from such a group. The group observes the conventional dissimulation ideal by 
promoting absolute invisibility to outsiders and the absolute discipline of insiders. On the other 
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hand, more “liberal” Alevi babas and elder males promote a perhaps more contemporary 
dissimulation ideal, which perceives secrecy as counter-productive for the community since it 
alienates younger, uninitiated Alevis. The proponents of this second ideal remain within the 
framework of dissimulation, since they still promote the concealment of Alevi identity from 
outsiders; yet they are more flexible in relation to uninitiated insiders, the heritage Alevis. The 
second informant exemplifies this position; he stressed the visibility of Alevi rituals on TV yet 
he was confident that this was not a disclosure of the secret, given the difference between the 
broadcasted Alevi rituals in Turkey and Alevi rituals among Bulgarian Turks. In addition, few 
Alevi babas promote complete abandonment of dissimulation, since they support conducting 
Alevi ceremonies that are open to the public. The third informant exemplifies this position. 
Despite this openness, this third position still promotes some form of dissimulation against 
outsiders, because they believe an untrained eye and immature soul will not be able to decipher 
the symbolism of these ceremonies and the Secret will remain as a secret to the outsiders even if 
they watch the Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ ceremonies.  
6.1.2.3 The ritual formalism of secrecy: “Die; but don’t break your oath” 
The literature on secret societies recognizes the importance of ritual formalism or “technologies 
of secrecy” and how these technologies are informed by “a body of doctrine” to keep the secrets 
safe from public scrutiny (Simmel1906: 476). Often such formalisms help create a reality unique 
to the group and shared by the group members as an alternative to the reality of the surrounding 
society (Simmel: 476, Bellman1981, George 1993). Individual Alevi Bulgarian Turks enter into 
the world of this alternative reality by the initiation ritual ikrar (oath) during which they promise 
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not to “break the Oath,” not even when facing death.  The following is an excerpt from an ikrar 
ceremony from Turkish Bektaşis, which is available online:4  
The guide on behalf of the Initiate:  We came from the Mağrifet [door] and we are 
going to the Hakikat [door], my master.
5
 
Baba:  You cannot go. It is winter; there are insurmountable mountains, 
unsurpassable rivers. You cannot pass these barriers, you cannot pass 
these floods. There are huge obstacles and a very harsh environment. It 
is a hard nut to crack; it cannot be eaten. It is a fiery trial; it cannot be 
handled. Don’t come in. If you come in, don’t return (convert). Those 
who come in lose their property and those who return lose their life. 
Die; but do not pledge [the Alevi Oath]. Die; but do not break your 
oath. The situation is like this. Let me tell and make you hear these 
situations, my child.  
The Initiate: My master, we came by believing in the community and the unity of 
God and by following the road of Muhammed Ali…We came by 
believing in and trusting those people we named. We may die but we will 
not return….  
 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks keep the oath ceremony itself as a secret, which doubles the 
secrecy level. This is the reason why I use an online source rather than my field notes, even 
though I later received confirmation from Alevi Bulgarian Turks that this ikrar pledge was 
similar to their own ikrar.  In addition, during interviews my informants uttered the phrase “Die  
but not pledge. Die  but not break your oath” together with the phrase “Get beheaded but do not 
disclose your secret [Ser ver ama sır verme].”  
The Oath is the seal on Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ mouths when speaking not only to 
outsiders but also to insiders from different sub-groups of Alevism. Information about specific 
religious rituals is partially known yet mostly restricted across subgroups. For instance, 
musahiplik, the fictive kinship relation established between Alevi followers in a cem community, 
                                                 
4
 http://www.aleviweb.com/forum/showthread.php?t=36145 
5 As I discussed in Chapter Five the ultimate aim of  initiated Alevi is to become “the perfect human being” (insan-ı 
kamil), which can be possible by passing the stages manifested in the principle “Four Doors and Forty Ranks (Dort 
Kapi Kirk Makam). The four doors are named as Şeriat (Sharia as religious law), Tarikat   (Tariqa as religious 
brotherhood), Marifet (Marifa as spiritual knowledge) and Hakikat (Haqiqa as the Truth). 
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marks the differences among subgroups and subsegments of Alevi Bulgarian Turks, as I 
discussed in Chapter Five. These intra-group differences influence the distribution of the Secret 
among Alevi subgroups and subsegments. For instance, the groups with Musahiplik 
(Northeastern Babais and Bektaşis as well as Southern Musahiplis) require Musahiplik in order 
for individual members to claim possession of the Alevi Secret, while the groups without 
Musahiplik (Southern Babais, Bektaşis and Northern Dervişes) allow members’ access to the all 
parts of the ceremony only after the ikrar.  Furthermore, crossing from a group requiring 
musahips to a group without Musahiplik is almost unimaginable. The effect of these formalisms 
becomes visible when members of Alevi subgroups from different subsegments cross the border. 
A Bektaşi migrant may join a Babai migrant cem community but only after pledging before the 
Babai baba. A Northeastern Babai migrant may not join a Southern Babai migrant community’s 
cem in the resettlement area. 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks have institutionalized the formalism regarding secrecy into their 
religious rituals. For instance, every cem has two agents of control. The Gözcü (Watchman) 
keeps the cem orderly by controlling insiders while the Pervane (Doorman) keeps outsiders away 
from the cem. They maintain the secrecy of the community by policing insiders and outsiders, 
sometimes by force. The very existence of these positions indicates that there are external and 
internal aspects to the secrecy and that Alevis control dissemination of the secret from inside the 
group to outside the group. In addition, the religious poems (nefes, or Kuran as Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks call them) composed into religious songs constitute a central component of cems. These 
songs are highly symbolic in terms of the metaphors utilized, and they are they are compact 
manifestations of Alevi cosmology, including the Secret. The high level of symbolism, however, 
often makes them inaccessible even to insiders. In this respect, Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ Kurans 
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help maintain the dissimulations of Alevi Bulgarian Turks even against insiders who have not 
reached a high level of spiritual maturity.  
All in all, the secrecy regime among Alevi Bulgarian Turks helps them to identify the 
differences between and within outsiders. It both totalizes and individualizes the insiders. 
Secrecy is manifested in the embodied ritual performances, such as initiation ceremonies. It 
becomes a ground for Alevis’ linguistic performances by means of hiding the contents of “the 
Secret” while revealing its function, use and forms as well as its very existence.  Ultimately, the 
power of the secrecy is a curious power: the uncertainity about what constitutes the secret is a 
large part of what makes the secrecy powerful for both insiders and outsiders. 
6.2 SPEAKING OTHERS’ LANGUAGES: DISSIMULATION VIA CODE 
LANGUAGE  
Alevis Bulgarian Turks practice linguistic dissimulation by using of a set of “code words” that 
subtly allude to particular Alevi beliefs and practices. These code words are drawn from the 
vocabulary pool in their surrounding society, but Alevi Bulgarian Turks attribute unique 
meanings to them. Their specific usage of ordinary words often remains unnoticed in the wider 
society. Even if Alevis notice some “strange” difference between these words’ general use and 
their use by Alevis, they cannot truly explain it. Outsiders will neither associate the speaker with 
Alevism nor will they be able to decipher the specific meaning of the words. Only Alevis 
themselves can decipher the intended meanings of these words. In this way, Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks appear as a part of the majority in the presence of outsiders, while they reinforce their 
Alevi identity to insiders.    
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A small number of scholars (e.g. Günşen 2007, Sevinçli 2009) depict Alevis’ code 
language as a boundary marker between insiders and outsiders, based on their studies of Alevis 
in Turkey. These accounts are right in pointing out that the primary function of the code word is 
to maintain an insider-outsider distinction between Alevis and non-Alevis. I think, however, that 
Alevi Bulgarian Turkish  uses of a code language are also primarily about the insider-outsider 
distinction, yet hint at a more complicated system of classification of insiders and outsiders, due 
to their encounters with multiple outsiders groups and to regional and subgroup segmentation, as 
well as internal hierarchy within insider groups. Such use of code words in relation to multiple 
outsiders and varying insiders confirms that dissimulation is not an inherent element of religious 
belief, but a dynamic strategy that minorities use to protect themselves from potentially or 
actually hostile outsiders, and uninitiated and initiated yet spiritually immature insiders.   
6.2.1 Use of Code Words in relation to Insiders 
Alevi code language is transmitted in the ritual environment of cem ceremonies. A close 
examination of rules of participation in cems reveals that insiders have graduated access to Alevi 
code words. First, uninitiated Alevi heritage members do not have access to the code language, 
since they are not allowed to attend cems before the ikrar (oath). Furthermore, some Alevi 
Bulgarian Turkish subgroups and subsegments (Razgrad Babais, Razgrad Bektaşis and Kardjali 
Musahiplis) require Musahiplik for initiated Alevis to attend all parts of the cem.   
Second, Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ code words may show differences across subgroups and 
subsegments. Often the difference is due to the existence of variations in practices based on the 
same idea. For instance, Musahiplik exists in different forms among Alevi Bulgarian Turkish 
subgroups and is accordingly named differently in them. For example, Razgrad Babais, Razgrad 
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Bektaşis and Kardjali Musahiplis accept Musahiplik between two married couples that are equal 
in status and use the term blazer or kafadar.  Kardjali Babais and Bektaşis seem to reject the idea 
of Musahiplik on the grounds that it has caused groundless slander of Alevis slanders about 
Alevis for supposedly engaging in wife-exchange; yet these same groups actually emply a 
different form of fictive kinship relation between generations. Among them, a heritage Alevi 
should select an initiated Alevi male as Father to the Path (Yol Babası), who will instruct and 
protect the Son in the Path (Yol Oğlu). Because of these problems with Sunnis, Alevis refer to 
musahiplik relations by utilizing code words from colloquial local languages, such as blazer 
(brother), kafadar (buddy), and yol oglu (son in the path), which do not connote musahiplik 
relation to Turkish speaking outsiders.   
It is important to note that these differences in code words within subgroups and 
subsegments are not an obstacle for interactions among their members. When they notice 
differences, they talk about it and see them as variations of the same ideas inherent to Alevi 
cosmology, as I noticed during my fieldwork during the meetings of members of various 
subgroups during türbe visits. Strikingly this seems to be the case even when Alevis speak 
different languages.  For instance, Arab Alevis in Syria and in Hatay (Turkey) pray in Arabic and 
Bulgarian Turkish Alevis pray in Turkish. Their code words are also in these languages. 
However, the code word “Father in the Path” (Yol Babası) for Southern Babais and Bektaşis 
becomes “the Uncle for Religion” (Em-i Seyid) among Arab Alawis (Arayancan: 2010), denoting 
the same function in different terminology.  
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6.2.2 Use of Code Words in relation to Outsiders 
Historically, many Alevi groups have resided in Sunni-dominant settings, so it is not surprising 
that many Alevi code words have developed in relation to Sunni Islam. Some researchers have 
identified a set of terms common in Sunni and Alevi Islam, yet the terms have quite different 
meanings. Dedekargınoğlu (2011) examines the different perceptions of these terms by Alevis 
and Sunnis in Turkey. For example, terms for places (e.g. tekke, zaviye, dergah, cem, cemevi), 
religious ideas (e.g. tecella, temenna, tevella,teberra), sacred characters (e.g. Ehl-i Beyt) as well 
as profane characters (e.g. Muaviye, Yezid) are perceived differently. I also identified several 
terms common to Sunni and Alevi Bulgarian Turks but with different meanings, with regards to 
rituals (e.g. kurban, oruc, ziyaret, asure), sacred texts (e.g. Quran), and specific relations 
between believers (e.g. ahretlik).  
Some authors see this phenomenon as “shared” vocabulary and explain it as due to the 
Islamic nature of both Alevism and Sunnism (Dedekargınoğlu 2011), while Alevis’ different 
meanings are due to the esoteric nature of their views (Türkdoğan 1994).I see these explanations 
as too doctrine-oriented. Considering the historical asymmetry of power between the Alevis and 
Sunnis, I see these commonly used words not as examples of a “shared vocabulary” by Alevis 
and Sunnis but rather as Alevis’ strategic adoptions of the Sunni terms to code their esoteric 
views when these views were a cause for persecution. During my fieldwork I saw Alevis use so-
called “shared” terms while referring to Alevi beliefs and practices, especially in settings where 
Sunni and Alevi were mixed. The Sunni vocabulary continues to be the main pool of reference 
for Alevis in Sunni-Alevi mixed settings, reflecting that the Sunnis were seen historically as a 
threat to the community. Thus, Alevis using terms to refer to Alevi religious rituals that insinuate 
Sunni belief is a product of their historical dissimulation. This strategy is still in use since it helps 
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Alevis to dissimulate by hiding their Alevi identity from Sunnis, while conveying their messages 
to Alevis present at the venue.       
A more important yet largely unrecognized fact about Alevi use of code words in relation 
to non-Sunni groups is that Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ utilizations of code languages are tailored 
differently in relation to different majorities. My Alevi Bulgarian Turkish informants often 
narrated the historical strategy of referring to Alevi beliefs and practices by utilizing terms from 
the vocabularies of secular nationalists and socialist Turks and Bulgarians. This is an example of 
speaking to a dominant group in their own language, but in ways that obscure the Alevi beliefs 
and practices for the dominant groups’ members while still hinting at them to Alevis. In the past 
they adopted secular terminology for Alevi religious rituals when political regimes in Bulgaria 
and Turkey discredited and even abandoned religious markers, but Alevis continued to perform 
Alevi religious rituals in the privacy of their own religious community. The rest of this section 
focuses on Alevis code words regarding cem ceremonies and türbe visits in relation to different 
majorities and political regimes. 
6.2.2.1 Cems as Namaz to Sunnis and Banket [банкет] to Socialists  
Alevi Bulgarian Turks publicly refer to cem ceremonies by using code words depending on the 
immediate and historical majorities of their surroundings. The code words used in the Sunni 
Muslims’ presence have gained permanence  Alevis often use them in private among group 
members, as I noted during my fieldwork. For instance, Alevi Bulgarian Turks sometimes refer 
to cems as halka namazı, literally “circle prayer.” To Sunnis, the term recalls Sunni daily prayer 
(namaz), because they do not know the nature of Alevi prayer. Yet, in fact, the phrase underlines 
the difference between Sunni and Alevi prayers. Sunni prayer is unidirectional. All worshippers 
pray and prostrate themselves in the direction of Mecca, while praying toward another direction 
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is void and considered a sin. Alevi prayer is circular; all worshippers form a circle according to 
their rank in relation to the baba, and they prostrate themselves to each other, indicating the 
belief that God is not in some distant place (such as Mecca) but in every human. As an Alevi 
baba put it during the interview: “We also have namaz [like Sunnis]; yet, it should be conducted 
not by turning our backs to each other but by turning our faces to each other.”   
Sometimes Alevi code words for cem have an emphasis on the time of the ritual.  Some 
Alevi groups refer to cems as cuma kılmak (literally meaning performing Friday prayer in Sunni 
Islam) or aksam kılmak (literally meaning performing evening prayer). Alevis use these Sunni 
terms to pretend to be Sunnis while interacting with Sunnis or at least to hide their Alevi identity 
since they use the term “ayn-ül cem” or “cem” among Alevis Yet again, this usage is understood 
only as indicating cem, since Alevis in Bulgaria conduct cems on Fridays evenings. In this sense, 
even while pretending to appear as Sunni to Sunnis, Alevis signal Alevi identity to other Alevis. 
This usage has become engrained among Alevi Bulgarian Turks over time and it is possible to 
see their reference to cems in such code words as the following excerpts from my interviews 
show: 
You cannot talk about a naming [ceremony for a newborn] without aksam kılma. 
And aksam kilmak is done only by the baba, that is, not by anyone else. C 86 
Razgrad  
 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks have historically utilized non-Sunni groups’ words to refer to 
Alevi cems. In socialist Bulgaria, where practicing religion was discredited and strictly 
monitored, Alevi Bulgarian Turks survived the state surveillance by relying on dissimulation. 
Among several ways of handling pressures coming from local authorities, one was to publicly 
present the cem ceremonies not as religious rituals but rather as secular banquets [Banket, 
банкет], dinners or harvest feastsIt is worth noting that in the present day Alevi Bulgarian Turks 
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seems to dropped to use the word “banket” to refer to the cems.  Understandably Alevis’ use of 
the term banket for cems was abandoned as socialists stopped to be the majority group 
threatening the Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ religious identity or practices.   
Alevi Bulgarian Turks used code words also in migrant settings in Turkey, when the local 
elite and administrators discredited displays of Alevism. While various Alevi migrants from 
different subgroups managed to form their own cem communities in Turkey, they concealed the 
cem ceremonies by portraying them as secular or culturally mainstream religious events. The 
following excerpt exemplifies Alevis’ situation before and after migration, in relation to secular 
Bulgarian and Turkish authorities:  
“The cemevi does not bother anyone here [İstanbul]. We were doing aşure at the 
last muharram. It became crowded  thus, the police came. We said, “We made 
aşure and we are distributing it” and we handed one plate to them too. In the past 
they [the police] used to come and check us in Bulgaria too. Those were times 
when communism was very strict; it was forbidden for 4-5 people to gather.  We 
used to gather [for cem] even under those conditions. Once they squealed on us; 
so police arrived. We said, “look, we come together three times every year. We 
hold a banquet; we eat and drink. The first one is during spring before seeding, 
the second one is before cultivating, and the last one is after the harvest. We 
combine whatever we have and we share whatever we combined.” Then the baba 
offered them dem [a ritual drink with alcohol, e.g. raki]. That is to say, nothing 
really bad happened during the communist period.”  
Babai religious leader from Kardjali, resettled in İstanbul   
 
The quote clearly exemplifies Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ portrayals of cems in two settings. 
In socialist Bulgaria, cems were described not as religious gatherings but as secular celebrations 
drawing upon ideals valued by socialism, such as the value of agricultural labor, a sense of 
collectivity, unity in production and consumption, and also on the presence of alcohol as a 
pseudo sign for detachment from traditional Muslim worldviews. Their situation becomes even 
more interesting in Turkey. The resettlement neighborhood was made up of local and migrant 
Sunnis and Alevis, including migrants from the three subgroups Babai, Bektaşi and Musahipli. 
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Alevis migrants are known to attend local Alevi’s cemevi in the next neighborhood. Unknown to 
outsiders, Alevi migrants also have their own private cemevi. These are rented places where each 
subgroup conducts Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ traditional ayn-ül cem, which is quite different from 
local Alevis’ cems in the public cemevi. Simply put, Alevi migrants still hide their own cem 
ceremonies from both local Sunnis and local Alevis. The full meaning of the above excerpt 
becomes clear only within this context.  
Alevi migrants strategically hide not only the cems and their private cemevi but also other 
Alevi ceremonies. For instance, they strategically reduced the significance of all Muharram 
commemoration events (i.e. the muharram fast, ayn-ul cem and preparing aşure) into making 
and distributing aşure when confronted by an outside authority. The police tolerated the 
gathering since this iconic Alevi ritual was represented by Alevis as a common tradition among 
secular Sunnis in Turkey. The most important point, however, is that while both Sunnis and 
Alevis make and distribute aşure, they attribute a different meaning to it. In fact, as noted earlier, 
aşure is the food Sunnis use to celebrate the survival of Noah after the Flood, while it is the food 
used by Alevis to celebrate Salman-i Pak as the only Alevi who had survived the martyrdom of 
Huseyin and his followers by Sunni leaders in Kerbela.  
6.2.2.2 Türbe visits as Ziyaret to Sunnis, Ekskursiya [екскурзия] to Bulgarians   
Türbes in Bulgaria are contact zones between Alevi and Sunni Turks, and also Orthodox 
Christian Bulgarians, who may all visit türbes despite their different perceptions, beliefs and 
practices in them, as I explained in chapter five. However, these groups compete to control 
türbes regarding issues such as the ownership, usage rights, maintenance and administration of 
the türbes. For instance, the Alevi türbes in Razgrad are few in number, large in size and 
scattered in faraway places. They are mostly under state control on the grounds that they are 
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“Cultural Monuments” (Pametnik na Kulturata/ паметник на културата). On the other hand, 
the türbes in Kardjali, with the exception of a few monumental ones, are more numerous, usually 
small in size, and are located in almost in every village next to the central cemetery.  They are 
usually under the legal control of Sunni Müftülüks, while Alevis take care of their maintenance. 
These differences have led to various different patterns of dissimulation with regards to türbes 
for Alevis, including but not limited to linguistic dissimulations. In this section, I examine Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks’ these linguistic dissimulations by discussing examples of their use of non-
verbal as well as verbal language for controlling their visibilities and invisibilities in türbes and 
in the presence of outsiders.   
I devoted a great portion of my fieldwork to türbe visits in various configurations: by 
myself, with Alevi babas and believers and even with Sunni imams from outside of the region. 
Only once did I make a visit with Alevis to a türbe in a Sunni-only village in Kardjali. The 
province is physically segregated; its western half consists of Sunni Bulgarians and Turks and its 
eastern half consists of Alevi subgroups in Alevi-only or mixed villages. Soon I noticed there 
was intense prejudice between Alevis and Sunnis due to intergroup contact in the eastern parts, 
although inter-group prejudice was no less in the western parts. After numerous visits to türbes 
in eastern Kardjali, I decided to visit a türbe in a Sunni village in western Kardjali: 
The türbe site was rather difficult to reach via public transportation. An Alevi key 
informant kindly offered me a ride to visit it. We arrived and found villagers in the 
garden of the mosque next to the türbe. As they were waiting for the prayer, I 
introduced myself as a graduate student writing a thesis on Bulgarian Turks and 
religion and then I paused out of curiosity, wondering how my Alevi informants 
would introduce themselves. Would they reveal their Alevi identity or at least the 
name of their villages, which would indicate their Alevi identity? Unsurprisingly 
they did not reveal either; they presented themselves as visitors from the city who 
were helping me to see the site. Their self-portrayals were not actually untrue and 
were reasonably cautious for an unknown setting.  
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Surprisingly, our Sunni hosts were completely indifferent to our religious 
orientations. It was just the opposite of my experience in Alevi villages, where 
villagers had immediately questioned my orientation. Our Sunni hosts gave us 
information about the legends of the türbe. I was surprised once again by the 
resemblance between their narratives and those narratives of the türbes for Alevis. 
Sunnis saw the türbe’s saint as the protector of the village, since when Bulgarian 
soldiers came to destroy the village, the mosque and the türbe, the soldiers were 
able to burn down the village and mosque but could not harm the türbe. For this 
reason, the türbe was seen as sacred and was well-maintained. In fact, it was so 
well-maintained that some visitors’ donations go to the mosque’s wakf for the 
mosque’s maintenance!  If I did not know the villagers were Sunnis, I might have 
mistaken them for Alevis. My Alevi informants were also surprised; they knew 
that “Sunnis, at least, fear damaging türbes” but they had not seen this level of 
respect for türbes from Sunnis.  
 
At our entrance to the türbe, our Sunni hosts warned us not to step on the threshold 
or turn our backs to the saint! These were the exact same warnings to me by Alevis 
in my türbe visits! I was anticipating that my Alevi informants would reveal their 
identity at that point, given the friendly attitude of our Sunni hosts. They did not do 
so…at least, verbally. Yet they strictly followed Alevi rules for entering türbes: 
They touched the bottom, top, right side and left side of the threshold (to indicate 
the niyaz); they jumped over the threshold; they walked around the tomb while 
touching its corners at seven spots (also an Alevi niyaz from Babai tradition); they 
avoided passing the headstone of the tomb, which is seen as very disrespectful by 
Kardjali Alevis; they left some money in a box in the türbe; this money is called 
“niyaz money” (niyaz parasi) and represents the “bloodless sacrifice”(kansiz 
kurban) into the “niyaz box” (niyaz kutusu), as there was no place for burning 
candles or other bloodless sacrifice; and they left the türbe without turning their 
backs to the tomb. Ultimately they did not reveal anything about their Alevi 
identity verbally; yet they gave a lot of non-verbal clues for those familiar with 
Alevi ways such as me. Still, our Sunni hosts could not (or did not appear to) 
identify their identity.    
 
This visit to a türbe in a Sunni Village shows two forms of dissimulations by Alevis. 
First, during the introduction the Alevi informants did not volunteer information about their 
Alevi identity and village of origin. More importantly, they utilized linguistic dissimulation by 
non-verbal code language (by conducting the embodied acts of niyaz and bloodless sacrifice) and 
they observed Babai Alevi türbe-visit rules by the book, while uninformed outsiders were unable 
to identify this. Our Sunni hosts probably noticed a difference between Alevis and other visitors’ 
performances in the türbe, yet, they did not feel compelled to ask further questions. I am not 
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certain about whether Sunnis know my Alevi friends were conducting Alevi prayers. The türbe is 
located in a Sunni-only zone, which might have deterred many Alevis, given that my Alevi 
informants are those who arrange türbe events in the whole region could not have visited the 
türbe before our visit. I knew the hosts were actually Sunnis since the site was a well-known 
Sunni-only village, one of the host was functioning as the imam and the other one came for noon 
prayer.   
Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ have utilized linguistic dissimulations also against non-Sunni 
outsiders, such as hostile political regimes in Bulgaria. During socialism especially, many major 
türbes were closed to worship and transformed into museums (e.g. Akyazili Sultan near Balchik, 
Demir Baba near Razgrad); or their territories were confiscated and transformed into national 
parks and residences (e.g. Huseyin Baba Türbe near Razgrad). Other türbes were either closed to 
worship or put under strict state surveillance, like the Sunni mosques. Only those türbes next to 
the villages inhabited by Alevi were easier to visit, such as the village türbes in Kardjali, but 
only if the Alevis were not denounced by their Sunni neighbors. Alevis still managed to visit 
türbes due to their linguistic dissimulations. They made visits to türbes in distant regions of 
Bulgaria (traveling from Razgrad to Kardjali or vice-versa) despite the strict restrictions on 
mobility for citizens of socialist Bulgaria. They framed these visits to authorities as “excursions” 
(ekskursiya/ екскурзия). They also conducted regular local türbe visits by framing them as 
“picnics,” just as they framed the ritual animal sacrifices (kurban) as picnic meals. I should note 
that under socialism picnics and excursions were not mundane events but social activities for 
political indoctrination of the the socialist citizens, especially the youth. In this respect Alevis’ 
utilization of code words picnic for türbe visits and excursions for ritual sacrifice meals were not 
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random. By using these words, they appeared allied with socialist ideals even when they did not 
really feel so, as clearly stated by my Alevi informants in interviews.  
Even the strict border during socialism, part of the “Iron Curtain,” after all, did not 
prevent some Alevi babas from annual visits to serve in major Alevi tekkes outside Bulgaria’s 
borders. Some babas successfully framed their visits as tourism and received tourist visas to 
Turkey (for Şücaeddin Veli Sultan for Babais) or Greece (for Kızıl Deli Sultan for Bektaşis). 
This became possible even though during the socialist period Bulgarian authorities were not very 
willing to issue tourist visas to citizens of NATO member states. It is an instance of double 
dissimulation, as Robert M. Hayden noted in our correspondence, since while Alevis were using 
“tourism” as the subterfuge for their religious visits, Bulgarian authorities were pretending to 
accept this subterfuge, given that the socialist administration could not recognize religion but 
tourism as a valid ground for issuing visas to Turkey or Greece. There were, however, Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks who could not get legal visas. Their solution was crossing the border illegally. 
On the other side of the border, in Turkey, Alevi migrants also pursued tourist visas for visiting 
türbes in Bulgaria. For instance, an Alevi informant had migrated from Ruse to Bursa in the 
1970s after pledging the Alevi path (ikrar), and his pledge required his participation in cems for 
the annual purification ceremonies. Unable to find a cem community in Bursa, my informant 
pursued another option, seeking tourist visas to participate in the Nevruz ceremony in Ruse, 
where he also made türbe visits. However, none of my Alevi informants now refer to cems as 
bankets, türbe visits as excursions or ritual sacrifice meals as picnic meals. These words seem to 
lose their “code word” function with the end of socialism, which shows the temporary and 
strategic nature of Alevis’ use of code works. Alevi Bulgarian Turks may thus abandon the code 
words for Alevi beliefs and practices from the vocabulary pool of the majorities which do not 
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pose a threat to them any more.  This also means that Alevis continue to use the code words from 
the vocabulary pool of the dominant majorities to refer to Alevi practices only if these majorities 
continue to pose a perceived or actual threat Alevis. For instance, Alevi Bulgarian Turks still use 
the code words from the vocabulary pool of Sunni Islam, halka namazi, aksam kilmak for cem, 
and ziyaret for türbe visits.  
This situation had a great impact on my field research and  research findings. During 
fieldwork I noticed that my informants were more comfortable in talking about dissimulation 
cases in the past, especially during their interactions with Communist Party Officials. 
Understandably, my informants did not display the same level of comfort in talking about 
historical and present relations with the surrounding present-day majorities, such as Sunnis in 
Bulgaria or Turkey. By considering their past dissimulations by using code words, I did not 
hesitate to utilize interview data, while regarding their ongoing dissimulations I purposefully 
relied on data not from interviews but from participant observation.  
6.3 PRACTICING OTHERS’ PRACTICES:  
6.3.1 Performing Sunni religious practices  
The central worshipping practices of Alevis and Sunnis are different, the former performing 
cems the latter namaz. The difference is apparent in terms of rules regarding time, space, 
frequency, sequence and the structure of these practices. The social context of the two 
worshipping practices is also different: namaz is performed either individually or collectively, 
and can be done privately or in public, in mosques; while Alevi cems are collective ceremonies 
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which are performed in ad hoc cem rooms or permanent cemevis. Moreover, the two practices 
are informed by different approaches to Islam. Alevi cems rests on the heavy symbolism of 
Alevis’ esoteric interpretations of Islam while Sunni namaz rests on a rather formalist view. The 
theological distinction between Alevism and Sunnism is clearly and correctly noted in the 
literature an (e.g. Schüler 1999: 159,  amuroğlu 1992: 67), yet it leaves some phenomena 
unexplained: some Alevi Bulgarian Turks are involved in Sunni rituals, especially Sunni namaz 
in local mosques.   
In the literature, the phenomenon of Alevis performing Sunni namaz has been examined 
by several scholars. Türkdoğan (1995) finds this phenomenon unsurprising; since he emphasizes 
that both communities are ultimately Islamic. This view ignores the historical power asymmetry 
which has calcified inter-group differences, however. Ilyas Űzüm (2006) seems to presume 
Sunni Islam as the norm and thus finds nothing noteworthy in Alevis following Sunni rules. 
Some other scholars consider Alevi practice of Sunni prayers as an indicator of  assimilation into 
the Sunni belief system (Zeidan 1999). However, I find this conclusion not to be well grounded 
in data, and actually contradicted by my field research experiences.  
As an alternative to these approaches, I argue that at least some Alevi Bulgarian Turks 
practice Sunni religious rituals not because they trivialize the theological differences between 
Alevism and Sunnism, nor because they are assimilating into Sunnism. On the contrary, the 
majority of Alevis whom I observed performing Sunni prayers stated that they did so to protect 
the Alevis and Alevi ways against hostile outsiders, and many still do so in order to avoid 
discrimination. Further, some Alevis continue to perform Sunni prayers so they can seek certain 
advantages which are otherwise unavailable to them. Attending Sunni ceremonies has helped 
Alevis dissimulate against outsiders by publicly appearing as if they finally found the putatively 
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“true path” of Sunni Islam, while they pursue Alevi ways in the privacy of their own religious 
group.   
My Alevi informants clearly link their practice of Sunni customs or rites like namaz on 
Fridays and thebBayrams within the broader history of Alevi-Sunni relations.  An informant 
from Razgrad stated that Alevis’ participation in Friday prayers dates back to “the Ottoman 
period” when “neighboring villages were prying about their practices and informing the 
authorities.” Another informant from Razgrad emphasized that namaz was almost compulsory 
for him because of the “Sunni hocas in the mekteps” (Turkish schools before socialism) who 
forced him to attend namaz when he was a child. They would “beat [the ones] who did not 
appear in the mosque during Friday prayers.” Another Alevi informant was quite sarcastic and 
indifferent: “at least it [performing namaz] is not a sin.”  
Many Alevi Bulgarian Turks continue to perform public Sunni rituals today not because 
of the threat of persecution but to avoid discrimination, as the following excerpts show: 
“If you do not attend the Friday or Bayram prayers, they will call you Kızılbaş! 
That’s all. Nothing more happens. We [Alevis] meet at houses, in the presence of 
a baba, who prays on the hosting house.” Bektaşi from Kardjali 
 
“In Turkey they call you “infidel” [if one does not go to the mosques]. My brother 
in law felt forced to go to mosque just for this reason. Then, my sister started to 
save him from this problem by fabricating lies, such as ‘he went to buy bread’ 
[when his friends called him to attend Friday prayers]. Now his friends are calling 
him ‘Alevi annex’ [“Alevi yamamasi,” which refers to one who is affiliated with 
Alevism in a rather derogatory way].” Bektaşi from Razgrad 
 
“I always perform Friday prayers. I do not miss the Bayram Prayers either. I 
perform only the “obligatory duty” [farz] sections, but I perform them. The rest of 
the people perform the sunnah section as well. The other day the headman of the 
town did not go to Bayram prayer in the town’s mosque. Imam paid him a visit 
while the headman said ‘I do not care  it is not my business.’ I was there and I 
said ‘Yet, you are an example [for the rest].’ He became convinced and said all 
right. Of course it is a political issue. Then I added, “you should come without 
eating anything, drinking anything, or smoking cigarettes and after conducting the 
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ritual cleaning [abdest].’ He chuckled and added “no way, not that far.”  Babai 
from Razgrad in Turkey  
 
As indicated in the above quotations, Alevi Bulgarian Turks preserve their sense of Alevi 
identity while practicing Sunni practices, even though their practices are not due to external 
oppression but because they become habits. The following excerpt from my migrant informant 
exemplifies this argument by stating that “namaz should be presided over by a real imam and the 
only real imams are the twelve imams”:  
“Well, the namaz prayer is not an issue; Ali himself performed namaz. Therefore, 
Alevis go to mosques to perform Friday and Bayram prayers. They perform both 
Friday and Bayram prayers for 2 rekats each, both in Bulgaria and Turkey. Also, 
you should know, the namaz for Ramadan Bayram is not namaz for fasting. It is 
written in the Quran too. Also, I should add, even when sofuluk was the most 
powerful, those sofus [pious Sunnis] were waiting for my grandfather to perform 
Friday namaz. In reality, this is the truth: Namaz should be performed in the 
presence of and just behind a real imam and the only real imams are the 
twelve imams [of Alevism].” Musahipli from Kardjali in Turkey 
 
Public performances of Sunni practices by Alevi Bulgarian Turks vary in terms of the 
type of practice (daily prayers, Bayram prayers or funerals), the degree of publicity and visibility 
(e.g. in the local mosque, city mosque, of the müftülük), the degree of Sunni awareness about 
Alevis’ presence and the roles assumed by Alevis (leader, participant or mere observer). In the 
rest of this section I discuss two cases of Alevi performance of and attendance at Sunni practices, 
which ultimately reveal and reinforce their Alevi identities. 
6.3.2 The Holy Birth Week 
The Holy Birth Week is a recently invented tradition among Sunnis to celebrate 
the birth of Muhammed. In Bulgaria the celebrations are organized by regional 
müftülüks who invite members of the mosque wakfs and the villagers to a theater 
to listen to presentations about Muhammed, hear religious songs and reciting of the 
Quran. I attended one of those ceremonies at one of my field sites. Apparently my 
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Alevi informants attended the Holy Birth Week ceremony as representatives of 
their village’s mosque commission, just like any other guest in the ceremony. They 
were known as Alevis by the events’ organizers and were in fact individually 
welcomed. During the ceremony, I noticed a great many of my Alevi and Sunni 
informants from the villages, with the most surprising group being from an Alevi 
village. They kindly invited me to a local restaurant after the event. I was not 
hoping for anything more than a lunch event, which was partially true with a 
difference: The top-rank Alevi religious leader asked for a bottle of vodka and shot 
glasses from the waitress. Then all at the table were silent, and baba started to pray 
over the bottle stating that they are celebrating the “Holy Birth of Muhammed” and 
divided the bottle among people, performed another prayer over the glasses, and 
distributed the shot glasses to the people, in a way strikingly similarly to how it is 
done during the cem ceremonies. I was stunned by their transforming a potentially 
secular lunch into an Alevi religious ritual [and in a way that is antithetical to 
Sunni Islam yet draws on the latter’s forms].  
6.3.3 Friday Prayer on Hıdrellez 
The most telling event for Alevi dissimulations is a Sunni prayer by Alevis at the 
mosque in an Alevi-only village. On an important Alevi holiday, I noticed Alevi 
males in the mosque garden. They saw me and invited me to the mosque room, 
which was decorated with Alevi markers, such as posters of Ali, his sons Huseyin 
and Hasan, the Holy Imams. After a long talk, the leader suggested performing 
Friday prayer, even though it was not the right time for it. For an untrained eye, the 
Alevis’ Friday prayer resembles the Sunni prayer; it is in a mosque, with the imam 
and worshippers, with prayer postures and Quranic verses in Arabic. Yet, in fact, 
this was not a Sunni prayer, but its imitation. The Alevis’ Friday prayer started 
with words praising God, Muhammed and Ali, indicating the idea of the Alevi 
trinity rather than Sunni unity. Then the “imam” recited the Quran in a melody 
resembling the melody used for Alevi religious poems. The most striking part was 
the incorporation of a Turkish prayer into the existing prayer, similar to Alevi 
ways as opposed to Sunni prayers, which are exclusively in Arabic. Moreover, the 
prayer in Turkish was responded to by the worshippers with the same word 
“Amen.” In Sunni Friday prayer, worshippers do not vocalize. This is just the 
opposite of the Alevi tradition of prayers: the religious leader constantly engages 
with the worshippers and worshippers respond by chanting “Allah Allah.” My 
Alevi informants were doing cross-cultural translation of Alevi “Allah Allah” into 
Sunni “Amen,” when normally Sunnis were supposed to be silent.  Yet, in fact, 
this was not a Sunni prayer; it was a prayer indicating what Alevis understand as 
Sunni Prayers. The several elements they did not pay attention to did not conceal 
but revealed the identity of the worshippers as Alevi. 
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If Alevis’ Holy Week celebrations and their Friday prayers are taken as isolated events, 
they look like cases of Alevis performing Sunni ways with an Alevi interpretation. Therefore 
they might have been seen as instances of syncretism. Yet, these cases should be considered in 
relation to the other religious practices performed by the same Alevi communities. Simply put, 
the Alevi groups involved in the seemingly syncretic Sunni namaz or Sunni Holy Birth Week 
celebrations do so only in public. Furthermore, they explicitly define Alevi cems as their central 
religious practice and t actively continue conducting weekly cems, “even under communism”. I 
see these cases as examples of dissimulation because I have noticed that their involvement of 
Sunni practices occurs only in public. That is to say the specified groups of Alevis do not 
conduct Sunni prayers in their homes and they clearly state that cems are the central religious 
practices in their view.     
Another feature that makes these cases examples of dissimulation is that they occur only 
in the presence of outsiders. Specifically, the first case indicates their dissimulations because 
they attended a public Sunni ritual, while immediately after it they re-created an alternative 
ceremony manifesting Alevi ways. The second case indicates their dissimulations by re-creating 
a Sunni ceremony in Alevi ways. Further, while both cases indicate how Alevi Bulgarian Turks 
perform seemingly Sunni ways, they do it either by emphasizing Alevi identity (in the parallel 
ceremony case) or by revealing Alevi identity (in their re-creation of the namaz case). In 
retrospect, I interpret both events as cases of dissimulation aimed at me, as the Sunni researcher 
present at the parallel celebration and re-created Sunni namaz.  
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6.4 MANIPULATING OTHERS’ SPACES:  
It is recognized in the literature that Alevis do not affiliate themselves with mosque, for a variety 
of reasons. Some Alevis believe that Ali was killed in a mosque during prayer while others see 
daily prayers as inventions to control the masses. To them the Quran does not state anything 
about the proper form, frequency of, or space and time for daily prayers (Türkdoğan 1995, Űzüm 
2006). Strikingly, I noticed what may be a unique trend among Alevi Bulgarian Turks in post-
socialist Bulgaria: Alevi Bulgarian Turks voluntarily built mosques in Alevi neighborhoods or 
villages, and voluntarily participate in mosque commissions in mixed settings.  
Coming from Turkey, I read this as a sign of forced Sunnification, since construction of 
Sunni mosques in Alevi neighborhoods is a method used historically for the Sunnification of 
Alevis, as I discussed in Chapter Four.  In fact, in Turkey, my Alevi Bulgarian Turkish 
informants still experience this situation. There are state-initiated Sunni mosques with Diyanet-
appointed imams in Alevi-only villages in Turkish Thrace and Yalova. In Bulgaria, Alevis also 
experienced the same pressure historically. Several elder Alevis mentioned how the only 
available education before socialism was the Quranic education in Sunni mosques, where prayers 
were forced, as I discussed in the previous section. Currently however, Alevis in Bulgaria do not 
feel forced to interact in Sunni spaces, but rather do so voluntarily. In building mosques in Alevi 
neighborhoods or actively participating in the commissions of existing Sunni mosques these 
Alevis are not manifesting their Sunnification, but rather are still practicing dissimulation. While 
not intended to provide immediate protection of the community, such practices provide access to 
advantages otherwise unavailable to the community.   
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6.4.1 Building Sunni Mosques 
One form of manipulation of Sunni spaces by Alevi Bulgarian Turks is to build Sunni mosques 
in Alevi neighborhoods. Building mosques allows Alevis to (re)gain access to income from the 
pious foundations’ territories, which had once belonged to Alevis but then became tied to Sunni 
müftülüks, and then were confiscated by the socialist state. In the 1990s a law was passed in 
Bulgaria which allowed religious communities to re-claim their territories and their properties 
through the court system. However, since only Sunni Müftülüks have the legal status of 
representing Islam in Bulgaria, Alevi Bulgarian Turks could not get these territories back without 
operating under the Sunni structures. The only solution left for Alevi Bulgarian Turks was to 
build mosques (see appendix for pictures), as they explain in the following words: 
“Originally the mosque was made by the Tatars in a closer village during 
Romanian rule. They forced our village to have a mosque; so we had a mosque 
built. The territories were tied to the mosque during the same period. Now we 
decided this [i.e. renovating the mosque in the village] because sometimes people 
come over, travel here to get some portion of the rent from the mosque territories. 
This is how and why they come. [Do you have to pray in the mosque?] No, not 
really, sometimes.” Razgrad 
 
“The mosque in the village owned lands, yet these lands were confiscated and 
transformed into cooperatives in the 1950s. The cooperatives were ended; but no 
change happened in the status of these lands until 1992. In 1992 these lands were 
given to the mosque. We could not take the benefit from these territories on our 
own, since we have müftülüks [in Bulgaria] and mosque waqfs are tied to 
müftülüks.” Razgrad 
 
As I discussed in Chapter Four, the academic literature clearly considers formation of 
Sunni mosques in Alevi villages as instances of state-initiated Sunnification (e.g.  amuroğlu 
1991, 1997). A common strategy used by Alevis in Razgrad, however, building mosques in 
Alevi neighborhoods, clearly does not indicate the Sunnification of these Alevis., who use these 
mosques for their own prayer purposes and also continue to conduct cem ceremonies. Instead, 
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these mosques indicate Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ dissimulations by appearing to be Sunnified, 
manipulating Sunni spaces in order to access the resources that formerly belonged to their 
community.  
6.4.2 Participating in Mosque Commissions 
Another form of Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ manipulation of Sunni spaces is participating in existing 
Sunni mosque commissions, as the following interview excerpts clearly show: 
“Lots of babas are working in the mosque commissions in the region. Therefore, 
they feel forced to attend namaz prayers and Friday prayers. They actually go to 
mosques for prayers on the grounds that they “do not want to remain apart from 
Sunnis.” Also, last time we collected donations around 300 levas for the mosque. 
Then, in the mosque commission meeting we said ‘look, this türbe is at the harem 
of the mosque [the word harem here stands for the inner courtyard of the Ottoman 
mosques].” Due to this conversation we managed to channel 80 leva for the 
maintenance of the mosque.  
 
“Right, Alevis are in the mosque commissions but there is no one in the mosques! 
Sunnis could come to mosques too; therefore there will be unity. By being in the 
mosque commissions we [Alevis] get a chance to know about what is happening.” 
 
As a common strategy in Kardjali, the involvement of Alevis in mosque commissions is a 
strategy of manipulating the already existing Sunni spaces to access information about 
developments in their mixed Sunni-Alevi villages, as well as to channel resources for the Alevi 
türbes. Otherwise, these Alevis continue to follow Alevi practices, and in fact most of them hold 
the position of baba in cems.  
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6.5  SLOGANS FOR INTER-GROUP RELATIONS  
My Alevi Bulgarian Turkish informants often cited some dictums in explaining phenomena 
during the interviews. Some of these dictums are religious in character, while others encapsulate 
Alevis’ accounts of their relations with the main majority groups. In this section, I examine 
frequently used sayings regarding Sunnis, Christians, socialist Bulgarians and secular Turks. I 
see these slogans as strategies that Alevi Bulgarian Turk use to emphasize certain rather 
superficial resemblances with various majorities, while hiding other aspects of their own beliefs. 
In this sense, they are examples of Alevis’ dissimulations because they are instances of 
controlling their own visibilities and invisibilities for various reasons. I should note that 
historically Alevis have made the decisions about their desired degree of visibilities and 
invisibilities collectively and in the privacy of the cem communities. This allowed Alevis to 
escape from persecution, avoid discrimination and even seek advancements otherwise 
unavailable for them.   
6.5.1 “Follow/watch out the Şeriat, Hide the Tarikat” in Relation to Sunnis 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks often use the dictum Seriati Izle, Tarikati Gizle (“Follow/watch out for 
the Şeriat, Hide the Tarikat”) to explain their relations with Sunnis and their practices in Sunni 
spaces, such as the cases of building mosques and attending Sunni rituals or spaces. The saying 
has double meaning, both appearing to follow and be alert to Sunnis while ultimately suggesting 
hiding Alevi identity. Therefore, it is a call for Alevis for dissimulation in relation to Sunnis. 
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6.5.1.1 Follow the Seriat… 
This saying has two interpretations among Alevi Bulgarian Turks. On the one hand, some Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks see Şeriat as the first door necessary to reach the other doors: namely Tarikat, 
Mağrifet, Şeriat and Hakikat. To them, Seriat and Tarikat do not exclude each other.  Şeriat is a 
step to be left behind to reach the Tarikat stage: 
“We enter into the Path thinking that Şeriat is also on our way. Yet, it is not 
necessary to follow the ways of Şeriat. The Prophet is also an Alevi; he has the 
blood link and we also have blood link. Yet, only a few people understand this 
and think deeper…Both Şeriat and Tarikat are ours.  The reason why the Prophet 
put Şeriat at the forefront is to unite people in the belief in God.” Babai from 
Razgrad (emphasis added) 
 
“Follow the Şeriat,” as we say. This does not mean there is no Şeriat. That is to 
say, namaz is not against our path. Yet, there is also Tarikat.” Babai from Kardjali 
in Turkey (emphasis added) 
 
As is clear in these excerpts, my informants do not exclude Şeriat, but they subordinate it 
to the Tarikat stage. It is no surprise that they interpret the saying as “Follow the Şeriat and hide 
the Tarikat ” they do not hesitate to appear to follow Şeriat in public. For instance, the first 
informant initiated the building of an Alevi mosque in his neighborhood and the second 
informant apparently performs Sunni namaz if needed.  
6.5.1.2 Be Wary of Şeriat …. 
On the other hand, while other Alevi Bulgarian Turks do not deny the compatibility of the Şeriat 
and Tarikat doors in principle (“we should not separate them” as they say rather normatively), 
they note a rather antagonistic relationship between proponents of the Seriat and Tarikat doors 
(i.e. Sunnis and Alevis), as the following example shows: 
“We should not separate them [Şeriat and Tarikat]. Ah, but they [Sunnis] try to 
drag us towards Muhammed’s side  it is given. They try to impose Şeriat so that 
one will go to mosques and cite Şeriat prayers.” Bektaşi, Razgrad  
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The Şeriat door ultimately gets reduced to its strategic meaning among some Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks, as the following example shows:  
“We keep both Şeriat and Tarikat doors. As a matter of fact, we unlock doors with 
the key of Seriat door. Thus, supporting the müftülük is not a big problem for us” 
Bektaşi, Kardjali (emphasis added) 
 
As a clear indicator of dissimulation, this informant was explaining to me why Alevi 
organizations preferred to support the müftülük even when it represents only Sunni Islam and is 
not particularly friendly towards the local Alevi organizations. My informant is deeply aware of 
the power asymmetry between müftülüks and Alevi organizations in his region. In these 
circumstances, Alevis do not seem to have any other option but to show support for Sunni 
authorities for strategic purposes, with the hope these will open doors for various levels of 
advancements otherwise impossible for local Alevis.  
6.5.2 “Our Difference is thinner than an Onion Skin” in relation to Bulgarians  
Alevi Bulgarian Turks use the saying “our difference is thinner than an onion skin” in referring 
to Orthodox Christian Bulgarians. They draw upon several fields of resemblance, ranging from 
their social life to religious practices. However, while they highlight certain resemblances 
between Alevis and Bulgarians, they do so on a rather superficial level, adhering to stereotypes 
about both groups. Ultimately they hide other aspects of Alevism which are incongruent with 
Orthodox Christian Bulgarians. I see this situation as another manifestation of Alevis’ 
dissimulations, which are about the strategic concealments of Alevis and revelations about 
themselves, often for protection not from the Bulgarian majority but from hostile Sunni 
neighbors. Simply put, Alevis dissimulate towards Bulgarians for protection from Sunni Turks.   
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Alevi Bulgarian Turks most often mention several specific practices in common with 
those of Orthodox Christian Bulgarians. For instance, an informant from Kardjali states that 
“Bulgarians see resemblance between themselves and us, since we both drank raki and light 
candles.” Another one from Razgrad states that “we are very democratic. Women and men 
gather together. This is why Bulgarians see us as closer to themselves.” Alevis particularly 
appreciate the Orthodox Christian religious leaders’ recognition of Alevi ways:  
One day we gathered with [Christian] priests and [Sunni] imams. The priests told 
me that “you know it [we recognize Ali] ” yet we could not convince the imams. 
Only Christians say Ilia [Bulgarian for the prophet Elija], recognizing Ali. They 
do not recognize Ebubekir, Omer or Osman! [Three Sunni caliphs held this 
position before Ali, wrongly according to Alevis].Kardjali  
 
However, Alevi Bulgarian Turks approach outsiders’ over-reading these resemblances 
sarcastically, since they clearly define themselves within Islam. They were targeted by Bulgarian 
authorities who had sought to find evidence to support the official thesis that Alevis were 
converted Bulgarians, which I discussed in Chapter Four. Examples of such sarcasm are as 
follows: 
 “I visited the Demir Baba [Türbe] one day with foreigners. As you know, when 
you enter into the türbe, we should conduct niyaz. I did niyaz at the threshold, first 
to the ground, then to the top, right side and left side of the türbe door. 
Supposedly I was making the sign of Christian cross on myself! They interpreted 
it as such! Ha ha ha!” Kardjali to Firuzkoy  
 
 “They say “Alevis are [separated] from us” while in reality Bulgarians are 
descended from Alevis. They are children of Khan Atilla…Bulgarians also 
conduct many of our ways. Except that they do not have babas. Otherwise they 
have musahips; they celebrate Hıdrellez, Kırklar, Kızıl Yumurta; they also have 
Imam Ali.” Razgrad  
 
Alevis have drawn upon resemblances to Orthodox Christian Bulgarians in contrast to 
two groups: periodically hostile political regimes in Bulgaria and, more interestingly, against 
hostile Sunni Turks, as the following excerpts indicate:  
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During the socialist period, we Alevis did not suffer much. In fact I myself 
became a party officer. We managed to explain ourselves to socialists. We took 
refuge under the roof of Bulgarians. We said to them that “our difference from 
Bulgarians is as thin as an onion skin,” and that “we celebrate the same religious 
days, for instance egg-day [Easter], Veliki Den” and that “we also light candles.” 
This was on purpose. However, under socialism there were Alevis who 
surrendered to Bulgarians such as Karahasan.  Corlu  (emphasis added)  
 
One night Sunnis in the village wanted to break into here [the baba’s house where 
Alevis conduct cem ceremonies at the evening]. They visited the Kmet [the Head 
of the Municipality] and said “we should make these Kızılbaş disappear, since 
they drink raki.” It is said that the Kmet, who was a Bulgarian, smiled, turned 
around towards his closet and opened its door to show them various raki. He 
added, “I also have various raki.” This is how they [Bulgarians] saved us  they 
treated us closer. In fact, they believe in us and our way [Alevism] Kardjali 
 
The first excerpt clearly shows how Alevis had to emphasize resemblance relations with 
Orthodox Christians, as a form of dissimulation towards Bulgarians. They did this to protect 
themselves against local Sunnis. The second excerpt shows a successful result of such 
dissimulation. 
6.5.3  Dissimulation of secular identity in relation to socialist Bulgarians 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks had a complicated relationship with the socialist regime. As just noted, 
drawing superficial parallels between Orthodox Christianity and Alevism sometimes seems to 
have worked during socialism. Yet at other times, they drew resemblances between socialist and 
Alevi ideals. Many Alevi leaders worked as active members of the Bulgarian Communist Party 
(BCP), which seemed to contribute to this vision of “the common ideals.”    
Some Alevi Bulgarian Turkish babas in BCP truly believed in the “common ideals” 
argument, while others were almost forced into being members of the party.   
I worked in BCP. Therefore, they [communists] did not put much pressure on us. 
How do I reconcile communism and Alevism? Well, both communism and 
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Bektaşism defend the same ideal. First, the members of the society should be 
equal. Second, God is not in the sky. Also, in both communism and Bektaşism 
people are expected to work together and eat together.   
 
They made me a secretary for the party [BCP]. Yet, I did not harm anyone. Once 
they confiscated the books for mevlüt [a poem about the birth of Muhammed, 
treated as sacred among Sunnis in Bulgaria] with the intention to burn them. I did 
not let them touch the books.  During socialism I served at the tekke in Kardjali! 
At the same time socialists granted me medals for my services in the BCP.   
 
Confirming these babas’ accounts, I found out that Alevi babas in the BCP are still 
respected within their own communities, unlike the religious leaders of other groups who served 
in BCP.  
Various Alevi groups experienced the socialist period differently, depending on particular 
political leaders’ attitudes and on specific majority-minority configurations. In mixed settings 
where Alevis did not have any political power, they faced difficulties in pursuing some religious 
rituals: 
 “During communism they interfered in the gathering of cems. The Party would 
appoint prominent residents of the village into important positions. These people 
would reveal the Alevis practices to the party officials as they knew that we were 
Alevis and we conducted cems. The interference was at this scale” Razgrad 
 
“It was difficult to be in a mixed town. Still, even under communism we were not 
under great pressure. In the Alevi dominant neighborhoods, we remained 
unrecognized by outsiders. In the mixed neighborhoods, Sunnis knew who was 
Alevi and who was not; but they were clueless about what Alevis do. [Thus, they 
could not do much to influence Alevi rituals.] Sunnis were clueless but they had 
negative perceptions of Alevis. It is because they had been indoctrinated by their 
grandparents against Alevis. Today, Alevis still keep their ritual places hidden 
from their sight. For instance, in this town, they rent the place for cem after 10:00 
pm. In this way, Sunnis do not know what Alevis are doing.” Kardjali  
 
Many other Alevis stress that the socialist period was good for Alevism in Bulgaria. 
Alevis were targeted by socialists but the pressures from the socialist regime tied the members of 
the Alevi community closer together: 
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“Whenever Alevism was under the strictest pressures, it turned out to be the best 
for Alevis. The youth were attending cems, involved in the conversation cems. 
The worst period of Alevism is, in fact, today. Whatever the pressures were 
during the communism period, there were no interruptions in the cems. It was 
always crowded.” Kardjali 
 
Even under socialism the cems were followed. In the mixed villages, the Sunnis 
complained about Alevis. The communists sent Nacalnik [local police] to cems to 
double check. They came in and did not find anything wrong; candles were 
lighted, people were eating and drinking. We said it was a dinner, a banquet. Baba 
offered them food and drinks, they drank and ate and then left us alone.   
 
There were troubles in the 1980s. In that period, even ritual sacrifices were 
prohibited. Still, people managed to gather in here secretly. We managed to 
continue the path. Alevis in Dulovo also did the same. We sometimes tricked 
them: we said the cem is at 7 pm when we actually performed it at 9 pm. It was 
very, very difficult for the Alevis living in mixed villages.    
 
6.5.4 “We are all Turkish” to secular Turks.  
Alevi Bulgarian Turks often utilize the slogan “we are all Turkish.” At first glance the saying is 
not surprising and even self-evident, given that their native language is Turkish, their prayers are 
in Turkish, and they trace their own heritage to Turkish groups from Central Asia, from 
Khurasan and Anatolia. As a matter of fact many Alevi informants state that both Alevis and 
Sunnis have suffered in Bulgaria because they are Turkish, as the following excerpt shows:  
“This village was once Bulgaria, then Romania and then Bulgaria. There is no 
difference for Alevis under Bulgaria or under Romania. Bulgarians put pressure 
on Alevis just because they are Turks. They look at your name when you petition 
for something [whether it is a Turkish name or not]. Otherwise, it is not related to 
religion anymore. You can go to mosque, you can go to cem. But if you are 
looking for a job, we have neither lawyers nor army officers. Turkishness is all 
the same. In Anatolia, all were migrants from Khurasan, all were one type. Later, 
with Yavuz Sultan Selim a separation occurred [within Turks].”   
 
Alevi Turks claim of Turkish identity does not count as dissimulation per se. In fact 
almost all of my Alevi Bulgarian Turkish informants identified themselves as both Alevi and 
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Turkish. It is possible to see individual Alevis who prioritize their own Turkish identity over 
their Alevi identity, as indicated by the above quotation from my interviews. Within the context 
of my analysis and this section I did not count this group of Alevis as dissimulating at all, since 
Surely some members of double minorities like Alevi Bulgarian Turks can be expected to have 
nested identities. 
In my analysis, I focus on another configuration among minorities with nested identities: 
some Alevi Bulgarian Turks may announce their Alevi identity as primary and their Turkish 
identity as secondary, even though both are sincere felt as components of their identity. These 
Alevis may utilize their self-identified secondary identity, Turkish, to blanket their primary Alevi 
identity when the latter is used by outsiders to exclude and discriminate against Alevis. This 
configuration indicates some Alevis’ strategic use of their Turkish identity when they identify 
with Turkishness, yet in secondary level, after the Alevi identity. In the rest of this section I 
discuss this configuraton as dissimulation.  
Some Alevi Bulgarian Turks’s strategic emphasize of their ethnic Turkish identity is 
similar to other cases of dissimulaton.  They may publicly encourage a secular Turkish ethnic 
identity which causes a public disassociation from Alevism, while in fact they continue to follow 
Alevi ways privately. Concealing Alevism under a generic Turkish ethnic identity may grant 
them protection and even access to favors which are only available to Turkish Sunnis.  In the rest 
of this section I examine specific cases of Alevis’ dissimulations by emphasizing secular Turkish 
identity. 
6.5.4.1 How many Bulgarian Turks are Alevis? 
One question I was curious about is the number of Alevi Bulgarian Turks in 
Bulgaria and Turkey. Neither state has disclosed any statistical data about this 
population. Turkey does not seem to have such data, probably due to the only 
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very recent publicity about Alevism. The situation is the same for Bulgaria even 
though studies on Alevis date back to the interwar period. I could not find any 
explanation for the lack of such data until the very end of my fieldwork. The lack 
of data did not mean lack of interest on the part of the states.  For instance, in the 
1992 census, Bulgaria’s attempt to know the number of Alevis had failed. This 
failure was due to the census categories on Islam: Muslim citizens were given the 
options of Sunni and Shia, but Shia was an alien category to many Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks. Even today many Alevis joke about how they did not know back 
then what Shia was. The census had some result; yet its accuracy was dubious, 
given that several “Shia” groups “emerged” in unexpected parts of Bulgaria.  
 
Later on, during my fieldwork in Kardjali, things become much more transparent 
to me. In the 2000s the Bulgarian state had commissioned a census at the local 
municipality using the categories of “Sunni” and “Alevi.” Municipality officials 
declined on the grounds that “such classification would lead to division within the 
Turkish community” as one of my informants states. The striking fact is that these 
municipal officials were not merely Sunnis but also Alevis! 
 
Alevi Turks in the migrant and minority organization are often underrepresented. 
Mentioning the existence of Alevis Bulgarian Turks is seen as dividing the community. This 
policy led to the invisibility of Alevis and ultimately led to affiliation of the Bulgarian Turkish 
identity with Sunni Islam. In such circumstances it is surprising to see that Alevi municipality 
leaders refused to be classified as Alevis. Their rejection hints at their dissimulation under the 
generic Turkish identity in Kardjali, where Turkish identity is dominant.  
The self-reinforced invisibility of Alevi Bulgarian Turks hints at another dissimulation 
strategy. The ambiguity surrounding the size of the Alevi population makes the situation 
unpredictable and causes anxiety for Sunni Turks. Some of my informants told me that Alevis 
uttered statements like “you know how many we are!” to deter Sunni Turks from supporting 
policies that were potentially in conflict with Alevis’ interests. Alevis are thought to be around 
10 percent of the Turkish population in Bulgaria, though the ambiguity about the exact number 
grants them some space to maneuver in their relationship to the Sunnis. Therefore Alevis have 
preferred to remain invisible under the Turkish minority in demographic terms.  
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6.5.4.2 Not an Alevi religious leader but a former Belene prisoner  
In Bulgaria during the 1990s, Alevis become more visible following the emergence of 
Alevi NGOs such as the Cem Wakf in Razgrad, the Dulovo Association in Silistre and the 
Southern Bulgaria Cem Association in Kardjali. Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ visibilities were not 
unproblematic in any of these places. In Kardjali, however, it was particularly tense for Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks. I was told that even a Turkish Sunni parliamentarian had said that he would be 
the first to burn down an Alevi NGO if it would be established in Kardjali. Yet Alevis managed 
to open the organization with support from the leader of the Turkish party. Therefore, 
interference from above resolved the immediate issue, although the tension seems to remain until 
the present day. In the present context, where Alevis in Kardjali are granted a degree of 
visibility, they dissimulate emphasizing their Turkishness as the common ground with Sunnis yet 
at the cost of silencing their Alevi identity. One instance of such dissimulation became explicit to 
me when I was conducting my fieldwork.  
In the summer of 2010 the Müftülük crisis reached its peak when the Sunni Grand 
Müftü of Bulgaria was removed from his position by a court decision. As a result, 
elected regional muftis were removed from their offices by force and replaced by 
a last-minute team from the infamous socialist period mufti. Sunni Muslims 
initiated peaceful protests all over Bulgaria, including Razgrad and Kardjali. Just 
a few weeks before the actual replacement of the müftü in Kardjali, the rumors 
started. At a local Turkish newspaper I noticed one interesting piece of news, 
concerning the visit of the members of the Southern Bulgarian Alevi 
organizations to the regional müftülük in support of the elected müftü.  
 
I was surprised by the visit and the support the organization gave to the Sunni müftülüks. 
Alevis in Kardjali seemed to me to be the most abject group of Alevis in all Bulgaria. I visited 
the müftü as well as the visitors to understand their perceptions of the visit and the event. The 
regional müftü did not look pleased when I asked what he thought of the visit and support from 
Alevis. Instead he started to explain the historical roots of sectarianism in Islam, arguing that the 
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distinction between groups is groundless and that Alevism is based on a misunderstanding, since 
Ali and Muhammed were blood relatives and in-laws. He added that he particularly respected the 
persona of one of the visitors. This person was religious leader in Kardjali yet the regional müftü 
portrayed him as a former Belene prisoner
6
 who resisted the name-change process and remained 
in the same prison cell with the current leader of the Turkish party. The regional müftü 
completely ignored the other visitor, who was the sole leader of the only Alevi organization in 
Kardjali. He also silenced the Alevi identity of the Alevi Baba by portraying him in terms of his 
secular Turkish ethnic identity.  
Most strikingly, Alevi visitors were not interpreting their visit much differently from the 
regional müftü. When I had a chance to talk with Alevi visitors about their visit, they explained 
they went to “publicly support Turkishness in the region,” even though the Alevi organization’s 
leader was particularly disturbed by the müftü’s indifference to the organization and the Alevi 
community behind it. My Alevi informants were taking on the invisibility which the müftülük 
imposed upon Alevis. 
6.5.4.3 Not an Alevi türbe but a monument of Turkishness 
One of the first findings during my preliminary research in Bulgaria for the NSF 
REG project was about the restoration of an old Alevi site in post-socialist 
Bulgaria. The site was located in an area between Sunni and Alevi populated 
villages in Kardjali. The site was a complex made up of türbes, a meydanevi, an 
asevi and a mosque. The mosque was built to repress Alevis in the region during 
late Ottoman rule. Alevis trained in the medrese complex were replaced by Sunni 
scholars from the Ottoman center.  The site was known as a very important 
center for Bektaşism in Southern Bulgaria; yet the Bektaşi and Babai 
communities did not have sufficient resources for restoring it. The process which 
                                                 
6
 Belene is a small town in north Bulgaria and it known for an infamous prison for political prisoners during 
socialism. It holds an important symbolic significance among Bulgarian Turks; in 1985-1989 Bulgarian Turks who 
resisted to the name change process were not only imprisoned but also faced various forms of torture by the 
socialist officials in the Belene prison.   
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led to the restoration of the site was interesting. The funding was sought by an 
Alevi Bulgarian Turkish businessman with connections to Turkey, and he 
presented the site as a landmark of Turkishness in Kardjali to a local Sunni 
Turkish businessman who was from and resided in Turkey. The Sunni 
businessman from Turkey agreed to finance the site, but only on the condition 
that both the türbe and the mosque would be restored.  
 
The portrayal of the site by Alevi Bulgarian Turks as a landmark of Turkishness helped 
the restoration of the place by utilizing the financial support of a local Sunni Turkish 
businessman. Needless to say, the restoration of the mosque was a condition for the restoration 
of the Alevi site. Also, a striking fact was that Alevi Bulgarian Turks did not reveal that the 
mosque was a later development on this site, just above the çilehane (an area for withdrawal, 
suffering and introspection for Alevi Dervişhes). The mosque was built for forced Sunnification 
of Alevis there and in the surrounding villages. They managed to portray it a landmark of 
Turkishness rather than a landmark of oppression by the strictly-Sunni regime. Overall, this case 
shows how Alevi Bulgarian Turks may dissimulate by emphasizing their Turkish ethnic identity. 
They do this not to avoid discrimination but to seek various advantages for the community in 
relation to local Turks from Turkey.   
6.5.4.4 Emphasizing Turkishness in Resettlement Context  
A town near Bursa is divided between a complex for recent Bulgarian Turkish 
migrants and a settlement of Alevi Kurds from Eastern Turkey. The town’s lower 
part has an old mosque and a recently formed cemevi for the Kurdish Alevi 
migrants, while its higher part has a mosque. The recent history of the town 
clearly indicates tension between Kurdish and Bulgarian Turkish migrants, which 
caused intense polarization and politicization during the municipal elections and 
even violent fights.  
 
The site was extremely accommodating to me at the very beginning of my 
fieldwork; however, it turned out to be the most difficult place to study the 
situation for Alevi migrants within the Bulgarian Turkish community. The 
migrant complex was directed towards people who migrated in 1989, a group of 
migrants made up of Sunni Bulgarian Turks and a few Alevi families. Alevi 
families were known to Sunni migrants who came from nearby villages; yet even 
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though they know these families, they were not willing to put me into contact 
with them so as “not to offend them.” When I convinced one of my Sunni 
informants to introduce me, he introduced me to an Alevi family who had a small 
shop in the migrant complex. We visited the shop together and I had promised not 
to mention Alevism to the family unless they mentioned it. We started talking 
about migration and the village they migrated to and at one point the conversation 
come to the famous Alevi türbe located next to their village in Razgrad. Suddenly 
the lady’s face changed and expressed discomfort. She started to talk about the 
türbe as a site for very recent ceremonies for “1989 martyrs.” She preferred to 
portray the Alevi türbe as a site for secular-political ceremonies rather than an 
Alevi türbe, indicating her dissimulation by prioritizing Turkish identity while 
talking to me.  
 
This case shows the two different forms of dissimulations which I discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter. I argued that Alevi Bulgarian Turks may hide the components of their 
Alevi identity if they are already known as Alevis, and they may try hiding their Alevi identity 
completely if they are not known to the outsiders. The above case exemplifies both cases of 
dissimulation of my Alevi female informant. First, she was already well-known to my Sunni 
informant, though the latter was clueless about to what extent and how she practices Alevism. 
Second, she emphasized her Turkish identity to me to hide her Alevi identity from me, the 
Turkish researcher with Sunni heritage, from Turkey. 
During my quest to reach a few Alevi Bulgarian Turkish families, I ended up connecting 
with the Kurdish Alevi migrants’ cemevis, hoping that they were being contacted by Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks. It was striking to me to note that the personnel from the cemevi including the 
administrator were unaware that some Bulgarian Turks may be Alevis. They knew a few Balkan 
Alevis who were attending to the cemevi from another neighborhood of Bursa, and I had a 
chance to contact them with the hope of reaching Alevi Bulgarian Turks. This attempt also failed 
when my contacts turned out to be Alevi Turks from Greece. Interestingly, I discovered that 
many Alevi Turkish migrants from Greece continue to follow their path as separate cem 
communities in their neighborhoods, or they attend existing cemevis. On the other hand, Alevi 
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Turks from Bulgaria were unable to form their own cems due to lack both of babas and of 
sufficient followers. Yet they also refused to attend the existing cemevis of the local Alevis. 
Finally, I had a chance to reach a few Alevis in different neighborhoods. They gave some clear 
reasons for not attending the existing cemevis in Bursa: 
 “Right, there are cemevis in Bursa. Yet we do not go to them. There are Kurds in 
those cemevis. The cemevis here are sites where Kurds gather. I have not visited 
them even once. I have not even considered it as an option. Why? They are doing 
stuff wrong.  We came here to defend our Turkishness; they are looking for 
something else.. Also their traditions are different, their worship is different. They 
also have musahips but they can change their musahips throughout their lifetime. 
We have musahips once and till we die.” Ruse to Bursa 
 
As this excerpt indicates, Alevi migrants from Bulgaria feel they are at a crossroads 
between choosing either Turkishness or Alevi identity, in migrant settings marked by political 
polarization. They voluntarily silence their Alevi identity to form an alliance with the Sunni 
Bulgarian Turkish migrants.  
Alevi migrants in Bursa often prioritize their Turkish identity over their Alevi identity. In 
old migrant neighborhoods, where they face elder Sunni migrants and local Sunnis, Alevi 
migrants prioritize their Turkishness and thus resolve the “migrant versus local” tension, in a 
situation in which the local Turks mainly stigmatize the migrants by calling them “Bulgarians.” 
In these places Alevi migrants manage to hide their Alevi identity from the local Sunnis. Sunni 
Bulgarian Turks support the Alevi Bulgarian Turks by hiding who is Alevi from the local Turks, 
thus bridging the division that exists among Turks within Bulgaria because in Turkey, both 
groups are stigmatized as Bulgarians rather than real Turks.  
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6.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I examined Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ dissimulations by focusing on their narratives 
and practices, which publicly indicate their distancing themselves from the Alevi ideal-type 
while they privately continue adhering to it.  I began by discussing Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ 
notions of secrecy and of the Alevi secret. I argued that the Alevi secret is a component of 
dissimulation and that the Alevis’ particular notion of secrecy is symptomatic of their 
dissimulations: Alevis do an “in-your-face-disguise” which emphasizes control over information 
about the group.  It is a strategy based on ambiguity; Alevis disguise information by revealing a 
portion of it, and therefore control their visibilities and invisibilities. This ambiguity creates a 
space for maneuver for Alevis in their relations with local outsiders: they can to pretend to be a 
part of the majority if that is required, or they can manifest a distinct minority identity if that is 
possible.  
The rest of the chapter analyzes cases of dissimulation. In the first section, I examined 
Alevis’ linguistic dissimulations by using a set of code words for Alevi beliefs and practices in 
the presence of outsiders. I noted that their specific usage of the ordinary words often remains 
unnoticed by non-Alevis, while Alevis can themselves decipher their intended meanings. In this 
way, Alevis appear as a part of the majority in the presence of outsiders while they state their 
Alevi identity to insiders. I focused on Alevis’ dissimulations in conducting Sunni religious 
practices with a focus on my Alevi informants’ accounts of performing Sunni namaz, and then 
drew on on my participant observation of events, such as Alevis performing Sunni Friday prayer 
and Alevis attending müftülük -initiated Holy Birth Week. I claim that while they may be 
speaking a Sunni prayer, how they do so reveals their very Alevi identity. In the third section, I 
examined Alevis’ spatial arrangements, such as creating Sunni mosques in Alevi neighborhoods 
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in order to gain access to waqf territories, and membership on Sunni mosque committees in 
mixed villages in order to have information about developments in the village and to support the 
Alevi türbes next to the mosque.  
Finally, I discussed some sayings common among Alevi Bulgarian Turks. I argued that 
these slogans encapsulate Alevis’ accounts of their relations with the main majority groups. I 
argue that they acted like Sunnis with Sunnis while drawing on resemblances between 
Bulgarians and themselves in their interactions with the national majority in Bulgaria; however,, 
they prioritized Turkishness over religious identity in relation to secular Turks and drew upon the 
sense of equality that is present in both socialism and Alevism. They did all of this in various 
historical contexts, in order to survive persecution and to freely practice their religion, and to 
protecting their sites, among other reasons. I argue that this strategy of highlighting certain 
superficial resemblances with the majorities while hiding other aspects of their beliefs is 
dissimulation, since their historical survival has become possible by controlling the visibility of 
the community.  
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7.0  DISSIMILATION AND ASSIMILATION 
Scholarly literature generally portrays dissimilation and assimilation as antithetical conditions for 
minority groups. Accordingly, dissimilation means that minority groups maintain their salience 
and assimilation means the dissolution of a minority’s identity (Yinger 1981, Rumbout 2005). 
Several studies have also questioned the assumption that a lineal relation exists between 
dissimulation and assimilation, claiming that there are different trajectories and rhythms of 
assimilation (Banton 1983) and dissimilation (Brubaker 2001). These works are limited because 
they focus on social contexts in the USA, France and Germany and do not help explain the 
situation for minorities in divided societies, or those outside of western Europe or the USA, such 
as settlement areas of Alevi Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria and Turkey.  
In severely divided societies, I argue, dissimilation and assimilation are both antithetical 
and lineal conditions. In these societies a minority’s dissimilation is often interpreted as their 
resistance to assimilating into “the nation.” This situation may even provoke violent measures for 
their forced assimilation, such as the name change process that was implemented against Turkish 
Muslims in Bulgaria in 1984-89. Further, while the existing literature considers assimilation and 
dissimulation as static (though sometimes “reversible”) conditions (Yinger 1981), assimilation 
and dissimilation may be strategic, collective and less than permanent ways of being for some 
groups. This is especially true for those double minorities which are endogamous in principle 
and which prioritize members’ heritage identities over the individuals members’ actual religious 
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practices.  Members of such double minorities might adjust to the prevailing circumstances by 
strategic dissimilation in an environment of broadened possibilities for expression, and by 
strategic assimilation one of increased constraints. This chapter focusses on Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks’ strategic assimilations and dissimilations in Bulgaria and Turkey. By “strategic” I mean 
their conscious, calculated and collectively decided and executed plans. In the Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks’ case, these plans are not to obtain something, such as a particular benefit, 
opportunistically or instrumentally, but rather to avoid negative actions such as persecution, 
social-political-legal exclusion and severe discrimination due to their Alevi identity.  
It is necessary to emphasize that the terms dissimulation and assimilation ultimately are 
ways to name the conditions of a minority in relation to the wider society in which they live, and 
usually it is dominant actors in this wider societ as well as scholars, who label the actions of 
minorities as assimilation or dissimilation. In this respect, the terms dissimilation and 
assimilation are externally imposed upon minorities by outsiders and thus signal how a minority 
group appears in the eyes of outsiders. However, minority members may have self-perceptions 
about their group’s situation that are different from the externally-imposed “dissimilation” or 
“assimilation” labels.  
I see both dissimilation and assimilation as strategic collective acts, since they appear to 
be planned, calculated and decided collectively. Alevi Bulgarian Turks seem to decide whether 
they will follow the Alevi ways in public (i.e. dissimilate) or quit following Alevi ways by 
gathering in cems collectively, under changing political and social circumstances such as after 
mass migrations. However, strategic dissimilation is more visible on the collective level while 
strategic assimilation can be identified mainly on the level of individuals. For this reason, my 
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empirical evidence for strategic dissimilation comes from cases involving collectivities acting 
visibly as such, while those for strategic assimilation come from cases involving individuals.     
As the situation of Alevi Bulgarian Turks reveals, a minority may develop one 
appearance in relating to outsiders in public, while pursuing another way of being within the 
privacy of their own group. This collective privacy among Alevis creates the same effect as 
“cultural intimacy” in terms of “assur[ing a] common sociality” as Michael Herzfeld (2005: 3) 
puts it; but the intimate aspect of the group is kept hidden from outsiders due to not 
“embarrassment” but rather for self-protection. In Chapter Six, I discussed Alevis’ development 
of different public and private collectivities within the context of their dissimulations, but this is 
not the whole story. During my fieldwork, I was faced with the fact that even Alevis who appear 
to be assimilating defined themselves as heritage Alevis (Alevi orandasi, meaning one with Alevi 
parents), and are seen as such by other Alevis. This was true even for those not initiated into the 
Alevi Path, who do not attend any cem community and who practice Sunni Islam. 
We thus need to consider a potential distinction between public and private in assessing 
minorities’ dissimilations and assimilations, as well as dissimulations. I earlier saw dissimulation 
in the narratives and practices that Alevi Bulgarian Turks use to publicly distance themselves 
from an ideal-type Alevism and approximate another groups’ ideal type,,while privately 
continuing to adhere to Alevi ways. In this chapter I focus instead on dissimilation and 
assimilation. I see dissimilation in those Alevi narratives and practices which both publicly and 
privately indicate adherence to Alevism. I see assimilation in Alevi narratives and collective 
practices which both publicly and privately indicate adherence to ideal-types of other groups. Yet 
we must recall that many of these same Alevis individually continue to define themselves as of 
Alevi heritage.    
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Moreover, I argue that Alevis’ pursuit of any of these strategies is not random. Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks’ collective strategies are conditioned by the varying forms of marginalization 
they experience, including the varied demographic compositions of their local settings as well as 
the different social, political and economic configurations that occur locally and at the national 
level. For instance, during my recent fieldwork I noticed examples of dissimilation (the public 
and private articulation and manifestation of Alevi ways) more frequently in Razgrad, where the 
competition between Sunni Turks and Orthodox Christian Bulgarians has created maneuvering 
space for Alevis. On the other hand, assimilation (where Alevis publically and privately display 
Sunni ways) was more frequent in Bursa, where there seems to be no other option for the few 
Alevis who live there, since there are few followers and no religious leader. Bursa was also 
visibly Sunni-dominant and a site where there was historically a lot of tension between migrants 
and the local population.   This chapter examines the narratives and practices that Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks use publicly as dissimilation and then those which appear to be examples of 
assimilation.  
7.1 DISSIMILATION 
Dissimilation is a strategy groups use to distinguish themselves from another group, or to 
emphasize their separate identity and increase their visibility.Some segments of Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks can dissimilate as a collective strategy by publicly promoting the distinct identity of their 
group when relating to outsiders. Alevi dissimilations are evident in attempts to make secular 
and even religious Alevi group identity visible, the recent formation of local Alevi NGOs in 
Razgrad and Kardjali being a case in point.  
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Absolute dissimilation has not been achieved, due to the persistence of the structural 
double minority status of Alevis within the Bulgarian Turkish community. Some Alevis’ 
dissimilations have caused their public visibility, which helped them in maintaining inter-group 
borders and even pursuing for collective advancement as a recognized group in society. 
However, this is not an instrumentalist use of identity in the sense that Abner Cohen uses 
regarding Hausa in Yoruba. Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ dissimilation means activation in public of 
their religious identity, which was already active in private (in the presence of insiders). Further, 
some Alevi Bulgarian Turks utilize dissimilation not to maintain a powerful position in the 
society (like the Hausa) but rather to avoid further marginalization, persecution and political and 
social discrimination. 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks who can utilize dissimilation effectively are usually those with a 
degree of visibility already established, transforming and increasing their existing visibilities. In 
this respect they are different from dissimulating Alevis, who aim to transform existing 
visibilities into invisibility. For instance, both Razgrad and Kardjali Alevis have a certain amount 
of visibility on the local level, given that Alevi and Sunni villages are clearly known to residents 
of these areas. Yet, in the present day Alevis in Kardjali continue to seek invisibility by 
dissimulating under the generic Turkish identity, while some Alevis in Razgrad have started to 
seek visibility by dissimilating their separate identity. I explain the pursuit of different collective 
strategies as a matter of availabilities or constraints for Alevis on the local levels. Maintaining a 
separate identity by dissimilation is possible for Razgrad Alevis, who have managed to create a 
maneuvering space between competing Bulgarian and Sunni Turkish groups. Alevis in Kardjali 
could not do the same, as they are surrounded by the manifestations of a strong ethnic Turkish 
majority identity, defined in Sunni terms.   
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Dissimilation is motivated by various factors. For instance, Alevi Bulgarian Turks 
dissimilate by forming NGOs in Bulgaria, which increases their visibility in seeking social 
recognition in Bulgaria, and through these organizations they form ties with Alevis in different 
parts of the world. Alevis who are dissimilating in Razgrad’s already strictly segregated villages 
seek further visibility, in order to protect communal boundaries. Alevi migrants in the isolated 
villages of Turkish Thrace and the cosmopolitan neighborhoods of İstanbul often publically 
dissimilate their Alevi identity even in Alevi-only settings, and especially when outsiders (e.g. 
appointed Sunni imams, teachers or other state officials) visit Alevi villages or neighborhoods, 
although they also utilize dissimulation strategies when they encounter outsiders, as I discussed 
in Chapter Six.  
The next section focuses on dissimilation practices by examining the narratives and 
practices that Alevi Bulgarian Turks use to increase public visibility of the group. I focus on how 
they publicly separate themselves from other groups, on linguistic, physical, social-
organizational and religious levels.   
7.1.1 Separating the Greetings  
A great majority of my informants in Razgrad city center were both Alevi and 
Sunni Bulgarian Turks who had occupied important roles in the maintenance of 
Turkish identity. They were mostly artists, authors, poets, teachers, engineers as 
well as well-educated blue-collar workers with amazing intellectual backgrounds 
and with various degrees of religious orientations within their sects. They were all 
very accommodating and responsive, providing insights which helped me a lot in 
developing my research.  Yet, after a while, I decided to move from the city center 
to the towns and villages. There was one issue I failed to notice during my 
interviews with individual Alevis in Bursa and Razgrad city center. This issue 
became clear to me after I started to meet with Alevis in groups in villages of 
Razgrad: In the city I had interviewed mostly males. These interviews often started 
in the city-style with the relatively formal greeting anticipated between Turkish 
males and females: hand shaking.  
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On my first village visit however, I found myself with a roomful of Alevi women, 
who were very kind in devoting their time to come to meet and talk with me. I 
verbally greeted them and we started talking. At the end of the day, before I left, I 
felt thankful and close to them and decided to say farewell by kissing the hands of 
the elders and kissing the cheeks of those who are one generation older than me, 
following the Turkish tradition in intergenerational interaction codes that I had 
grown up with. I was perplexed by one of their gestures: for every two kisses I put 
on each cheek, I received not just two kisses but three kisses in return.  
Considering it a local form of greeting, I thought I should adjust myself to my 
female informants’ greeting by also giving them three kisses. I decided to follow 
these codes in future meetings with other local informants.  
 
About two days later at my next meeting, I masterfully practiced the three kiss 
greeting…until I saw questioning and angry looks from my key informant, who 
helped me reach women in another village. He waited until we were alone and 
asked me pretty straightforwardly: “what do you think you are doing?” I was very 
surprised by his reaction given his otherwise very friendly approach to me. He 
understood my surprise and confusion and explained: “Don’t you know that only 
Alevis put three kisses on the cheek while greeting each other!” I was infinitely 
embarrassed initially and then extremely disappointed in myself.  I clearly 
introduced myself as a researcher with Sunni heritage but when I left I 
unintentionally conveyed another message, unknowingly “posing as an Alevi” to 
my second group of Alevi informants! From that moment forward I unlearned the 
local Alevi code of greeting between females  I put two kisses on my friends’ 
cheeks and pause for their reply of two kisses, plus one.  
 
The issue of the kiss in this excerpt from my field notes not only reveals a temporary lapse 
in my assessment of a very basic inter-personal greeting etiquette at the very beginning of my 
fieldwork, it also shows how broader inter-group relations may be encapsulated in the seemingly 
simplest level of interpersonal interaction. Alevis’ greetings are not only interpersonal exchanges 
but are also of a collective kind, indicating the heritage identities of the different parties. The 
greeting formula among Alevis is straightforward: putting one kiss to the person’s cheek 
indicates Christian heritage, two kisses indicate Sunni heritage and three kisses indicate Alevi 
heritage. On a symbolic level, the triple kiss is seen as recalling God, Muhammad, Ali as 
opposed to the double kiss, which means recalling God and Mohammed in Sunni Islam.  
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Existing literature on greetings does not explain the greeting formula in Razgrad that I 
experienced among, first, Alevis and then Sunnis and Christians. Linguistic studies of greetings 
focus extensively on verbal behavior while portraying the non-verbal elements as of secondary 
importance. Among Alevis in Razgrad, though, the non-verbal element is not ancillary to the 
words, but is actually the central component of the greeting. The verbal exchange is almost 
completely irrelevant. Sociolinguistic studies have also focused on greetings, in terms of their 
social function, for example in indicating the legitimacy of the encounter (Firth 1972), 
recognizing the presence and legitimacy of the interlocutor (Schiffrin 1977), or in regard to the 
social context of the greeting, such as the location of the interlocutors in social hierarchy (Goody 
1972). However, Alevi greetings are not merely about recognizing the other party or the 
encounter as legitimate, but instead afford an opportunity to question and determine the 
legitimacy of the other party as an interlocutor. Linguistic anthropologists such as Alessandro 
Duranti (1972) have challenged universalist assumptions on greetings inherent in many 
sociolinguistic analysis and argued for examining greetings in terms of not only their social 
context, but also cultural context, such as that in Samoa (Duranti 1972, 1997). However, while 
Samoan society is hierarchical in terms of differentiation of power it is relatively homogeneous 
in ethnic terms, so Duranti’s analyses do not help explain the forms of greeting in ethnically 
divided societies such as Bulgaria.A few works have focused on greetings within the context of 
divided societies. For instance, Germanos (2007) examined greetings in Beirut within the context 
of Maronite, Shiite, Sunni and Greek Orthodox communities’ in “identity zones,” where group 
members use either ethnically marked greetings. She adds that the greetings within each ethnic 
group are complicated by other factors such as gender, age and formal or informal context of the 
encounter (2007). Therefore, she identifies complicated patterns of “linguistic differentiation” 
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not only among but also within ethnic groups. My experience in Razgrad also indicated 
linguistic differentiations on ethno-religious grounds, among and between Alevis, Sunnis and 
Christians. The greeting formulae is quite direct, precise and standard for each group’s members: 
one kiss is for a Christian, two kisses for a Sunni and three kisses for an Alevi irrespective of 
their age, location or context of the conversation. Razgrad Alevis’ clear-cut non-verbal greetings 
thus show the cultural function of the greetings in severely divided societies, maintaining and 
reinforcing intergroup differences. In this respect, I believe Alevi greetings in Razgrad are an 
instance of public dissimilation given that non-Alevis there also see it as such. The greeting 
distinguishes them as Alevis from other groups, in the very first moments of inter-group 
encounters.   
7.1.2 Separating names and separating spaces: Kızılbaş versus Turkish Villages  
At the beginning of my visits to the villages of Razgrad I knew of three villages 
where Alevi reside, owing to the academic work of Georgieva and her students 
(1998). Yet there were other villages where Alevis were present but not visible. In 
addition, I was planning to interview Sunni Turks in the villages. Several times I 
found myself in bus stations of distant towns with a map of Razgrad in my hand, 
trying to decide the next village I should go to. However, my map predictably 
showed the official names of the villages in Bulgarian, which would make it hard 
to detect the demographic make up of their residents. Often my solution was to 
point out the specific village on the map and ask random Turkish-speaking people 
present in bus stations about the village. The random Turkish-speakers would point 
to the villages on the map while classifying them not into two categories, of “a 
Bulgarian village” or “a Turkish village” but into three categories, i.e. “a Bulgarian 
village,” “a Turkish village” and “a Kızılbaş village.” I was very surprised by the 
categorization which excludes Alevis (“Kızılbaş”) from the category of Turk, 
which I had initially thought as a marker of discrimination against Alevis by 
outsiders, especially given the negative connotations of the word Kızılbaş in the 
context of Turkey. Yet, soon I realized that the word “Kızılbaş” does not mean 
anything more than Alevi and is used also by Alevis themselves.  
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My map-learning experiences recounted above point to the ingrained nature of intergroup 
distinctions that are expressed via the classification and naming systems in some societies. James 
Valentine portrays naming as a “contrastive identification” practice, which means that the 
naming constructs the identity of different groups in an interactional context (1998). Razgrad 
exemplifies such contrastive identification, in that the distinction between Sunnis and Alevis is 
translated to the corresponding identification: Turkish versus Kızılbaş. These identifications are 
not imposed on Alevis, yet Alevis also use them in ways similar to Sunnis and Orthodox 
Christians. This distinction seems to grant Alevis self-initiated autonomy from Bulgarian Turkish 
group identity, in a context in which Bulgarian Turkish group identity is equated with Sunnism. 
This autonomy is also accepted by Sunni Turks for the same reason, as defining the Bulgarian 
Turkish identity in Sunni terms, as I discussed in chapter 1 and 4.  In this respect, contrastive 
identification of Sunnis as Turks and Alevis as Kızılbaş indicates both groups’ dissimilation from 
each other.  
It is worth noting that the Kızılbaş vs. Turk categorization is not made in Kardjali although 
it was expressed there in the past. It is not common among migrants in Bursa either. In Kardjali 
the term “Alevi” is more common and neutral, while the term Kızılbaş is negatively charged. In 
contrast, Bulgarian Turks often do not use a term marking Alevis in Bursa. In only a few cases 
did my informants whisper “we used to call Alevis Kızılbaş,” lowering their voices further when 
uttering the word Alevi and even further with the word Kızılbaş. These differences among 
Razgrad, Kardjali and Bursa are not random but reflect the different political-demographic 
configurations of these places, which condition variations in the collective strategies used by 
Alevis.  
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The physical segregation of Alevis from Sunnis is manifested in the separation of the 
neighborhoods, and the separation of cemeteries in the mixed villages is another element of 
Alevis’ dissimilations. I noticed relatively clear-cut segregation in the mixed villages of Razgrad 
where Alevis reside, for example, by a small pond in Sevar and by the main arterial road to the 
village in Bisertsi. In Sevar the administrative unit is on the Alevi side of this Sunni-Alevi-Roma 
mixed village, while in Bisertsi it is located in the center between one Bulgarian neighborhood, 
two Sunni Turkish neighborhoods and one Alevi neighborhood. In all three villages, Alevi 
neighborhoods have their own public space, a center, a small grocery store and a coffee house. In 
addition, the segregation in social life continues after death: both villages have at least two (one 
old and the other new) cemeteries which are also physically segregated into Alevi and Sunni 
sides. Again, this segregation is unique to Razgrad and lacking in Kardjali.   
7.1.3 Separating families: 
The principle of endogamy in Razgrad villages is very firm for both Alevis and 
Sunnis. In the words of one Sunni informant: “every rooster should paw the earth 
on its own patch; a Turk with a Turk, a Kızılbaş with a Kızılbaş.” The principle is 
also strictly adhered to by Alevis. Until very recently they had not allowed 
marriages across different Alevi subgroups (e.g. Babai and Bektaşi).   
 
In one of the heavily polarized Alevi-Sunni mixed villages of Razgrad, two 
marriage narratives were often brought to my attention during interviews. One is 
about the marriage of an Alevi girl to a Sunni from “the other side of the village” 
and the other is about the marriage of an Alevi boy to an Alevi girl from the “other 
side of the village.” In both cases, the girls are the ones who moved to “the other 
side,” which resulted in their facing physical violence from their own natal family 
members trying to force them to divorce. Both cases ended up with the couples 
moving abroad. Strikingly the villagers from both sides see the intermarried 
couples as “outsiders.”  
 
A third story is even more interesting. The tale explains how an Alevi man from 
the Alevi side of the neighborhood decided to have an arranged marriage. His 
mother found the proper Alevi girl, talked with her and the marriage was finalized. 
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On the wedding night the groom saw the bride and realized that she was bald. He 
did not say anything to the bride other than “it is not your fault  it is my family 
who decided it.” The next day, he visited his own family to talk to his mother. 
Then, the newlywed couple moved from the Alevi side to the Sunni side of the 
village. It was said he told his bride`s mother the following: “if this is what you 
think is proper for me, then I will leave my religion but I will not leave my wife as 
she is innocent.” He moved to the Sunni side, started a family and raised his 
children according to Sunni Islamic principles. In contrast to the first two stories, 
the Alevi groom is still not called “an outsider” but is still regarded as “kin” by the 
people living in the Alevi side. I was told this story by an Alevi who also 
understands (if not affirms) the Alevi groom’s behavior as evidence that he is a a 
good Alevi because he was fair and just to his innocent wife, even at the cost of 
leaving his community and his religion.   
 
The above excerpts from my field notes concern primarily the relationship between 
marriage patterns and group membership in a mixed village that is drastically polarized.  The 
first two marriage narratives are significant because they are exemplary stories for acculturating 
young Alevis into the endogamy rule and didactic tales about the ultimate outcome of violating 
it: being disowned by the community. They also teach that group members will give inter-
married Alevi the status of “düşkün,” which is a status at least equal to (and sometimes worse 
than) the status of “outsider”, as I discussed in Chapter Five. It is not merely the endogamy 
principle, but also the narratives about the violations of this principle, that help Alevis to publicly 
claim a distinct identity. Alevis secure and maintain inter-group differences and thereby 
dissimilate from outsiders in the village.  
The endogamy principle has been very well-protected among Alevi Bulgarian Turks with 
the exception of permitting taking a Sunni bride, as the following excerpt from an interview 
shows: 
 “A child will follow his or her father’s path. Only if the father is an Alevi will the 
child be an Alevi. Yet the residents of the opposite [Sunni] neighborhood want to 
receive brides and they do not want to give their daughters as brides to our 
children… In our case, if a [Sunni] girl loves one of our sons and decides to come 
here, she must become a follower [by pledging to the Path].  After she becomes a 
follower, if she divorces her [Alevi] husband, her recently gained Alevi status will 
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be lost. This is because she owes her Alevi identity to her husband and only to her 
husband. Otherwise she cannot re-enter the Path. Women receive their oath (ikrar) 
via men.” Babai, Razgrad     
 
It shoud be noted that this exception to the endogamy principle, where Alevi men are 
permitted to take brides from Sunnis, is seen in a particular way. The Sunni wife is a temporary 
insider, even if she converts to Alevi ways. Her status is strictly conditioned by her role as a wife 
and is in function of her bearing Alevi children. Therefore, if she denounces these roles, her 
status irreversibly changes back to her original heritage identity as a member of the Sunni group. 
In this severely divided mixed village, the only exception to the endogamy principle thus leads 
not to blurring intergroup borders but but to highlighting and maintaining them. 
Similarly, the third story on marriage provided at the very beginning of this section, on the 
bald bride, is not about the violation of endogamy but rather the strict observation of the 
principle. A marriage between an Alevi bride and an Alevi groom serves to reproduce inter-
group boundaries. The twist in this narrative is that the Alevi groom chooses to withdraw from 
Alevi ways and renounce his heritage identity by the very symbolic act of moving to the Sunni 
side of the village.  The interesting part is the Alevi community’s reaction to the groom’s 
actions: Alevis in the village still consider him as kin and as an Alevi despite the groom’s choice 
of Sunnism and to raise his children in Sunni ways.  This example shows that in this extremely 
divided society, where dissimilation is a main strategy of maintaining group identity, the 
intergroup differences are so robust that heritage-based group identities are prioritized over 
individuals’ choices or actual religious practices.  In this respect the Alevi man claiming the 
Sunni identity resembles examples of individual members of the Fur claiming the nomadic Arabs 
or the South Pathans claiming Baluch identity in Barth (1969): individuals may move across the 
intergroup boundaries yet intergroup boundaries remain intact. The only difference is that the 
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Alevi man in the marriage narrative rejects Alevi identity but is still seen as Alevi by Alevis, 
while individual Pathans continue to see themselves as Pathans even after their political 
affiliation with Baluch (Barth 1969: 16).  
I should note that these marriage stories are narratives that are close to the absolute 
dissimilation ideal in this divided and polarized context. In less polarized settings, Alevis’ 
dissimilations via marriage patterns are more flexible, as the following accounts from my 
informants seem to show a degree of openness to both groom- and bride-taking from Sunni 
groups only recently:  
 “We have not accepted any children whose parents are Sunnis. But, if he or she is 
interested, at the present time some may accept. Once a Sunni bride came to us and 
she was inquiring about the possibility to enter into our Path. I said, ‘You may be 
accepted to our Path. Yet, if you later chose another path, it will be a huge 
mistake.’ She replied the following: “I found such a Path that I will die on my way 
there.” So, for an outsider to enter into our path, she should pledge (ikrar) before a 
baba, she should say ‘this is a fiery trial [atesten gomlek], she will find a musahip 
[fictive kin].” Babai, Razgrad 
 
“We accept [Sunnis] in the case of marriage. For instance, they had brought us a 
groom from a Sunni village. We accepted him. In fact those who are convinced to 
marry with an Alevi come with the consent of entering into the [Alevi] Path; they 
do not have any objection to becoming an Alevi” Babai, Turkish Thrace  
 
These narratives are my informants’ self-representations about Alevi marriage norms with 
respect to inter-group marriages, and thus are about “representational kinship” or “official 
kinship” in Bourdieu’s terms (1990: 169-170). They present endogamy as the rule, yet exogamy 
in the form of bride or groom-taking becomes acceptable as long as these outsiders assimilate to 
Alevi ways. In my view, these representational narratives are meant to control and police inter-
group relations and highlight the inter-group borders. The narratives promoting strict endogamy 
as a norm do so straightforwardly. The narratives allowing exogamy by bride- or groom-taking 
are only allowing movement of individuals across the intergroup borders without challenging to 
 250 
the salience of the inter-group borders (Barth 1969) as long as the movement is one directional, 
towards the Alevi side. In this sense, I see these normative narratives as examples of Alevis’ 
understandings which highlight their separate communal identity, and are therefore strategic 
dissimilations on the level of narratives.  
 Of course, these normative narratives on intermarriages do not always reflect the reality 
about intermarriages. Historicaly, Alevi Bulgarian Turks have been involved in intermarriages 
despite their “official kinship” principles, but such intermarriage stories are largely silenced 
among them. My informants did not directly narrate these stories to me, and I learned about them 
as they were revealed as bits and pieces in other stories. For instance, while I noticed the 
existence of intermarriages dating back to the interwar period in one location, I received only one 
explanation from my informants: “outsiders kidnapped and forced our daughters to marry them.”  
Whenever I wanted to contact an intermarried couple via my existing informants, somehow my 
informants “could not reach them,” even though the same contacts had been the ones who 
revealed that there were intermarried couples in the first place. I heard about cases of inter-
marriages which had been contractedby the couples against the will of their families. However,  
when these marriages were discovered, the newly-weds had been tracked down by their Sunni or 
Alevi family members, beaten by their brothers or fathers and forced into divorce, as well as 
marriage with a member of their own heritage community. These are examples of “practical 
kinship” (Bourdieu 1990: 170), in cases of violation of the “official kinship” rules, and which 
leads to that “the kinship norms [are] bent in several directions to absorb abducted [individual] 
within the normal structures of family and marriage” (Das 1995: 64). 
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7.1.4 Separations related to türbes:  
During my fieldwork I was struck by the difference between Razgrad and Kardjali 
in terms of the distribution of the türbes. In Razgrad there are large, historical 
türbes at locations far away from the residential areas. In Kardjali, however, türbe 
buildings are relatively small, modest and recent-looking, built next to cemeteries 
in almost all villages. There are only a few major historical türbes. I was aware 
that this regional difference was not due to the settlement of Alevis in these 
regions during  different historical time frames, as many historical studies have 
shown (e.g. Inalcık: 1964, Doğru: 2000). It was not brought about by the different 
levels of mass destruction that occurred due to the terrifying effects of war in 
Razgrad during the Ottoman-Russian War in 1877-8 and in Kardjali during the 
Balkan Wars in 1912-1913. The main difference was the presence of small scale 
village türbes in Kardjali, which made sense to me when an informant talked to me 
about türbe forms called nazarlama, are empty türbes which do not have remnants 
of a saint in the tomb. It is because there is no saint buried in them!  Nazarlama 
türbes are as respected as the other türbes, given that they are devoted to saints 
who made himself or herself visible to people at that spot. That is to say, it is not a 
big deal if türbes have or have not been the sites where saints’ bodies are buried.  
 
Türbes are not merely religious sites but also territory markers for Alevis. The very 
existence of major Alevi türbes in Razgrad and Kardjali marks the historical presence of the 
Alevis in the region as a distinct group, just as mosques mark the presence of Sunnis (see 
Hayden 2002, Hayden, Sözer et al. 2011). Even though türbes have historically been under the 
control of the other groups and vistors are not limited to Alevis, these türbes are well known as 
Alevi sites. The presence of nazarlama in Kardjali is especially interesting given that Kardjali 
Alevis are vulnerable in manifesting their group identity in the face of an aggressive Sunni local 
majority. In Razgrad, Alevis have managed over time to create a space for promoting a separate 
group identity, despite competition with Orthodox Christian Bulgarians and Sunni Turks. The 
nazarlama türbes of Kardjali can be seen as a response by local Alevis to the demographic 
configurations that mark regional territories as Alevi zones, and therefore functio as a source for 
their dissimilation from other groups on the local level.  
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In Bulgaria there is a common understanding about türbe affiliation with Alevis; yet, 
despite this, türbe sites have historically been sites of inter-group competition for control and 
ownership of territories. Originally Alevis had the control of the türbes until the independence of 
Bulgaria. Starting from the 19
th
 century, Christians also claimed access to türbes. After the 
independence of Bulgaria, türbes passed under the control of the Sunni müftülüks. The türbes fell 
under state control during socialism when the state initiated efforts aimed at “proving” the 
Christian or Bulgarian roots of saints, such as at Demir Baba Türbe in Razgrad and Akyazili 
Baba Türbe. Many türbes passed again to the müftülüks after socialism, though some were 
returned to Alevi communities’ use following a special court procedure beginning in the early 
1990s.  
Currently the difference between Razgrad and Kardjali in regards to control of the türbes 
is also striking. In Razgrad major türbes are under state control as monuments of cultural 
heritage, and their lands were first confiscated by the state during socialism and then returned to 
regional müftülük, as the only legally recognized representative of Muslims. Razgrad Alevis 
come and visit these türbes and perform their rituals in their complexes; yet it is almost 
impossible for them to make changes in order to maintain the türbe sites. On the other hand, the 
major türbes in Kardjali were not deemed monuments of cultural heritage although their 
territories are registered under the Sunni müftülüks. Unlike türbes in Razgrad, those in Kardjali 
have survived through the efforts of local Alevis to maintain them.  
Prominent members of both Razgrad and Kardjali Alevis are dissatisfied with their 
respective situations. Razgrad Alevis want control of the türbes, with the pertinent ownership 
rights and maintenance duties returned to the Alevis Community. Kardjali Alevis seek complete 
control of türbes but also demand financial support from the state. I consider Alevis’ demands on 
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türbes to be a sign of the emergence of a visible Alevi collective identity and therefore as an 
example of their dissimilation from other groups.            
7.1.5 Forming separate organizations  
Alevi Bulgarian Turks do not resemble any other religious group in Bulgaria in 
terms their well-knit social structure. Such social organization seems to be possible 
due to the organization of local cem communities, which has facilitated Alevis’ 
frequent practices of quick organization with clear division of labor for social 
events or religious rituals. In other words, the social organization of Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks is informed by their religious organization. Yet the formation of 
formal and public social organizations for Alevis is very recent. It was only in the 
early 2000s that Alevis could form social organizations based on Alevi identity. As 
a result of a tedious process they managed to form three NGOs in different regions 
of Bulgaria, namely the Razgrad Cem Wakf, the Southeastern Bulgarian Cem 
Association in Kardjali and the Akkadinlar Association in Silistre.  
 
The delay in the formation of Alevi NGOs could be explained easily by restrictions on the 
public sphere during the socialist period, when formation of organizations based on religious 
identity was unimaginable, and Islamic communities were under the control of the state-
controlled Müftülük. However, it took almost a decade for Alevis to form NGOs after the end of 
socialism in Bulgaria, so, socialist rule cannot be the only reason for the delay in their creation. 
NGOs were seen in a positive light by a number of politically active and powerful Sunni 
Bulgarian Turks in Kardjali and Razgrad, as I was told during my fieldwork, But they reacted 
negatively to the possibility that Alevi organizations might emerge “in their region.” For 
instance, a very important local political figure stated publicly that he would be the first one to 
set an Alevi NGOs building on fire if he were to see a signboard for one hanging in Kardjali. In 
Razgrad it was not the emergence of the NGO but its attempts to form a visible cemevi in the city 
center with the help of the Turkish Cem Waqf that caused a profound reaction in the local press. 
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The press presented the view that any visibility of Alevis among Bulgarian Turks would divide 
the community and be a threat to the unity of the Bulgarian Turks.   
Especially because of such resistence, the emergence of NGOs which emphasize Alevi 
identity is a big step in seeking visibility of the structurally invisible Alevi Bulgarian Turks, and 
I see it as an example the dissimilation of Alevi Bulgarian Turks. It is worth noting that Razgrad 
and Kardjali Alevi NGOs are very local organizations even though they are in frequent 
interaction with each other. The two organizations pursue Alevis’ visibility via different policies 
which are informed by the needs of local Alevis and conditioned by specific local circumstances. 
For instance, the NGO in Razgrad not only organizes social and religious activities in the region 
and in other regions in Bulgaria, it also develops connections and workshops with Alevi 
organizations and Alevi groups beyond Bulgaria’s borders, such as in Greece, Turkey, Germany, 
Albania, and Romania. On the other hand, the NGO in Kardjali remains focused locally due to 
the constant struggles it faces at the local and regional levels, both inside and outside the group, 
which is to say between Bektaşis and Babais as well as with Sunni Turks. In addition to its 
interactions with other Alevi NGOs in Bulgaria, it organizes religious site visits beyond the 
borders of Bulgaria.   
7.2 ASSIMILATION  
I conceptualize assimilation as a condition whereby Alevi Bulgarian Turks both publicly and 
privately distance themselves from Alevi ways, and also adhere to the ideal types of other 
groups. It is possible to see this process in two forms. Absolute assimilation would require a 
complete abandonment of Alevi ways and absolute adherence to Sunni ways, together with the 
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denial of Alevi heritage. I could not identify any such Alevi Bulgarian Turks during my 
fieldwork, but logically, total assimilation would be almost undetectable.  Strategic assimilation 
constitutes the main focus of my thesis, and requires strategic abandonment of Alevi ways and 
possible adherence to Sunni ways, without denying Alevi heritage. I have interviewed Alevis 
who are strategically assimilated, often in reaction to their environment. The following excerpt 
from one of my informants exemplifies the difference between what I call “absolute 
assimilation” and “strategic assimilation:” 
 “…Lenin says that communism and worshipping cannot go together. Now 
communism is gone; yet worshipping is gone too. Our daughters only know that 
they are Alevis and that’s it, that’s all! We cannot explain it to our children 
[oranda]. Right, [overall] our children are getting Sunnified  but don’t ever think 
that they are going to the mosque to become Sunnis. They become a street person 
[sokak insanı]… [On the other hand] for instance there is one Alevi girl [unmarried 
young women may often be referred to as “girl” in Turkish] who migrated to 
Ankara, where she presented herself as a Turk [i.e. Sunni], she recited the Quran as 
a whole, she is reciting the Quran now.” Bektaşi, Razgrad    
 
This shows that my informant identifies two forms of assimilation. The migrant woman in 
Ankara represents what I call absolute assimilation as she denies her Alevi heritage completely. 
On the other hand, my informant defines another form of assimilation, which is an in-between 
situation of neither following Sunni ways nor leaving behind Alevi heritage identity. In this way, 
it is a form of assimilation for strategic purposes, motivated mostly by the intention to adjust to 
circumstances.   
My examples for Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ strategic assimilation mostly come from 
migrant communities in Bursa, which are marked by their visibly Sunni-dominant character 
despite the presence of Kurdish migrant Alevis and Alevi migrants from Greece. In addition, 
immediately after migrating to Bursa, a few Alevi Bulgarian Turk families were faced with the 
double-edged situation of being seen as migrants by the locals and as Alevis by the migrants, as 
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my informants mentioned. Furthermore, Alevi Bulgarian Turks migrated to Bursa as only a few 
families and without a religious leader, which made it difficult to form a cem community. The 
following excerpt depicts this process very well:  
“After the migration we dissolved, we tore apart. Once we gathered as 5-6 
households of migrants to decide what to do. We gathered but not for worshipping; 
just for deciding a course of action. Before, at the places we come from we used to 
consult with the religious leader of the cem. Now we migrated to here and we 
cannot come together at all. What can we do? We mixed with Turks [i.e. 
Sunnis].”Bektaşi from Ruse to Bursa 
 
It is not only in Bursa but also in Bulgaria where there is a risk of being assimilated, 
especially when an Alevi group lives in a mixed setting and when it loses its religious leaders. 
For instance, in one village of Razgrad, the only baba had passed away a few years ago. He was 
not replaced by a new baba and the community does not accept a religious baba from other 
villages. The Alevi rules in Razgrad are that babas live in the same village as their followers, 
which is different from the rules in Kardjali where babas are responsible for multiple villages. 
During my fieldwork, I did not notice any sign of assimilation in the Alevis in this village; yet 
the absence of a baba is expected to influence the community’s religious practices, beginning 
with the entrance of new followers into the cem community via the ikrar ceremony and ending 
with the need for burial rituals.   
The rest of this section examines two forms of strategic assimilation among Alevi 
Bulgarian Turks. The first one is “Sunnification,” or “becoming bigoted” [Yobazlasmak] ,which 
my informants identified and defined either as “not attending cem ceremonies” or as “going to 
Sunni mosques while not attending cems.” The second is rootlessness, or as my informants’ put 
it, “To become wild” [Yabanilesme], which is defined as following neither Alevi nor Sunni 
ways, but simply becoming a-religious.  
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7.2.1 Sunnification or “Becoming Bigoted” [Yobazlasmak] 
7.2.1.1 Not Attending Cems  
“If an Alevi does not attend cems, if he or she does not observe the rules of cem 
then Sunnification happens. Otherwise, an Alevi will not become a Sunni just 
because he goes to a mosque.” Bektaşi, Razgrad   
 
The above quote from an interview exemplifies a firm perception about Alevis 
assimilation. Not attending cems is a marker of Sunnification. Therefore, a heritage Alevi does 
not need to practice Sunni ways to be seen as Sunnified. In this perception, the category of the 
Sunnified Alevis consists of two groups. The group is made up of heritage Alevis who have not 
pledged to follow the Alevi Path (ikrar), as the following examples show: 
“They [heritage Alevis] know that they are “Alevis ” yet, they do not join cems. 
How can I teach them the Path? How can I force them to join us if they do not 
want to join?” Babai, Kardjali 
 
“They say the youth do not come to cems. You cannot pass this fire in their heart. 
It happens spontaneously. If they do not come to cems, that means they are able to 
understand that much. Don’t they believe in [the Path]? Yes, they do but there is 
also a need for serving in cems. I have two sons and a daughter. They do not 
believe. They did not want to partake. They are like ‘the Prophet Noah’s infidel 
son/ he did not jump into the ship/he got drowned’ [Nuh Nebinin kafir 
oglu/Gemiye binmedi, boguldu].” Derviş, Razgrad 
 
“I was married in 1986. Until that period I had seen people attending cems. Then I 
have not seen anyone attending to cems. There is no more ayn-ül cem. If a hundred 
percent of my father’s generation pledged the oath, in my generation this number 
dropped to fifty percent and in my children’s generation it is about twenty percent. 
In my generation, Alevi men state that ‘we are Alevis’ when they face a mullah. 
When I ask them ‘why don’t you observe Alevi ways?’ he replies ‘I am an atheist.’ 
This is just not acceptable.” Babai, Razgrad to Turkey   
 
These excerpts from my interviews were replies to questions about assimilation and 
Sunnification of Alevis. They clearly show my informants’ association of assimilation with the 
unwillingness of Alevi youth to pledge the Alevi oath. The last excerpt shows that neither the 
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ikrar nor public announcement of Alevism to outsiders suffices for being seen as an 
unassimilated Alevi. In this view, one should also follow Alevi ways throughout his or her 
lifetime.  
The second group of Alevis who are seen as assimilated by not attending cems are 
heritage Alevis who pledged the Alevi Path yet have been  dismissed from the cem community 
(became düşkün) due to various transgressions, permanently (due to committing murder, theft or 
adultery) or temporarily (due to unresolved disputes with other cem members). Many of my 
informants see permanent düşkün status as being the same as outsider status; since it is 
irreversible. They add that düşkünlük may ultimately lead to the assimilation of Alevis into the 
other groups: 
“Among us, people who are involved in murder or adultery are not welcomed to 
cems.  Şeriat [Sunnis] punishes someone who murders another by imprisonment. 
We [Alevis] see the situation [differently]: if one commits such a crime, this means 
he also uprooted the victim’s family  and therefore he does not even deserve 
greeting. We do not even say “hi” to the murderer…Those may be the Alevis who 
start to go to mosques later.”   Babai, Razgrad  
 
Similar to permanent düşkünlük, the temporary düşkünlük traditionally functions as a 
means of social control within the group. Yet in the present context, punishing the transgressions 
of Alevis by temporarily proclaiming them as düşkün after being interrogated in cem by the baba 
(dara cekmek) had unintended effects as the following examples show:     
“[Discipline] has become loose in the last 20 years. Previously it was strict. There 
was no possibility to object to the baba. He could prohibit you from cems for one 
or two years and you could not come to cems. Now they do not even attend cems 
without any punishment or prohibition [cezalamadan da gelmiyorlar]. They 
punished themselves already! The times have changed greatly…”  Babai, Kardjali 
 
“Previously babas would punish  they would put them into the position of dar 
[dara cekerdi]. The ones with dar status could not be accepted by their 
neighborhoods for evening visits. Now you cannot punish anyone. That guy does 
not come to cems even without punishment! Who would come if I punish those 
who are attending cems now!” Bektaşi, Razgrad 
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These excerpts from my interviews reflect my informants’ views on the dissolution of 
former social control mechanisms, e.g. düşkünlük or dar. In addition, they indicate the possible 
outcome of this dissolution as Alevi individuals distance themselves from Alevi ways rather than 
trying to re-gain their status in the cem community via a special ceremony.    
It is noteworthy that not attending cem was portrayed as a sign of assimilation mostly by 
my informants in Razgrad. This pattern is related to the different significance of the cem 
ceremonies in the everyday lives of Alevis in Razgrad. As I discussed in Chapter Five, Razgrad 
Bektaşis conduct cem ceremonies twice a week throughout the year but Razgrad Babais do so 
only in cem season. On the other hand, Kardjali Bektaşis and Babais conduct cems during the 
cem season and when a cem is needed. Therefore, for the Razgrad Alevis, someone with Alevis 
heritage who does not attend cems means they are severely distancing themselves from the local 
Alevi community. This is therefore seen as an example of assimilation.   
7.2.1.2 Attending mosques while not attending cems 
Another group of my informants equates the assimilation of Alevis with their 
Sunnification by attendance in mosques. They clearly distinguish between collective and 
individual assimilation, seeing the collective assimilation of Alevis by Sunnification as a 
phenomenon that occurred in the past, and something that is impossible to see in the present day, 
as the following excerpt shows: 
 “It is impossible to think about [collective] Sunnification now; yet, previously this 
had happened. For instance, under the rule of Fatih [Mehmet II] the administrators 
in the state announced that anyone who would kill 1000 Alevis can become a 
statesman. Therefore, at that time you can see collective Sunnification. This also 
led to migrations; for instance in the [X] village of Kardjali you can see that 
everyone is a Bulgarian Muslim now. It was once an Alevi village.” Bektaşi, 
Kardjali  
 260 
 
“Nakşibendis7 were brought here during the Ottoman period. Some converted but 
the Alevi Path continued to live.” Derviş, Razgrad   
 
Both of these excerpts from my interviews about collective assimilation of Alevis depict 
forms of assimilation as events that occurred in the past. In addition, my informants emphasized 
that Alevis had sought ways to resist forced assimilation, such as by migrating. Furthermore, 
even though groups of Alevis had actually assimilated, the Alevi Path was kept alive. This point 
indicates the possibility of assimilating strategically without forgetting the Alevi identity and 
ways. Ultimately it is owing to strategic assimilation that Alevism in Bulgaria has survived 
various oppressions and continues today.     
My informants also discuss the assimilations of individual Alevis by following Sunni 
ways in the following ways: 
 “Sunnification means going to mosques with Turks [Sunnis]. If one does so, he 
will start swearing at Alevis like the other people in the mosques.” Razgrad  
 
“In our times in the past we did not go to mosques. It changed when we came here. 
I explained our situation and our Bektaşi identity. They said, ‘OK ’ yet they go to 
mosques for namaz… Well, what can I do? I will see it as ‘worship is a worship, 
Islam is Islam.” Ruse in Bursa 
 
These informants indicate their reactions to the Sunnification of individual Alevis. 
Especially when this experience is close to one’s home, as the case in my second informant, 
                                                 
7
 The Nakşibendi Order is a Sufi order in Sunni Islam. In the late 17th century the Ottoman Emperor Mahmut II 
banished the Janissary Order, which had official ties to Bektaşi beliefs since its formation. The Sultan also initiated 
policies for conversion of Bektaşis into Sunni Islam by exiling or killing Bektaşi leaders, replacing them with 
Nakşibendi leaders and transferring the properties and religious sites of the Bektaşi order to the Nakşibendi and 
Mevlevis (Doja 2006:442). During my fieldwork, I reached two Derviş Alevis in Svestari, which had been a well-
known Derviş-Bektaşi center. My informants also told me the history of their ancestors who “converted” to 
Nakşibendi in the 18th century and yet re-converted to Derviş-Bektaşi ways in the 1970s. Currently the village has 
two Derviş-Bektaşis, who consider the similarities between Nakşibendi and Derviş ways (e.g. the Sufism principle 
and collective rituals) as the main reason for the Ottoman administrators’ sending Nakşibendi to Bulgaria.  Yet, they 
were clear on the differences between two groups, as the Nakşibendi recognize all Caliphs as legitimate while 
Derviş -Bektaşi sees Ali as legitimate.  
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Alevis try to make sense of the development. However, ultimately the individual Alevis’ 
Sunnification does not cause dissolution of categorical group identities (see Barth: 1969). The 
following quote from one interview reveals the robustness of the Alevi and Sunni group 
identities irrespective of individual practices:    
 “One’s job is important in our path. The [importance of having a] job is different 
from [the importance of] the path. Ali has it in his will: you will adjust your 
children [oranda] in line with yourself. For instance, there are Alevi children who 
have gone to Europe for jobs. Yet, they did so with the permission from here [of 
the baba]. They are Alevi. They do not stop to be Alevis. It is because being an 
Alevi comes by birth. A Sunni cannot become an Alevi. Also an Alevi kid cannot 
become Sunni” Babai, Razgrad. (Emphasis are added) 
7.2.2 Not Alevi But not Sunni Either: “Becoming Undomesticated” [Yabanilesmek] 
“The situation is that our youth are becoming undomesticated, wild.” When I heard this 
statement from an informant I did not quite get it at first. He was using a term “yabani,” 
which is commonly used to qualify undomesticated animals and plants in Turkish. In its 
verb form, the term “becoming undomesticated” sounded a little strange, given that in the 
natural order of things we tend to see changes in from “the undomesticated” to the 
“domesticated stage.” It later became clear to me that my informant was talking about the 
phenomenon that young Alevis do not recognize their heritage and its requirements. My 
informant was using the phrase “becoming undomesticated” because he sees Alevi youth as 
those who are potentially open to “domestication into the Alevi ways” due to their 
membership in the Alevi group by birth. Yet, some of them choose the path of “becoming 
undomesticated” by refusing to fully recognize their heritage and become Alevi by being 
initiated and following Alevi ways. Thus they actually moved from the “domesticated” 
stage to the undomesticated one,” quite contrary to nature, as my informant portrays.   
 
This excerpt from my fieldwork shows the disappointment felt by many Alevi religious 
leaders regarding the situation of young Alevis. These young Alevis are blamed for not 
following any religious ways even though they had been initiated into Alevism, as the following 
examples show: 
“Alevi children are becoming wild  that is to say their remaining as they are after pledging 
the Alevi Oath” Babai, Kardjali 
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“Those who pledged yet who do not follow the path probably succumb to pressures. I do 
not know. Maybe his wife is a Sunni. Then, whether he pledged the Alevi Path or not does 
not make any difference.” Kardjali  
 
As my informants make clear, some Alevi youth actually pick the Alevi path by going 
through the initiation ceremony. Yet afterwards as they do not follow the Alevi ways, or they 
become involved in practices that prevent the full realization of their Alevi identity, such as 
intergroup marriages. Such individuals’ are portrayed as “undomesticated” or “wild” by my 
informants. Another configuration of “being undomesticated” is when an Alevi does not go 
through initiation into Alevism, as the following excerpt shows:  
 “Beware of one thing: those youngsters, who have not pledged and who have not 
converted to the Sunni way either. They pursue a life which is neither here nor there 
[neither Alevi nor Sunni]. The fight for bread is also another pressure on our youth. Don’t 
think that they go to the mosques. Among us, those who go to mosque are the ones who are 
forbidden from the cems [as düşkün]. It [Alevis’ going to mosques] would not happen 
among us. Kardjali 
 
My informant is critical of the Alevi youth for not claiming their heritage. Yet, as the 
excerpt reveals, he is also relieved by the fact that such Alevis do not chose the path of Sunnism 
either. In other words, these young Alevis don.t pursue either path; they remain in-between 
Sunni and Alevi ways and ultimately choose to become a-religious people. Many of my 
informants from Sunni-Alevi mixed settings with polarized relations consider the a-religious 
status better than becoming Sunni.       
7.3 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I focused on dissimilation and assimilation as collective strategies utilized by 
Alevi Bulgarian Turks in their relations with outsiders. These collective strategies depend on 
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their local, regional and national contexts. In the first section, I focused on Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks’ dissimilations by examining their narratives and practices which publicly and privately 
indicate adherence to Alevism. Specifically, I focused on Alevis’ collective practices related to 
strategies that they use to separate themselves from outsiders, such as greeting codes, naming 
activities, settlement patterns, use and control of religious sites as well as the formation of 
religiously marked NGOs. In the second section, I identified distinctions between regular 
assimilation and strategic assimilation, as well as between individual and collective assimilation.  
I then focused on Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ individual and collective strategic assimilations by 
examining the narratives and practices that indicated their adherence to the ideal-types of other 
groups.  Specifically, I utilized my informants’ categorizations for strategic assimilation, which 
are identified as “not attending cems,” “attending to mosques while not attending cems” and 
following an a-religious way of being, adhering neither to Alevi nor to Sunni ways. I concluded 
that in all three configurations of assimilation, my informants emphasized the significance of 
categorical group identities as Alevis and Sunnis, irrespective of individual cases of Alevis who 
assimilated.     
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8.0  CONCLUSION 
My analysis has questioned two widespread assumptions about invisibility of ethno-religious 
minorities.  Many academics, activists and policy-makers equate visibility with recognition and 
empowerment (e.g. McDonald and Wingfield 2009, Thongthiraj 1994, Naber 2010, Blasco 
2002), although some others portray visibility as a source of control over and surveillance of 
marginalized groups (e.g. Foucault 1977, Carter 2010). I have argued that both approaches 
essentialize invisibility and tend to portray it as either a benevolent or a malevolent condition for 
minorities. Some scholars of media sociology state that visibility can be empowering and 
disempowering (Brighenti 2007) but they do not explain when, for whom, and under which 
conditions visibility is either. My thesis uses Brighenti’s insight as a starting point to understand 
the complicated (in)visibilities of marginalized communities. I argue that for such communities 
what matters is not their visibility or invisibility per se but rather their control over it.  Thus the 
key issue is to what extent the members of a community are willing to reveal or conceal, 
information about themselves. I argue that marginalized communities may display complicated 
invisibilities. For such communities, invisibility may be a tactical tool as well as a structural 
burden; self-chosen as well as externally-imposed; subversive as well as oppressive; depending 
on the wider political and social configurations.   
To discuss complicated (in)visibilities of marginalized communities, I focused on what 
would seem to be a paradoxical configuration: a minority that is marginalized, disempowered 
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and invisible due to historical and structural conditions and does not strive for increased 
visibility, but rather tries to decrease it. This configuration forms the group’s active response to 
externally-imposed images of itself by pursuing self-imposed invisibility, and is captured by the 
term takiye (dissimulation), a Turkish variant of an Arabic word in Islamic theology. This term is 
used and discussed in Sunni and Shia doctrines and refers to hiding one’s religious identity and 
concealing information about one’s religious group from outsiders, in the face of life-threatening 
contexts and severe discrimination (see Kohlberg1975, Sachedina 2010). These doctrines also 
recognize that dissimulation may require appearing to claim membership in the religious 
majority group.  
  
The dissimulation concept helps us see that while some minorities may publicly appear to 
be crossing ethnic boundaries by leaving their distinct identities behind and by assuming another 
group’s identity, they may be doing so to protect their members, their group and most 
importantly, the very group identity that they appear to be renouncing. These minorities may 
appear to be simulating the majority group and assimilating into a majority while they are 
actually not doing so, but dissimulating. Thus, dissimulation actually reinforces the distinction 
between the minority and other groups in the eyes of the minority’s members. For such 
minorities, the group identities remain robust even when they claim membership in other groups, 
and group boundaries remain salient even when they pretend to cross them.  
  
The dissimulation concept may challenge the idea that ethnicity emerges in everyday 
practices of an ethnic group’s individual members. To give a promiment example, Rogers 
Brubaker promotes studying “everyday ethnicity” to counter to the essentialism in “assuming 
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bounded groups as fundamental units of analysis” (i.e. “groupism”) and to “clichéd 
constructivism” which is “too obviously right, too familiar, too readily taken for granted to 
generate friction” (2004: 2-3). He states that constructivism has become “the epitome of 
academic respectability, even orthodoxy” and intends to introduce “friction” by examining 
“ethnicity without groups,” i.e. “how ethnicity ‘happen[s]’ in everyday” (2004: 6) affairs rather 
than “presuming [that] everyday experience is pervasively organized by strong ethnic identities” 
(2004: 11).  He provides evidence for this framework by examining how everyday interaction 
makes Hungarian and Romanian ethnicities “happen” in Cluj/Napoca, Romania. Interestingly he 
acknowledges the importance of ethno-national affiliations for ordinary people; yet, he devalues 
this fact as a commonsense reification that scholars should avoid re-producing (2006: 9). Such 
avoidance of locals’ commonsense by scholars studying social phenomena is criticized by 
Hayden (2007).  In fact, Brubaker’s field data actually shows the opposite process of his 
analytical framework, since being a Hungarian or Romanian determines a priori the forms of 
everyday interactions in Cluj. Specifically, Hungarians continue to be seen as Hungarian even if 
they deemphasize their Hungarian identity, claim broader Romanian citizenship or are involved 
in a mixed marriage with a Romanian.   
The idea that ethnicity may emerge in everyday inter-group relations is not unique to 
Brubaker. Evergeti makes a similar argument in the context of everyday interactions between 
Roma, Pomak and Turkish Muslim minorities in Western Thrace in Greece (2005). She provides 
evidence for this claim by stating that these communities celebrate both Greek and Turkish 
holidays and are involved in intermarriages despite the endogamy principle being held in all 
three communities (2005: 184). Similarly Joanne Smith claims that ethnicity is emergent by 
examining how Uygurs’ activate their differences against Han Chinese (cf. Abner Cohen) when 
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the tension between two groups are due to not religious or cultural differences but social or 
economic asymmetries (Smith 2002). She points out various zones, such as dance halls, in which 
the two groups self-segregate but concludes that there are venues which are not marked by ethnic 
differences such as workplace (2002: 164).   
My work on dissimulation does not reject the possibility that there are some aspects of 
life where ethnic affiliations are not the primary determinant for some groups. Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks do not have any problem in shopping at Sunnis’ stores, yet they reject being buried on the 
Sunni side of the village cemeteries.  I argue that the existence of intermarriages in principally 
endogamous groups (as per Brubaker and in Evergeti) does not mean that these areas of life are 
de-ethnicized in general intergroup relations.  Veena Das shows that in polarized societies when 
the “official kinship” rules are violated by intermarriages, these intermarriages are absorbed by 
interpreting the matter in a flexible way as the “practical kinship” notion suggests (Bourdieu 
1990: 170, Das 1995: 64), or, more efficiently, by pretending that the transgression did not occur, 
inventing a new insider genealogy for the outsider. Similarly the presence of “ethnic differences” 
in dance halls but not workplaces in the case of Uygur- Han Chinese relations seems to me an 
example of public de-activation of the ethnic differences in the workplace, which does not mean 
absence of ethnic differences in peoples’ minds. For instance, in socialist Bulgaria the 
workplaces seem to have been unmarked in terms of ethno-religious differences while the 
socialist state was actually relying heavily on nationalist ideology, which contributed to ethnic 
tensions among groups, similar to the situation in Romania analyzed by Verdery (1995). My 
interviews with Alevi Bulgarian Turkish babas reveal that their de-activation of the ethno-
religious identity as members of local Communist Party administrations did not prevent them 
from leading the cem ceremonies, but hiding these ceremonies from their superiors. I argue that 
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dissimulating ethno-religious minorities may purposefully create the public impression that their 
ethno-religious identity is de-activated while they continue to think in ethnic terms, and act in 
accordance with them in the privacy of the group.   
My research also shows that in ethno-religiously divided societies inter-group boundaries 
remain salient once they are historically formed (Barth 1969, Hayden 2011), and categorical 
group identities become robust once they are named and “labeled” (Goodenough 1964). The 
ethnic group labels may historically change in many contexts, for instance, from “colored” to 
“black” to “African-American” in the USA (Smith1992), or the differing labels assigned to the 
various peoples in Bosnia by since at least the middle of the 19th century, showing stable, robust 
divisions being labeled differently at different moments (Hayden 2000, 2007). Yet, these labels 
are relatively more stable in societies in which religion and ethno-national group are assumed to 
correspond, and they may be institutionalized such as under the historical millet system in the 
Ottoman Empire, or in marriage laws in present-day India, Lebanon and Israel.  
Historically, under Ottoman rule Alevi Bulgarian Turks were conflated with Sunnis under 
the category of “Muslims”, a practice which continued after the independence of Bulgaria. Yet 
Alevi and Sunni Bulgarian Turks have long formed distinct communities because the vast 
majority of Alevi individuals are born into endogamous marriages while the limited cases of 
intermarriages have been absorbed into one group or the other group along the principles of 
“practical kinship” (Bourdieu 1990, Das 1995). In this respect Alevi Bulgarian Turkish identity 
is not different from the identities of other locally-presumed ethno-national identities in the 
Balkans that are defined in terms of religious heritage, regardless of whether one practices the 
religion: Bosniaks (nee Muslimani, Muslim heritage speakers of Serbo-Croatian) in Bosnia, 
Pomaks (Muslim-heritage speakers of Bulgarian) in Bulgaria and Greece, Jews throughout the 
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region, Serbs (nee Pravoslavci [Orthodox], Orthodox-Christian-heritage speakers of Serbo-
Croatian) and Croats (nee Katolici [Catholics], Roman-Catholic-heritage speakers of Serbo-
Croatian) (Hayden 2007). In these groups a religious heritage is a marker of national identity 
(ethnic identity in American terms) that is unrelated to religiosity, and group membership is 
assigned by birth not only irrespective of whether the individual practices the religion of the 
group in question, but even when she or he is practices another group’s religion, whether through 
assimilation or dissimulation.
8
   
Thus my informants firmly state the significance of birth-membership to the Alevi group 
as forming not only the ethnic content of the Alevi identity but also as marking the boundary of 
the inter-group identities between themselves and Sunnis or Orthodox Christians. Two striking 
quotes in my interviews show this point very clearly: several informants claim that “an Alevi’s 
child cannot become a Sunni,” while another said straightforwardly: “we [Alevis] are like a 
walnut; a bug may infiltrate through the shell and eat up the core. Yet, the shell will remain.” 
Tellingly, this last informant did not himself practice the Alevi way. 
Furthermore, in ethno-religiously divided societies, the categorical identities may remain 
robust in the eyes of minorities, who may display “self-imposed primordialism” (Gil-White 
1995) despite deep internal heterogeneities within their group. For instance, throughout this 
thesis I discussed the internal heterogeneity within Alevi Bulgarian Turks in terms of sub-groups 
(Babai, Bektaşi, Musahipli, Derviş); sub-segments (Northeastern and Southern), and varying 
degrees of following Alevism (uninitiated, initiated with oath, initiated with musahipli, religious 
leader, atheist), and/ or observing other groups’ religious practices (e.g. Sunni namaz). I argued 
that sometimes these differences prevent members of one Alevi subgroup from attending the 
                                                 
8
 I should note that in reporting this Balkan system of linking ethno-national identity to religious heritage I am not 
claiming either the empirical truth of such associations nor endorsing the system I describe. 
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other group’s religious ceremonies, or taking a marriage partner from another group. When I 
asked my informants about how they reconcile these differences, their answer was consistently 
the same statement: “the Path is one, the practices are a thousand and one.” This shows that their 
internal heterogeneity does not really matter for either the Alevi or Sunni Bulgarian Turks; the 
categorical “Alevi” and “Sunni” identities remain robust in the eyes of Alevis in their everyday 
inter-group interactions despite the lack of consistency in defining what, exactly, is meant by 
them.  
 
Many works have examined how nationalist projects have caused homogenization of 
majorities (Gellner 1983, Hobsbawn 1983, Anderson 1983). Some have noted that a majority’s 
nationalist project can also homogenize excluded minorities as ultimate outsiders (e.g. 
Neuburger 2004).  However, only a few authors have noted the internal differentiation within 
minorities and additional marginalization of segments within these minorities, such as 
Protestants in Catholic Europe (Coakley 2009) and Catholics in Protestant Europe (Evans1999), 
and even these who do so focus on majority-minority relations, ignoring those within the 
minorities. I focus on minorities that may be internally fragmented along criteria such as religion, 
language or regional identity, and in which some sub-groups may be even more disprivileged 
than the other segments of the minority. They form a minority within a minority, or a double 
minority.   
My work thus contributes to the literature on minorities by examining the conditions and 
experiences of minorities within minorities. The double minority condition indicates structural 
and social exclusion and extreme invisibility of the most disfavored minority segment. Yet, my 
analysis shows that this invisibility does not only mean disempowerment for the members of the 
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double minorities. I argue instead that that double minorities may utilize dissimulation as a 
viable collective tactic when they cannot directly emphasize their own identity (i.e. dissimilate) 
under the threat of persecution or severe discrimination, while still avoiding the option of 
actually giving up their own identity in order to blend in (i.e. assimilate). I portray dissimulation, 
dissimilation and assimilation not as final conditions or as manifestations of devious affiliations 
of minorities. Instead, I argue that these are collective tactics utilized by minorities in response to 
their social and political settings, which are marked by diversified opportunities and obstacles for 
them. My analysis points out that a marginalized community may exert a degree of agency even 
though the conditions that cause its members’ oppression persist, and even though they remain a 
double minority.  
A discussion showing the possibility and excise of agency by double minorities is useful 
on several grounds. First, it problematizes structural-determinist models on marginalized groups. 
For instance, the “trapped minorities” model of Rabinowitz (2001) emphasizes the burdens of 
minorities with dual affiliations to an external homeland and residential state, while I show the 
possibility for such minorities to exercise agency even when their entrapment persists. Second, 
my argument questions sociological models of social movements, which reduce agency to 
formal, organized, systematic actions (see Edelman 2001). Moreover my work challenges the 
“weapons of the weak” model of Scott (1985), since while Scott examines agency based on ad 
hoc, unplanned, sporadic acts of sums of individuals, I show how Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ may 
display collective, relatively organized and patterned forms of resistive agency by dissimulation. 
My analysis points out that an examination of ethno-religious double minorities’ identity 
and agency may require moving beyond the kind of ontological individualism which claims that 
social phenomena are made up of individuals and caused by individuals, and methodological 
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individualism which claims that social phenomena can be explained in terms of individuals 
(Udehn 2002). Alevi Bulgarian Turks form an ethnic group which is strictly defined by religious 
identity, birth-membership and endogamous practices irrespective of individual members’ actual 
religious practices. The collectivism of Alevi Bulgarian Turks became clear to me at the very 
beginning of my fieldwork: whenever I wanted to find an informant about Alevi beliefs and 
practices my individuals stated that they are not allowed to talk about Alevism and directed me 
to an Alevi religious leader. As a result I interviewed  Alevi religious leaders who are males (as a 
rule without any exception) and who have a corporate identity in representing their specific 
community, for my data about the Alevi belief system, rituals and practices, while I interviewed 
regular, non-leadership male and female members of the society with regards to the inter-group 
relations on everyday level.  By so doing, I both reflected and respected my informants’ stated 
and enacted preferences about who could, and should, discuss Alevi beliefs, as, in fact, the ethics 
of informed consent require. 
Furthermore, in arguing that Alevi Bulgarian Turks exercise collective agency via 
dissimulations and dissimilations and that in some cases assimilations are collective acts, I am 
consciously not adopting conceptual or methodological individualism, in a social and cultural 
setting which also rejects it. In other words, Alevis’ collective agency is cannot be analyzed as 
just a total sum of individual Alevis’ agencies. My fieldwork reveals that Alevi Bulgarian Turks 
have collectively discussed and decided their actions during political regime changes and local 
government transitions, as well as before and after migrations, in the cem communities under the 
leadership of Alevi babas. Dissimulation, dissimilation and assimilation are decided in the cem 
group. For instance, I was told several times that in the 1990s Alevi NGOs were proposed and 
these organizations intended to build public cemevis, but these proposals were reacted to 
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negatively by the local Sunni Turks. The NGO leaders then gathered regional religious leaders to 
discuss and decide. This sense of collectivism became most evident to me during my interviews 
about Alevi migrations. For instance, in the 1930s, the Alevi-only Midrevo village was divided 
into two. One cem community decided to migrate under the leadership of their baba and formed 
the Subasi town in Yalova, Turkey, while other cem communities remained in Midrevo. On the 
other hand in 1989 when Bulgarian Turks were forced to migrate to Turkey, some Alevis had to 
separate from their cem communities and moved to Bursa. As I was told, five families came 
together in Bursa and considered their possibilities to follow Alevi ways without a religious 
leader and decided that they could not achieve it.  Even though Alevi individuals’ identities may 
be multi-dimensional and not limited to their Alevi aspect of identity, the decisions about 
dissimulation, dissimulation and assimilation seems to me to be collective actions, and the 
collective decision making it is patterned.   
The idea that Alevi Bulgarian Turks have exerted collective agency does not exclude the 
possibility of Alevi individuals’ agency, of course. The individual’s agency becomes visible at 
moments of conflict of interest between the community and individual members.  For instance, I 
spoke with a few heart-felt socialist Alevi informants who had worked in the Bulgarian 
Communist Party and who still adhere to socialist ideals, yet they still define themselves as 
Alevis even though they were not initiated in cems.    
Furthermore, I argue that Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ exercises of collective agency via 
dissimulation, dissimilation and assimilation are not random or unbounded but mediated by 
sociocultural settings (Ahearn 2001). They may be faced with different degrees and forms of 
marginalization due to varying local majority-minority configurations in their surrounding 
society.  In the case of Alevi Bulgarian Turks, all subsegments and subgroups have historically 
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utilized all three collective tactics, i.e. dissimulation, dissimilation and assimilation, but at 
different times and facing different concrete situations. An analysis of Alevis’ collective tactics 
in the present day reveals clear patterns. In Kardjali, where the ethnic Bulgarian national 
majority is the local minority and the Sunni Turkish national minority forms the local 
demographic and administrative majority, Alevi Bulgarian Turks have utilized dissimulation 
historically by claiming Sunni identity, and currently do so by hiding their Alevi identity under 
the generic ethnic Turkish one. On the other hand, in Razgrad, I noticed examples of 
dissimilation more frequently, because in Razgrad the competition between the minority Sunni 
Turks and majority Orthodox Christian Bulgarians has created maneuvering space for Alevis. 
Moreover, assimilation is most frequent across the Turkish border in Bursa, where there seems to 
be no other option for the few Alevis, as Bursa is a visibly Sunni-dominant city with a reputation 
for religious conservatism.   
I have portrayed dissimulation as being visible in a minority’s narratives and practices 
which publicly indicate their distancing themselves from the minority ideal-type while they 
privately continue to adhere to it. I see dissimilation as such narratives and practices which 
publicly and privately indicate adherence to minority ways, while I consider assimilation to be 
their narratives and practices which indicate, publicly and privately, adherence to the ideal-types 
of the other groups.  This model enabled me to describe the Alevi Bulgarian Turks’ ideal types 
by focusing on Alevi babas’ accounts of typical narratives and the practiceswhich they anticipate 
from Alevis. I described babas’ accounts regarding the elements of Alevi belief system, practices 
and organizational structure, perceptions about the internal differences within Alevi Bulgarian 
Turks across subgroups and subsegments and comparisons of the Alevi and Sunni ideal-types. 
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I have identified several specific forms of dissimulations by Alevi Bulgarian Turks. 
Sometimes they have dissimulated by hiding their Alevi identity completely. This form had 
historically been utilized in the face of persecutions, but can also be seen today in places where 
Alevis’ identity may remain unnoticed by outsiders, such as cosmopolitan re-settlement zones 
after migrations, as seen in Bursa. Moreover, Alevis may dissimulate by seeking not absolute 
concealment, but rather control of the information disseminated about the community. Alevis 
utilize this form of dissimulation when their heritage identity is already well-known by outsiders. 
This is dissimulation in the form of an “in-your-face disguise,” which relies on ambiguity: Alevis 
disguise information by revealing a portion of it. The ambiguity creates a space for maneuver for 
Alevis in their relations with local outsiders, in that they can to pretend to be a part of the 
majority if that is required, or they can at least attempt to manifest a distinct minority identity. 
For their part, majorities seem to “tolerate” this in-your-face-disguise. For instance, Sunni Turks 
pretend to accept Alevis’ dissimulations, since it creates the impression that Alevis are “under 
control” (cf. George 1990).   
Dissimulation is a collective relational tactic. Alevi Bulgarian Turks have readjusted in 
relation to various majority groups, including but not limited to Sunni Turks. Some common 
sayings among Alevi Bulgarian Turks capture the Alevis’ accounts of their relations with various 
majorities. For instance, they use the slogan “Follow/watch out for the Şeriat, Hide the Tarikat”” 
to act like Sunnis with Sunnis. They use the saying “Our Difference is Thinner than an Onion 
Skin” to drew on resemblances between Bulgarians and themselves. They prioritized 
“Turkishness” over religious identity in relation to secular Turks, while under socialism in 
Bulgaria they drew upon the sense of equality that is present in both socialism and Alevism.   
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Dissimulation may be utilized for re-calibration of a group’s visibility in order to find 
practical solutions to immediate problems. As I argued in Chapter Six, Alevi Bulgarian Turks 
have dissimulated by “speaking others’ language,” using code words for Alevi practices from 
vocabularies of the majority groups in order to hide their Alevi ways when outsiders are present 
in the setting. For instance, they referred to Alevi cem ceremonies as “namaz” in the presence of 
pious Sunnis and “banquet” in the presence of socialist Bulgarians. Moreover, they have 
dissimulated by “practicing others’ practices” in public. During my fieldwork I conducted 
participant observations in Sunni spaces, where I encountered my Alevi informants. I noticed 
that Alevis may participate in Sunni rituals for reasons such as following the developments 
related to the waqf properties. Furthermore, they have dissimulated by manipulating others’ 
spaces, for example, by voluntarily forming Sunni mosques in Alevi neighborhoods, or by 
joining already existing Sunni mosque commissions in mixed settings in Bulgaria. Both of these 
practices indicate not Sunnification of Alevis but their attempts to channel resources to the Alevi 
community by pretending to be Sunni. Access to such resources is otherwise impossible since 
Sunni Islam is the only recognized sect in Bulgaria.  
In the literature on dissimilation and assimilation, some studies reject the lineal relation 
between these conditions by presuming different trajectories and rhythms of assimilation 
(Banton 1983) and dissimilation (Brubaker 2001). My research counters these approaches by 
showing that in severely divided societies dissimilation and assimilation are both antithetical and 
linear conditions. In these societies, a minority’s dissimilation is often interpreted as their 
resistance to assimilating into “the nation” and may even provoke violent measures for their 
assimilation. However, minority members may have self-perceptions about their group’s 
situation different than the externally-imposed “dissimilation” or “assimilation” labels.  
 277 
Taking these points into account, I have utilized Alevis’ own perceptions about their 
dissimilations and assimilations. Thus, regarding dissimilation, I focused on their collective 
practices to separate themselves from outsiders, such as through greetings, names, places, 
organizations and household. I argued that Alevis’ collective dissimilations help them maintain 
their distinct group identity, publicly and privately. Regarding assimilation, I examined Alevis’ 
self-identified categories of assimilating groups: those who are “not attending cems,” those who 
are attending mosque without attending to cems” and those “attending neither cems nor 
mosques.” Strikingly I noticed that my informants present all of these groups as “assimilating,” 
yet they still count the members of these groups as Alevis. This clearly shows that this double 
minority prioritizes members’ heritage identities over the individuals members’ actual religious 
practices.  
The most striking aspect of such dissimulation is its paradoxical effect: while double 
minorities pretend to be members of the majority group and to cross the ethnic boundaries from 
their group towards the other groups, they actually do so in order to maintain their distinct group 
identity, their group’s ethnic boundaries and the distinctions between the minority and the 
majority. My analysis points out that what appears to non-members to be an ethnic shift (cf. 
Barth 1969) may be a tool of ethnic identity maintenance in the eyes of insiders, and that what 
appears to be ethnic boundary crossing to outsiders may be ethnic boundary fortification in the 
eyes of insiders. For such communities, the heritage identity prevails, and it does so irrespective 
of whether individual members practice the minority ways, or claim publicly others’ identities 
and practice others’ ways.   
During my fieldwork, I was often puzzled by the confidence of Alevi religious leaders in 
their community and its perpetuation even though they all mentioned the general decline in 
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interest in religion among youngsters, and increased unwillingness of followers to become 
religious leaders. Some of these religious leaders no longer had any followers, while others had 
around 100 of them; yet, they all remained confident, concluding our conversations on the 
situation of the community by quoting Ali’s famous saying: “Ali told once upon a time ago: 
‘One day at one point the Path may get thinner than hair; yet, it will not break…’” Dissimulation, 
it seems, is one way to keep the thinned path from breaking.  
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APPENDIX A 
ABBREVIATIONS 
BCP  Bulgarian Communist Party  
BSP  Bulgarian Socialist Party 
CUP  Committee for Union and Progress 
DP  Democrat Party 
DRA  Department of Religious Affairs 
GERB  Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria 
IMIR  International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations 
JDP  Justice and Development Party 
MP  Motherland Party 
NMSS  National Movement of Simeon II 
NOP  National Order Party 
NSP  National Salvation Party 
RPP  Republican People’s Party 
VP  Virtue Party  
WP  Welfare Party    
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APPENDIX B 
GLOSSARY FOR TURKISH WORDS 
Ayn-ül cem   Cems which are open to initiated Alevis 
Baba   Alevi Religious leader 
Batini   Esoteric  
Can   Initiated Alevi  
Cem:   Central religious ritual in Alevism 
Cemevi:   Places of worshipping for Alevis 
Dort Kapı Kırk Makam: Four Doors and Forty Ranks. The stages an Alevi should pass for  
Ehl-i Beyt     Household of Muhammed, also known as “Beşler” 
Erkan   Code of conducts in the Alevi Path  
Hakikat   Haqiqa, the Truth 
Halifebaba or Kocababa: The superior religious leader elected among Alevi babas 
Ikrar   1. Oath 2. Initiation  
Insan-ı Kamil  The Perfect Human Being  
Marifet   Marifa, spiritual knowledge 
Maye   Annual ceremonies at the Southern Bulgarian Turbes 
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Muhabbet cemi Cems that are open to uninitiated Alevis 
Musahiplik  Spritual brotherhood and sisterhood  
Namaz   Daily prayers in Sunni Islam 
Niyaz   Supplication, it is a form of worshipping among Alevis  
Onikiler  Twelves, Twevle Holy Imam among Bektasi, Musahipli and Dervis Alevis  
Şeriat   Sharia, religious law. It also indicatesa Sunnism in the eyes of Alevis 
Sır   Secret, the Alevi Secret 
Taberra  Avoiding those who do not love the household of Muhammed    
Talip    Follower 
Tarikat    Tariqa, religious brotherhood It also indicates Alevism in the eyes of 
Alevis 
Tarikten gecmek or baş okutmak: Going through purification ceremony 
Tavella  Love and devolution to the household of Muhammed 
Türbe   A saint’s tomb 
Üçler   God-Muhammed-Ali in Alevi belief 
Yediler   Sevens, Seven Holy Imams among Babai Alevis 
Yol   Path, the AleviPath 
Zahiri   A person who is an outsider or a belief that is formalist 
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